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Abstract 
This project seeks to bring a critical utopian methodology to bear upon the institution of citizenship 
in the hope of imagining a theoretical formulation that could encourage active, anti-hierarchical, 
participatory and empowering practices. The critical utopian approach disrupts conventional 
disciplinary boundaries, and allows theories and practices that would not normally be associated 
with citizenship to be brought into dialogue with the concept in thought and imagination, as part of 
a strategic intervention. This produces a perspective that is simultaneously estranging and creative, 
deconstructive and experimental. The body of the work considers three themes in particular: 
territory, authority and rights, which are frequently posited as foundational for politics and 
citizenship, and proceeds to deconstruct their dominant formulations by imagining an infinitely 
critical utopian ÔoutsideÕ. Diverse bodies of theory including post-structuralism, anarchism, post-
structural and post-left anarchisms, ecology, critical geography and feminism are drawn upon to 
articulate critical utopias of space without territory, decision-making without authority and ethics 
without rights. The project then brings another ÔoutsideÕ into dialogue with the theory: practices in 
what are termed Ôautonomous utopian communitiesÕ; including intentional communities, 
autonomous social centres, housing co-operatives and eco-villages. The aim of the project is to use 
a dialogue between critically resistant theories and practices to expose the obscured normative and 
indeed utopian foundations of many dominant theories of citizenship, and to consider the ethical 
and practical effects of hegemonic and truth-claiming discourses. The project also posits something 
different: a contingent and open-ended critical utopian citizenship that favours perspectival 
multiplicity, process over closure, and contingency over certainty, that can be engaged in by 
citizens and non-citizens in everyday life. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 6
1.  Introduction 
The work of an intellectual is not to mold the political will of others; it is, through the analyses 
that he does in his own field, to re-examine evidence and assumptions, to shake up habitual 
ways of working and thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities, to re-evaluate rules and 
institutions and starting from this re-problematization (where he occupies his specific 
profession as an intellectual) to participate in the formation of a political will (where he has his 
role as a citizen to play).  
(Foucault, 1989: 462-3) 
 
What does it mean to be a citizen? What does it mean not to be a citizen? What is the relationship 
between intellectual activity and citizenship? The purpose of this project is to bring theory and 
practice into a dialogue in the hope of imagining new ways in which we can think, act, and enact 
change in everyday life by disrupting definitional and institutional boundaries.  
 
1.1. Rationale and context 
The topic of citizenship is poignant, topical yet intellectually elusive. In the weeks leading up to the 
submission of this thesis, the Labour Government of the United Kingdom has unveiled plans to 
dispense with previous customs whereby citizenship would often be granted after five years in the 
country in favour of a Ôpoints systemÕ to evaluate new migrants and a new category of 
ÔprobationaryÕ citizen. Points will be allocated for attributes deemed desirable, such as ÔEnglish 
language ability, earnings potential, qualifications, shortage skills, volunteeringÕ (Travis, The 
Guardian, 4 August 2009: 4) and deducted for Ôactive disregard for UK valuesÕ (Ibid: 4). This 
continues a long line of British governmental policies designed to define and control what the 
ÔcitizenÕ is or should be. 
 
At the same time, there is a growing tendency in academia to move away from understandings of 
citizenship that tie it to the nation-state. Dominant notions of citizenship are often judged unable to 
deal with many social and environmental problems of the twenty-first century. The rise of global 
problems such as environmental degradation and escalating material inequality mean that forces 
beyond their democratic control often impinge upon ÔrightsÕ and ÔentitlementsÕ of citizens 
promised by the nation state (Held, 1995; Carter, 2001). Contemporary citizenship discourses are 
also problematised on the individual and subjective level. Advances in communication, transport 
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and technology mean that identities, relationships and communities are often formed through 
connections that are not contained within the territorial boundaries of the nation state. The question 
of what, exactly, binds citizens together within a political community arises. This has led 
contemporary citizenship theory away from a focus on state policy discourses of nationality 
towards a focus on everyday practices (see, for example, Faulks, 2000; Dobson, 2003; Hoffman, 
2004; Isin, 2008; Isin & Nielsen (eds), 2008; Fairclough, Pardoe & Szerzinski, 2006). 
 
Everyday practices have long been a concern for anarchist thought, which has largely been ignored 
by contemporary citizenship theory. In a plea for an Ôanarchist anthropologyÕ, David Graeber posits 
that one aim of such a project might be to Ôtheorize a citizenship outside the stateÕ (Graeber, 2004: 
68). My project might be seen as a partial response to this entreaty. It is my contention that in 
failing to conceptualise an ÔoutsideÕ to the state, citizenship theory remains trapped in a paradoxical 
situation where its ends, or normative content are contradictory with its means.   
 
1.2. Contribution 
My project emerges at the nexus between citizenship studies, utopian studies, anarchist studies and 
radical activism, and hopes to contribute to each of these as well as towards a wider unbounded 
movement for autonomy and non-hierarchy. The relation to each of these bodies of thought and 
practice forms the theme of the following two chapters. The contribution I hope to offer each is 
complex and overlapping. My contention is that aspects of canonical and contemporary citizenship 
theory rely on an implicit logic of hegemony, unquestioned hierarchy and domination, which can 
be disrupted through imaging and practicing alternative possibilities. 
 
The project is thus seeking a space for politics outside the usually conceived terrain. This relies on 
a nuanced understanding of power. A traditional but comprehensive definition of power is that ÔA 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise doÕ 
(Dahl, 1957: 202-3). Aside from the pluralist position, it is now widely accepted within debates on 
power that a sufficiently broad definition of the political must include non-decisions (Bachrach & 
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Baratz, 1970) and the hegemonic shaping of interests (Lukes, 1974). Hegemony is best described 
as a process of domination (which is always partial) manifested when a social group Ôtends to 
ÒliquidateÓ or to subjugate [antagonistic groups] perhaps even by armed forceÕ whilst it Ôleads 
kindred and allied groupsÕ (Gramsci, 1971: 57). Domination thus operates through a 
complimentary process of coercion and manufactured consent: Ôthe threat of the man with the stick 
permeates our world at every moment; most of us have given up even thinking of crossing the 
innumerable lines and barriers that he creates, just so we donÕt have to remind ourselves of his 
existenceÕ (Graeber, 2004: 72). This definition exists in tension with some definitions of politics, 
which stipulate that politics always entails the constrained use of power and that use of force is 
anti-political (Goodin & Klingemann, 1996: 7; Hoffman, 2004: 25). In the context of domination, 
associated with the state, consent is always backed up by force. 
 
My contention is that this does not have to be the case. This project therefore proceeds from the 
assumption that: 
ÔÓanother world is possible.Ó That institutions like the state, capitalism, racism and male 
dominance are not inevitable; that it would be possible to have a world in which these things 
would not exist, and that weÕd all be better off as a resultÕ (Graeber, 2004: 10).  
 
This contention is Ôalmost an act of faithÕ (Ibid: 10) but is a commitment to optimism that is based 
upon a moral imperative:  
since one cannot know a radically better world is not possible, are we not betraying everyone 
by insisting on continuing to justify, and reproduce, the mess we have today? And anyway, 
even if weÕre wrong, we might well get a little closerÕ (Ibid: 10).  
 
Utopianism can be seen as a basis for resistance. If citizenship means belonging to a place, then it 
perhaps has a certain resonance with utopianism as a theory of imagined and alternative places. 
Some utopian beliefs work by turning existing arrangements upside down, leading to a Ôtotal 
reversal of the existing distrubution of status and rewardsÕ (Scott, 1990: 80), whereby the slave 
becomes master and the master becomes slave. Other utopian beliefs operate as a Ôsystematic 
negation of an existing pattern of exploitationÕ (Ibid: 81) Ð that is, they involve imagining the 
complete absence of hierarchical distinctions. It is this latter kind of utopianism in which I am most 
interested. Where Scott concentrates primarily on the utopian imaginaries and discourses of 
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subordinate groups through history, Richard Day (2005) concentrates on the political practices of 
contemporary activist groups. He argues that rather than trying to establish a counter-hegemony 
that shifts the balance of power back in favour of the oppressed, some contemporary radical activist 
groups Ôare breaking out of this trap by operating non- hegemonically rather than counter- 
hegemonically. They seek radical change, but not through taking or influencing state power, and in 
so doing they challenge the logic of hegemony at its very coreÕ (Day, 2005: 8; italics in the 
original). Graeber argues that anarchist, or anarchist-inspired principles such as Ôautonomy, 
voluntary association, self-organisation, mutual aid and direct democracyÕ now form the basic 
principles of organisation for Ôradical movements of all kinds everywhereÕ (Greaber, 2004: 2). 
Despite the everyday proliferation of practices of resistance that work to overcome all forms of 
domination rather than seize power for themselves, these principles have Ôfound almost no 
reflection in the academyÕ (Ibid: 2; see also Day 2005: 8; Tormey, 2006: 139). It is my contention 
that some of these principles might offer a basis for an alternative conceptualisation and practice of 
citizenship Ð yet as I shall argue in the following chapter, many contemporary citizenship theorists 
who claim to be seeking a Ôcitizenship beyond the stateÕ (Faulks, 2000; Hoffman, 2004) do not 
manage to overcome what Day calls Ôthe hegemony of hegemonyÕ (Day, 2005: 8).  
 
In this thesis, I seek to understand and articulate possibilities for citizenship that are disruptive, 
critical and resistant through a critical utopian approach, and a dialogue with anarchistic theory and 
practice. In so doing, I hope to develop critical utopian methodology in ways that might be 
transferable to further projects, to disrupt, broaden and offer alternative possibilities for citizenship 
studies, and to offer strategic possibilities for would-be critical utopian citizens, wherever they 
might be. 
 
1.3. Research design 
The research design is based upon the assumptions outlined above that the concept of citizenship is 
essentially contested, and relies upon two different logics or potentials, which exist in tension. One 
of these assumes hierarchy, rests on domination and hegemony and focuses on the relationship of 
the citizen with the state. The other emphasises participation, non-hierarchy, self-management and 
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focuses on everyday practices and relationships between citizens. Throughout the thesis, I argue 
that these offer different potentials for citizenship.  The former seeks the integration of citizens into 
the higher totality of the state whereas the latter emphasises the multiplication of difference. The 
primary question motivating the research is: 
 
How else could we live as politically active, participatory people, or, what other types of citizen 
could we be?  
 
This is a rather broad question that can be disaggregated into the following research questions, 
which are further broken down and approached from various angles throughout the thesis: 
¥ Out of what historical conditions do dominant models of citizenship arise, what do they 
have in common, and what are the effects of dominant modes of theorising citizenship? 
¥ What alternatives to these dominant models of citizenship are offered by critical utopian 
theory? 
¥ What theoretical and practiced alternatives to dominant models of citizenship are offered 
by political agents in autonomous spaces? 
¥ What can a dialogue between theory and practice tell us about the conditions for a critical 
utopian citizenship? 
Using a critical utopian methodology, I deconstruct dominant models of citizenship by bringing 
them into dialogue with estranged, critical utopian perspectives. These perspectives come from 
both academic theory and from radical alternative political practices.  
 
The body of the thesis is structured around three thematic concepts: territory, authority and rights. 
Saskia Sassen describes these as Ôtranshistorical components being present in almost all societiesÕ 
(Sassen, 2006: 4), and she asserts these to be foundational (Ibid: 4). Sassen uses them as variables 
that Ôassume specific contents, shapes and interdependencies in each historical formationÕ (Ibid: 4). 
As should become clear throughout the thesis, I have ethical and intellectual objections to positing 
any concept as foundational, since this practice will tend to disguise the normative starting point 
and also to block the critical utopian function and radical potential. The reasons I have persisted 
with the concepts are twofold. First, they are themes that recur throughout the literature on 
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citizenship, as well as throughout my own fieldwork observations. Dominant theories of citizenship 
indeed assume specific formulations of territory, authority and rights, and these components 
structure the historical milieu out of which critical utopian alternative or oppositional approaches 
emerge. Viewing the political in terms of territory, authority and rights gives a broadened 
conception of politics and allows us to Ôhistoricise both the national and the global as constructed 
conditionsÕ (Ibid: 4), rather than taking any given spatial formation of politics or the state (itself an 
historical construct) for granted. Secondly, the very fact that these concepts are posited as 
foundational and recur throughout political theory and practice makes them important institutions 
to hold up to scrutiny and attempt to transgress in imagining the conditions for a critical utopian 
citizenship.  
 
Each of these concepts is deconstructed in terms of the effects of specific theoretical and historical 
formulations upon the institution of citizenship. The implications for citizenship will be based upon 
the themes of participation, belonging and ethics, drawn from contemporary citizenship debates 
(see, for example Turner, 1992: 55; Dobson, 2003: 37). I consider the estranged perspectives that 
make critique possible, the critical utopias from theory and practice that help us to imagine new 
ways of living as citizens. Using this approach, I seek to offer new possibilities for a critical 
utopian theory and practice of citizenship. It is an approach and a method that is effective in the 
sense put forward in the quote from Foucault at the start of this chapter: it re-problematises taken-
for-granted assumptions, transgresses and disrupts institutional boundaries and in so doing opens 
up new avenues for thought. This also offers something in the way of a politics, but not a blueprint 
or a generalised theory of citizenship. Rather, this approach offers potential strategies for critical 
citizenship in everyday life.  
 
1.4. Summary of thesis 
Chapter 2 focuses on the critical utopian approach, explaining how it differs from blueprinting, 
truth-claiming and hegemonising utopianism. It includes a brief literature review outlining why 
citizenship is particularly amenable to this approach. Although the chapter includes a survey of 
literature relevant to these aims, it should not be considered a self-contained literature review, as 
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the nature of this work means that relevant literatures are interwoven with considerations of 
practices throughout the entire body of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the relationship between theory and practice, and how the critical utopian 
approach outlined in the previous chapter is used in this thesis. The chapter capitulates criteria for 
theory and case selection, as well as the empirical methods used to obtain information on practices 
in autonomous communities.  
 
The remaining body of the thesis attempts to disrupt, deconstruct and then re-imagine theories, 
public discourses and practices of citizenship through the conceptual lenses of territory, authority 
and rights. Each concept forms the basis for two complimentary chapters, one on theory and one on 
practice. Together, Chapters 4 & 5: ÒTransgressing Territory: TheoryÓ and ÒTransgressing 
Territory: PracticeÓ consider the effects of ÔdominantÕ (as defined in Chapters 2 & 3) theories, 
public discourses and practices of territory in terms of the ways in which they shape and limit the 
institution of citizenship, and then consider alternatives that might inform a critical utopian 
citizenship. In Chapter 4, I outline features that are common to dominant theoretical constructions 
of territory: sovereignty, commodification and the hierarchical imposition of the built environment. 
I deconstruct these in terms of their effects upon formations of citizenship, and then outline the 
critical utopian ÔoutsideÕ, or estranged perspective from which such a deconstruction is made 
possible, involving deterritorialisation and autonomy as alternatives to sovereignty,  appropriation 
and common ownership, and consensus design. Chapter 5 critiques and transgresses these 
formations further, using everyday practices in autonomous communities as another radical 
ÔoutsideÕ offering alternative ways of conceptualising and transgressing territory. Sometimes 
practices reflect critical utopian theoretical approaches, and sometimes they parody dominant 
approaches. What is more interesting, is where they transgress both of these approaches and disrupt 
their boundaries, offering something new that requires further theorisation. This polyphonic 
dialogue (Bakhtin, 1984 [c. 1929]) between different perspectives informs the critical utopian 
approach. In the last section of the chapter on practice I consider the implications of the dialogue 
between theories and practices for critical utopian citizenship. 
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The subsequent chapters follow the same structure. Chapter 6, ÒTransgressing Authority: TheoryÓ 
critiques the bases of legitimacy of dominant theoretical models of authority: contractarianism, 
democratic representation, instrumentalism, and natural hierarchy. It posits critical utopian 
alternatives to the modes of organisation presupposed by dominant models of authority: 
voluntarism, collective decision-making in small groups, immanent orientation to desires and non-
hierarchy. Chapter 7: ÒTransgressing Authority: PracticeÓ, considers how ideas and practices in 
autonomous communities both reflect and transgress theoretical models of consent, decision-
making structures, orientation to desires and relationship dynamics. The final part of the chapter 
analyses the implications of the dialogue between theory and practice for critical utopian 
citizenship. 
 
Chapter 8, ÒTransgressing Rights: TheoryÓ critiques and deconstructs the foundations of dominant 
models of rights: foundationalism and universalism, binary thought and atomised subjectivity, the 
unequal relations disguised by abstract equality, the mediation and alienation of relationships and a 
politics of demand that perpetuates structural inequality. I posit some critical utopian alternatives 
that transgress and disrupt the foundations of dominant ÔrightsÕ theory: contingency and 
experimentation, transgressing binary thought, ethics of care and infinite responsibility, unmediated 
relationships and the active creation of alternatives in the present. Chapter 9, ÒTransgressing 
Rights: PracticeÓ considers the analogous practices in autonomous communities: ontological 
difference, construction of subjectivity, privilege, equality and difference, community formations 
and models of political change, and how these either reflect or transgress theoretical models. The 
final part of this chapter considers the implications for the dialogue between theory and practice 
and the implications for critical utopian citizenship. Taken together, these chapters offer a critical 
utopian vision of space without territorial sovereignty, decision-making and organisation without 
political authority, ethics without moral and legal rights, and citizenship without the state. The final 
chapter reflects upon these findings in terms of what they mean for citizenship studies and what 
they mean for citizens, and also considers the limitations of, and further possibilities for the critical 
utopian methodology. 
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2. Approach 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces critical utopianism as a method that will be applied to citizenship 
throughout the project, and anarchism as a body of theory that contributes useful concepts and 
methods for resistance. I consider how we can conceptualise citizenship, if not as formal 
membership of straightforwardly identifiable legal political units and associated legal rights and 
duties. I argue that citizenship might more usefully be considered functionally, as a process and a 
relationship, and as a Ôutopia of autonomyÕ. It has empirical referents, which will be identified in 
the subsequent chapter.  
 
The chapter should not be read as a traditional Ôliterature reviewÕ, although it does have some 
aspects of this. The chapter identifies gaps in the literature to which I am contributing, and the 
bodies of theory that I would like to draw on to fill these gaps Ð anarchism and utopianism Ð which 
are largely ignored by mainstream citizenship theory. I use two loosely grouped bodies of theory in 
particular to inform my analytical framework: utopian studies and variations on anarchism. The 
final part of the chapter explains why insights from utopianism and anarchism are useful to 
articulate a utopian and anarchistic tendency for citizenship that has already existent references in 
the present, and will form the basis of the remainder of the thesis.  
 
2.2. Post-state citizenship theory: deferring autonomy 
Two theorists whose conceptions I find to be particularly useful, insofar as they take the potentially 
radical function of citizenship to its limits within contemporary theory, are Keith Faulks (2000) and 
John Hoffman (2004)
1
. Where these thinkers differ radically from their cohorts is their shared 
desire Ôto challenge the assumption Ð almost universally held Ð that citizenship involves the 
                                            
1
 Perhaps the most influential ÔpostmodernÕ or Ôpost-MarxistÕ theorist of citizenship with whom I shall not be dealing with in detail here 
is Chantal Mouffe (see Mouffe 1992 and 1996). I feel that the statist assumptions of her approach are effectively critiqued and 
transgressed by the thinkers that I shall be considering here (see particularly Hoffman 2004: 37 and 76-8), and in deference to the 
constraints of space I do not feel any need to further their critique here. For what I feel is an even more valuable critique of what he 
argues is a new paradigm based around a questionable ontological claim of Ôconstitutive lackÕ, in which Mouffe and many other 
contemporary ÔpostmodernÕ or Ôpost-MarxistÕ theorists of citizenship partake, see Robinson 2005. 
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membership of a stateÕ (Hoffman 2004: 1). I would like to transgress their critique by identifying 
the implicit utopian function of their theory of citizenship. Later in this chapter I will critique 
implicit utopianism more generally and argue for the value of explicit and critically resistant forms 
of utopianism. 
 
Both thinkers stress the importance of rebuilding the concept of citizenship in order to recognise its 
emancipatory potential: Ôan effective critique involves both deconstruction and reconstruction. One 
without the other is either nihilist or positivist Ð either a mindless destruction, or a triumphalist 
celebration, of the status quoÕ (Hoffman 2004: 137-8, see also Faulks, 2000: 3).  An inclusive 
notion of citizenship is presented as incompatible with the state due to the use of force to address 
conflicts of interest Ð a tension is highlighted between the state, as a form of concentrated violence, 
and citizenship as autonomy and self-governance (Faulks, 2000: 127; Hoffman, 2004: 22-24). To 
this point, I agree. Where I begin to diverge is the point at which a sharp distinction is made 
between force, coercion and constraint, and between the state, as the concentration of power and 
the means of violence, and government as Ôthe settlement of conflict through arbitration and 
negotiationÕ (Hoffman, 2004: 31). Coercion and constraint, it is argued, result in a person wilfully 
acting in a way they might not have otherwise, whereas force means that no activity is possible 
since a person is unable to exercise power of will at all. Thus coercion (conceived as diffuse social 
pressure) and constraint (conceived of as internal/psychological pressure) are presented as 
compatible with a democratic citizenship, whereas the state (as the concentration of power-as-
violence in a centralised institution) is seen to be incompatible with the notion of citizenship 
(Faulks, 2000: 128-9; Hoffman, 2004: 23-24).  This view remains somewhat unconvincing in view 
of the conceptualisation of domination and hegemony given above, but is not the primary point at 
which I would like to pick apart the thoughts of these thinkers. This resides in their implicit and 
obscured utopianism, to which I will now turn.  
 
At a conceptual level, and at the level of practice, citizenship is seen to be inherently progressive, 
and both thinkers use the idea of the Ômomentum conceptÕ. This was devised by Hoffman (1988), 
but first applied to the concept of citizenship by Faulks (2000: 3), and then taken up and further 
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expanded by Hoffman (2004: passim). Several other contemporary citizenship theorists also adopt 
the term (see for example: Roy, 2005; Lister, 2007) or describe similar ideas of deferall, and 
progress without perfection (Mouffe, 1992: 238).  
 
Momentum concepts are opposed to Ôstatic conceptsÕ, which are seen to be Ôintrinsically repressive 
and exclusionaryÕ (Hoffman, 2004: 138) and include the state, patriarchy and violence. They are 
seen to be Ônot ... part of the Òhuman conditionÓ and they stand as barriers to emancipation and an 
inclusive citizenshipÕ (Ibid: 138). Momentum concepts, by contrast: 
Have an egalitarian and anti-hierarchical ÔlogicÕ, using the term ÔhierarchyÕ to mean a 
differentiation that is repressive and divisive. This logic invites us to link the different phases 
within a conceptÕs formulation in a progressive manner, so that É the ÔmovementÕ from 
ancient notions of freedom (for example) to liberal notions, constitutes a step forward. 
Momentum concepts are inherently progressive. They ÔunfoldÕ so that we must continuously 
rework them in a way that realizes more and more of their egalitarianism and anti-hierarchical 
potential (Ibid: 138) 
 
The momentum concept, however anti-hierarchical its ÔlogicÕ, is not conceived to have an end-
point; inclusive citizenship and emancipation are thus seen to be concepts towards which we move, 
but never perfect or complete: ÔWere we to say that an emancipated society had finally arrived, we 
would indeed have idealized a particular status quo, and abandoned the infinitely critical quality of 
the momentum conceptÕ (Ibid: 139).  
 
Although both Hoffman and Faulks claim to reject the state, they see it as necessary in the 
movement towards inclusive citizenship: ÔWe need a view of the state that sees it as transitionally 
necessary until a time that common interests are sufficiently robust to rely solely upon arbitration 
and negotiation to tackle conflictÕ (Hoffman, 2004: 161). Thus both theorists put forward similar 
policy suggestions to enhance citizenship, including the requirement to perform more duties 
(Faulks, 2000: 130; Hoffman, 2004: 105), compulsory voting and community service (Faulks, 
2000: 130; Hoffman, 2004: 93,105), and a ÔcitizenÕs incomeÕ (Faulks, 2000: 130; Hoffman, 2004: 
93). It is clear that a state would be necessary to implement these. Hoffman rejects anarchism, 
saying that its theory is Ôstill premised upon statist assumptionsÕ such as Ôthe assumption of a 
sociable human nature and an abstract view of the individualÕ (Hoffman, 2004: 161). Although I 
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will be examining the anarchist view along similar lines later, I also feel that the arguments of both 
Hoffman and Faulks suffer from an inability to imagine a non-hegemonic outside to the state. I 
tend to concur with parts of their critiques, and my own work starts from a similar point of 
dissatisfaction with state-centred theories of citizenship. I am particularly sympathetic to the 
proposal that force and violence are incompatible with many of the conceptual tendencies of 
citizenship, particularly in its historical context of contrast with the feudal subject, since they 
negate will and agency
2
. I also agree with the relational view that rights and duties are 
complimentary rather than contradictory when viewed in a social context rather than as abstractions 
bestowed by centralised power
3
. I would place particular emphasis on their argument that 
citizenship implies (or at least should imply) autonomy and self-governance so that participation is 
essential. Insofar as it emphasises process over finality, I also feel that the momentum concept is a 
useful device. However, I do not agree to the extent that I can support a view of citizenship as part 
of the Ôhuman conditionÕ (Hoffman, 2004: 12) with an inherently progressive and egalitarian 
Ôhistorical dynamicÕ (Ibid: 12), which progressively undermines hierarchy and the state. As 
Graeber suggests, in reality the situation is more messy and complicated: 
Modern Western notions of citizenship and political freedoms are usually seen to derive from 
two traditions, one originating in ancient Athens, the other primarily stemming from medieval 
England É In fact, there is no consensus among historians that either classical Athens or 
medieval England were states at all Ð and moreover, precisely for the reason that citizensÕ 
rights in the first, and aristocratic privilege in the second, were so well established É It seems 
we just donÕt have the intellectual tools to talk about such things (Graeber, 2004: 69). 
 
There are contradictions between HoffmanÕs criticism of the anarchistsÕ assumption of human 
nature and his own teleological view of momentum concepts as part of the Ôhuman conditionÕ (Ibid: 
138), as well as between FaulksÕ assertion that citizenship is fundamentally contested yet that it is 
also inherently progressive (Faulks, 2000: 6). To view a concept in this way could lead us to 
uncritically accept its use in future contexts and may also negate the necessity for Ð and ignore the 
pre-existence of - certain types of agency in the present. Groups of people are, and always have 
been, taking back power for themselves and participating in autonomy, self-governance and 
                                            
2
 I consider the importance of participation and the articulation of desire, and their incompatibility with certain conceptualisations of 
authority in Chapters 6 & 7. 
3
 This is the focus of Chapters 8 & 9. 
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decentralised political activity without petitioning to the state for the right to do so (Scott, 1990: 
118-119; Graeber, 2003: 2; Day, 2005: 4-5). I prefer to view citizenship as a concept which is 
potentially emancipatory, or which has progressive moments. These potentials and moments, I will 
later argue, can only be seized by the oppressed rather than imposed from Ôon highÕ through policy 
recommendations or a transitory state. Although policy can be a potentially useful (but limited) 
strategic tool, it cannot be a sole means for instituting change that seeks to be anti-statist: 
The notion of ÒpolicyÓ presumes a state or governing apparatus which imposes its will on 
others. ÒPolicyÓ is the negation of politics; policy is by definition something concocted by 
some form of elite, which presumes it knows better than others how their affairs are to be 
conducted. By participating in policy debates the very best one can hope to achieve is to limit 
the damage, since the very premise is inimical to the idea of people managing their own affairs 
(Graeber, 2004: 9) 
 
In summary my argument is that Hoffman and Faulks present a theory of agency and realisation 
that is at odds with their theoretical framework. This critique extends to other citizenship theories 
that emphasise agency, participation and change, yet fail to criticise the state (whether national or 
ÔglobalÕ) and seek the integration of difference and dissidence into a higher unity
4
.  
 
It is my contention that citizenship theory would benefit from a conceptual dialogue with a critical 
utopian and anarchistic framework. In particular I will introduce the idea that viewing citizenship 
in terms of self-governance and autonomy is a utopian undertaking, and that the idea of the 
Ômomentum conceptÕ resonates with certain utopian and post-left anarchist notions of becoming, 
potentiality and lines of flight. I attempt to develop what I perceive as the emancipatory potentiality 
of citizenship, by transgressing the critiques of Hoffman and Faulks via an incursion through utopia 
and anarchism. I use these loosely grouped and diverse bodies of theory because they come closest 
to overcoming the Ôhegemony of hegemonyÕ articulated by Day. There is significant overlap 
between these two traditions, and it is at their nexus that I feel the relevance for a stateless 
conception of citizenship might emerge.  
 
                                            
4
 This includes most canonical and citizenship theory, and is referred to throughout the thesis. See particularly Young (1989), HMSO 
(1991), Mouffe (1992), Turner (1992), Held (1993, 1995), Kymlicka (1995), Crick (2001), Heater (2004). 
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2.3. Utopianism: citizenship as potentiality 
The word ÔUtopiaÕ is a neologism that was coined by Sir Thomas More in 1516 (More, 2004 
[1516]). The term comes from a pun on eutopia meaning Ôgood placeÕ and outopia meaning Ôno 
placeÕ (Taylor, 2003: 554) so is derived from three Greek words, ÕeuÕ (good), ÔouÕ (no) and ÔtopiaÕ 
(place). From this preliminary etymology it can be discerned that Ôthe primary characteristic of the 
utopian place is its non-existence combined with topos Ð a location in time and space Ð to give 
verisimilitudeÕ (Sargent, 1994: 5). ÔUtopianismÕ may be seen to denote the movement or tradition 
of ideas and practices that have developed around this ambiguous concept. ÔUtopianÕ is used to 
describe particular objects, subjects or processes within this canon. Since the term was first used it 
has taken on a much wider scope in terms of conceptualisations and associations, which will be 
further examined below. Even with this initial impression, however, it is possible to anticipate that 
utopianism will have some relevance to a project which seeks to examine the possibility and 
desirability of a citizenship without the state, since as discussed, such a project is seeking a space 
for politics outside or beyond that which is its more usually conceived terrain
5
. Utopianism, it shall 
be argued, offers a useful theoretical framework and methodology for both thinking about and 
practicing non-state relationships. However, any sufficiently engaged understanding of utopianism 
must first overcome wide-ranging criticisms of utopianism that have emerged from a variety of 
perspectives which tend to associate utopianism with domination. This association, I will argue, 
rests on a misunderstanding that associates utopianism with hegemony (or counter-hegemony) in 
thinkers who fail to disclose the utopian and hegemonic elements of their own perspectives.  
 
2.3.1. Utopia and domination 
Anti-utopianism has permeated political theory. Classical Marxists and liberals have variously 
suggested that utopia is unscientific (Marx and Engels 1998 [1846]: 26; Engels, 1999 [1892]: 60) 
and totalitarian (Popper, 2002 [1945]: 173). These precepts link to what I previously termed, 
following Day (2005), Ôthe hegemony of hegemonyÕ, that is, both classical Marxists and Liberals 
                                            
5
 The importance of space, or the topos of citizenship and emergent spaces for non-state citizenship will be further explored in Chapters 
4 & 5.  
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claim an alternative and unifying truth against which deviations are labelled ÔutopianÕ and are 
derided Ð when in fact, both modes of theorising themselves have utopian visions. Popper criticises 
Marx and EngelsÕ utopianism, despite their own refusal to associate their work with normative 
political theory and utopia (Popper, 2002 [1945]: 178). What I find contradictory is the distance 
that Popper tries to draw between his own ideological background and utopianism. Popper himself 
unwittingly sums up the crux of the problem, when he affirms that Ôwhat is common to MarxÕs 
criticism and mine is that both demand more realismÕ (Ibid: 177). Popper does not appear to grasp 
the radical and disruptive implications of the existence these two simultaneous yet competing 
demands for Ômore realismÕ. The important point here is that both the liberal and Marxist visions 
have utopian elements, but they are obscured by the ways in which each lays claim to truth. It is 
this truth-claiming, rather than the ability to use oneÕs imagination to create alternative 
possibilities, that Graeber argues lies at the heart of violence and oppression:  
Stalinists and their ilk did not kill because they dreamed great dreams É but because they 
mistook their dreams for scientific certainties É In fact all forms of systemic violence are 
(amongst other things) assaults on the role of the imagination as a political principle (Graeber, 
2004: 10-11). 
 
The role of the imagination as a political principle is central to utopianism as a theoretical 
framework and as a methodology of resistance and for studying resistance. This is something that 
is lacking in citizenship theory, and I will later consider how utopianism might be applied to 
citizenship theory and the study of citizen practices. First, though, I will consider how we can move 
away from liberal and Marxist anti-utopianism to a conceptualisation of utopianism as non-
hegemonic, critical and resistant.  
 
2.3.2. Critical utopias 
2.3.2.1. Utopia as function 
Where for Marx, the function of utopia is purely compensatory and operates to sustain the status 
quo, for others the function is very much the opposite. Karl Mannheim (1960 [1936]) distinguishes 
between ideology and utopia. Ideology is defined as a force that operates at a psychological and 
societal level to maintain the status quo (Mannheim, 1960 [1936]: 50-2), propagating false 
consciousness (Ibid: 84). Utopia functions to raise consciousness and change society (Ibid: 87-8). 
Chapter 2: Approach 
 
21 
Despite the fact that MannheimÕs theory exhibits contradictions around issues of categorisation and 
causality, tied up with the paradox that utopia is defined in terms of potentiality, yet can only be 
defined after it has fulfilled its purpose of social change, he makes a clear move towards 
identifying a positive social function for utopia. This analysis is furthered by Ernst Bloch (1986a, b 
& c [1938-47]), who offers a new approach to studying utopias and broadens the scope of what 
might be considered utopian. He takes as his objects of analysis a field which includes daydreams 
(Bloch 1986a, Part 1), fairytales, film and theatre (Ibid, Part 2), medicinal practices, technology, 
architecture, art (Bloch 1986b, Part 4) and religion (Bloch 1986c, Part 5). For Bloch, unlike for 
Mannheim, there is no clear distinction between ideology and utopia, and almost any human wish 
or dream can be defined as ÔutopianÕ, or as containing a utopian moment. For Bloch, utopia resides 
in the ÔNot-YetÕ, which has two aspects: Ôthe Not-Yet-Conscious as a whole is the psychological 
representation of the Not-Yet-Become in an age and in its worldÕ (Bloch, 1986a: 127; capitalisation 
in the original). The Not-Yet-Conscious is the psychological aspect and the Not-Yet-Become the 
material aspect of a hope or desire. This is an ontology of pure possibility and potentiality, of a 
multiplicity of things waiting, or just about to happen, which will have a real effect on a future that 
cannot yet be predicted. Insofar as it both expresses and affects the Not-Yet-Conscious, Utopia 
reaches towards the Not-Yet-Become through the potential effect on human activity: Ôthe positive 
utopian function; the historical content of hope, first represented in ideas, encyclopaedically 
explored in real judgements, is human culture referred to its concrete-utopian horizonÕ (Bloch, 
1986a: 146, italics in the original).  
 
Although there are remnants of Marxist teleology, BlochÕs framework differs from MannheimÕs 
ideology/utopia distinction insofar as the expressive function is not simply misleading, but has a 
function compensating for the alienation and disappointment of the present and in cultivating 
further hopes and desires, which may yet come to fruition (Ibid: 143-4). Indeed, it is the presence 
of potentiality which has the most radical implications within BlochÕs framework, to the extent that 
this idea almost undermines his own distinction between ÔabstractÕ and ÔconcreteÕ utopias (which 
bears the remnants of Marxist teleology):  
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And as long as the reality has not become a completely determined one, as long as it possesses 
still unclosed possibilities, in the shape of new shoots and new spaces for development, then no 
absolute objection to utopia can be raised by merely factual reality (Ibid: 197).  
 
BlochÕs ontology of possibility, potentiality and the intrinsic value of desire has much in common 
with a post-left anarchist ontology of immanent desire, lines of flight and becoming- which I shall 
consider later. It also has some resonance with the idea of the Ômomentum conceptÕ, which was 
discussed previously insofar as it implies a continual process rather than an end-point. At this point, 
however, I would like to emphasise the aspect of BlochÕs approach that undermines the 
essentialising and hegemonic (or counter-hegemonic) aspects of the anti-utopian critiques from 
both liberal and Marxist traditions. If utopia cannot be defined by reference to an unknown and 
unclosed future, then all expressions of potential futures might be deemed utopian, including those 
implicit within PopperÕs ÔreformistÕ methodology and MarxÕs ÔscientificÕ one. Levitas asserts that 
Ôwe have to recognise that utopias are not the monopoly of the LeftÕ (Levitas, 1990: 185). This 
leads her to declare the existence of seemingly counter-intuitive neo-liberal and conservative 
utopias (Ibid: 188-9). This allows for the possibility of utopias which are pro- rather than anti- or 
post- statist: Ôthere is no doubt that there is an image of a desired society here, where there is 
unquestioned loyalty to the state É where there is hierarchy, deference, order, centralised powerÕ 
(Ibid: 180). Graeber also raises the issue of statist utopianism: 
States have a peculiar dual character. They are at the same time forms of institutionalized 
raiding or extortion, and utopian projects É In one sense states are the Òimagined totalityÓ par 
excellence, and much of the confusion entailed in theories of the state historically lies in an 
inability or unwillingness to recognize this. For the most part, states were ideas, ways of 
imagining social order as something one could get a grip on, modes of control (Graeber, 2004: 
65). 
 
All of this has relevance for citizenship Ð those theories that associate citizenship with the state and 
hegemony are exposed as ÔutopianÕ, but in the ÔbadÕ totalising sense Ð Ôwe tend to assume that 
states, and social order, even societies, largely correspondÕ (Ibid: 65). It therefore becomes 
important to distinguish between critical, resistant utopias as the free expression of desires, and 
dominant (and dominating) anti-utopian utopias.  
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2.3.2.2. Utopia as method 
This is something which is taken up by Susan McManus (2005), who suggests that all political 
theory is always-already utopian, in that it always rests on fictions of what exists, and what should 
exist, and that it is not only the content that theory puts forward which secures its affects, but the 
ways in which it lays claim to truth:  
Epistemologies of Òthe given,Ó conservative and ostensibly authoritative modes of knowledge-
production, are always already creative epistemologies, but creative epistemologies that efface 
their contingency and creative power in favour of their legislative and authoritative power 
(McManus, 2005: 1). 
 
It is not then, the lack of a basis in ÔtruthÕ, which makes particular theories or utopias potentially 
oppressive. Rather, it is their hegemonic or totalising affects, the ways in which they lay claim to 
truth, through abstract rationalism (or ÔpragmatismÕ, or ÔscienceÕ), which underlie their potentially 
oppressive nature.   
 
At this stage, the important point is the difference of affect that resides between those utopias that 
are based upon truth-claims, and those that are not. The particularly radical and subversive 
potential of the latter kind is something that I feel is best brought out in the theories of the Ôcritical 
utopiaÕ (Moylan, 1986, passim) and Ôtransgressive utopianismÕ (Sargisson, 1996 & 2000, passim), 
which are to a certain extent complimentary and form the meta-theoretical methodological basis of 
my project
6
. These theorists show how the creative function of utopianism that is so abhorrent to 
anti-utopian critics does not inevitably lead to blueprinting or a perfection-seeking totalitarianism. 
For Tom Moylan the primary function of utopia lies in the process or method of critique, which lies 
already within the literary genre and is inseparable from the creative aestheticism of the utopian 
method: 
In generating preconceptual images of human fulfilment that radically break with the 
prevailing social system, utopian discourse articulates the possibility of other ways of living in 
the world. The strength of critical utopian expression lies not in the particular social structures 
it portrays but in the very act of portraying a utopian vision itself (Moylan 1986: 26). 
 
                                            
6
 The epistemological implications of these theories for the study of practice are further explicated in Chapter 3 
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Like the Ômomentum conceptÕ outlined earlier, yet without reference to an already foreclosed 
future or specified trajectory for reform, the critical utopia must remain infinitely critical, resisting 
closure in both its method and expressed vision: ÔThere can be no Utopia, but there can be utopian 
expressions that constantly shatter the present achievements and compromises of society and point 
to that which is not yet experienced in the human project of fulfilment and creationÕ (Ibid: 28; 
italics in the original). Lucy Sargisson furthers MoylanÕs critique. Through an exploration of 
contemporary feminist utopianism, in both literature and social theory, she accords a function to 
utopianism which is not only critical, but through the Ôwilful transgression of generic or conceptual 
boundariesÕ (Sargisson, 1996: 58) is simultaneously transformative (Ibid: 59), yet without reference 
to a preconceived ideal or foreclosed future. It is, rather, transformative of consciousness, and 
Ôcreates new conceptual spaces Ð outopias Ð in which can be imagined different ways of 
conceptualizing the past, present and futureÕ, allowing Ôthe unthinkable [to] be thought and desiredÕ 
(Ibid: 59).  
 
2.3.2.3. Utopianism and citizenship 
Important points to be taken out of the foregoing discussion are, first, that any social, political or 
cultural product, dream, wish, concept or idea, indeed any form of expression of desire, can have a 
utopian moment, potential, or perform a utopian function. This idea is most evident in BlochÕs 
work, but also informs the assumptions of contemporary utopian studies, and is evident in the 
interdisciplinary approaches of Sargisson and Moylan. Secondly, I would like to highlight how 
these theorists have shown that the utopian function can only reach its full critical or transgressive 
potential where utopias and utopian thought resists closure. Closure, in the form of dualistic 
thought, universalism, offering full and complete explanation, and claiming Ôto name the truthÕ, 
inform Ôthe repressive function of the dominant mode of conceptualizationÕ (Sargisson, 1996: 228). 
Coming back to the case of citizenship, the most poignant issue is that the concept has a utopian 
aspect, and may also be subject to utopian analysis, even where it is found in the context of 
hegemonic political discourse or the dominant mode of theorising. Hoffman and Faulks, who 
transgress the status quo somewhat by offering a vision of a citizenship beyond the state, clearly 
have a utopian visionÐ a utopia of self-governance and autonomy within a society free from force. 
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However, the utopian vision and its affective function are obscured by the assumption of 
impossibility and deferral to the future: ÔCitizenship is an emancipatory situation towards which we 
move, but can never actually reachÕ (Hoffman, 2004: 185). This leads to a means of agency and 
realisation that is normatively and ethically incompatible with the critique and desired future. This 
is something that in the frame of reference provided by critical utopianism is potentially more 
oppressive than experimenting with self-consciously utopian fictions, visions and experiments in 
the present, insofar as it accepts uncritically what has already been judged to be an ethically 
destructive force as having a primary role in social change.  
 
In later chapters (particularly 6 & 7, but also as a recurrent theme throughout) I discuss how a 
tension is highlighted by many theorists between the normative and formal aspects of citizenship, 
or between those who view citizenship as a relationship and a process, and those who view it as a 
legal status of membership within a nation state. It is arguable that both of these have a utopian 
vision Ð one of a strictly regulated, hierarchical and statist society where immigration and 
movement are strictly controlled and social relationships are mediated by the state through legal 
rights and duties; the other of a Ôbottom-upÕ society which is composed of no more or less than the 
practices and relationships of the people who compose it. However, despite the fact that both trends 
within citizenship literature and discourse have a utopian vision, the latter is more open to own its 
normativity and contingency whereas the former tends towards truth claims. This legalistic 
approach is integral to what I shall be calling the ÔdominantÕ
7
 mode of political theorising and 
practice: ÔIn this effacement of the fictions that make theory work inheres the reification of political 
theory into legislative, authoritative, and programmatic modeÕ (McManus, 2005: 1, italics in the 
original). With all this in mind, I would now like to turn to anarchistic utopias.  
 
                                            
7
 By dominant, I do not mean to say more prevalent, but ÔdominatingÕ; and therefore with a tendency to dominate other, more creative 
and contingent modes of theorising; a tendency which can be attributed to hegemonic, didactic form and the legislative mode. 
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2.4. Autonomy, anarchism8 and the non-deferral of utopian practice 
A key concept in this project is autonomy, which is an important utopian function within many 
theories and discourses on citizenship. Indeed, one of the central debates of citizenship theory, and 
a primary tension in theorisations of the concept, might be seen to be the reconciliation of the 
autonomy or self-determination of the individual with that of the community
9
. To this extent, 
citizenship and anarchism might both be seen as a Ôutopias of autonomyÕ. 
 
The term ÔautonomyÕ has potentially problematic associations. The word ÔautonomousÕ comes 
from the Greek, autos-nomos, meaning Ôself-legislationÕ and has similarities with anarchism, 
meaning Ôwithout governmentÕ (Pickerill & Chatterton, 2006: 732). The term can be distinguished 
from independence, which is often used to mean separateness from community, whereas autonomy 
refers to life within society, but by oneÕs own rule. Thus the term is often used in politics to refer to 
a government and its people. The concept also forms a basis for KantÕs account of practical reason, 
and his conceptions of moral obligation and responsibility, forming a justification for 
universalising and hegemonic models of morality and centralised constitutional politics (Kant, 
1970 [1797]). Some of these themes clearly contradict those associated (above) with critical 
utopianism.   
 
Attempting to reclaim ÔautonomyÕ from centralised power and rule and move it smaller, 
voluntaristic communities, where the process of governing is not separated from processes of living 
and being, does not dissolve these problems completely. One problem is that ÔautonomousÕ 
communities exist within, rather than outside of, states and centralised power, as well as within 
relationships to other entities and to power on other levels. Spaces, communities and the people 
                                            
8
 Not all thinkers I shall be describing under the rubric of ÔanarchismÕ self-define as anarchist, often due either to historically negative 
connotations of the term (see Marshall, 1993: ix-x) or the association of the term with a particular type of anarcho-communism and the 
triad of Proudhon-Bakunin-Kropotkin. Sometimes people who do not identify with this tradition are less likely to call themselves 
anarchists (Ibid, p. xiii). Also, related to the politics of the tradition is the fact that many who might be subsumed under its umbrella do 
not like to associate themselves with ÔismsÕ or fixed categories. Peter Marshall acknowledges the problem of self-definition and defines 
an anarchist as Ôone who rejects all forms of external government and the State and believes that society and individuals would function 
well without themÕ (Ibid, p. xiii). Although this definition is useful, I find the term ÔgovernmentÕ quite slippery as it is used in many 
different ways, both positive and negative, by diverse thinkers, and certainly many valorise the idea of self-government. I would 
therefore elaborate on this by distinguishing vertical government and forms of organisation from horizontal forms of affiliation (based 
on self-organisation, voluntary association and mutual aid), the latter being associated with the tradition of anarchism and anarchistic 
thought (Graeber, 2004, p.3). 
9
 See, for example, Janoski, 1998, p. 19; Heater, 1999, p. 177; Faulks, 2000, p. 4; Plummer, 2003, p. 111.  
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who comprise them are constituted on several levels, through several relationships with other 
people and communities. Pickerill
10
 and Chatterton acknowledge many of these problems, yet 
persist with their use of the term in what they call part of a Ôsubstantive and linguistic interventionÕ 
(Pickerill & Chatterton, 2006: 731), using the term in a manner that parallels the critical utopian 
sensibility: 
Calling forth autonomy does not simply lead to concrete solutions to change the world. Nor is 
the term a panacea. To offer it as such would sustain the problems of blueprints which plague 
the contemporary world. However, autonomous geographies are part of a vocabulary of 
urgency, hope and inspiration, a call to action that we can dismantle wage labour, the oil 
economy, or representative democracy, and that thousands of capable and workable micro-
examples existÕ (Ibid: 731). 
 
Thus, rather than being seen as complete, self-sufficient blueprints for a better future, autonomous 
spaces may be seen as moments of resistance and creation, and as a constant process of negotiation 
and interplay between autonomous and non-autonomous propensities and potentials. Indeed, 
autonomy lies at the heart of the critical utopian impulse in its first explicit formulation as put 
forward by Moylan: 
The new movements of liberation insist on a multiplicity of voices, autonomous from each 
other, but commonly rooted in unfulfilled needs centring around the practice of autonomy. 
This shared goal of fulfilment of desire for collective humanity informs the utopian impulse at 
the heart of the historic bloc of opposition. The impulse, however, is one that must resist 
closure and systematization both in the steps taken toward it and in the vision that expresses it 
(Moylan, 1986: 28). 
 
These understandings of autonomy resonate with the conceptual framework and political project of 
anarchism Ð in particular ideas of an always-already existent autonomous society of autonomous 
individuals that exists in opposition to the hierarchical political principle. Where mainstream 
citizenship theory aims to protect individual autonomy through rights
11
, enforced by a highly 
centralised power such as the state, anarchism views power itself as a source of oppression, 
incompatible with individual autonomy. I will now turn to a brief history of ideas of anarchism in 
order to offer a genealogy of what I perceive to be the utopian vision of anarchism, which is 
                                            
10
 I met with Jenny Pickerill at Leicester University on 12 July 2007 and discussed the use of the term ÔautonomyÕ in this context. A 
useful theme of this discussion was that although ÔautonomyÕ can be slippery and ambiguous, it is often found within the vocabulary of 
activists, and is also a useful term for bringing together quite diverse activities and practices which serve a similar function of resisting 
neo-liberal society through the construction of creative alternatives.  
11
 See Chapters 8 & 9 
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inseparable from the utopian function within anarchism: a drive towards autonomy through 
principles of self-activity, affinity and non-hierarchical organisation. The lack of contradiction 
between function and vision, or means and ends, within anarchism is of particular interest since it 
overcomes many problems of mainstream citizenship theory. Rather than reciting a chronological 
history of ideas, I will be grouping thinkers together broadly based on their standpoints concerning 
the function of utopia, and the nature and possibility of resistance. As well as offering a theoretical 
framework of a methodology for studying practice, anarchism also offers theories and concepts that 
will be referred to throughout the project, in particular utopia and autonomy. 
 
2.4.1. Classical anarchist utopias  
Common to most anarchist and anarchistic thought is an opposition to centralised, concentrated 
power and an ethical commitment to decentralisation. For classical anarchists the critique was often 
couched in foundational discourses of human nature and rationalism, which is somewhat 
problematic. A brief sample of the classical anarchists shows how each based his critique of the 
state on a specific conjecture concerning human nature. For Godwin, humans are fundamentally 
rational and truth-seeking (Godwin, 1985 [1798]: 251) and individual autonomy is realised not 
through the legislative apparatus but through communicative rationality within social relationships 
(Ibid: 554). TolstoyÕs humanity is naturally spiritual and benign, actuated through love (Tolstoy, 
1990 [1900]a: 69) whereas KropotkinÕs is, by virtue of evolution, co-operative (Kropotkin, 1970 
[1896]: 215). Although the concentration of power in the hands of the few is tied up with property 
relations, unlike Marx the classical anarchists do not see economic power as existing a priori to 
political power, but rather the relationship between the two is interdependent, and both forms of 
power are opposed to the principle of society (see particularly Kropotkin 1970 [1896]: 323). A 
recurring theme is human rationality and its individualised aspect of personal reason as the point of 
departure for linkage with common reality and truth. This allows for the convergence of the 
interests of the individual with the social and thus establishes Ôa moral place of subjectivityÕ 
(Newman, 2001: 34). The state is thus seen to be an evil, malevolent and unnatural outgrowth of 
society (Godwin, 1985 [1798]: 542-3; Kropotkin 1970 [1896]: 323). The ontological thrust of 
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classical anarchism therefore revolves around two essentialist propositions: that power is 
essentially negative and oppressive and that humanity is essentially benign (May, 1994: 48).  
 
If we posit essential human rationality, we also have to account for human actions that are 
incongruent with its posited foundations Ð such as the rise of the state! A major difficulty with 
positing essential entities in political philosophy is that when something is regarded as ÔnaturalÕ or 
essential it is taken as given and Ôabsolved from political analysisÕ (Newman, 2001: 158). This is 
problematic, since all definitions have implications for inclusion and exclusion; for what is to be 
included within the definition of the entityÕs essence, and for what is not. This in itself has ethico-
political implications, particularly concerning the ability to cope with difference and anomaly, and 
exhibits many of the same ambiguities and contradictions as the anti-utopian theory that I discussed 
earlier, such as hegemonic and desire-blocking tendencies.  
 
2.4.2. Evolutionary anarchism12 
Although writing at the same time as some of the classical anarchists, and despite their shared 
valorisation of ÔsocietyÕ, I feel that there is something in the thoughts of Martin Buber (1951; 1996 
[1949]; 2004 [1937]), Gustav Landauer (1983 [1911]) and (writing later), Colin Ward (1973; 2005 
[2002]), which moves towards overcoming hegemonic thought. These theorists are important to my 
project, because they introduce the value of bringing practice into dialogue with theory as a 
strategy for preventing ideas from becoming transcendental, ossified and dominating. Practice 
represents a realm of contingency, and potentially a critical utopian space in which fixed ideas and 
identities can be transgressed. This premise underlies my own emphasis on the importance of 
studying practice, and also provides some initial pointers to the kinds of practices that might be 
studied in a project that seeks to imagine a critical utopian citizenship.  
 
                                            
12
 The term is not in wide usage but seems sufficient to describe those anarchists who do not believe in the possibility or desirability of 
revolution or rupture to institute an anarchist society, but prefer the idea of gradual evolution towards greater self-management and 
autonomy. 
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Although these thinkers ally themselves with the classical anarchistsÕ emphasis on society, they 
often stress this as a function or a mode of relating rather than an essentialist entity, and come 
somewhat closer to an immanentist epistemology, recognising utopia as process and function in the 
present rather than deferring to the future. Rather than using utopia as a blueprint and taking a 
programmatic approach to politics they emphasise process over closure. Landauer offers an 
alternative to both revolution and reform, and therefore overcomes the problems associated with 
the deferral of utopia. Landauer was influenced by Max Stirner13, and his Ôsocial AnarchismÕ was a 
Ôunion of individualsÕ (like StirnerÕs Ôunion of egoistsÕ; see Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 308) who 
voluntarily founded and joined small socialist communities. This was based on the premise that the 
state is not a thing that can be destroyed in one fell swoop, through revolution. Rather, it is a 
particular perception of relationships between people (Landauer, 1978 [1911]: 141); in StirnerÕs 
terms, a ÔspookÕ (Stirner 1993 [1893]: 39). It is a system of internal beliefs and values, rather than a 
concrete and identifiable external structure, which creates the conditions for agents of the state to 
act as agents of the state, and subjects of the state to act as such, and thus for the state to have any 
purchase in reality whatsoever. There are parallels with the critical utopian approach: the state 
becomes a fiction or an idea, perpetrated and gaining power solely through claims to, and beliefs 
in, its truth. It is not only the state that can be included under the rubric of ÔstatualÕ, but any 
hierarchical relationships involving the abrogation of personal autonomy to a higher authority, be it 
state, church, capitalism, even ÔsocietyÕ in the abstract (Stirner 1993 [1893]: 143).  
 
Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of the critical utopian potential of society comes from 
Buber. In his Paths in Utopia (1996 [1949]) he offers a comprehensive genealogy of utopian 
socialism, concentrating on Ôits postulate of a renewal of society through its cell tissueÕ (Buber, 
1996 [1949]: vii). Buber combines KropotkinÕs idea of the social principle and LandauerÕs 
conception of the state as a particular logic of affiliation and practice rather than a ÔthingÕ that can 
                                            
13
 Although Stirner is often placed within the classical anarchist tradition due to his contemporaneity with the previously discussed 
thinkers (see for example Marshall, 1993: 220), this is somewhat misleading since his thought deviates drastically from their 
foundational premises. More recently, Stirner has been acknowledged as an important precursor to poststructuralism, and is increasingly 
being read within this framework (Newman, 2001: 56). Stirner occupies a particularly important role in later chapters of this project due 
to his unsurpassable critique of essentialist discourse and abstract transcendental thought (see Stirner 1993 [1844]: 72 and passim). 
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be destroyed, in order to articulate the contradictions inherent within the Marxist epistemology and 
theory of social change: 
We can see with the greatest clarity what it is that connects Marx with ÒutopianÓ socialism: the 
will to supersede the political principle by the social principle, and what divides him from it: 
his opinion that this supersession can be effected by exclusively political means Ð hence by 
way of sheer suicide, so to speak, on the part of the political principleÕ (Buber, 1996 [1949]: 
83). 
 
The social principle is defined as Ôthe principle of inner cohesion, collaboration and mutual 
simulationÕ (Ibid: 80): it relates to direct experience and doing things in person, creating social 
adhesion through the direct experience of overcoming problems of collective interest. It is defined 
in opposition to the political principle, which is an abstract principle that sacrifices the social 
reality of fellowship and solidarity for the domination of government and the surplus, ossified 
power of the state. This surplus power overcodes
14
 identities: the universal liberal ÔcitizenÕ or the 
class-based Marxist ÔproletarianÕ. This is a relation to a certain type of political space: a pyramidal, 
hierarchical, representative, hegemonic, or vertical political space.  
 
BuberÕs contention that Marx shared with the utopian socialists the same goal; the supersession of 
the political by the social, is interesting. Like the utopian socialists, Marx imagines a society that 
does not yet exist on a large scale, and in this respect it is also utopian. The difference inheres in 
the attitude as to how change will be achieved. For Marx, universal change should be achieved 
through a revolution on the part of a hegemonic vanguard, or a representative common identity: the 
proletariat. The image of Ôsheer suicideÕ of the political principle is a particularly vivid image to 
describe the means/ends contradiction inherent within Marxist theory, whereby domination of one 
group over another is overcome by further domination. This parallels the idea that the emancipation 
of citizens can be bestowed from Ôon highÕ, through policy reform to integrate difference into a 
higher totality15. For Buber, change should be achieved through non-coercive structural renewal - 
                                            
14
 The concept of ÔovercodingÕ is borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p. 9, 68-70) and refers to a loss of excess desire, or the 
suppression of difference, through unification, totalisation, integration into a hierarchical system and finalisation. It is a useful concept 
that is almost the antithesis of critical utopianism, so is used frequently throughout the thesis. 
15
 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
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through the creation of new types of political space in the here and now, on a small scale, and the 
formation of new identities and forms of interaction in practice.  
 
A more recent theorist who applies a very similar methodology to many contemporary problems, 
such as education, architecture and town planning is Colin Ward (1973 & 2005 [2002]). In his 
book Anarchy in Action (1973), Ward offers a model of anarchism as a theory of organisation and a 
method of action, rather than a strategy for revolution or a vision of a future society, to a certain 
extent dissolving the tension between what is and what might be: Ôit is about the ways in which 
people organise themselves in any kind of human society, whether we care to categorise those 
societies as primitive, traditional, capitalist or communistÕ (Ward, 1973: 8; italics in the original). 
He chronicles examples of self-organisation in fields of housing (see also Ward 2002 passim), 
schooling, sexual relationships and the family, workersÕ self-management and welfare. Ward 
shows us the importance of having means of realising utopia that are congruent with the ends, and 
of not deferring to the future what can be practiced in the present.  
 
The role of existing ÔsocialÕ spaces, or practical utopias, is particularly important. In his 1951 
article, ÒSociety and the StateÓ, Buber traces a widespread inability of social science to distinguish 
the social principle from the political principle since antiquity, in both Western and Eastern 
thought. In this article, Buber recognises the difficulties of essentialising the social principle, and 
the contradictions of setting something up as a principle, when the principle itself is 
unrepresentable: 
The new concept of society loses concreteness because it is deprived of its limitations; this 
occurs in the most sublime manner in that the ideal of universal humanism is formulated 
without any indication as to how it is to be realised. Whether the Stoic speaks in the new terms 
of a society of the human race (societas generis human), or in the old terms of a megapolis, it 
amounts to the same thing: a high-souled idea emerges to confront reality but cannot find a 
womb from which to propagate a living creature because it has been stripped of corporeality 
(Buber, 1951: 7). 
 
This corporeality is seen to consist in the community, a preliminary justification for my own study 
of certain types of community that will be further discussed in the following chapter. Using the 
example of ancient China, Buber shows how the village community Ôinterposed between the 
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individual and the State...two purely social structures, namely the home and the communityÕ (Ibid: 
6), which is counterposed to urban civilization where there remained Ôonly one of these structures Ð 
the home, the family, which, contrary to its status in the village, was in its urban form completely 
integrated into the StateÕ (Ibid: 6). It is only within the former spatial formation that the individual 
can exist in relation to a multiplicity of not Ôfamilies alone, but of societies, groups, circles, unions, 
co-operative bodies, and communitiesÕ (Ibid: 11) as opposed to his or her identity being overcoded 
by a pre-eminent relation to the political principle of the state. Buber resists essentialising the 
social: 
There is no form of social activity which cannot, on some side or at some moment, become 
political; we must realize that social forms on the one hand and State institutions on the other 
are crystallisations of the two principles. But it is most essential that we recognise the 
structural difference between the two spheres in regard to the relationship between unity and 
multiformity (Ibid: 11) 
 
This is a vision of an already existing, immanent utopia, expressed through multiple and particular 
crystallisations of community. The state, however, persists, and utopian community borders on 
potential oppression. 
 
2.4.3. Anarchist utopia and political agency 
The theme of developing an adequate praxis will be developed below, and then re-articulated in the 
context of the utopian potential of citizenship in the conclusion to this, and in forthcoming 
chapters. The problem of utopian agency has recurred throughout the foregoing work. An 
important function of the critical utopia, which has informed these approaches, has been the 
potential to transform individual consciousness through allowing space for the education of desire 
that is Ôfree from the constraints, norms and codes of present societyÕ (Sargisson, 1996: 50). 
However, the relationship of utopianism to wider social and political change remains uncertain, and 
this has been the basis of Marxist criticisms of utopianism. In this context it is useful to consider 
LevitasÕ distinction between hope and desire (Levitas, 1990: 190). Despite the fact that some 
utopias are, in theory, possible and thus capable of being hoped for, some such as ÒThe Land of 
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CockaygneÓ
16
 are not even intended to be so. It is the issue of possibility that distinguishes between 
hope and desire: 
Utopia expresses and explores what is desired; under certain conditions it also contains the 
hope that these desires may be met in reality, rather than merely in fantasy. The essential 
element in utopia is not hope but desire Ð the desire for a better way of living (Levitas, 1990: 
191). 
 
If utopianism does not translate directly into political action, this is because desire alone cannot 
bring about social transformation. The difficulty arises in the quest to conceive of an autonomous 
place from which utopian desire and action can take place. For Buber, the small-scale community 
modelled on the kibbutz was the answer, whereas for Ward, this is immanent to all societal 
relationships and interactions involving co-operation rather than authority.  However, autonomy is 
still only partial since utopian practices are defined in opposition to dominant practices, and 
functions such as structural renewal are oriented towards a particular future goal (a stateless 
society), which does not yet exist: the basic premises point to an evolution towards a future utopia 
which is deferred. This is something that is criticised and transgressed by the post-left anarchy 
tendency. Post-left anarchy informs my wider project only partially, in combination with the other 
forms of anarchism discussed above as well as poststructural anarchism, as part of a more general 
critical utopian tendency. It is an important body of thought to consider because it offers a novel 
conceptualisation of the orientation to utopia and the role of practice. Some of the concepts and 
ideas emanating from post-left anarchy, in particular those relating to autonomy, space and 
organisation, are useful to describe and analyse some of the practices considered later in the thesis. 
 
2.4.4. Post-left anarchy and utopia 
Recently, there have been efforts within Ôpost-left anarchyÕ17, to adapt the anarchist theory and 
practice of non-dominatory social space as a response to poststructural critique and postmodern 
                                            
16
 A mythical medieval land of plenty and excess pleasures, with rivers of wine, edible architecture and ready-cooked food that appeared 
spontaneously (Plej, 2001: p. 3). 
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social conditions. There is a significant trend within this strand of contemporary anarchist thought 
to reject political tendencies associated with leftist anarchism and leftism more generally Ð such as 
ideology, hegemony/counter-hegemony, progressivism, mass-politics, categorisation/identity 
politics, organisation, representation, struggle, politics of demand and collectivism
18
 - in favour of 
Ôthe immediate expression of desire, constructing the kind of world one wants to live in 
immanently and horizontally, and radically and antagonistically rejecting or attacking the social 
forms and institutions of the dominant social systemÕ (Robinson & Tormey, 2009: 159).  
 
Thinkers who tend to be associated with post-left or post-anarchist thought include Hakim Bey 
(1985, 1993 & 1994), Alfredo Bonanno (1998 [1977]; 1988 & 1998 [1996]), Bob Black (1996 & 
1997), Wolfi Landstreicher (2002), John Zerzan (1996), Jason McQuinn (2002) and others
19
. Other 
thinkers who I would somewhat reservedly associate with the tendency are Deleuze and Guattari, 
particularly their 1988 work A Thousand Plateaus (1988). Although neither in this work nor 
elsewhere do they identify as Ôpost-leftÕ or Ôpost-anarchistÕ, many of their concepts are used 
extensively by other theorists within the movement, particularly Bey and the anonymous author of 
ÒDesire is Speaking: Utopian rhizomesÓ (1999). There are also many connections between the 
epistemological proclivities of these theorists and other thinkers from the post-left tendency, 
particularly in relation to a preference for immanence or immediacy over the deferral of desire, a 
rejection of the idea of rupture between the present and future goals or society, a refusal of 
foundations, a recognition of contingency and a creative and playful mode of theorising that 
                                            
17
 Anarchy: A journal of Desire Armed - a publication closely associated with the development of post-left anarchy Ð states on its 
website that post-left anarchy Ôis not an independent "movement" as such but rather a critical way of thinking about anarchist ideasÕ 
(from http://www.anarchymag.org/node/8 accessed 22 July 2008). In the same place it is stated that ÔPost-leftists frequently use the word 
anarchy instead of anarchism to avoid the -ism suffix's connotations of doctrineÕ. Despite this proviso there are sufficient theoretical 
similarities to identify this heterogeneous collection of groups and individuals collectively, which I shall attempt to do with reference to 
tendencies and inclinations rather than to ÔmovementÕ (a term that can also imply a similar goal or direction which would be 
theoretically misleading).  
 
18
 This list is partially drawn from Wolfi LandstreicherÕs paradigmatic 2002 essay From Politics to Life: Ridding anarchy of the leftist 
millstone from http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/life.html accessed 22 July 2009 
19
 Much of the material that has emerged from post-left anarchy is available primarily on the internet due to a commitment to 
widespread and unrestricted access to information and rejection of intellectual vanguardism. Since the mode or genre of theorising is for 
political reasons often stylistically informal and is distributed freely under anti-copyright practices, many of the texts are not readily 
available in an ÔoriginalÕ or officially published format. Also, many writers prefer to remain anonymous, or to use pseudonyms. For this 
reason, the references for this section might, due to lack of information, be somewhat sparser or less accurate than they would be when 
dealing with other bodies of thought. Many of the articles, and the list of thinkers above, have been drawn from two publications which 
are particularly associated with the tendency; Anarchy: a journal of desire armed which can be accessed online at: 
http://www.anarchymag.org/ and Killing King Abacus which can be accessed online at http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ (both last 
accessed 11 December 2008). Both of these journals are also available in print. 
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experiments with form and style. I shall also be considering Robinson & TormeyÕs (2009) 
discussion of the conceptual relationship between utopia and post-left anarchism. My main concern 
here, as in the rest of the chapter, is the relationship of practice to utopia, which will later be 
interpreted in connection with the relevance for citizenship theory. 
 
In ÒDesire is Speaking: Utopian rhizomesÓ (Anon, 1999), the post-left critique of the idea of 
separation or rupture between present and future is evident, as is the refusal to defer utopia or the 
creative expression of desire to the future, but rather to experience and live it in the present. There 
are reflections here of the previously considered critique of utopia-as-blueprint, which emphasised 
the importance of utopia-as-function: 
A lot of people are disappointed that there isn't a shared utopia anymore, no expectation of a 
better future. According to some of them, the shared utopian vision has always been 'the core 
of left politics, and that has to stay that way.'...Well, if this is true, then perhaps the movement 
isn't 'left' anymore. But the discord with the existing order and the desire to create something 
different here and now still remains. The shared utopia disappeared, but the utopian practices 
didn't (Anon, 1999, from http://www.eco-action.org/dod/no8/desire.html accessed 22 July 2009).  
 
Here, the specific function appears to be a do-it-yourself ethos and immediate approach to the 
expression and satisfaction of oneÕs own desires; Ômost important is that the movement shows that 
you can have fun doing what you do. That you can play instead of workÕ (Ibid). An explicitly 
Deleuzoguattarian framework is used to theorise groups of agents acting together to form 
alternative ways of life, not as intentional or prefigurative communities, but as assemblages of 
desire: 
What we see here is not a community, nor solidarity groups, but configurations of desire: 
networks of friendship and expression which undermine the prevailing relations of production, 
society, politics, family, the body, sex and even the cosmos. Lacking a single clear goal or 
programme, we see a multitude of struggles. There is no utopian tree from which readymade 
ideas about another world can be picked, but endless rhizomes on which at unexpected 
moments flowers appear (Ibid). 
 
It is with the post-left anarchist vision of utopia that the content and function of utopia are 
reconciled in a truly present autonomy, rather deferred to the future. In a piece called ÔBrittle 
UtopiasÕ (Anon, 2001 from http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/kka/UTOPIAS.html accessed 22 July 2009), 
another anonymous author elaborates on the theme discussed earlier; that although all normative 
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theory is utopian, the utopian function becomes blocked where claims to truth and power take 
precedence over creativity and contingency: 
Some dreams are supple and resonate with the ever renewed present, others become fossilized, 
they are so dry and brittle that they crack and shatter to pieces when they try to move from the 
dream into reality. Some utopias are visions of places in which humans can be truly present, 
places that lack the ever proliferating forms of mediation of this society.  Others are non-
places, these are dreams that are old even if just conceived of though they donÕt crack, they are 
too unified, too pristine.  Ethnic cleansing, Communism with a big C, the nation, pure 
capitalism, these utopias can never be fully brought into practice, but that is not the problem.  
The problem is that there are powerful structures which try to bring these grand-plans into 
being, to the letter and with scientific precision.  
(Anon, 2001, http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/kka/UTOPIAS.html accessed July 22, 2009)    
 
The difference between claims to truth and the recognition of contingency is mirrored in this 
passage in the relationship between presence and mediation. A more general refusal of 
representation, deferral and indeed anything that lies above or beyond immanent experience is also 
articulated. The importance of process, constant transformation and movement is summed up in a 
vivid metaphor emphasising the seemingly counterintuitive necessity for destruction and death 
within utopia:  
Where death is packed in Styrofoam, one has to wonder what kind of life can be lived.  
Creation which doesnÕt include a little death isnÕt part of life, it is instead the clonelike 
reproduction of the same. We dream of other ways of relating, of a utopia that is a real living 
dying rotting place, a utopia of process not a brittle non-place (Ibid). 
 
This living immediacy and refusal of separation can also be found in Bonanno: Ôthis is the secret of 
life: never ever separate thought from action, the things we know, the things we understand, from 
the things we do, the things with which we carry out our actionsÕ (Bonanno, 1998 [1996], from 
http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/tension.html accessed July 7, 2009). The valorisation of presence 
also translates into an emphasis on the importance of action: ÔWe cannot wait for things to come to 
an end in our absence. We want to be in the game É so are acting here and now, recognising no 
point of reference on which to pin our hopes and expectationsÕ (Bonanno, 1988: 20-21). This 
equates to more than acting without thinking, or to practice without theory, however. We are 
brought back to the earlier theme of theory in its playful, fictive, and contingent mode Ð theory 
(utopia) as immanent to the experience of life itself rather than a static and removed abstraction:  
There is not one ÒplaceÓ for theory and another for practice therefore, except in an abstract 
consideration suspended like a ghost outside the world. The fact that this ghost turns out to be 
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anything but outside this world but acts and produces effects inside it merely confirms what we 
have just said (Ibid: 22). 
 
Such a mode of theorising has a clear relevance for my project, which seeks dialogue between 
theory and practice, and a reconceptualisation of citizenship as a living practice rather than an 
abstract identity. There are resonances between critical utopianism and post-left anarchy, although 
the two are not synonymous. Post-left anarchy exists in somewhat of a tension with modernist 
utopian thinking because it embraces an atemporal and immanentist epistemology, which rejects 
orientation to a future goal, calling for action instead of hope or dreaming as the appropriate 
modality of relation to oneÕs desires (Robinson & Tormey, 2009: 157). Whilst the utopian 
approaches that I considered previously tended to view utopia as either deferred (Bloch & 
Mannheim) or prefigurative (classical and evolutionary anarchists), post-left anarchy refuses to 
acknowledge either reform/evolution or rupture/revolution, and indeed any idea of progressivism. 
As an orientation to social change Ð based in non-deferral and hedonism, post-left anarchy offers 
some useful concepts and methods for social change that find articulation in my considerations of 
critical utopian practices and practitioner discourses throughout the thesis, although they are often 
transgressed and disrupted by simultaneous orientation to a future goal or reform within the system. 
 
It is intriguing that despite this refusal of transcendence, post-left anarchist thinkers and activists 
(the two roles often go hand in hand) often embrace the practices that are traditionally associated 
with utopianism Ð such as creative writing, intentional communities and transformative action. We 
saw in the preceding discussion how the theme of process over content of utopia is emphasised in 
post-left anarchy, but unlike Mannheim and Bloch, who distinguished between types of utopia by 
reference to an unforeseen future, a distinction can be made between what Robinson and Tormey 
term ÔutopiasÕ and ÔutopianismsÕ (Robinson & Tormey, 2009: 164), the distinction being based on 
Ôthe energies and potentialities they express or actualizeÕ (Ibid: 164). Whilst utopianism might be 
seen to be on the side of structure (Ibid: 165) - or in my previous terms, a didactic, legislative, 
truth-claiming mode Ð utopia Ôconsists of something akin to the Situationist idea of Òdemanding the 
impossibleÓ, something which defies and exceeds the systemÕs insistence that its own limits be 
taken as limits of the possibleÕ (Ibid: 164), so that Ôutopia has the function of escaping the limits on 
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the possible which are posited by the systemÕ (Ibid: 164). Robinson and Tormey proceed to 
reconcile the relationship between post-left anarchy and utopia by theorising social dreaming as a 
variety of the broader phenomenon of Ôlines of flightÕ (Ibid: 172), a concept taken from Deleuze 
and Guattari (1998: 561-2 and passim). Deleuze and Guattari play an important role in this thesis, 
particularly because many of their concepts have been useful in understanding and interpreting 
other theories and the practices studied later in this thesis in meta-theoretical terms of ethical 
effects. 
 
2.4.5. Deleuze & Guattari and ontological anarchy20 
Deleuze and Guattari do not self-define as either utopian or anarchist, and indeed it would be fair to 
say that their thought is uncategorisable (Tormey, 2006: 154). However, there are fairly apparent 
connections with both critical utopianism and post-left anarchism. Deleuze and Guattari offer two 
ways of experiencing and living in the world, variously expressed as rhizomatics versus 
arborescent schema (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 361-3), micropolitics versus macropolitics (Ibid: 
229-255) and Royal (capitalised in the original) versus nomad science (Ibid: 405-6). It is important 
to emphasise that the dichotomy or juxtaposition between these two ways of being is not between 
the way society is now and the way that society ought to be in the future, nor between a 
ÔtrueÕ/ÔrightÕ understanding and a false/wrong one, but between two different ways of perceiving, 
desiring, knowing, acting and being - between two different modes of experience, dominant and 
minor, which are distinguishable through their ethical effects. The dominant set is termed by the 
authors ÔmajorityÕ and is a standard measure against which all variants are measured. This atypical 
understanding of the term ÔmajorityÕ rests on an understanding of difference and multiplicity as 
ontologically prior to sameness or identity: to perceive two (or three, or nÉ) things as Ôthe sameÕ 
suppresses or obscures the difference pressuposed by there being more than one thing in the first 
place: ÔA determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered 
minoritarian, by nature and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or an outsystemÕ 
                                            
20
 This section of the thesis is admittedly too short to do justice to the complex ideas of Deleuze and Guattari, and I will be using the 
conceptual tools offered by their work throughout the thesis. What I am offering here is a preliminary justification of my use of their 
epistemological position to inform my wider approach in the remainder of this thesis. 
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(Ibid: 117). This has implications for issues of subjectivity, in that the majority status blocks flows 
of creativity and desire by fixing people, groups, and other assemblages into predetermined 
identities. This ties in with the idea considered earlier that political theories are always already 
fictions. Dominant fictions disguise their creativity behind claims to truth, whereas minor 
tendencies propagate multiplicity and celebrate the impossibility of fixing truth. This again 
articulates the critical utopian function that I would like to bring into a dialogue with citizenship, 
through the study of critical utopian theories and practices, in the remainder of this thesis. First, 
though, I will conclude this chapter by considering how critical utopian, anarchistic modes of 
thought and suggestions for praxis might inform a broader theory of citizenship. Although this is 
not the place to provide an overview of canonical and dominant theories of citizenship, which will 
be interspersed throughout the forthcoming chapters, in dialogue with utopian theories and 
practices, I would like to offer some preliminary considerations on how function of citizenship 
might relate to the functions of utopian thought and practice considered above. 
 
2.5. Citizenship, anarchism and utopia: towards a critical utopian citizenship 
2.5.1. Anarchy against citizenship 
A tension between the concept of citizenship and critical utopianism/anarchism can be exposed to 
Stirnerean critique: the identity of the citizen tends to privilege the state as a singular, special, or 
primary affiliation: a good citizen is a citizen first and family/social community/ethnic 
group/political party/activist group affiliations, linked to the ÔprivateÕ sphere, are presumed to come 
second
21
: ÔEverything un-human or ÒegoisticÓ that clings to us is degraded to a ÒprivateÓ matter and 
we distinguish the State definitely from Òcivil societyÓ, which is the sphere of ÒegoismÕsÓ activityÕ 
(Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 99). This abstracted identity can repress or oppress aspects of a subjectÕs 
identity in the ÔpublicÕ/state sphere, and such an identity may not be liked or accepted; it separates 
                                            
21
 This is a thread that runs through citizenship theory. Where there is an emphasis on a ÔdeepÕ state and duties over rights, there is a 
strong emphasis on the autonomy of the community over and above the individual, whose differences are expected to be entirely 
subjugated to the higher unity (Machiavelli, 1988 [1513], p. 21; Hobbes, 1991 [1651], p. 32). Where the state is seen to play a relatively 
minimal role, the citizen is endowed with an abstract public equality and any differences which do not infringe upon othersÕ rights and 
duties are seen not to be of public concern, so are relegated to the Ôprivate sphereÕ (Locke 2002 [1689]; Paine 1984 [1791] & Madison et 
al 1987 [1787]; see also Chapters 6 & 8 of this thesis). 
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the individual from his or her autonomous activity, which is in turn watched over and regulated by 
the state.  
 
Although Deleuze and Guattari do not mention citizenship explicitly, Richard Day (2003, 2005) 
has used some of their concepts and terminologies to articulate alternative, anarchistic forms of 
subjectivity and ways in which humans can exist within social and political spaces. Day proceeds 
to posit three articulations of subject identification; the citizen, the nomad and the smith. DayÕs 
ÔcitizensÕ are ÔOedipalized subjects making demands of those in authorityÕ (Day, 2005: 173); they 
are the subjects of the liberal-democratic state, who campaign for rights and accept responsibilities 
within the system without questioning the authority of the system as such. In direct contrast to, yet 
in symbiotic relationship with, the citizen exists the ÔnomadÕ. To Day, the nomad represents 
Ôattempts to abandon paternal protection finally and absolutelyÕ (Ibid: 173), that is to abolish the 
system in a revolutionary moment, yet with an inherent risk of reterritorialisation - of positing a 
new hegemony: ÔThe inside and outside of any social space are interdependent, each potentially 
giving rise to the other, each warding off the other, in an ongoing play of relations of co-operative 
and competitive powerÕ (Ibid: 173-4). Also drawn from Deleuze and Guattari, is Ôthe smithÕ, who 
Ôexists in a complex relation to both the citizen and the nomadÕ, in that Ôrather than attempting to 
dominate by imposing all-encompassing norms, the smith seeks to innovate by tracking and 
exploiting opportunities in and around existing structuresÕ (Ibid: 174).  
 
2.5.2. Citizenship and the strategic terrain 
I have some difficulties with DayÕs citizen/nomad/smith distinction, both at an analytical level and 
at the level of relating them to my project. I feel that DayÕs dismissal of the ÔnomadÕ as counter-
hegemonic (and therefore relying on a logic of hegemony rather than affinity/resistance/criticality) 
rests on a misreading of Deleuze and Guattari, who are careful to conceptualise the nomad as a 
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multiple, minoritarian, and infinitely critical mode of subjectivity
22
. I also feel that his dismissal of 
the citizen as intrinsically deferent to authority disregards many of the ways in which gaining 
recognition as citizens has aided women, racial minorities and others through the ages, and also the 
ways in which material and ideological resources associated with the concept can be exploited for 
transformative, critical and resistant purposes
23
. In this respect Day has not gone far enough to 
conceptualise and describe the different modes of identity/belonging/action, nor to iterate their 
practical significance, and they remain largely abstract, so are difficult to apply in the context of a 
project using empirical evidence. It is notable that despite the fact that the distinction between these 
three modes of being forms a large part of DayÕs theoretical discussion, he rarely seems to apply 
the terms to his practical examples in a coherent way24. This is indeed a difficulty with an approach 
(that I admittedly share) that attempts to bring theory into dialogue with practice in this way.  
 
Naming a tendency will always involve representing and hegemonising it to some extent, and there 
will always be an overcoding of the kind that Day and the anarchist and poststructuralist traditions 
he traces are seeking to resist. In StirnerÕs moving words, ÔI live after a calling as little as the 
flower grows and gives fragrance after a calling É no concept expresses me, nothing that is 
designated as my essence exhausts me; they are only namesÕ (Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 366). Yet, it is 
still necessary to speak: ÔFor thinking and speaking I need truths and words, as I do foods for 
eating; without them I cannot think nor speakÕ (Ibid: 347), or in the words of Deleuze and Guattari:  
ItÕs nice to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows itÕs only a 
manner of speaking. To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it 
is no longer of any importance whether one says I (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 1-2). 
 
What is perhaps more interesting and important than naming subjects/citizens, is recognising that 
they/we are constituted in and by multiple belongings and affiliations, which are created through 
                                            
22
ÔIndra, the warrior god [...] is like a pure and immeasurable multiplicity [...] he bears witness, above all, to other relations with 
women, with animals, because he sees all things in relations of becoming, rather than implementing binary distributions between statesÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p. 388, italics in the original). Here Indra works as an image for the nomad assemblage Ôthe war machineÕ. 
23
 Particularly informative upon these topics is Holloway SparksÕ (1992) excellent article ÔDissident Citizenship: Democratic Theory, 
Political Courage and Activist WomenÕ, wherein she points to the fact that theorists of citizenship tend to ignore the public (not just 
private) activities of women and excluded racial groups. In order to bridge this gap, she attempts to develop a more expansive theory of 
citizenship that recognises dissidence and political courage as vital elements of political life. She uses a case-study of a black womanÕs 
activism: Rosa Parks, whose refusal to give up her seat on a bus to a white man led to public boycotts of busses, widespread political 
debate on segregation policies, and eventually political change.  
24
 Day limits his focused discussion of activist practices to a section of the penultimate chapter (Day, 2005: 189-197). 
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multiple choices, actions and interactions. This may sometimes involve acting as a ÔcitizenÕ, 
sometimes a ÔnomadÕ, sometimes a ÔsmithÕ and always as a plurality of other overlapping roles and 
identities. In this sense, the attempt of this project to separate out different modes of belonging and 
social subjectivity could be seen as an exercise in abstraction and universalism. With an ontology 
of pure difference Ð informed by critical utopianism and various strands of anarchism, Stirner and 
Deleuze and Guattari - we might be overwhelmed that no assemblage is self-existent or separable. 
There is no singular utopia and there are no autonomous subjects or spaces, only assemblages 
constituted in and by their surroundings, constituted in and by actors also conditioned by and 
conditioning their spaces and relationships, including the state. However, in choosing to create 
resistant spaces, actors are creating spaces that are becoming-utopian, or becoming-autonomous, or 
in DeleuzeÕs interpretation of NietzscheÕs (1996 [1887]: 22-4; 54-5) terminology, they are 
constituted by active, rather than reactive forces, where reactive forces are those which Ôseparate 
active force from what it can doÕ (Deleuze, 2006 [1983]:  57). They represent a consciously chosen 
and voluntary Ôline of flightÕ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 213) from the state apparatus, from the 
imposed identity of the citizen of the state, by subjects who have taken an experimental approach 
of trial and error, to create workable alternative spaces and relationships, which are never finished, 
but open-ended. ÔStrategic terrainÕ refers to the everyday melieu in which the resistant subject or 
group must live and practice resistant, simultaneously ÔinsideÕ whilst attempting to live by an ethic 
that looks ÔoutsideÕ. This can involve some complex negotiations, such as Ôworking inside the 
system, using dominant forms and means; but it should remain outside on the level of intentionality 
and desire, never reducible to these forms and means, always treating them as strategic choices, as 
means to be used for a purpose should they fail to serve itÕ (Robinson, 2007: 48). My use of the 
term citizenship in the current project implies that it is a useful tool in the present strategic terrain, 
but should always remain open to change and negotiation, and to being discarded should it cease to 
be useful. 
 
2.6. Summary of approach  
Through an examination of post-state theories of citizenship, I have attempted to argue that 
citizenship, as a concept, has utopian content and has the potential for a utopian function. 
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Mainstream theorists, however, tend to obscure the utopian potential of citizenship. Herein arises 
my critique of legislative, didactic and definitive approaches to citizenship, which through seeking 
finality and integration into a higher unity, have an anti-utopian function of blocking flows of 
desire. I have also argued that anarchism and post-left anarchy have a particular affinity with 
utopianism, since they seek to liberate, rather than block, lines of flight and emphasise process over 
closure. As a utopia of self-governance and autonomy, the concept of citizenship has a surprising 
resonance with anarchistic theories. For these reasons I will be using anarchistic critical utopianism 
to inform my general approach and guide theory and case selection. The core concepts driving this 
thesis, therefore, are: 
¥ Citizenship: Viewed as a Ôutopia of autonomyÕ, informed by, but transgressing post-state 
theories of citizenship (Faulks 2000; Hoffman 2004) and post-representational modes of 
belonging such as the ÔnomadÕ and the ÔsmithÕ (Day 2005). The concept of citizenship is 
seen to have radical disruptive and strategic potential. 
 
¥ Critical utopianism: Ideas of critical utopia, utopia as function, and the relationship of 
utopia to hope, desire and transformation are crucial to the structure of the thesis and the 
presumption that autonomous spaces and intentional communities are relevant to 
citizenship. The approach is interdisciplinary and draws on a tradition of scholarship on 
utopias and utopianism particularly emerging from the work of Bloch (1986 [1938-47]) 
and continuing through the more recent ÔcriticalÕ and ÔtransgressiveÕ utopianisms of 
Moylan (1986) and Sargisson (1996). The approach envisiges the utopian impulse as 
something that is not confined to social engineers but is endemic to, and transformative of, 
everyday life.  
 
¥ Autonomy: The way in which autonomy is used in this thesis presumes two levels of 
autonomy: autonomy from the state and the autonomy of the individual within their 
community through ideas and practices of non-hierarchy and self-governance. This is 
informed by the idea of the Ôsocial principleÕ derived from classical anarchism, 
evolutionary anarchism and post-left anarchy, and the epistemological anarchism of 
Deleuze and Guattari (1986). It is presumed that autonomy may only be partial, but that 
qua critical utopianism it is defined in relation to hope, desire, and transformation rather 
than needing to be actualised in totality, and there is a particular emphasis on everyday 
practices (Pickerill & Chatterton, 2006).  
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In this chapter I have tried to identify and clarify the conceptual boundaries of my core terms and 
the epistemological approach that drives the project. The ways in which the meta-theoretical 
approach and core concepts are operationalised will be further elaborated upon in the following 
chapter, which outlines the methods used in the remainder of the thesis. 
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3. Methods 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the theoretical approach and conceptual framework of the 
project. I introduced a distinction between hegemonising utopias and critical utopias, and between 
citizenship of status and of identity, which I associated with the former, and citizenship of process, 
relationships and praxis, associated with the latter. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the 
methods used to obtain information used in the remainder of the thesis, which are informed by 
critical utopianism. In this chapter, I will consider the relationship between theory and practice that 
informs the methodological basis of this project. I will then consider the criteria used for theory 
selection and empirical case selection. I then discuss particular data collection methods used to 
obtain data from cases, how others have used these methods, and how these have raised various 
problems when introduced into the context of my own research. Throughout the chapter, I aim for 
reflexivity by referring to conceptual, theoretical and practical difficulties that I have encountered, 
and how these were overcome, if at all. Some contradictions remain, and I shall endeavour to be 
explicit where this is the case. 
 
3.2. The relationship between theory and practice 
 
¥ How else could we live as politically active, participatory people, or, what other types of 
citizen could we be?  
This broad question was disaggregated into a number of smaller questions in section 1.3 of the 
Introduction. The methodology will involve attention to both theoretical and practiced alternatives 
to orthodox modes of political existence. I feel that to study solely within the realms of formal 
political theory would contradict and remove the vitality of an argument that emphasises activity 
and participation, and impoverish the final theory. I therefore posit that some kind of primary 
empirical research into alternative participatory practices is necessary in order to furnish the theory. 
This project does not claim to be an empirically rigorous exercise in political science.  Although 
some rigour, in line with the aims of the project, is necessary, my aim is not primarily to explain, 
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describe or classify political phenomena (although this will play a part), but rather to take the 
worldviews, experiences, practices, aims and actions of practitioners seriously in formulating a 
normative theory. There will of course be some overlap. The project therefore requires a nuanced 
understanding of the different ways in which ÔtheoryÕ and ÔpracticeÕ overlap and intersect. 
 
An important purpose of this project is to bring theory into dialogue with practice in interesting and 
transgressive ways. This disrupts many of the traditional boundaries between political science and 
political theory. There is a clear normative vision, which places the project within the discipline of 
political theory, but this is informed by practices and takes inspiration from ÔdataÕ gleaned through 
empirical research. A number of specific points should be noted: 
 
3.2.1. Shared function of critical utopian theories and practices 
Both radical theories and practices can be viewed as critical utopian liminal spaces that offer an 
estranged perspective from which it becomes possible to critique and transgress conventional 
models of citizenship. This links to the idea of ÔpraxisÕ, a term derived from Gramsci (1971) whose 
view was that all meaning derives from the relation between human practical activity (or ÔpraxisÕ) 
and historical and social processes. This has influenced contemporary radical thought which shares 
commitment to Ôexpose the socio-spatial processes that (re)produce inequalities between people 
and places; challenge and change those inequalities; and bridge the divide between theorisation and 
praxisÕ (Fuller & Kitchin 2004: 5). This commitment has led to an emphasis amongst critical 
academics on embedding research within the groups and communities that are being studied, using 
methods such as Participatory Action Research and scholar-activism (discussed below), which 
partially inform the ethos of this project. Whilst I view this move towards embedded forms of 
knowledge and praxis in radical research in a wholly positive light, an exclusive emphasis on 
relevance could Ôlimit the scope of critique, and especially that ÔutopianÕ capacity to think beyond 
what isÕ (Wilbert & Hoskyns, 2004: 71). I would therefore like to maintain the importance of 
utopian dreaming not only in practice but also in social theory and literature, which can educate 
desire (Levitas, 1990), critique the status quo (Moylan, 1986) and transform consciousness 
(Sargisson, 1996; 2000). Critical utopianism Ð where the emphasis is on perspectival multiplicity 
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and unalienated life - can thus be seen as a practice (even where that practice is largely theoretical) 
that exists within and derives from the existing social melieu yet simultaneously signals to 
something ÔoutsideÕ or ÔotherÕ and thus has the transgressive potential to disrupt and transform 
habitual ways of thinking and living (Sargisson, 1996: passim). This conception of critical 
utopianism as (one form of) praxis informs the structuring of this thesis into separate yet connected 
chapters upon ÔtheoryÕ (divided into mainstrem and alternative) and ÔpracticeÕ which is inspired by 
the idea that alternative practices embody the critical and transformative function of everyday 
philosophies and conceptions.  
 
3.2.2. Theory as practice 
Theorising is itself a mode of practice. It involves the creation of concepts, which have effects 
upon the real world, lived experience and everyday life: 
I É love remembering to queer any supposed border separating theory from practice. To 
theorise is a social practice. Like any other practice, theory has effects Ðwhether that be to 
challenge or to contribute to relationships of domination (or, as often is the case, both 
simultaneously) (Heckert, [Forthcoming]). 
 
The way in which citizenship is conceptualised by dominant political theory has effects upon 
citizens. Alternative conceptualisations also potentially have concrete effects upon lives, so should 
remain open to renegotiation in light of these effects, in order to maintain the critical utopian 
modality (McManus, 2005: 165). Studying practice can alert us to the limitations and effects of 
different theories, and act as a prompt for further theorising. This does, however, raise issues of the 
purpose of theorising and routes of transmission between academic theory and practice, linked to 
the discussion of praxis above, particularly in the context of such an individualised work as a PhD 
thesis. In some respects, however, it is important not to overplay divisions between academic 
theory and practice: Ôwe often forget just how pivotal academics are in the production of 
commonsense and hegemonic ideasÕ (The Autonomous Geographies Collective, 2010: 263), and it 
is unlikely that those academics working within the dominant paradigm feel it so necessary to 
question their positionality as those who are critical. Critical theory, research and publications can 
also be of use to activists (Ibid: 263-4), and being in a position to produce such research often 
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means being willing to engage strategically within institutional constraints whilst also challenging 
and organising outside established structures (Ibid, p. 264). 
 
3.2.3. Practitioners as theorists 
Practitioners and activists are Ôalways already doing theory and theorists are always already 
political subjectsÕ (Day, 2005: 206, italics in the original). The individuals and groups being 
researched have their own sets of views, beliefs, ideals and values Ð their own Ôpolitical theoryÕ, 
whether or not this is consciously articulated as such. One task of this research is to give expression 
to these theories in a context that is ÔoutsideÕ the usual domain Ð to bring the voices and theories of 
practitioners into academic theory wherein they might otherwise have been ignored. There is a 
presumption here that political theorists have often neglected to attend to the views of those 
practitioners who do not consider themselves theorists, and that this is an interesting and valuable 
thing for a theorist to do. This links with the above point that theory should remain as open as is 
possible to its ethical effects upon lived experience, and bringing in the views of practitioners is 
just one way in which this can be done. 
 
3.2.4. Empirical research and theorising practices 
Ascertaining the views and practices of practitioners will involve primary empirical research. As a 
researcher, I will also have a theory to bring to bear upon the empirical material when interpreting 
its significance for the programme of research. Usually, in the field of political science, where most 
empirical research takes place, this is an explanatory or classificatory theory. In this case, however, 
it is an explicitly normative theory relating to the concept of citizenship: namely, that other ways of 
thinking about and doing citizenship are both possible and desirable. There are therefore two levels 
of discourse and practice in operation simultaneously: those of practitioners and those of the 
researcher, and a potentially reciprocal relationship between the two. Attending to the relationship 
between theory and practice, without closing the one off from the other, is essential to promote 
sustainable alternatives to the neoliberal order:  
This can only be a practical theory and a theoretical practice, one that avoids both the 
quiescence brought on by excessive abstraction and the frustrations inherent in setting out to 
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Ôdo somethingÕ without paying adequate attention to what others are doing now and have done 
before (Day, 2005: 205). 
 
The critical utopian methodology used in this project attempts to bring theory and practice into a 
mutually reconstructive dialogue, whilst critiquing and transgressing images of academy as an elite 
prescriptive vanguard of authoritative knowledge production. Both critical utopian theories and 
critical utopian practices oppose the status quo and offer alternatives that are creative and 
affirmative. Bringing critical utopian theories and practices into dialogue also allows us to consider 
how each informs but also transgresses the other: theory can highlight the limitations of, and new 
possibilities for, practice, whilst practice can reveal inadequacies of theoretical abstractions. 
 
3.2.5. Positionality: theorist as engaged practitioner 
A traditional view of the production and dissemination of knowledge tends to assume that 
knowledges produced through research will dissipate from the academy into the wider world 
through publishing, the media, the internet, (Mitchell, 2004) through teaching and on-campus 
activities (Castree, 1999), and through influence on policy and decision-makers in the traditionally 
conceived public arenas of state politics and bureaucracy (Blowers, 1974). An ethos of non-
hierarchy and anti-hegemony suggests a different relation to the production of knowledge. This 
kind of relation is fairly well established in participatory- or solidarity-action research, which 
attempts to disrupt and transgress the boundary between research participants and the researcher by 
conducting research as a mutual process between the researcher and practitioners, who jointly 
define the subject and guide the process of research through a mutually engaged programme of 
social or political action (Pain, 2003; Pickerill & Chatterton 2006). Solidarity action research 
involves a dual role for the researcher: Ôwe are unashamedly commentators on Ð and also 
embedded participants within Ð autonomous projectsÕ (Pickerill & Chatterton, 2006: 732). This 
kind of research does not claim the impartial viewpoint and dispassionate distance required by 
most traditional social science: ÔOur encounters are as academic-activists, undertaking embedded 
participatory forms of action research which are empathic and interactive rather than extractive and 
objectiveÕ (Ibid: 732).  
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Although I am not undertaking action research in this project, my positionality as researcher 
reflects this ethos. A commitment to solidarity and mutual aid has been a guiding principle of the 
research agenda and practices. I am neither a fully involved participant in the communities that I 
study, nor do I retain a safe distance and objective viewpoint. Whilst I have not been involved in 
self-consciously political actions with the subjects of this study, I am involved in grassroots radical 
educational and cultural projects and have aims, viewpoints and experiences that overlap and 
intertwine with participants in this study, and attempt to contribute to a broader movement for 
autonomy.  My interstitial role reflects a growing body of literature on Ôscholar-activismÕ 
(Chatterton, 2008; The Autonomous Geographies Collective, 2010), which entreats radical 
academics Ôto collectively organise, strategise and actÕ (The Autonomous Geographies Project, 
2010: 264-5). 
 
3.3. Theory: role and selection criteria 
Above, I argued that theory can be viewed as a practice that has effects upon everyday life. The 
critical utopian approach, outlined in the previous chapter, allows us to differentiate between two 
different types of theory Ð dominant, hegemonising theory and critical utopian theory. A brief 
summary of the differing aspects of these will operate as selection criteria for theories used in the 
following chapters. In each theoretical chapter, I will begin with dominant theorisations of the 
concept at hand (territory, authority or rights). These will then be criticised and transgressed using 
theories that fulfil the criteria for a critical utopian approach. The selection criteria for the theories 
used in theoretical chapters, summarised from Chapter 2 are as therefore follows: 
Mode of theorising Dominant Critical Utopian 
Characteristics ¥ Truth-claiming 
¥ Foundational assumptions 
¥ Efface contingency 
¥ Hegemonising 
¥ Hierarchical 
¥ Seek integration of difference 
into a higher unity 
¥ Seek closure 
¥ Creative 
¥ Oppositional 
¥ Disruptive and transgressive 
¥ Non-hegemonising 
¥ Anti-hierarchical 
¥ Valorise difference 
¥ Infinitely critical 
 
Examples Most ÔcanonicalÕ theory; (some) 
liberalism, civic republicanism, 
classical Marxism, Ôidentity politicsÕ 
(Some) anarchism, post-structuralism, 
post-structural and post-left 
anarchism, post-structuralist 
influenced feminism, queer theory, 
deep ecology 
Figure 3-1: Theory selection 
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3.3.1. Limitations of theory selection 
There are some potentially serious problems with dividing up bodies of theories in this way. 
Focusing on what theories have in common rather than how they differ can lead to 
oversimplification, particularly in the case of dominant theories where it may appear that I am 
attacking a Ôstraw manÕ. It is important to note that since they are defined in terms of function 
rather than a specific or identifiable form or content, critical utopianism and dominance can exist 
within the same theories: dominant theories may have critical utopian aspects and vice versa. 
However, it is my contention that some theories are more dominant, and dominating, than others, 
and I will stand by this contention in the face of the acknowledged limitations, with the proviso that 
in the upcoming chapters I will be careful and explicit in each case as to why I have chosen a 
specific theorist or body of theory as representative of dominant thought. Sometimes this will mean 
only picking out one aspect of a theoristÕs work as ÔdominantÕ when other aspects might be 
considered Ôcritical utopianÕ. I also hope to ameliorate the problems of oversimplification when I 
consider practices, which often transgress both dominant and critical utopian formulations, and 
thus highlight the critical utopian aspects of dominant theory and the dominating effects of some 
critical utopian theory. Indeed, it is frequently the case that oppositional practices parody dominant 
models. In some cases this might be viewed as a co-optation or recuperation of the radicalism of 
the individuals and groups who I study. In other cases, however, it is a consciously chosen strategy 
for achieving radical goals. The ÔimplicationsÕ section of each of the chapters on practice forms a 
kind of metatheoretical analysis of the implications of the dialogue between different theories and 
practices, and highlights gaps and weaknesses of both dominant and critical utopian theories as 
well as in the theories of practitioners, in the hope of opening up space for further theorising. It is 
this final part of the dialogue that begins to imagine the conditions for a critical utopian conception 
of citizenship Ð but does not seek closure or conclusion, since the critical utopian process is 
ongoing. 
 
3.4. Studying practices 
Practitioners who are involved in activities positioned self-consciously outside the domain of what 
is usually associated with citizenship have something valuable to offer a critical and transgressive 
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theory of citizenship. The case study method is particularly useful for my purposes here. In 
particular, I will be studying what I am terming Ôautonomous spacesÕ as specific and clearly 
identifiable instances of critical utopian practice (the links between autonomy and critical 
utopianism were outlined in Chapter 2). Although I would not like to suggest that these are the only 
places in which critical utopian practices occur, they are places where people engage in such 
practices as part of their core intent. Although the groups and communities that I am terming 
Ôautonomous spacesÕ do not always self-define as such25 the terminology is useful for a preliminary 
outline of selection criteria, since they encompass a broader range of activities that speak to this 
project than would be included if I decided to look at, for example, Ôintentional communitiesÕ or 
Ôhousing co-operativesÕ, and certainly more so if than if I decided only to look at communities that 
self-defined as any singular category
26
. Due to these complexities, it is important to clearly justify 
why I consider autonomous spaces to be useful places to look for critical utopian practices, and 
also the selection criteria that I will use to identify such spaces.  
 
3.4.1. Case selection 
3.4.1.1. Case selection criteria 
I have based my case selection on the concept of autonomy, as outlined in the previous chapter 
(section 2.4). I will specifically be using the terminology of Ôautonomous spacesÕ following the 
research of Jenny Pickerill, Paul Chatterton and Stuart Hodkinson in their collaborative 
ÔAutonomous GeographiesÕ project27. Defining autonomous spaces is not uncontroversial, since in 
line with the critical utopian impulse, movements for autonomy Ôdo not subscribe to the belief that 
there is one over-riding truth or one true form of autonomyÕ (Katsiaficas, 2006 [1997]: 8). 
However, a definition is necessary for case selection. Katsiaficas has outlined Ôa number of 
                                            
25
 The term is, however, within the vocabulary of some activists. For a small selection of examples of the use of the term ÔautonomousÕ 
to denote spaces of resistance and the creation of alternatives in activist-oriented media, see: Schnews. (2008, April Friday 11). Weekly 
Schnews: Issue 628. from Schnews: http://www.schnews.org.uk/archive/news628.htm accessed June 9, 2009; WOMBLES, (2002, May 
1). Mayday Autonomus Actions.  from Our May Day: http://ourmayday.org/uk/autonomous.html.j25.or.html accessed 6 June, 2009; Do 
or Die Web Team. (1999, June Friday 18). Autonomous Spaces. from Do or Die (Issue 8): http://www.eco-
action.org/dod/no8/space.html accessed June 9, 2009 
26
 CommunitiesÕ self-definitions are incredibly variable and diverse, and individual members sometimes define the natures and purposes 
of the same community in different terms. 
27
 The outputs of this collaborative research have included a website (Chatterton, Hodkinson, & Pickerill, 2007, 
http://www.autonomousgeographies.org/ accessed April 9, 2009), pamphlets aimed at activist communities (Chatterton, 2007; 
Chatterton & Hodkinson, 2006) and academic articles (Hodkinson & Chatterton, 2006; Pickerill & Chatterton, 2006; Chatterton & 
Hodkinson, 2007). 
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principles that provide coherenceÕ to the specifically European autonomous movements, although 
he states that these principles do have wider significance internationally (Ibid: 9). I have used these 
as the basis of my case selection criteria. It is important to reiterate that these principles of 
autonomy are based in desire and intent rather than needing to be fully realised.  
 
My benchmark for case selection has been that communitiesÕ aims speak to the following criteria: 
¥ Independence from hierarchically organized political parties, trade unions and traditional 
conceptions of politics as well as from ÔÒpseudo-democraticÓ capitalismÕ
28
 
¥ Collectivism  
¥ Participative forms of decision-making, such as consensus or direct-democratic  
¥ Oppositional and resistant  
¥ Belief in diversity and continuing differentiation  
¥ Belief in self-management and the need for individuals and groups to take responsibility for their 
own actions  
¥ Orientation toward the transformation of everyday life  
(Adapted from Katsiaficas, 2006 [1997]: 7-8) 
Examples of autonomous spaces, using this definition, may include, but are not limited to: social 
centres, eco-villages, housing co-operatives, intentional communities and workersÕ co-operatives 
(Pickerill & Chatterton, 2006: 731; Bey, 1993). The forms of these spaces, and the nature and 
extent of their autonomy, are as multiple as the futures they propose. It is therefore important to 
note that my case studies are very different from one another. Selecting very different case studies 
is a well-established method in the social sciences, but is usually undertaken to establish 
comparability and representativeness (Gerring, 2004, p. 348). In this study, however, the necessity 
for selecting very different cases arises due to practical constraints Ð because autonomous 
communities in the UK are all very different Ð and also because I am interested in the idea of 
critical utopianism, and in my casesÕ function of critiquing dominant models of citizenship, which 
presupposes difference and even division rather than a unified singular utopia. Thus it may seem 
that I concentrate on certain functional or processual similarities between cases Ð particularly 
                                            
28
 This principle is defined in terms of shared intent, rather than actuality, since complete autonomy is arguably impossible. Also, 
independence is defined in terms of the community, rather than individuals, who may have various overlapping affiliations with other 
groups and organisations.  
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shared critique and methods of resistance and creation Ð rather than in differences of form and 
content.  
 
3.4.1.2. Limits of case selection 
I decided to confine my study to the United Kingdom. This is problematic in some respects. It 
raises issues of cultural exclusivity and generalisability. However, I do not believe that this 
problem would diminish if I took my research further afield, since considering the potentially 
limitless numbers of autonomous spaces worldwide, it would be hard to justify singling out any 
particular examples, were generalisability a goal. Indeed, the purpose of this study is not to make 
generalisations but rather to open a field of thought to difference. ÔCritical utopian citizenshipÕ does 
not propose a single model or blueprint for the future or universal model of citizenship, but rather 
an ongoing criticality that is always open to difference. It is a method rather than an institution. 
This exercise is potentially limitless and indeed spaces and communities further afield could form a 
basis for further study, as well as resistant groups that do not fall under the rubric of Ôautonomous 
spacesÕ, such as countercultural, indigenous, networked and online movements. Restricting the 
study to the United Kingdom has reduced the environmental impact of the study, and unnecessary 
air-travel in particular would have been difficult to justify in the context of a project premised on 
issues of social and environmental justice. This is in line with the scholar-activist ethos that Ôour 
work as academics should be socially and ecologically responsibleÕ (The Autonomous Geographies 
Collective, 2010: 265). The restriction of the study was also based on practical reasons Ð expense, 
linguistic ability and time constraints were all prohibitive. 
 
3.4.1.3. Practicalities of case selection 
Potential cases were identified using the Diggers and Dreamers website 
(http://www.diggersanddreamers.org.uk accessed August 13, 2009) which provides a directory of groups 
dedicated to communal living in the United Kingdom, and also using Paul Chatterton and Stewart 
HodkinsonÕs (2006) article ÒAutonomy in the City?Ó which provides a list of social centres in 
existence in the United Kingdom at the time of its going to print. CommunitiesÕ aims and principles 
were researched on the Diggers and Dreamers website, which provides brief descriptions of 
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communities, or through communitiesÕ own websites which often provide copies of their 
constitutions or agreed aims and principles
29
. Occasionally it was necessary to request further 
information via email. Those communities that met the selection criteria stated previously (section 
3.4.1.1) were contacted through email or written letter with a brief explanation of my research and 
a request to visit.  
 
A surprisingly small number of communities replied to my initial contact. This was perhaps due to 
the fact that the communities use participative decision-making processes, often requiring 
consensus, which can often be slow. Sending a physical letter through the post to follow-up emails 
ameliorated this somewhat, since it meant that the person who dealt with such communications had 
something tangible to present at a meeting. In total, I was invited to visit twelve communities, and 
after discussion and planning ten of these visits turned out to be feasible. A brief description of my 
cases can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
3.4.2. Empirical methods 
In this section, I will outline the research methods that I used before and during visits to 
communities, how these methods were adapted for this project, and how the methods attempt to 
address the research questions. The first two of the four research questions outlined in the 
Introduction (section 1.3) are addressed through theoretical analysis, the fourth is addressed after 
empirical data has been gathered, taking an interpretive approach with relation to the relevance for 
citizenship studies. The focus for empirical research is therefore on the third research question: 
What theoretical and practiced alternatives to dominant models of citizenship do political agents in 
autonomous democratic communities offer? It might be useful to unpack this question: 
¥ What shared vision of alternative modes of belonging, participation and ethics do 
autonomous communities put forward? 
 
¥ What theories30 of belonging, participation and ethics do individual members of 
autonomous democratic communities have, and how do these speak to the shared vision? 
                                            
29
 These are usually decided by the communities as a whole through consensus Ð the process of consensus is described more fully in 
Chapter 7.  
30
 Although this terminology might seem adventitious, I have previously argued that I believe members of communities do have their 
own Ôpolitical theoriesÕ, even if these are not consciously articulated as such (see section 2.3.2). 
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¥ How do practices affirm, and in what ways do they transgress theories? 
 
¥ Do autonomous spaces provide conditions for critical utopian modes of belonging, 
participation and ethics? 
The following research methods were used to obtain the information: 
3.4.2.1. Documentary analysis 
Documentary analysis is a well-established method in the social sciences (Burnham et. al., 2004: 
165-188; Bryman, 2004: 380-397). Documentary analysis was undertaken before, during and after 
visits to communities. Documents included community websites, published books and pamphlets 
and documents obtained from communities through the mail or during visits (such as community 
maps and organisational diagrams Ð for examples see appendices 3 & 4). Documents were 
particularly useful for obtaining information needed to answer the first of the above questions, on 
the shared visions of the communities (where they were presented as such) and were usually the 
outcome of consensus. Documents such as websites
31
 and published works
32
 often provide detailed 
insight into community histories and organisation, and some documents, in particular pamphlets, 
newsletters and published works, provide information on individual perspectives
33
. It can 
sometimes be difficult to verify the content of documents, as they are designed to appear 
authoritative and can disguise particular interests (MacDonald 2001: 205). To increase reliability, 
this method was triangulated with interviews and participant observation. This was particularly 
important when considering matters of organisation and decision-making processes, since practices 
often transgressed the formal rules or procedures outlined in written formats. 
 
3.4.2.2. Interviews 
Interviews are a central qualitative approach in social studies primarily used to gain information on 
subjectsÕ worldviews (Wengraf, 2000: passim; Burnham et. al., 2004: 205-220; Bryman, 2004: 
                                            
31
 See, for example, Kebele Community Cooperative. (n.d.). History. Retrieved June 16, 2009 from Kebele Community Cooperative 
website: http://www.kebelecoop.org/History.html 
32
 See, for example, Walker (ed.) (1994), an edited collection of writings by community members about the history, work, beliefs and 
practices of the Findhorn Foundation.  
33
 See for example Coventry Peace House. (n.d.). I Came Here for Safety: The reality of detention and destitution for asylum seekers. 
Coventry: Coventry Peace House publication. This self-published booklet provides factual information on the British asylum system, 
personal accounts from asylum seekers and also personal accounts from members of Peace House and volunteers at the communityÕs 
refugee shelter of experiences of working with asylum seekers. 
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318-314). Interviews were particularly important in this project which attempts to take the 
worldviews of activists seriously and the method was used to gain insight into individual membersÕ 
perspectives on participation, belonging and ethics, as well as the effects of shared beliefs and 
practices Ð the conditions of the community - upon individuals. They are also used to compare 
personal opinions on how things work to the outward statements of groupsÕ aims and purposes. 
These themes were kept in mind when compiling an interview schedule, which can be found in 
Appendix 2. I also included number of questions asking for intervieweesÕ opinions on citizenship. 
My assumption was that I was operating with a wider conceptualisation of citizenship than that 
held by participants in the study, but the question was included to ascertain whether this was really 
the case. These questions were strategically placed at the end of the interview, since they are of 
secondary importance and I did not want the themes to influence or dominate interviews. The 
interviews were also strategically structured so that more personal or sensitive questions were 
placed towards the middle and end of the interviews, allowing me time to build a rapport with 
participants. I chose to use semi-structured, rather than structured or unstructured interviews, since 
they allow the interviewer to cover the central themes of the project whilst allowing flexibility for 
participants to develop their own issues. Interviews were undertaken with 22 consenting 
participants and with written permission all interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed. 
 
Wolcott (1994) makes a useful distinction between description, analysis and interpretation in 
qualitative enquiry. All of these have been of importance in understanding my findings. 
Description means Ôto stay as close to the data as originally recordedÕ, under the assumption that 
Ôthe data speak for themselvesÕ (Wolcott, 1994: 10). Part of the purpose of this research is to allow 
activists to speak where otherwise their voices might have been ignored. This has involved quoting 
participants sometimes at great length, bringing their voices into the project. Sometimes 
participants articulate their experiences and worldviews more clearly and with greater articulacy 
and clarity of reflection than I possibly could my own, rendering further interpretation unnecessary. 
This is certainly the case when addressing the research question concerning personal viewpoints, 
although the questions on the relationship between individual and group theories, and on the 
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conditions for critical utopian modes of participation, belonging and ethics required further work 
on my part.  
 
Analysis expands and extends beyond a merely descriptive account (although is often built upon 
one which has already been given) and Ôproceeds in some careful, systematic way to identify key 
factors and relationships among themÕ (Ibid: 10). Analysis involved looking for key themes across 
interviews, and organising extracts into common themes
34
. This process is necessarily reductive, 
since potential ÔcategoriesÕ or ÔthemesÕ are infinite. The process is time consuming and involves 
getting very close to the data, getting to know it with incredible familiarity, which alleviates the 
reductive character somewhat. Frequent return to the transcripts is also important, because often 
unique, original and inventive articulations are just as important as those that recur through 
interviews. Interpretation follows from analysis and description, and:  
does not claim to be as convincingly or compulsively ÒscientificÓ as [analysis], being neither as 
loyal to nor as restricted by observational data only. The goal is to make sense of what goes on, 
to reach for understanding or explanation beyond the limits of what can be explained with the 
degree of certainty usually associated with analysis (Ibid: 10). 
 
Interpretation addresses meanings and contexts of interview extracts, the relationship between 
individual and community theories, between theories and practices, and between all of this and the 
wider purpose of my project Ð critical utopian citizenship. Here I pay attention to any linkages 
between my observations and the theory that I have been criticising, transgressing and attempting 
to build. Interpretation will form the basis of my broad theory of critical and transgressive 
citizenship. 
 
3.4.2.3. Participant observation 
Participant observation has its roots in anthropology but is now widely used in many disciplines 
across the social sciences (Burnham et. al., 2004: 221-249; Bryman, 2004: 291-317). It has played 
an important role in this project, which involves the study of activities, behaviour and attitudes that 
                                            
34
 For this, I used NVivo
© 
software which allows the coding and organisation of data into themes in something akin to a linked electronic 
filing system. For the purposes that I used the software, more traditional methods of colour coding, or cutting up and filing extracts from 
printed copies of interviews would have worked equally as well, but would have been (even) more time consuming. 
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are outside the realms of my own previous experience. The values, beliefs, language and behaviour 
of some of the participants may differ somewhat from political behaviour to which myself as the 
researcher, and potential readers of my research, are accustomed. The project also involves trying 
to map the participatory discourses and practices of individuals who are very closely involved with 
one another often in the context of a strong sense of shared purpose (communities and groups may 
have their own in-group quasi-theory, set of references and symbols, akin to a kind of Ôgroup-
slangÕ, of which it could prove problematic and difficult for an ÔoutsiderÕ immediately to 
understand the significance). Thus it is important to gain an insiderÕs point of view (as a 
participant) in order to interpret or translate what is seen and heard as a researcher (observer). 
Participant observation involves taking extensive field notes, including Ôthick descriptionsÕ (Geertz, 
1973). I have quoted extracts from my diaries occasionally in the ÔpracticeÕ chapters of this thesis, 
although I have relied more heavily on interview extracts, as a more important aim of the thesis is 
to give voice to practitioners. Participant observation was useful to verify information and to fill in 
gaps. 
 
Participant observation and interviewing are intimate, embedded and embodied forms of research. 
Unlike documentary analysis they encourage the researcher to observe and participate in emotions, 
feelings and relationships. There is an emphasis on the everyday. The focus of this approach is on 
intersubjective understanding and empathy. Bruyn says of his first impressions during his first use 
of participant observation: ÔI realized that what I was studying was not human behaviour so much 
as the inner collective life of people who were deeply involved personally in changing their 
community and in being changed by itÕ (Bruyn, 1966: x). This kind of reciprocally constitutive 
relationship between the individual and their community is one of the important aspects of 
autonomous spaces I am trying to understand, study and articulate through critical utopian 
citizenship. However, it is likely that community members will not understand their collective life 
in the same terms as myself, and participant observation is one way to access their experiences 
before bringing them into dialogue with academic theory and developing them as sources for my 
own theory-building. In this sense, ÔcitizenshipÕ becomes what Bruyn terms a Ôsensitising conceptÕ, 
that is a term which is not derived indigenously from the culture under observation, but rather is 
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Ôformulated by the scientist who sees significant areas of social life that require definition. He takes 
the conventional meaning into account in his own definition but he is not ruled by itÕ (Ibid: 38). 
This reflects the anthropological distinction between ÔemicÕ (from ÔphonemicÕ) research, which 
focuses on the intrinsic cultural distinctions that are meaningful to the members of a given society, 
and the ÔeticÕ (from ÔphoneticÕ) perspective, which relies upon the extrinsic concepts and categories 
that have meaning for ÔscientificÕ observers (Gellner, 1986: 144-5). Here, the concept of critical 
utopian citizenship is being deployed mainly in an etic sense: there is a strong possibility that as the 
researcher, I am operating with a broader (or different) view of citizenship than the 
practitioners/participants of the study. This becomes problematic in light of the possibility that 
some participants may have a negative evaluative judgement concerning the concept of citizenship 
itself (as I do, within many of its current formulations or constructions). It has therefore been 
necessary at times to translate my understanding of ÔcitizenshipÕ in other terms to the participants Ð 
belonging, participation, ethical values - in order to investigate their beliefs and attitudes 
concerning my formulation, and then to translate words and actions, which practitioners might term 
otherwise, as critical utopian citizenship. It is important to emphasise the multiple, contested and 
constructed nature of the concept I am attempting to give voice to, which might perhaps better 
(although more clumsily) have been termed critical utopian citizenships, so as to avoid the ethical 
and conceptual pitfalls (particularly in the context of the theoretical framework in which I am 
operating) of positing a transcendental model. Participant observation has helped me to gain 
understandings that have allowed me to interpret the significance of data for the wider aims of my 
project.  
 
I undertook participant observation in nine communities during the course of this research between 
April and September 2007, with visits ranging from one day to two weeks (further information can 
be found in Appendix 1). Participant observation involved attending meetings in order personally 
to observe decision-making in action as well as participating in everyday situations in an attempt 
read in terms of power what was occurring behind seemingly self-evident interactions. This has 
allowed me to gain a perspective on how participation and relationships in alternative spaces work 
in practice. Above all, it has given me first hand experience of how it feels to live and work in a 
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wide variety of autonomous communities, even if only for short periods of time. This has involved 
a large amount of gardening and cooking, eating delicious (vegetarian) meals in good company, 
pointing a stone wall, painting and decorating, cleaning, attending seemingly endless meetings, 
visiting community-made saunas and compost toilets, demolishing a caravan by hand for recycling, 
feeding pigs, composting waste, cutting wood, meditating, dancing, attending classes and 
workshops, engaging in community outreach, making new friends, and innumerable other fantastic, 
enjoyable, extraordinary and sometimes scary experiences that unfortunately, for lack of space, do 
not enter this project as much as I would like them to. All of these activities speak to themes of 
belonging, participation, ethics, and social and environmental justice, and have relevance for 
critical utopian citizenship35. 
 
3.4.3. Limitations 
There are some limitations to these forms of research, some of which I have outlined in the 
foregoing discussion. Qualitative research can be messy, fuzzy and indeterminate Ð even more so 
in a project such as this where the population is indeterminate. This research does not attempt to 
generalise as it is about transgressing boundaries Ð the population is purposefully undefined 
because it refers to an open field of unfolding differentiation. Having said this, it has also been 
necessary to continually make generalisations, since without doing so it is impossible to speak. My 
hope is to continually undermine and transgress even my own categories and generalisations.  
 
It is important to remember that what I am observing represents a limited snapshot of a continuing 
process; that the communities and people that I am studying are involved in processes of change 
and negotiation, rather than presenting a finite and static ÔproductÕ. A renowned participant 
observer describes how time itself became a key element in his study, and how through a very 
extended stay, he realised that ÔI was taking a moving picture instead of a still photographÕ (Whyte, 
                                            
35
 I also attempted one further method - Q-methodology Ð which gives participants an opportunity to evaluate academic theories and 
discourses by sorting discursive statements printed on cards into piles depending on their level of agreement. I thought that this method 
would be useful since it transgresses the often one-way direction in which academic interpretation and evaluation operate (see 
Stephenson, 1953; Brown, 1980; McKeown & Thomas, 1988; Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993; Barry & Proops, 1999). Unfortunately, in the 
context of this project, the method was unsuccessful, since participants were either unable or unwilling to sort the statements in the 
manner required. However, the discussions arising from these attempts often provided further material for interpretation. 
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1987 [1943]: 323). It is unlikely that I was able to fully understand processes of change during my 
short visits, although this was sometimes discussed with participants.  
 
3.5. Ethics 
I have consulted the University of NottinghamÕs ÒResearch Code of ConductÓ and the Economic 
and Social Research CouncilÕs ÒResearch Ethics FrameworkÓ and have considered all the issues 
covered which are relevant to my research: all subjects were fully informed of the purpose, 
methods and intended uses of the research and what their participation would entail; participation 
was voluntary and free from coercion; written consent was obtained from all interviewees in the 
form of a signed consent form and the names of those who requested anonymity36 have been 
changed in the text of this thesis. I have also considered some issues particular to this project, and 
further issues also arose during fieldwork: 
 
¥ Some of the conceptual and methodological issues discussed in this chapter include ethical 
components. Just as there is a danger of misrepresenting political thought to practitioners, 
there is also a possibility of misrepresenting or over-theorising the actions, beliefs and 
experiences of practitioners in my own research. 
 
¥ Whilst this is endemic to research practice, here there is the particular problem of (mis-
)representing participantsÕ actions as pertaining to citizenship, when they might not self-
describe them as such or indeed may have personal objections to terminologies and values 
put forward in this thesis. Whilst a small number acknowledged that they were 
uncomfortable with my terminology, they still wished to be interviewed since they wanted 
their views to be heard. 
 
¥ Whilst participants expressed consent for material to be used for this research, which 
expressly stipulated a chance of publication, there is a danger that they might be 
unprepared for it to fully enter the public domain, or change their minds in retrospect. For 
this reason I will consider anonymising all names in any publications likely to have wider 
or comercial distribution. 
 
                                            
36
 In practice only two participants requested anonymity, and only one has been quoted in this thesis. 
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¥ There is also a need to protect people living at the margins of legality or conventional 
society. On one occasion this meant excluding information from the thesis where I had 
doubts about the effects of bringing it into the public domain.  
 
¥ Due to the nature of this project, research necessarily involved going into private spaces 
and homes. This was only done after appropriate permission had been sought and due 
respect and care were observed at all times. Whilst the vast majority of community 
members welcomed me happily into their spaces, some were more wary. I was careful not 
to approach anyone for participation in the project who seemed unwilling. 
 
In conclusion to this chapter and to address the first three of these points I would like to emphasise 
that although many of the ideas offered in this project have been influenced by and formulated 
through discussions with participants, full responsibility for values and political views expressed 
herein remains my own.  
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4. Transgressing Territory: Theory 
 
4.1. Introduction and working definitions 
Issues of space, place, and scale are incredibly important for politics and citizenship, with public 
space forming an integral feature of western democracy going back to the agora of ancient Greece 
(Isin, 1997: 118; Bickford, 2000: 355; Hirst, 2005: 10). A conceptual distinction is often drawn 
between ÒspaceÓ and ÒplaceÓ. Space is oten viewed as more abstract than place Ð Ôwhen we speak 
of space we tend to think of outer-space or the spaces of geometry. Spaces have areas and volumes. 
Places have spaces between themÕ (Cresswell, 2004: 8). Place, on the other hand, has a social 
element:  ÔWhen humans invest meaning in a portion of space and then become attached to it in 
some way (naming is one such way) it becomes a placeÕ (Ibid: 10). This chapter is not primarily 
concerned with the particular significances of particular places, but rather with the ways in which 
spaces are made into places, the power dynamics that are involved in such processes, and the 
ethical effects of these. Following Massey (2005) I would like to move away from the image of 
space as a surface, and place as a bounded mark upon a map, and move towards an understanding 
of space as Ôa simultaneity of stories-so-farÕ (Massey, 2005: 130) and of places as Ôcollections of 
these stories, articulations within the wider power-geometries of spaceÕ (Ibid: 130). For Massey, 
viewing space in relational terms means refusing to map dichotomies such as space/place and 
local/global onto the couplet of concrete/abstract - the local and the global should be seen as 
mutually constituted (Ibid: 184-5). For Massey, the distinction that should be drawn, rather, is 
between understandings of space that are static and totalising Ð embedded in concepts of Ôstasis, 
closure and representationÕ (Ibid: 13) and those understandings which emphasise Ôheterogeneity; 
relationality; coevalnessÉ liveliness indeedÕ (Ibid: 13; elipsis in the original). A politics that is 
open to the future Ôentails a radically open time-space, a space which is always being madeÕ (Ibid: 
189). This mirrors the distinction between dominant, totalising utopias and critical utopias. As a 
theory of imagined and practiced alternatives, and a politics experimentation and the education of 
desire, critical utopianism clearly has a role to play here in the construction of radically new 
spaces.  
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As a tentative, working definition (which will be developed throughout the chapter): Territory is a 
type of place, insofar as it is a manner or organising space that operates through human 
signification, but with an added political element - sovereignty. Territory defines the boundaries of 
the polity that the citizen exists in relation to (Sassen, 2006: 277). A political geographic definition 
implies that the concept of territory has material significance as a model of organising space and 
people: Ôterritory appears as a material, spatial notion establishing links between politics, people, 
and the natural settingÕ (Gottman, 1973: ix). This chapter engages theoretically with the concept of 
territory. The structure of this chapter mirrors those on ÒTransgressing Authority: TheoryÓ (Chapter 
6) and ÒTransgressing Rights: TheoryÓ (Chapter 8), and begins by outlining dominant theorisations 
of the concept of territory, and associated formations of citizenship. Dominant models of territory 
will be drawn from the western political cannon, contemporary state-democratic citizenship theory 
and political geography, with an emphasis on the liberal tradition which has arguably had the most 
influence on the contemporary organisation of space (Gottman, 1973: 53-90).  
 
The grouping together of theories as ÔdominantÕ presents dangers of oversimplification. These 
theories are multiple and diverse, with some historically or potentially more ÔdominantÕ than 
others. As throughout, I will be using ÔdominantÕ in the Lefebvrian sense of ÔdominatingÕ 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 164-168), or in the Deleuzian sense of major or Royal science (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988: 405, 412)
37
. In this chapter, I argue that despite their diversity, dominant 
approaches to the concept of territory share certain foundational assumptions. These include the 
ontological construction of territory as alienated sovereignty38, the commodification of physical 
space, and the hierarchical imposition of the built environment. In the first part of this chapter I 
critique dominant approaches by deconstructing their foundational assumptions and considering 
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 See section 3.3 for logics guiding theory selection. 
38
 Massey warns against associating the local with the ÔconcreteÕ and other scales with ÔabstractionÕ: ÔIf space is to be viewed 
relationally then it is no more than the sum of our relations and interconnections, and the lack of them; it is to utterly ÒconcreteÕ (Massey 
2005: 184). For Massey, romanticising the local is another form of dangerous abstraction (Ibid: 184). It is therefore important to note 
that my understanding of abstraction is based on kinds of relationships involving hierarchy, representation, and hegemonic unification 
rather than on scale. However, it is also important to note that all of the communities that I study in this thesis could be described as 
ÔlocalÕ and although I view them as having porous boundaries and wider significance (discussed particularly in chapters 8 & 9), I also 
view the small-scale as a particularly important site for resistance and the creation of non-totalising alternatives (discussed in chapters 6 
& 7). 
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their normative implications for citizenship. I will then attempt to map the theoretical positions that 
proceed from this deconstruction: the Ôcritical utopiaÕ that makes critical engagement possible, or 
the Ôno placeÕ from which we can reflect upon and deconstruct dominant notions of territory and 
citizenship. In this section I have focused upon radical political geography, post-structuralism, 
post-feminism, psychogeography, situationist theory and contemporary (post-structural and post-
left) anarchism. I have selected these theories since they offer non-territorial and non-foundational 
approaches to the understanding of physical space and place. This discussion will form the basis 
for the following chapter on utopian praxis, where I use examples from my fieldwork to consider 
functioning alternative practices of understandings, arrangements and uses of the physical 
environment in autonomous spaces. In the concluding part of this section on territory I consider the 
relationship between theory and practice and the implications for a critical understanding and 
practice of citizenship. 
 
4.2. Dominant approaches 
4.2.1. The ontological construction of territory as alienated sovereignty 
Historically and etymologically, the notion of territory is tightly bound with the notion of 
sovereignty and implies Ôland belonging to a town, a ruler or a stateÕ (Onions, 1966: 912). In 
ancient times through to the middle ages, city-states and regions had territorial sovereignty, whilst 
the sovereignty of aristocracy and royalty rested on individual allegiances or organised bodies 
rather than on the possession of areas of land (Gottman, 1973: 17). It was during the sixteenth to 
eighteenth centuries that legal and political doctrine established territorial sovereignty as the 
exclusive attribute of kingdoms or states (Ibid: 11-12). This process occurred through a 
combination of Ôpractical needÕ and Ômoral debateÕ (Ibid: 17).  
 
The shifting process of territorialisation from city-states, through nationalism, to contemporary 
dynamics of globalisation, is reflected in the history of political thought. For Plato, self-sufficiency 
and unification were sufficient to define the limits of a city (Plato, 1992 [c. 380 B.C.]: 98). For 
Aristotle, ideal territory was also seen to be defined by self-sufficiency (Aristotle, Politics, 2000 [c. 
350 BC]: 268-9). For Aristotle, the criteria by which this might be judged was conceptualised 
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differently, exposing the normativity of this formula. Machiavelli (1988 [1583]: 35-36) emphasised 
the importance of the political partitioning of space in a manner that ensured each unit had a strong 
and unified sovereign power. 
 
During the sixteenth century, the discovery of new lands led to an influx of resources to western 
Europe and the expansion of trade (to the detriment of the sources of these resources!). This led to 
rapid urban growth and the expansion of industry, as well as to a series of destructive wars 
(Gottman, 1973: 44). In 1648 the major European powers agreed to abide by principle of territorial 
integrity, signified by the Treaties of Westphalia, establishing the modern principle of the territorial 
sovereignty of clearly bounded nation states (Ibid: 44). It is with the historically contemporaneous 
theories of Hobbes (2006 [1651]) and Locke (2002 [1689]) that the territorial state comes to be 
asserted in theory as an ontological necessity rather than a normative proposition. Although each 
posits an alternative in the form of a pre-territorial Ôstate of natureÕ (Hobbes, 2006 [1651]: 68-71; 
Locke, 2002 [1689]: 2-7), this is formulated as either so unattractive that no rational being could 
possibly desire its return (Hobbes, 2006 [1651]: 70), or so far removed through historical progress 
that the status quo has become both instrumentally and morally right
39
 (Locke, 2002 [1689]: 20-
21).  
 
Hobbes and Locke both posit (different) naturalistic historical foundations for the formation of the 
sovereign territorial state, which are now widely considered to be myths (Clastres, 1977 [1974]: 5-
6; Johnston, 1982, Ch.3 passim). Their accounts are inadequate, in that they fail to account for 
situated networks and kinship networks (Clastres, 1977 [1974], passim) and the role of ideology in 
the formation of the territorial state (Johnston, 1982: 36-38). Hobbes and Locke claim to give 
historical accounts, when really their propositions are normative, and themselves play a role in the 
formation of the territorial state. Going back to the first of my disaggregated research questions in 
section 1.3 of the introduction, this serves to highlight that the historical conditions through which 
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 The meanings and implications of this term are considered in more detail in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 4: Transgressing Territory: Theory 69 
dominant models of citizenship came to be associated with the territorial nation state are rooted in 
utopianism, but a mode of utopian theorising that disguises its own fictive and creative origins 
(McManus, 2005: 3 and passim). It is important to consider the ethical and political effects of this 
mode of theorising the practices that it entails. 
 
The alienated sovereignty put forward in theories of territorial sovereignty has implications for 
citizenship. A theme of citizen homogeneity is evident throughout the foregoing discussion on 
territory, and finds particular expression in the advocacy of a common belief system or civil 
religion by many canonical philosophers (Plato, 1992 [c. 380 B.C.]: 91-92; Machiavelli, 1988 
[1583]: 39; Hobbes, 2006 [1651]: 60-61; Rousseau, 2004 [1762]: 154-156). This begins in the city-
state, showing that even non-representative democracy rests on an assumption of the total 
alienation of the rights of the individual to the entire community (see also Rousseau, 2004 [1762]: 
15). During the nineteenth century in particular, rising nationalism meant that Ôcitizenship became 
grafted onto an ideal of cultural and ethnic homogeneity rooted in a particular territoryÕ (Cowen & 
Gilbert, 2008: 12). The nation constitutes a cultural, rather than a political, identity, but liberalism 
has tended to conflate the two:  
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among 
themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others Ñ which 
make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be 
under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion 
of themselves exclusively. (Mill, 1946 [1861]: 291). 
 
This notion of cultural exclusivity creates a tension with liberal ideals of egalitarianism and 
universality. It not only creates a unified cultural identity which is internally injurious of 
difference, but it also creates a basis for exclusion; not only of those outside any given state, but 
particularly in times of increasing migration, of those inside the state. Citizenship defined by 
membership of sovereign territory thus has several implications for exclusion and the oppression of 
difference. Whereas in PlatoÕs time it was women and slaves who were excluded from citizenship 
and thus participation in politics (Hirst, 2005: 10) contemporary society usually excludes those 
born outside the territorial boundaries of any particular state leading to a discourse and institutional 
practice of citizenship/alienhood that is Ôa highly racialised rhetorical and disciplinary apparatus 
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that classifies immigrants, refugees, and border crossersÕ (Marciniak, 2006: xii; see also Croucher 
2004: 90).   
 
Territory is therefore part of a narrative of inclusion and exclusion that determines who is, and who 
is not, a citizen. This leads to an increasing tension between the rise of a discourse of human rights, 
in which ÔpersonhoodÕ rather than ÔnationhoodÕ is Ôpositioned as the criterion legitimating claims to 
welfare resources and other Òpublic goodsÓÕ (Lewis, 2004a: 2). At the same time we have 
witnessed Ôa more strident policing of international borders and an increased demonization and 
criminalization of asylum seekers and refugeesÕ (Ibid: 2). Belonging is an important aspect of 
citizenship that is often articulated in terms of membership and identity of a bounded territorial 
nation state; but it is a shifting and unstable form of membership that is undermined by, and in 
tension with other particular forms of identity and belonging Ð those of the excluded, and also 
identities of class, sexuality, gender, ethnicity or religion (Ibid: 8). In Deleuze and GuattariÕs 
terminology, a citizenship of status and identity overcodes these complexities, which are excessive 
of the concept of citizenship that tries to impose unity on multiplicity (see Deleuze & Guattari 
1988: 9). It is therefore useful to view citizenship as a relationship Ð between citizens and the state, 
citizens and other citizens, and citizens and non-citizens; as well as a process Ð that shifts across 
the life-course of individuals and within and between specific groups through historical time 
(Lewis, 2004a: 3). 
 
As well as having implications for belonging, status and identity, the scale at which territorial 
sovereignty occurs also has implications for the processes of participation and governance by 
which citizensÕ lives are organised. The alienation of the rights of the individual citizen to the 
community is a symptom of classical democracy based on the city-states, as well as the small-scale 
direct democracy of Rousseau (Rousseau, 2004 [1762]: 15). Although in Rousseau, as in classical 
democracy, all citizens are entitled to participate in decision-making, decisions ars applied to all as 
though they voted the same, even if they did not. For Hobbes, the process of unification leads to the 
concentration of power in one person, who comes to be the embodiment of morality: ÔA multitude 
of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, RepresentedÕ (Hobbes, 
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2006 [1651]: 91). Although LockeÕs government is more limited in the scope of its power over 
citizens, it still relies on a logic of representation (Locke, 2002 [1689]: 88). When sovereignty 
exists at the national scale, power is also concentrated at this level, and citizens are represented and 
ruled by an abstracted government. This abstracted view of morality leads to Ôhegemonic 
discourses of citizenship [which] have embedded within them ideas about the ÒbestÓ and most 
appropriate ways of organizing domestic, sexual, work, or leisure activitiesÕ (Lewis, 2004a: 8) that 
are again unified at the abstracted level of territorial governance. These overcode Ôpractices of the 
everydayÕ (Ibid: 8), which again tend to be in excess of these universal moral codes. Such forms of 
everyday life and experience are also potential bases of critique and resistance: Ôthe actual practices 
of everyday life É might be deployed in opposition to hegemonic conceptions and/or be the basis 
of claims for an extended or deepened citizenshipÕ (Ibid: 8). 
 
4.2.2. The commodification of physical space 
Traditionally, political theory and practice externalises the physical environment. Space is seen as 
separate from, and categorically outside, our human bodies and subjectivities. This tendency to 
ÔotherÕ space also implies a relation of domination. Consider the Christian belief, evident in Locke, 
that nature was given by God to mankind to make use of as he willed: ÔThe earth, and all that is 
therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their beingÕ (Locke, 2002 [1689]: 12).  
 
This externalisation and domination of nature leads to a second property with which dominant 
approaches imbue the physical environment: the appropriation and marketability of space. When 
space is seen as something that can be treated as humans will in a one-way relation of domination, 
it does not take a great leap to transform it into an exchange commodity:  
God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the 
greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant 
it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and 
rational, (and labour was to be his title to it) (Locke, 2002 [1689]: 16). 
 
For Locke, the essence of property is labour, which brings property into the domain of the self: 
ÔThe labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly hisÕ (Ibid: 13). Locke, 
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in a double move, asserts that land is originally owned in common, but that individual ownership is 
necessary (and must be defended by the state) in order that land can be properly cultivated and 
made use of: ÔLockeÕs astonishing achievement was to base the property right on natural right and 
natural law, and then to remove all the natural limits from the property rightÕ (Macpherson, 1962: 
199). Locke thus Ôjustified the specifically capitalist appropriation of land and moneyÕ (Ibid: 208). 
 
This mythologisation of land enclosure goes some way to concealing the fact that the enclosure of 
land, which was occurring in earnest in the seventeenth century and increased throughout the 
eighteenth century (Thompson, 1991 [1963], passim), was something that was occurring during 
LockeÕs lifetime (and probably influenced by theorists such as himself) rather than during some 
mythical, pre-civilized past. At this time, escalating industrialisation and the application of 
capitalist principles to farming struck to the heart of traditional communities because it involved 
removing land from common use (Ôthe commonsÕ); a practice for which the contemporaneous 
moral justifications were usually couched in similar terms to LockeÕs efficiency principle: ÔThe 
arguments of the enclosure propagandists were commonly phrased in terms of higher rental values 
and yield per acreÕ (Ibid: 237).  This was to the serious detriment of the poorer smallholding and 
landless commoners (Ward, 2005 [2002]: 139-151). An alternative conception of land enclosures 
to those posited by state of nature theorists portrays them as Ôdeliberate and necessary mechanisms 
of domination, exploitation and powerÕ (Chatterton & Hodkinson, 2007: 202).  
 
The ideas of possessive individualism and the instrumental necessity of private ownership of land 
continue in contemporary political theory and practice. Most notably, rational choice theory has 
been used to explain why rational actors, in seeking to maximise their own gain, can produce 
collective outcomes that are at best sub-optimal, at worst destructive. In ÒThe Tragedy of the 
CommonsÓ, Hardin (1968) uses the metaphor of a pasture where herdsmen are free to graze as 
many cattle as they wish. In ÔrationallyÕ seeking to maximise this opportunity, each herdsman 
allows as many cattle as possible to graze, so that the pasture is grazed beyond carrying capacity 
and thus ruined for everyone. The conclusion is arrived at that Ôfreedom in a commons brings ruin 
to allÕ (Hardin, 1968: 1244). This is used as a metaphor for overpopulation and environmental 
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destruction. The policy prescriptions implied by this metaphor are made explicit: we must institute 
Ôtaxes and other coercive devices to escape the horror of the commonsÕ (Ibid: 1247). Contemporary 
possessive individualism thus provides continued justification for practices of domination. Citizens 
are simultaneously given rights to ownership of land and property at the same time that these rights 
are undermined by the very fact that the guarantor of rights is a hierarchical and abstract entity able 
to reframe and restrict these rights (this is the paradox of sovereignty, which is further discussed in 
Chapters 8 & 9). This leads to an image of Ôcitizenship as an abstract status in which formal 
equality to make claims against the state É masks forms of inequality that are linked to social 
divisions and inequalities of social powerÕ (Lewis, 2004a: 8; see also Marshall & Bottomore, 1992 
[1949]). 
 
A major problem with dominant theories of territorial enclosure and possessive individualism is 
that private ownership is posited as an ontological necessity, based in discourses first about God 
and nature, and then about rationality. The normativity of these theories can be exposed through 
empirical evidence suggesting alternative possibilities. Ostrom takes issue with HardinÕs, and other 
rational choice models, which suggest the necessity in commons-governance of either Ôan external 
LeviathanÕ (Ostrom, 1990: 9) or Ôthe imposition of private property rightsÕ (Ibid: 12).  She stresses 
the danger of using metaphors as the basis for policy when these metaphors may not necessarily be 
borne out in reality and contends that there are both Ôtheoretical and empirical alternatives to the 
assertion that those involved cannot extricate themselves from the problems faced when multiple 
individuals use a given resourceÕ (Ibid: 21). Ostrom identifies her problem early on: Ôthe key to my 
argument is that some individuals have broken out of the trap inherent within the commons 
dilemma, whereas others continue remorsefully trapped into destroying their own resourcesÕ (Ibid: 
21). She is able to provide a series of counterfactual case studies, which although not generalisable 
to all situations, certainly provide sufficient evidence of the possibility of mutual co-operation in 
the context of common ownership to undermine possessive individualistic models of citizenship 
based on the ontological necessity of private land ownership. 
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Once we have undermined notions of private property rights rooted in ontological necessity, the 
ethical implications of their effects and the implications for citizenship gain increasing importance. 
These include a process of privatisation akin to eighteenth century enclosures of the public spaces 
of society and politics. It is important to note that enclosure should not be conceptualised as a one-
off event that ended in the nineteenth century, but rather as Ôa constant feature of capitalism in 
response to its contradictionsÕ (Chatterton & Hodkinson, 2007: 202). Chatterton and Hodkinson 
chart how land enclosure has been paralleled in contemporary society, particularly during the 
Ôneoliberal turn from the mid 1970s onwardsÕ:  
International business and its state partners in government and the International Finance 
Institutions (IFIs) have orchestrated a dramatic and unprecedented enclosure of land and life in 
almost every corner of the globe (Ibid: 202). 
 
This has had devastating implications on a global scale, leading to the replacement of 
ÔÓcolonialismÓ and formal independence with Òneo-colonialismÓÕ (Ibid: 202) by which Ôthe rich 
North strips poor countries of their natural resources and wealthÕ (Ibid: 203)40. 
 
The commodification and capitalisation of space are widely understood to create uneven economic 
development, often articulated in terms of ÔcoreÕ or ÔcentreÕ and ÔperipheryÕ (Gottman (ed.), 1980, 
passim; Johnston, 1982: 73 & 123). On a global scale, the core consists of Ôthe successful colonial 
powers of the nineteenth century plus the more recent neoimperial powers (Johnston, 1982: 73). 
Core countries are Ôrecipients of the surplus exploited elsewhere in the world economyÕ (Ibid: 73). 
The perifery is Ôthe other extreme of the world economy, the set of states in which neocolonial and 
neoimperial exploitation is greatest, where the returns to indigenous labour are smallest and levels 
of consumption lowestÕ (Ibid: 75).  
 
                                            
40
 There is a large and useful literature from critical geography on the dynamic between commons-enclosure and commoning practices, 
in particular in relation to primitive accumulation and disposession, which furthers this critique (see particularly The Midnight Notes 
Collective 1992 & 2003; Harvey 1996 & 2000; DeAngelis 2006; Linebaugh & Rediker 2008; Linebaugh 2009). A key theme is the 
difference of perspective between the social forces of capital and the accumulation of monetary value, and social forces that strive to 
rearrange life in their own terms through self-sufficiency and unalienated collective action. In the context of this literature I would like to 
acknowledge the limits of my own work on commons-elclosure, although themes are considered with a slightly different focus and 
terminology in sections 4.3.2, 5.2.2 and 5.3.2 of this thesis. 
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The core-periphery structures are echoed within states, even where the entire state is clearly within 
one zone at a global scale: Ôfor most countries the processes of economic and social development 
create a spatial pattern of inequality focused on a coreÕ (Ibid: 75). This has implications for the 
spaces of politics and citizenship. Chatterton and Hodkinson argue that global capitalism has 
locally instigated the destruction of social commons and the selling off of land and space to the 
highest bidder, leading to the loss in the West of public housing, community centres, local shops, 
post offices, working-class clubs and open spaces (Chatterton & Hodkinson, 2007: 204). All of 
these previously have been spaces of participation and belonging where citizens formed and 
enacted their political roles, and their loss leads to what might be termed Ôthe enclosure of everyday 
lifeÕ (Hodkinson & Chatterton, 2006: 305, italics in the original). This can serve to strengthen the 
already Ôrampant individualismÕ of neoliberal life (Ibid: 311) and causes government to become an 
activity that is increasingly alienated from the citizenry, leading to a Ôreduction of citizenship to the 
sum of provisions and entitlements (disposable goods and legitimate claims of access to them)Õ 
(Illuminati, 1996: 176). Neoliberal citizenship thus becomes an apolitical condition reflected in 
social fragmentation and  ÔinauthenticityÕ of collective desires (Ibid: 176). The ÔexodusÕ (Virno, 
1996) from dominant institutionalised politics and political spaces, which is both enforced and 
elected, also implies a particular politics of resistance embedded in the idea of ÔautonomyÕ, which 
will be further discussed under critical utopian alternatives (section 4.3.2). 
 
4.2.3. The hierarchical imposition of the built environment 
Architecture and planning in the contemporary world, and particularly in modern cities, are highly 
technical and specialised professions. This results in a situation where the processes of these 
professions are removed from the everyday lives of citizens, but their results have dramatic 
consequences upon everyday practice and experience. In their dominant formations both 
architecture and planning can be subsumed under the heading of the new field of practice called 
Ôurban designÕ; defined as Ôthe derivation of a set of principles that recognise the importance of 
composition and appearance in the built form while integrating this recognition with a commitment 
to the public benefit and a wider set of stakeholders than the building owner or clientÕ (Bounds, 
2004: 248; see also Schurch, 1999). When space is territorialised and is not owned in common, 
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design, planning and architecture become the remit of those who have money and power. The 
process of organising space is therefore imposed from Ôon highÕ rather than negotiated from below. 
This process has occurred through time: ÔThe impact of architecture and architects is determined by 
the historical coalescence of design ideas and the material power of patrons, whether they be 
emperors, corporate capital, or the stateÕ (Bounds, 2004: 245). Planning is a practice particular to 
the age of industrialisation, with its foundation as a recognised profession beginning in the 1900s 
(Hall, 1996 [1988]: 383) as a very technical profession suffused with the styles of design-based 
professions such as architecture and engineering (Ibid: 384). It was also very much about hierarchy 
and control: Ôthe job of planners was to make plans, to develop codes to enforce those plans, and 
then to enforce those codesÕ (Ibid: 384). Planning from the start was a profession that was 
ÔmysticalÕ, ÔarcaneÕ, and alienated from ordinary citizens (Ibid: 384). Historical processes and 
events, such as the baby boom of the 1950s continued to influence the profession of planning, 
Ôbringing pressures for new investment in factories and officesÕ (Ibid: 385-386), leading to an 
escalation of urban change and development Ôto an almost superheated levelÕ (Ibid: 386). At the 
same time, the professions of planning and architecture were increasingly coming to be influenced 
by academic theory, in particular a logical positivist turn in geography and the social sciences:  
The subject changed from a kind of craft, based on a personal knowledge of a rudimentary 
collection of concepts about the city, into an apparently scientific activity in which vast 
amounts of precise information were garnered and processed in such a way that a planner 
could develop very sensitive systems of guidance and control (Ibid: 386). 
 
This brief history shows how the history of planning is tightly bound up with the historical 
processes of capitalism and industrialisation. The discipline simultaneously became increasingly 
technical and specialised at the same time that increasing emphasis was placed on the potential of 
planning to predict and control, based upon an alliance with logical positivism in the social 
sciences. There are two main criticisms of this approach to planning. First, the account does not 
adequately account for complexity, leading to aesthetic and instrumental failures. Second, the 
organisation of space has ethical effects, in particular upon those who are expected to live in such 
spaces, and have little or no input into the process of design. One of the effects of the interweaving 
of capital and planning is that they produce alienated and alienating environments: Ôthe idea of an 
authentic place with an authentic past is being manufactured as an image for consumption É the 
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actual buildings are mass-produced by large companiesÕ (Cresswell, 2004: 96). There are particular 
implications for citizenship insofar as both the processes and outcomes of contemporary planning 
procedures alienate citizens from their environment, from each other, and from the processes that 
govern their lives. This suggests a rather passive vision of citizenship, and undermines the 
association with activity, self-governance and self-management. 
 
 The hierarchical imposition of space also has ethical effects upon subjectivity and belonging, and 
can be exclusive or oppressive of difference. I shall now turn to a consideration of these effects, 
and how they are normatively detrimental to the concept of citizenship. When the organisation of 
space is inscribed by power relations, through the hierarchical imposition of territory and built 
structures, the intermingling of space with subjectivity has ethical implications. Grosz, using the 
example of the city, shows how this is a complex relation, where human (bodies and identities) 
both produce, and are produced by, the physical environment around them: 
Cities have always represented and projected images and fantasies of bodies, whether 
individual, collective, or political. In this sense, the city can be seen as a (collective) body-
prosthesis or boundary that enframes, protects, and houses while at the same time taking its 
own forms and functions from the (imaginary) bodies it constitutes. Simultaneously, cities are 
loci that produce, regulate, and structure bodiesÕ (Grosz, 2001: 49). 
 
Since bodies are heterogeneous, there is always an excess, or bodies which do not fit the 
(imaginary) archetypal body that architects and planners had in mind when the city was built Ð 
often the white, able-bodied male41. GroszÕs emphasis on process and constant negotiation in the 
construction of space is important: Ôthe task for architecture, as for philosophy, is not to settle for 
utopias, models, concrete ideals, but instead to embark on the process of endless questioningÕ (Ibid: 
150). This resonates with my methodological conception of critical utopia as opposed to 
hegemonic or fixed utopianism. 
 
There are implications for citizenship. Citizens are excluded from both the processes involved in 
constructing the environments in which they live their lives, which are seen to be the domain of 
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 For a fascinating book that articulates this problematic in terms of the marginalisation of diverse inhabitants of the contemporary 
multicultural city, and the challenges that this poses to contemporary city-building professionals and city-dwellers, see Sandercock 
(2003). 
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technical experts, as well as from the spaces of politics, where decisions governing their lives are 
made (Bickford, 2000: 356). Bickford shows how spheres of life (the public and the private; 
different neighbourhoods) are segregated through Ôdeliberate institutional policiesÕ (Ibid: 359) that 
Ôshape political possibilityÕ (Ibid: 360). She details a variety of constructions common in 
contemporary cities; gated communities, condominiums, gentrified areas, shopping malls, and 
ÔpricklyÕ space that is designed to be difficult to occupy - particularly by the homeless. These are 
seen to Ôexhibit distinctly antipolitical impulses toward exclusion, control, security, sameness, and 
predictability Ð yet often under the guise of public spaceÕ (Ibid: 362). All this is seen to operate 
according to a logic of ÔpurificationÕ, in the interests of a privileged or dominant section of the 
citizenry: ÔIf the consuming white middle-class public comes to feel at risk in the presence of those 
who do not look or act like them, then purifying public space of risk for them means increasing 
danger, discomfort, or outright exclusion for those typed as alien or unknownÕ (Ibid: 362). Citizens 
are simultaneously alienated from each other, from non-citizens, and from the political process. 
The spaces in which governance takes place, such as parliaments, reflect the centralised and 
abstracted nature of state-capitalist territorial sovereignty through their placement in capital cities, 
and their inaccessibility to the general public. This is often reflected in the architecture of such 
buildings, which symbolises the desire for cultural unification and homogenisation: ÔThe 
architecture [of the palace of Westminster] was intended to help along an idea of British identity 
that was rooted in place, and rather piousÕ (Ballantyne, 2002: 34). This leads of a concept of 
citizenship that is rooted in status and membership based upon a national identity that is imposed 
from Ôon highÕ, undermining the participatory, contingent and creative potential of the relational 
aspects of citizenship, and resulting in a rather passive view. There are, however, possibilities for 
resistance and creation through critical utopianism and critical utopian citizenship. Alternative 
theoretical approaches address my second disaggregated research question from section 1.3 of the 
methods chapter: what alternatives to dominant models of citizenship are offered by critical utopian 
theory? 
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4.3. Critical utopian approaches 
4.3.1. Deterritorialisation and autonomy 
Previously, I considered how territory has historically been associated with alienated and abstracted 
sovereignty. This implies a particular (utopian) organisation of space, invested with power 
relations, that is mystified through ontological discourses such as self-sufficiency, rationality and 
human nature. I considered how dominant theories of territory actually serve to justify and 
perpetuate the organisation of space and place around clearly bounded, sovereign territorial units 
with centralised political power. This was seen to have implications for citizenship, which comes to 
be associated with exclusive notions of place resting on ideas of cultural homogeneity, unification 
and sameness. This is internally injurious of difference and excludes alien ÔothersÕ. By positing 
bounded sovereign territory as ontologically necessary, early liberal theorists failed to account 
sufficiently for the possibility and actuality of autonomy from the state. I will here consider 
theorists who offer critical utopian visions of living in and relating to the physical environment that 
do allow for the possibility of autonomy from the state, capitalism, and hierarchical power 
dynamics. 
 
A useful starting point for a critical utopian critique and transgression of territoriality can be 
accessed through an interpretation of Deleuze and GuattariÕs distinction between smooth and 
striated space (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 [1980]: 408-11). Striated space is seen to be 
Ôhomogeneous and centredÕ and occupied by the sedentary (Ibid: 408), whilst smooth space is 
Ônonmetric, acentred, rhizomaticÕ (Ibid: 409) and occupied by the nomad. The state operates to 
capture, territorialise and striate by suggesting an a priori territorial space or arena which gets 
filled with social and political relationships, which it ÔlegitimatelyÕ governs. Smooth space, on the 
other hand, is constituted by relationships themselves and is in a constant state of flux Ð it is 
excessive over and overflows the territory of the state. These relationships are not spatially exterior 
to the state- they operate in, through, above and below the state Ð but they do constitute an 
ÔoutsideÕ or potential for autonomy: 
The outside appears simultaneously in two directions: huge worldwide machines branched 
over the entire ecumenon at a given moment, which enjoy a large measure of autonomy in 
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relation to States É but also the local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities, which 
continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in opposition to the organs of State power 
(Ibid: 397). 
 
The latter part of this quote refers to relationships, forces or flows that are seen to contain 
mechanisms which ward off the formation of organs of power and leadership, of hierarchical 
organisation, in favour of Ôa fabric of immanent relationsÕ (Ibid: 395). Contrary to IsinÕs (2007: 
214-215) interpretation of this conceptualisation, I would argue that this distinction is not made at 
the level of ontology and therefore ahistorical, but rather is a normative and experiential 
proposition - a possibility for experiment. Striated and smooth spaces do not exist independently of 
experience or practice, but rather through the intermingling of desire, theory and practice, and the 
effects that they produce (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 524, 530). Smooth space is that which 
undermines and transgresses the striated space of the state through a process of continual criticism 
and creativity. This is not a case of positing an ontological binary:  
One can never posit a dualism or dichotomy, even in the rudimentary form of the good and the 
bad. You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will 
reencounter organizations that restratify everything É Good and bad are only the products of 
an active and temporary selection, which must be renewed (Ibid: 10).  
 
Thus, there is potentially a mode of being, perceiving and relating, which although spatially 
coterminous with the state, contains something which constitutes an absolute difference or 
exteriority Ð that being the desire (and/or ability) to ward off mechanisms of power. This difference 
cannot be reduced to Ôan ontological difference between the city and other bodies such as the stateÕ 
(Isin, 2007: 221). The distinction that should be made, rather, is a matter of both theory and 
practice; it derives from the way in which we perceive the world and interact within it, and the 
difference between potential effects of our beliefs and practices Ð one mode of which functions as 
hierarchy, abstraction, sovereignty, striated space and the culminates in the ossified power of the 
state, the other of which functions through multiplicity, social relationships and non-hierarchy. The 
latter can, indeed must, still be embodied in tangible forms, but these are not fixed territories. 
 
Smooth space is something that is close to a critical utopian understanding of space, since it 
constitutes a difference or exteriority to dominant, or striated space. Where striated space is 
centred, and always looking inward from the limits of a system (of materialised space, or of a 
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system of thought), smooth space moves outward beyond the limits of a system, undermining 
territorial boundaries or boundaries of thought through the assertion of difference or excess 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 408-9). Smooth space and the ÔnomadicÕ subjectivities that inhabit it 
are thus infinitely critical. The state operates to limit free movement and to capture movement and 
flows of desire, and to partition space, rendering it ÔstriatedÕ (Ibid: 472). The state and striated 
space thus represent stasis, and are inimical to continuous critique. I find Deleuze and Guattari a 
particularly useful starting point for thinking about alternatives to territorial space, since they 
articulate it specifically and in colossal detail. Deleuze and Guattari are not, however, the only 
thinkers to conceptualise a mode of thinking about, and living within space, which although 
territorially coterminous with the state, occupies it differently and to a certain extent constitutes an 
ÔoutsideÕ. This is also a theme that runs through much radical and utopian theory. 
 
Lefebvre (1991 [1974]) seeks to expose the ideologically obscured production of space, which is 
created from the raw material of nature through relations of production and consumption 
(Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 84). Yet space also ÔcommandsÕ bodies, by determining what activity may 
occur (Ibid: 143). This much has already been deduced from the foregoing critical discussion. 
What is most interesting about LefebvreÕs analysis, and which connects to the previously made 
distinction between smooth and striated space, is the normative primacy which he affords space, in 
the context of a political discussion. Capitalism is seen as unable to produce a space that has 
purpose outside its own replication, yet it is also able to conceal the signs of its production (Ibid: 
160). This resonates with the project of critical utopianism and critical citizenship: 
Is space a social relationship? Certainly Ð but one which is inherent to property relationships 
(especially the ownership of the earth, of land) and also closely bound up with the forces of 
production (which impose a form on the earth or land); here we see the polyvalence of social 
space, its ÔrealityÕ at once formal and material. Though a product to be used, to be consumed, it 
is also a means of production; networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy 
fashion space and are determined by it. Thus this means of production, produced as such, 
cannot be separated either from the productive forces, including technology and knowledge, or 
from the social division of labour which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of 
society [...] Here a unity transpires between levels which analysis often keeps separate from 
one another: the forces of production and their component elements (nature, labour, 
technology, knowledge); structures (property relations); superstructures (institutions and the 
state itself) (Ibid: 85). 
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This unity of analytic categories, of relationships and forces, appears to be all-encompassing and 
spatially totalising; somewhat akin to the striated space in Deleuze and GuattariÕs conceptual 
framework. However, Lefebvre does offer some hope in the form of an ÔoutsideÕ to capitalist and 
state space when he draws the distinction between Ôdominated (and dominant)Õ and ÔappropriatedÕ 
space (Ibid: 167). The former is Ôa space transformed Ð and mediated Ð by technology, by practiceÕ 
and Ôits origins coincide with the roots of political power itselfÕ (Ibid: 164). The other type of space 
appears rather vague; it is said to resemble, but not imitate a work of art (Ibid: 165); appropriated 
spaces Ôrecount, though in a mumbled and confused way, the lives of those who built and inhabited 
themÕ (Ibid: 165). The concepts of domination and appropriation can also be applied to the space of 
the body (Ibid: 165), and Ôthe true space of pleasure, which would be an appropriated space par 
excellence, does not yet existÕ (Ibid: 167). Like Deleuze and Guattari, Lefebvre emphasises the 
importance of desire, and the education of desire through theory and practice, in a form of 
resistance that occurs through the (re-) appropriation of space from dominating forces: 
Domination has grown pari passu with the part played by armies, war, the state and political 
power. The dichotomy between dominated and appropriated is thus not limited to the level of 
discourse or signification, for it gives rise to a contradiction or conflictual tendency which 
holds sway until one of the terms in play (domination) wins a crushing victory and the other 
(appropriation) is utterly subjugated. Not that appropriation disappears, for it cannot: both 
practice and theory continue to proclaim its importance and demand its restitution (Ibid: 166). 
 
For Lefebvre, then, the alternative, or ÔoutsideÕ to state/capitalist space Ð appropriation - is always-
already pre-existent within the dominant order of dominated space (albeit only in nascent form), 
and exists through the ÔappropriationÕ of space. 
 
This theme of an already existent, critical utopian (my terminology) ÔoutsideÕ to hierarchical statist 
relations, that is partially articulated in spatial form42, is found in several bodies of theory including 
                                            
42
 This idea of a critical utopian spatial ÔoutsideÕ links to the idea of a texual ÔoutsideÕ in deconstruction (Cixous & Clement 1986; 
Derrida 1978 [1967]) and utopian litarary criticism (Sargisson, 1996, Chapter 4; Moylan 186, p. 10). The question of whether there can 
be an ÔoutsideÕ given conditions of immanence is therefore a poignant one, yet somehwat misplaced. Utopianism is Ôembedded in the 
text which it critiques; it does not come from above, or outside...A text which critiques from inside, but which introduces a perspective 
that is outside, external or O/other, cannot be objective. Nor however can it be purely subjective...this kind of complicity with the 
(cultural) text is subversive of the boundary between these two approaches. No external ÔtruthÕ is imposed on the text, no normative 
conclusions are drawn, but rather the text is opened to enquiry. Truths and norms are challenged, and flux and ambiguity displace 
certaintyÕ (Sargisson, 1996: 230; italics in the original). The ethical imperative of introducing an ÔoutsiderÕ perspective mirrors the 
Deleuzian idea of Ôlines of flightÕ discussed elsewhere in this thesis and also the poststructural anarchist ethics articulated by Todd May: 
Ôour claim is that a guide for action cannot be derived entirely from an ÒisÓ; but neither can it be derived from an ÒoughtÓ. It is, in fact, 
the interaction of the two in ethical discourse that provides the grounds for actionÕ (May, 1994: 149). 
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classical and evolutionary anarchism (Buber, 1996 [1949]; Buber, 1951; Kropotkin, 1970 [1896]; 
Landauer, 1983 [1911]; Ward, 1973); autonomist Marxism (Virno, 1996; Illuminati, 1996; 
Montagna, 2006; Membretti, 2007), radical political geography (Hodkinson & Chatterton, 2006; 
Chatterton, 2007; Chatterton & Hodkinson, 2007), social and cultural history (Clastres, 1977 
[1974]; McKay, 1996; Ward, 2005 [2002]), post-structuralism (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988), 
situationist theory (Unsigned, 1959; Debord 2002 [1967]: 99; Vaneigem 2006 [1967] 185-189; 
Plant, 1992: 1; Tester 1994: 5; Andreotti, 1996: 13) and post-left anarchism (Anon, 1999; Bey, 
1985, 1993, 1994). Although they articulate it variously, all these theories have in common the 
articulation of an always-already existent, unalienated, non-abstract ÔoutsideÕ to relations and 
spaces of domination that operates through practice and is identifiable in spaces and times. 
 
The idea is lent historicity beyond theory by Colin Ward (2005 [2002]), who provides historical 
empirical examples of a principle of relating, organising and existing within space that contradicts 
or runs contrary to the dominant mode, and is analogous to Ôsmooth spaceÕ discussed above. 
Particular examples which Ward provides of this wider principle Ð cottages built overnight on 
common land (Ward 2005 [2002]: pp. 5-11; 41-52), cave dwellings (Ibid: 15-25) squatted houses 
(Ibid. pp. 159-166; Ward 1973: 67-73), gypsy and new-age traveller sites (Ward 2005 [2002]: 134-
136), spaces used for parties and raves (Ibid: 164-165) Ð constitute empirical examples of 
phenomena akin to LefebvreÕs appropriated spaces, or BeyÕs (1985; 1983) autonomous zones. 
Similar concepts are also expressed within George McKayÕs cultural history, which begins by 
introducing the concept of Ôthe Albion Free StateÕ (McKay 1996: 11). The idea was first used by a 
self-described loosely federated network of collectives and communities to describe another, 
territorially coterminous but subterranean, non-authoritarian England, which is later picked up by 
various fairs, festivals and protesters to declare their sites as autonomous zones expressing the 
Albion concept (Ibid: 35-8, 42-4, 46, 59, 134, 146).  These approaches to the creation of critically 
resistant spaces signal new spaces for politics and new possibilities for citizenship. They shift the 
focus from an emphasis on status, identity, rights and responsibility to self-governance, self-
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management, and Ôpractices of the everydayÕ (Lewis, 2004a: 21)43. This has particular implications 
for participation and belonging, which are further discussed in Chapter 5 in the context of the 
communities that I visited, which also potentially actualise this conceptualisation of a wider logic 
of ÔsmoothÕ, appropriated or autonomous space. 
 
4.3.2. Appropriation and common ownership 
Under dominant approaches, I considered how theories and practices based on a state-capitalist 
system of territorial organisation have tended to categorise the physical environment as something 
that is ÔoutsideÕ or ÔotherÕ to our human bodies and subjectivities. The physical environment is also 
viewed as something that can be appropriated by individuals, protected by land and property rights, 
and sold in a market. This leads to the removal of land from common use and its enclosure. This 
was seen to lead to the reduction of citizenship to rights and entitlements, to the detriment of public 
responsibility and participation, as the spaces of public participation and social commons are 
closed off, and individuals and households are separated and segregated.  
 
A critical utopian alternative to possessive individualism and the loss of social commons connects 
to the foregoing discussion on the appropriation of autonomous spaces and the practice of 
unalienated and unmediated experiences. I have already considered how utopian, ÔsmoothÕ space 
finds articulation in the setting up of concrete manifestations of ÔautonomousÕ alternatives to 
capitalist space. This practice connects directly to issues of ownership, since without an alternative 
theory and practice of property and ownership, such places could hardly be considered as 
autonomous from state-capitalism. New forms of collective ownership form a utopian moment of 
creation simultaneous with the resistant moment of reclamation. 
 
Colin Ward shows how the organisation of common land has tended towards democracy and 
anarchism against state and bureaucracy (Ward 2005 [2002]: 140). Like Ostrom (1990), Ward 
                                            
43
 It is interesting to note that in Bolivia, with a long history of very active local juntas, or small-scale committees, the term vecino can 
mean both ÔneighbourÕ and ÔcitizenÕ (Crabtree, 2005: 96), removing the association of citizenship with abstration and alienated territory. 
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shows us that when land or ÔpropertyÕ (buildings) are held in common, without or against state 
sanction, this does not imply that they will lie neglected, but rather people can and do continue to 
use and maintain space autonomously, for collective purpose and through democratic self-
governance. This implies a kind of collective stewardship, or custodianship rather than individual 
ownership. Throughout WardÕs historical work, examples are provided of co-operative behaviour 
between often poor and oppressed individuals to help house one another and secure access to the 
land, and a distinction is made between Ôthe appropriation of land by squatters and that by 
enclosersÕ (Ibid: 168) which parallels LefebvreÕs distinction between dominated and appropriated 
land, and BeyÕs distinction between autonomous and state space. Mostly, the ÔcottersÕ and 
ÔsquattersÕ to whom Ward refers are networks of friends and relations who co-operate to build 
dwellings for those of them who have none and are in need. Colin Ward sums up this distinction 
succinctly quoting Gerrard Winstanley: ÔNo man ... shall have any more land than he can labour 
himself, or have others to labour with him in love, working together and eating bread togetherÕ 
(from Christopher Hill, (ed.) Gerrard Winstanley: the law of freedom and other writings, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1973 cited in Ward 2005 [2002]: 168). The distinguishing factor 
appears to be the absence of centralisation of land, unequal distribution and accumulation, 
mediation and organised hierarchies - in other words: the striation of space.  
 
This has implications for citizenship that are discussed in contemporary studies of appropriated or 
autonomous spaces. The praxis of such spaces, a Ôcoming together of theory and practiceÕ, is based 
on a belief in prefigurative politics and an ethos of Ôbe the change you want to seeÕ (Pickerill & 
Chatterton, 2006: 738). This implies a Ôdo-it-yourselfÕ politics of Ôcreating workable alternatives 
outside the stateÕ (Ibid: 738; see also McKay 1996; McKay (ed.), 1998). Studies on social centres, 
a particular type of autonomous space, are seen to have a particular relevance for citizenship: Ôwhat 
sets social centres apart from residential squats or housing cooperatives is their simultaneous 
politicization of the very act of reclaiming private space and opening it up to the public as part of a 
conscious refusal and confrontation to neo-liberalism and the enclosure of public spaceÕ 
(Hodkinson & Chatterton, 2006: 310). As such, social centres Ôplay an important role in re-thinking 
and re-making ÒcitizenshipÓ by bringing people together in spaces whose very raison d'tre is to 
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question and confront the rampant individualism of everyday lifeÕ (Ibid: 311, italics in the 
original). A central part of recreating social ties is seen to lie in the concept of ÔhorizontalityÕ, the 
non-hierarchy or relationships Ôthat goes beyond liberal notions of equal rights and instead 
encompasses all aspects of human relationsÕ, relying on a principle of Ôcooperation, solidarity and 
mutual aidÕ (Ibid: 311). Horizontality also means relying upon those who are present for all aspects 
of running the centres, including self-production, self-management and self-financing by the group 
(Hodkinson & Chatterton, 2006: 311). This involves a reinvention of the political process to 
include direct democracy, decentralisation and consensus, as well as deliberate mechanisms for 
warding off the accumulation of power by any individual or group (Pickerill & Chatterton 2006: 
739-740).  Services are frequently offered to the public, such as radical bookshops and libraries, 
cheap cafs, cinema and gig spaces, computer lessons, benefit advice, language classes, bike 
workshops and crches and temporary refuge for the homeless, international activists and destitute 
asylum seekers (Hodkinson & Chatterton 2006: 311). Such groups can be seen as Ôclaiming new 
rights of citizenshipÕ, not by appealing to the state, but by defining needs that are not being 
provided by the system and taking concrete, bottom-up action to fulfil these needs collectively 
(Membretti, 2007). However, such actions should be viewed as something more than Ôproviding 
public services on the cheapÕ, but more importantly, and more radically, in terms of Ôinventing 
alternative economic models based on need not profit and respect for the planetÕ (Hodkinson & 
Chatterton, 2006: 311). This speaks to my conception of critical utopian citizenship: rather than 
taking the limits of the system for granted and working within the system for change, individuals 
and groups are re-inventing citizenship, by attempting to forge an ÔoutsideÕ and alternative to state-
relations that is run on different principles. 
 
The above shows that where there is intent, the internal dynamics of ownership and posession 
within a community potentially offer a critical utopian alternative to capitalist models of land 
ownership. It is important to note, however, that such spaces still exist within state capitalist 
territory, and as such must confront this challenge politically. This raises tensions in practice, 
particularly regarding ways in which spaces are appropriated (for example, through squatting or 
buying on a market), which will become further evident in section 5.2.2 of the following chapter. 
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4.3.3. Non-plan, consensus design and squatting 
Previously, I argued that dominant approaches consider the organisation of space through 
architecture, planning and design to be the remit of those who have money and power. Whilst cities 
and buildings are built according to the needs and desires of a dominant group, there is always an 
ÔexcessÕ; people with ÔdifferentÕ bodies that deviate from this norm, or have deviant desires. This 
has effects upon citizenship: citizens are excluded from participating in the built environment in 
which they lead their lives. Users of the built environment are left feeling disempowered, de-valued 
and alienated from their physical environment, which can lead to a lack of care for their 
surroundings and the loss of a sense of community (Day, 2003: 11). 
 
Christopher Alexander, a renowned radical architect, argues that alienation is produced by the 
inability of traditional models of planning and architecture to account for complexity, resulting 
from a particular pattern of thought that he terms a ÔtreeÕ (Alexander, 1996 [1965]: 119). He 
counterpoises the tree with the Ôsemi-latticeÕ, another pattern of thought (Ibid: 119). He makes a 
distinction between Ônatural citiesÕ, which have Ôarisen more or less spontaneously over many, 
many yearsÕ (Ibid: 119) and Ôartificial citiesÕ, which signify both entire cities, as well as parts of 
cities, Ôwhich have been deliberately created by designers and plannersÕ (Ibid. p. 119). He judges 
the latter type of city, informed by ÔtreeÕ thought, to be entirely unsuccessful (Ibid: 120). The 
distinction he makes between ÔtreeÕ and Ôsemi-latticeÕ patterns of thought is technical, but in more 
abstract terms, the former seems to operate on a principle of the distinct separation of disparate 
units, whereas the latter involves overlapping and intertwining. Although Alexander does not draw 
the connection himself, there seems to be a strong resonance with Deleuze and GuattariÕs 
conceptions of the ÔtreeÕ and the ÔrhizomeÕ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 6-7). Alexander displays a 
strong preference for the spontaneity of the semi-lattice over the excessive orderliness of the tree: 
ÔIn any organized object, extreme compartmentalization and the dissociation of internal elements 
are the first signs of destructionÕ (Alexander 1996 [1965]: 130-131).  
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Each mode of planning is seen to have different effects not only on the aesthetics of a situation, but 
also upon societies and lives (Alexander, 1996 [1965]: 130). Alexander provides particular 
examples the effects of planning informed by ÔtreeÕ thought. One is the example of manufactured 
retirement villages, whereby the elderly are separated from the rest of urban life:  
[I]t not only takes from the young the company of those who have lived long, but, worse, 
causes the same rift inside each individual life. As you will pass into [a retirement village] and 
into old age, your ties with your own past will be unacknowledged, lost, and therefore broken. 
Your own youth will no longer be alive in your old age Ð the two will be dissociated, your life 
will be cut in twoÕ (Ibid: 131) 
 
Other examples of tree-like separation include the separation of neighbourhoods according to 
discontinuities of building, income and job type, the separation of the ÔcampusÕ university from the 
rest of a city and the creation of asphalted and fenced-in playgrounds, creating a Ôpictoral 
acknowledgement of the fact that ÒplayÓ exists as an isolated concept in our mindsÕ (Ibid: 126), and 
in which Ôfew self-respecting children will even playÕ (Ibid: 126). Tree thought thus leads to 
contradictions and overflows of the kind Deleuze and Guattari call ÔovercodingÕ (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988: 9). The problems of the separation of spheres of life are highlighted by Stirner, who 
considers how economic competition and division of labour alienate one from the processes 
necessary for the sustenance of life. For Stirner, involvement in the production of all of the goods 
we desire is important for personal empowerment:  
Bread is a need of all the inhabitants of a city; therefore they might easily agree on setting up a 
public bakery. Instead of this, they leave the furnishing of the needful to the competing bakers. 
Just so meat to the butchers, wine to the wine-dealers, etc. É If I do not trouble myself about 
my affair, I must be content with what it pleases others to vouchsafe me (Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 
275-6, italics in the original).  
 
Spaces are always awaiting alteration according to the changing needs and desires of their users 
and inhabitants. This can be done through processes initiated Ôfrom belowÕ, rather than 
hierarchically. The devolution of power from planners to users was the central aim of a movement 
that had its origins in 1967, called ÔNon-PlanÕ (Barker, 2000: 4; Hughes & Sadler (eds.), 2000). 
The movement largely operated through publications based on criticism of modern planning 
disasters and the question: ÔCould things be any worse if there was no planning at all?Õ (Barker, 
2000: 5). The basic premise behind Non-Plan was that Ôit is very difficult to decide what is best for 
other peopleÕ (Ibid: 5). The argument against planning is based both on aesthetic outcomes (Ibid: 
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4) and an anti-doctrinaire and anti-hierarchy ethical commitment (Ibid: 10). The political strategy 
proposed by the movement was to campaign to the government for Ôa precise and carefully 
observed experiment in non-planningÕ in Ôa few appropriate zones of the country, which are subject 
to a characteristic range of pressures, and use them as Launch-Pads for Non-PlanÕ (Ibid: 11). Non-
Plan implies what the name indicates Ð the absence of all imposed planning by external agents.  
 
The movementÕs literature is less clear on the agents who will construct buildings and spaces. It 
seems to implicitly be taken for granted that the users of a given space will be responsible for the 
design process. This theoretical neglect of an analysis of mechanisms of power in capitalism 
combined with the reformist strategy of Non-Plan, has led to accusations that the project had more 
in common with the New Right than with the New Left or any kind of radicalism, despite the 
largely socialist leanings of those involved (Franks, 2000). Interestingly, the renowned historian 
and anarchist, Colin Ward, has countered such claims in the same volume, claiming that the 
reformist strategy was Ôuseful for propagandists since it implied a controlled experiment rather than 
a wholesale rejection of the planning systemÕ (Ward, 2000: 50). This strategy could then be used 
by Ôpeople who want to make room for freedom of experiment in architecture and planning É to 
make room for do-it-yourself alternatives to the rival orthodoxies of the bureaucracyÕ (Ibid: 51). 
The relationship between strategy, radicalism and co-optation runs as a theme throughout this 
project. 
 
What is important at this point, however, is that although Non-Plan articulates a very clear vision 
and an explicit normative desire, this is not done in spatially blueprinting terms, as are, for 
example, eco- and garden- city utopias of Murray Bookchin44 and Ebeneezer Howard45. In this 
instance, the utopian vision has been the process of building (that is, a process of building without 
                                            
44
 Bookchin (1974, 1992) offers an Ôeco-anarchistÕ vision of the space of citizenship based on the Athenian polis, which he argued was 
scaled to Ôhuman proportionsÕ (Bookchin, 1974: 97). Although BookchinÕs vision of the city does not seek integration into existing 
models or structures - Bookchin claims to be coming from an anarchist point of view - his vision still shares certain alienating and 
hegemonic features. Utopia is posited in terms of a particular content - a deferred and specified end - rather than in terms of a critical 
function, and thus exhibits hegemonic and truth-claiming features (see Bookchin 1992: xxi). Bob Black exposes BookchinÕs naturalistic, 
rationalistic, truth claiming discourse (Black, 1997: 129). 
45
 Ebenezer Howard (1996 [1902])Õs attempts at social change and environmental reformism have led to widespread criticism that 
utopian visions for cities are Ôauthoritarian attempts to remould urban space and behaviour according to abstract and supposedly 
universal rulesÕ, leading to Ôan environment that denies and suppresses local identitiesÕ (Pinder, 2000: 233) 
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externally imposed planning), which is viewed as an ÔexperimentÕ and is valourised in terms of the 
opening up of new possibilities:  
Even if matters ended up much the same, in terms of durable successes or disastrous failures, 
the overall pattern would be sure to be different: the look of the experiment would be sure to be 
different from what we have now É at least, one would find out what people want; at the most, 
one might discover the hidden style of mid-twentieth century Britain (Barker, 2000: 11). 
 
Unfortunately for the project, and to the detiment of its ethos of experimentation and the veneration 
of difference, this attempt was unsuccessful, and Non-Plan never received mainstream recognition 
or the legalisation that it required for its proposed experiments (Barker, 2000: 11; Ward, 2000: 50). 
However, for writers such as Franks (2000), for whom the reformist tendencies of the project were 
not wholly desirible, a more cohesive and potent counter-force to planning was located in the 
contemporaneous squattersÕ movement, formed in November 1968 (Franks, 2000: 37).  Franks 
argues that this movement highlighted the conservativeness of Non-Plan since it did not take 
capitalism to be value-neutral but rather a system of class domination; it viewed dominant 
architectural practices as repressive; that social divisions were due to hierarchies that could be 
confronted, and importantly Ôthat this confrontation itself provided opportunities for the realization 
of libertarian ways of livingÕ (Ibid: 39). It is less the political implications of these beliefs that I am 
interested in here, than the alternative (utopian) vision that is provided as a counter to the 
hierarchical imposition of the built environment, which is again one of process. In particular, the 
squatters challenged the traditional hierarchical division of the professional categories of planner 
and architect from space-users through Ôradical self-build projects and participatory democratic 
decision-makingÕ (Ibid: 41). This was something that was practiced by squatters, often through 
necessity, as they modified the spaces that they were able to appropriate motivated by the necessity 
of their needs (Ibid: 40). This practice has implications for a critical conception of citizenship that 
favours process and participation over legal status and passive entitlements. Both buildings and 
participation are seen to be something that should be built Ôfrom belowÕ, by those who are affected 
by the decisions, rather than imposed from above by external professionals and their funders or 
patrons. Although there were problems in the squattersÕ movement, such as internal gender 
hierarchies and anti-social behaviour, this does not undermine the viability of the utopian vision 
since the vision does not claim truth-status or propose a blueprint that is somehow failed: Ôthere is 
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not necessarily a connection between such activities and squatting. The practice provides a 
possibility, even if only occasionally successful, for more egalitarian social relationsÕ (Franks, 
2000: 42). 
 
There has also been resistance within the field of architecture to the separation of the roles of 
architect and user. In this case, experiments with Ôconsensus designÕ have yielded highly successful 
results. The architect most associated with this process is Cristopher Day, who in his book 
Consensus Design (2003) argues that not only do space-users know their requirements better than 
anyone else, but they also Ôknow the place, its climate and the micro-climactic subtelties of every 
valley and hillside, every street and open spaceÕ (Day, 2003: 11). Users are less likely to make the 
Ôstupid mistakes outsiders doÕ (Ibid: 11). Involving users in the design process not only leads to a 
more effective build, but also means that users are more likely to feel connected to the space, to 
Ôfeel their value confirmed by the places where they liveÕ (Ibid: 11) and to feel a sense of 
ÔstewardshipÕ (Ibid: 31). Such users are less likely to feel disempowered and alienated by their 
environment, meaning they are more willing to contribute to the maintenance of the place, and to 
abuse or vandalise the surroundings (Ibid: 11). For Day, the best way of getting everyone involved 
in a decision is through the process of consensus
46
, which is Ômore constructuve and more 
conscious Ð more fully involving Ð than votingÕ (Ibid: 21). The consensus process itself is also seen 
to be Ôbond-formingÕ, and to build a sense of community that is as essential to building a thriving 
place as are the built surroundings, and thus consensus is Ôa practical as well as a moral imperativeÕ 
(Ibid: 13; see also Ward, 1973: 41-42). 
 
What unites Non-Plan, the squatter movement and consensus design is the emphasis on process 
over blueprinting. Each offers theoretical criticisms of hierarchical planning and design, and 
justifications for alternative processes but buildings themselves are to come through theoretically 
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 ÔConsensus design is about everybody getting Ð if not what they originally wanted Ð what, after working together and listening to the 
whole situation, they have come to wantÕ (Day, 2003: 20). Consensus is also a mode of decision-making used by most of the 
communities that I visited. I will not be considering the consensus process in detail here Ð in the context of consensus design process, 
this is described in great detail in the book under discussion. The process of consensus as a broader mode of decision-making within 
communities will be considered in more detail in Chapters 6 & 7 of this thesis. 
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informed practice. Whereas squatters have to do the best with the spaces that become available, 
groups and communities involved in consensus design (and Non-Plan, had the scheme been 
implemented) have the opportunity to design their own builings from scratch. Both have 
implciations for a critical conception of citizenship. Non-Plan, and consensus design are more 
easily incorporated into existing structures, whilst at the same time being critical of these structures 
by offering something different: an alternative that favours process, self-activity and flexibility 
over finite spatial blueprints. Squatting also does this, but is doubly politicised, both in the fact of 
offering an alternative, and in the fact of directly confronting capitalism by seizing its spaces and 
resources. 
 
4.4. Summary of chapter 
In this chapter, I have attempted to partially address, through the category of territory, two of the 
research questions put forward in section 1.3 of this thesis: Ôout of what historical conditions do 
dominant models of citizenship arise, what do they have in common, and what are their effects?Õ 
and Ôwhat alternatives are offered by critical utopian theory?Õ I have considered how the concept of 
territory is central to dominant understandings of citizenship, and has effects upon formations of 
citizenship. Dominant theorisations of territory were judged to have certain features in common: 
the ontological construction of territory as alienated sovereignty, the commodification of physical 
space, and the hierarchical imposition of the built environment. The practices associated with these 
theorisations were seen to have political and ethical effects on citizenship: the exclusion of non-
citizens and of ÔdifferentÕ citizens from full belonging, the alienation of citizens from one another 
and from their environment and the exclusion of citizens from spaces and processes of 
participation. Many of these problems were seen to originate from an implicit utopianism based in 
ontological and foundational assumptions resulting in a static and fixed vision of citizenship as a 
legal status and identity rather than a relationship and a process. This overcoded vision of 
citizenship is exceeded and transgressed by practices and processes of everyday life. Critical 
utopian theories attempt to account for this complexity by offering bottom-up, autonomous 
possibilities that begin from a position of critique but simultaneously offer creative alternatives. 
These include the appropriation of social space for face-to-face relationships and participation, 
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transgressions of the urban/rural divide through unalienated experiences, occupation and common 
ownership of spaces, and bottom-up consensual design practices. What is immediately noticeable 
about critical utopian approaches is the primacy that they afford the mutually constitutive 
relationship between theory and practice. For this reason, it is important to consider examples of 
critical utopian practices (as defined in Chapter 3 section 3.4.1.1) in order to address how they 
speak to, and even more importantly, how they transgress and further critique, critical utopian 
alternatives to territorial formulations of citizenship. The upcoming chapter, ÒTransgressing 
Territory: PracticeÓ, addresses in terms of territory the third and fourth research questions of 
section 1.3 of Chapter 1: ÔWhat theoretical and practiced alternatives to dominant models of 
citizenship are offered by political agents in autonomous spaces?Õ and Ôwhat can a dialogue 
between theory and practice tell us about the conditions for a critical utopian citizenship?Õ 
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5. Transgressing Territory: Practice 
5.1. Typology47 
 Kebele S.hill HHP CPH Find.n  MGC  LSC Corani  LH 
Shared 
Kitchen(s) 
X X X X Fdn. X X X X 
Private 
Kitchen(s) 
 X X  NFA    X 
Communal 
social space 
X X X X X X X X X 
Shared gardens planned  X X X X X  X X 
Community 
outreach space 
X  X X X  X  X 
Urban/ suburban X X  X  X X X  
Rural   X  X    X 
Residential Prev. X X X X X  X X 
Non-residential X      X   
Some non-
resident 
members 
    X   X X 
Owned 
(outright/ 
mortgage) 
X X X X X X  X X 
Rented       X   
Squatted Prev.         
Collective 
Ownership/ fully 
mutual 
X   X Fdn. X  X X 
Private stake/ 
investment 
 X X  NFA     
Intentional 
design 
 X X  The 
Park 
    
Adapted design X   X Cluny X X X X 
Figure 5-1: Typology showing forms of spatial organisation in autonomous communities 
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 Community names are abbreiviated in all tables. The key to abbreviations, as well as more detailed descriptions of communities can 
be found in Appendix 1. 
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5.2. Actualisations: transgressing ÔterritoryÕ in utopian practice 
In the previous chapter I considered hegemonic and critical utopian approaches to physical space. 
Dominant, hegemonic approaches to the organisation of space are territorial48: they emphasise clear 
legal boundaries with a centralised sovereign power, the privatisation and commodification of 
physical space and the hierarchical imposition of the built environment. Critical utopian approaches 
emphasise autonomy based on the appropriation of space for the actualisation of non-hierarchical 
relationships and self-management, resistance to individualistic forms of ownership through 
collectivism, and adapted or consensus design. The implications for citizenship focus on effects 
upon participation and belonging. Dominant theoretical approaches that favour individualism and 
centralised power tend to disempower citizens, reducing citizenship to a series of rights and 
entitlements within an alienated public sphere, but de-emphasise participation and responsibility in 
the immediate social sphere. These approaches are based on possessive rational individualism, and 
ignore the ways in which the organisation of space can affect citizen participation, through 
controlling citizen movement and excluding people from public spaces. Critical utopian approaches 
emphasise the importance of involvement in the reconstruction of our own lives by opening up 
spaces for participation, do-it-yourself politics and the reconstruction of social commons.  
 
I will now turn to the realm of utopian praxis by considering discourses, attitudes and practices 
concerning the above themes in the Ôautonomous communitiesÕ in which I undertook fieldwork. I 
will be considering the existing physical spaces of communities, their policies towards building and 
the use of space, and the attitudes of community members toward physical spaces. Information on 
existing spaces will come mainly from my own observations, and through information from tours 
that were frequently offered to me upon arrival. Community-wide policies toward space imply 
some kind of formalisation, often accessible from websites or constitutional documents, and will 
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 I would like to thank Paul Chatterton for pointing out that the situation is often more complex than this, and that the dominant can 
often look more like the alternative Ð for example the global business elite, who are very dominant, are also very deterritorialised, as are 
right-wing militia networks such as al-Qaeda. Robinson & Karatzogianni (2010) theorise this precise problematic in Deleuzian terms of 
active and reactive forces, social logics and assemblages, and maintain the distinction between dominant and ÔminorÕ/alternative by 
theorising the re-territorialisation of capitalism on alienated exchange-value and of militia networks upon identity hierarchies. Although 
it is not the focus of this thesis, it is possible to conceptualise these complexities using a framework similar to my own, and I would refer 
the interested reader to this excellent book.  
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usually have been decided by consensus. Individual attitudes vary a lot more than the former types 
of data, and will be reaped from interviews, although it should be noted extracts of interviews with 
individuals are not necessarily representative or their community as a whole, and will mainly be 
used to consider the effects of policies and practices upon individuals, or the roles of individuals 
within communities. I will contextualise some of this with information from participant 
observation. I will also offer interpretations of praxis in terms of the implications for a criticism of 
dominant models of citizenship through the positing of an alternative, and the implications for 
participation and belonging. The final section of this chapter will consider the implications of the 
dialogue between theoretical models and utopian practices for a wider praxis of critical utopian 
citizenship. The structure of the chapter mirrors the themes drawn from theory in the previous 
chapter. 
 
5.2.1. Spatial relations and boundaries of belonging 
In the previous chapter, I considered how dominant conceptions of physical space operate through 
a political division of clearly bounded sovereign territories, creating a sense of place imbued with a 
unifying cultural logic of nationalism. This was seen to alienate citizensÕ identities from their own 
autonomous activities and to abstract sovereignty, which is injurious of difference and 
disempowering. I also considered other approaches, in line with the critical utopian framework, 
that imagine and desire an ÔoutsideÕ to statist relations and ways of occupying space, yet without 
blueprinting or deferring to a future goal. Such approaches emphasise multiplicity over unification, 
and community exists through creating spaces for participation, Ôpeak experiencesÕ (Bey, 1985: 
98), non-hierarchy, and self-management. This is articulated in terms of ÔautonomyÕ from the state 
and from statist, hierarchical relationships, and the emphasis is on intent, desire and process over 
outcome. Here, I would like to take these themes as a starting point for a consideration of practices 
in autonomous communities and have used them as a basis for formulating the following questions: 
¥ Do autonomous communities question dominant models of territorial organisation and 
transgress territorial boundaries? 
¥ What alternative kinds of spatial organisation or use do autonomous communities espouse, 
and how? 
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¥ What are the effects of alternative spatial models upon everyday praxis, belonging and 
participation? 
 
5.2.1.1. Do autonomous communities question dominant models of territorial organisation 
and transgress territorial boundaries? 
In the previous chapter, I considered how questioning dominant models of territorial organisation is 
something that can begin at a subjective, psychological and experiential level. Because of this, I 
will be concentrating on attitudes expressed in interviews in this section. One of the communities I 
visited where members expressed a particularly interesting perception of, and relation to, physical 
space and the environment was Findhorn. This may in part have been due to the spiritual 
foundations of the community, which espouses an holistic and pantheistic ontology
49
. A strong 
sense of place was expressed by this interviewee, not only at a personal level, but also of the 
community itself as blending with the topography of the local landscape: 
[Findhorn] is a complicated set of community, it isnÕt a firm boundary, itÕs a very permeable 
boundary. There are also lots of visitors and guests joining for a week or a month or a year, 
feeling like, and our intention is for them to feel like, they are part of the community so they 
are part of the community, but thatÕs the transitory kind of orb. We are also on the sandy 
peninsula with our tides going back and forth three times a day, so the transitory motif is quite 
strong in any case. And because we are a spiritual community of course, impermanence of 
course has merit, so we have it in our lifestyle and in our format (Interview: Mari Hollander, 
Findhorn Foundation, 18 June 2007).  
 
This quote reflects themes in the critical utopian literature of transgressing boundaries based on 
exclusive notions of place, and sovereign boundaries, resting on ideas of cultural homogeneity, 
unification and sameness.  
 
Interviewees from other communities criticised territorial boundedness. This interviewee, who 
favoured a sense of belonging based on multiplicity and the recognition of difference, expressed a 
political critique of the unifying cultural logic of nationalism: 
At one level, I could say ÔI want to be proud to be BritishÕ. And if I was proud to be British, the 
kind of things that I want to be proud of are being welcoming to people from other countries, 
really caring about human rights, treating people equally and all that type of thing. We do all 
have responsibilities to other citizens. So I think we all do have responsibilities to each other in 
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 This is considered in more detail in Chapters 8 & 9, and can also be seen in FindhornÕs (1996) constitution, the ÒCommon GroundÓ a 
copy of which can be found in Appendix 5. 
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this country and beyond, and we are global citizens (Interview: Penny, Coventry Peace House, 
10 May 2007). 
 
PennyÕs notion of Ôglobal citizenshipÕ is compelling, and rests on a notion of responsibility for 
others that is personal, and vested in emotions and relationships such as ÔwelcomingÕ and ÔcaringÕ 
rather than in a notion of belonging based on national identity. This dynamic works against the 
ideas of integration into a higher unity such as the nation state, or even a ÔglobalÕ state, as in 
hegemonic theories of global citizenship. This interviewee expressed similar feelings: 
I find it really sad right now because people É when they want to live in this country have to 
swear allegiance to the queen and I never had to do that, I just got born here, so I donÕt know if 
I am a citizen, because I never swore allegiance to the queen, but I live in this country. I think 
citizenship means abiding by the laws and value system of the country and knowing the 
cultural history, and that history is written by some people with certain agendas, so my, kind of 
links to the past are, what IÕm interested in is the social history of revolution, and how people 
lived, and dealt with landlords and stuff, so IÕm a kind of Ôfolk citizenÕ rather than a citizen 
because I wouldnÕt ever swear allegiance to the queen. IÕm not a citizen, IÕm a person, an 
autonomous person (Interview: Tash, Kebele, 7 April 2007). 
 
The idea expressed by Tash, above, of being a Ôfolk citizenÕ, as well as an Ôautonomous personÕ 
rather than a citizen of a country is compelling, and speaks particularly to much of the autonomous 
spaces literature in the foregoing chapter, such as George McKayÕs (1996) concept of ÔAlbionÕ, and 
Deleuze and GuattariÕs (1988) ÔrhizomesÕ.  It is an articulation of a coexistent, subterranean and 
non-authoritarian relation to space that exists simultaneously with, yet outside or underneath 
dominant, hegemonic territorial spatial models. This connects with the situationist and anarchist 
critiques of abstraction: that territorial spatial organisation alienates individuals by emphasising a 
primary relation to a centralised sovereign power. The anarchist alternative Ð a living togetherness 
and immediacy of relationships expressed through the small-scale community (see sections 2.4.2 
and 4.3.1 of this thesis), resonates with ideas expressed in interviews: 
IÕm certainly a citizen of Laurieston Hall, I mean that would certainly be a fine thing to say, 
and I would say, IÕm a citizen of here more than anywhere else. But if I was to ask what 
supports me, and what expresses my values, and what places its feet on the earth in a way that I 
approve of, itÕs this one, so itÕs not an abstract connection, itÕs a real connection. Whereas with 
British citizenship, itÕs just a pure matter of chance and an abstraction, it has absolutely no 
meaning whatsoever (Interview: Patrick. Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007; italics signify 
vocal emphasis). 
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The foregoing quotes illustrate well the idea that these small spaces express and actualise a 
different logic to hierarchical, territorial, models of territorial space, and thus to a certain extent are 
ÔoutsideÕ. A relation to the ÔinsideÕ was also expressed, however: 
The main purposes and aims of Kebele are to provide a space for the community to take part in 
creating the world they want to see. Its aims are for people to be able to express themselves in 
safety and to respect themselves and others. The aim is to create a space that is different from 
capitalist space so itÕs a place for a cross-over between capitalism and autonomy. But we are a 
part of the world, we are not separate from it so we are engaging in it (Interview: Tash, Kebele, 
7 April 2007). 
 
This again reflects themes that autonomous spaces offer moments of resistance and creation, and a 
constant process of negotiation between autonomy and embededdness. 
 
5.2.1.2. What alternative forms of spatial use do autonomous communities espouse, and 
how? 
Ways of organising and using space that differ from dominant models were clearly observable 
during my visits to communities, and in this section I will predominantly rely on extracts from my 
participant observation diaries and notes taken during guided tours. A particularly noticeable 
pattern through all the communities was the way in which all had prioritised communal space in 
the layout and design of their spaces. I will here give an extended extract from my notes taken at 
Findhorn50, since this is physically the largest of the communities, and therefore gives the broadest 
example of potential uses of space: 
 
Apart from bedrooms, both members and guests share the space of Cluny. Bathroom facilities 
are situated off hallways and shared between rooms. Communal space includes two meeting 
rooms for groups and a further two meeting spaces in the Pavilion behind Cluny, a ballroom 
used for sacred dance and workshops, a lounge, a library, a spacious dining room, a sauna and 
a meditation sanctuary. Shared facilities contribute to a feeling of community and co-operation, 
allow guests and members to meet and socialise, and also contribute to a lower ecological 
footprint. Outside the buildings are large and beautifully kept gardens, in which members and 
guests frequently spend time alone, socialise, eat, play games or take part in activities. These 
have an enchanting variety of unexpected hidden spaces and features, such as stone carvings, 
statues and other artwork left by previous guests and members, water features, tree swings, a 
Ôchakra gardenÕ, bee hives, a spiral walk leading up to a Ôpower pointÕ, where two lay-lines 
supposedly cross, and wild-flower gardens. There is also a small herb and vegetable garden 
that contributes some of the food produce for the Cluny Kitchens. 
 
The Park offers a completely different atmosphere and is a space that serves different functions 
to Cluny. It is a 30-acre site that was once a caravan park, and part of it still is used as such for 
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 More detail on the physical space of Findhorn community is given in appendices 1, 2 & 3. 
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paying visitors. It is situated next to the village of Findhorn, further up from the coast beside 
Findhorn Bay. It very much has the feel of a work in progress, as the caravans, mobile homes 
and chalets that used to house the community members are gradually being replaced by 
ecologically sound alternatives, such as yurts, eco-mobile homes, straw-bale housing, grass-top 
eco-houses (soil and grass on the roofs provide insulation) and whisky-barrel houses (made 
from huge wooden vats donated by a local distillery). These structures create a big patchwork 
of an astounding variety of small dwellings near pathways that weave around the larger 
communal spaces. These are the Universal Hall, which houses various events such as music 
and poetry nights, dances and conferences, and the Community Centre, with an adjoined 
kitchen where members and guests are invited to share meals. The Community Centre also has 
space for meetings and singing events that do not require the huge capacity of the Universal 
Hall. The Universal Hall also houses a Ôhot tubÕ. Particularly outstanding is a beautifully stone-
built Nature Sanctuary, built in 1986 by one man, Ian Turnbull, entirely from recycled found 
materials. It houses a meditation room and small anteroom where attendees can remove their 
shoes. There is a shop and a caf on the site, which are run as business enterprises separate 
from, yet associated with the Foundation É  The Park also has a large working plot, Cullerne 
Garden, which has the important purpose of providing 60-70% of the communityÕs fresh food 
in the summer, and 10-20% in the winter. It also provides salad, herbs and vegetables for the 
local Earthshare organic box scheme (Extracts from participant observation notes: Findhorn, 
9-20 June 2007). 
 
What I would particularly like the reader to take from this extract is the wide variety of different 
uses for which communal space can be used.  This has resonance with all of the communities that I 
visited. As can be seen in the typology at the beginning of this chapter, all of the communities had 
shared kitchens and shared social space, and most had shared gardens. Like Findhorn Community, 
Laurieston Hall also had a sauna. Findhorn, Springhill, Laurieston Hall and Hockerton all had 
childrenÕs play areas. Some of the communities also had crches. Many of these spaces were meant 
particularly for community members and guests, but communities also frequently had spaces meant 
for wider community use and outreach activities. The typology shows that six of the communities 
had space expressly designated for wider use and outreach activities, although this does not mean 
that the other communities do not accommodate for this on a more ad-hoc basis. Spaces for wider 
community use included bicycle workshops (Kebele and Coventry Peace House), a refugee shelter 
(Coventry Peace House), cafs (Kebele, Findhorn and Liverpool Social Centre [planned]), meeting 
rooms and classrooms for educational enterprises (Hockerton Housing Project, Coventry Peace 
House, Findhorn and Laurieston Hall) Libraries (Findhorn, Kebele) and Computer facilities 
(Findhorn, Kebele, Springhill and Liverpool Social Centre [planned]). Some of these spaces had 
flexible and shifting functions. Coventry Peace House in particular illustrates the sometimes-
ambiguous uses of space: 
At the opposite end of the block of houses, the first house is also somewhat separated, as it has 
no through corridors, although upstairs it has a security door with a digilock which joins it to 
the remainder of the houses. This house serves two purposes. In the day, after 8:30 am, the 
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large room downstairs offers a huge space for local community meetings. After 9:30 pm it 
opens as a refugee shelter. The large room has sliding wooden panels which can be used to 
separate the space, in order to create separate areas for male and female refugees at night. 
Refugees sleep on the floor. There is a storage cupboard at the back for blankets and clothes. 
There is also a small kitchen where refugees and volunteers can cook their own food (although 
they are also provided with free food form the local Sikh temple). In the day, this kitchen is 
used to make tea for the meetings that take pace within the space. Upstairs there is a bathroom, 
and also a small bedroom with two beds for volunteers at the shelter É 
 
The variety of activities that the space is used for and also the busy environment seem to create 
some tensions and difficulties. This was highlighted by two incidents É both of which seem to 
come down to a blurring of boundaries, or a difficult negotiation between public and private 
space. One of the incidents occurred during a formal meeting taking place in the large room 
which doubles up as a meeting space and night-shelter. One of the shelter-users attempted to 
enter this space during the meeting
51
 and had to be physically prevented from doing so. He got 
very angry and started shouting and banging on walls and windows and threatening to break 
them, and eventually had to be forcefully removed from the premises by one of the male 
members of the housing co-op, who was not in attendance at the meeting, but heard the 
commotion from the kitchen nextdoor É It turned out that he had been having difficulties over 
his possible deportation and really wanted to speak to Penny, who had offered him a lot of 
support previously, and who was in the meeting at the time. Penny explained to me that he was 
about to be deported, and Peace House had been unable to offer him the support that he 
needed, as this was not within their remit. They were only really able to offer shelter, but often 
refugees wanted help with the legal system or emotional support. It was explained to me that 
often the boundaries between these issues were difficult to explain, especially to people whose 
first language was not English, or who were unused to the British culture and legal system, 
which sometimes led to problems (Extracts from participant observation notes: Coventry 
Peace House, 9 May 2007). 
 
This serves as a poignant example of how boundaries and territories (even at the small scale) can 
impact upon everyday lives and subjectivities, and how they work to include and exclude, and how 
boundaries are exceeded by complexity. It also serves as a dramatic and emotive instance of how 
citizenship associated with bounded national territories serves to physically exclude non-citizens, 
with drastic consequences upon individual lives. Even where Ôautonomous spacesÕ attempt to 
provide refuge from this system, as in the above example, they are never totally ÔautonomousÕ from 
the national legal framework. 
 
5.2.1.3. What are the effects of alternative spatial models upon everyday praxis, belonging 
and participation? 
Communal spaces have several functions. They facilitate the breaking down of boundaries and the 
immediacy of face-to-face relationships that I was discussing in the previous section, sometimes 
fostering a sense of community and belonging:  
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 The meeting was a curriculum strategy meeting for a two-day world citizenship project in a local inner city school.  
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I think if we look at the situation in the Western world, community is definitely something that 
has been lost, and we have to re-engage with community at a different level of awareness. This 
isnÕt going to be the little family that all grew up on the land in the same vicinity. ThatÕs long 
gone, weÕve all migrated and mobilised everywhere, so rebuilding community and not just the 
people part of community but also the landscape and all of the life of the place. And although 
we are in a fairly rural setting, I think it also applies to urban areas that have neighbourhoods. 
ItÕs just as much a neighbourhood thing as a rural community thing of really working to what 
brings people together. And so much of the design of things, you know high-rises and things, 
just doesnÕt build community, you can actually build community by design, by landscape 
(Interview: Mari Hollander, Findhorn, 18 June 2007).  
 
Shared spaces create a space for members to socialise, talk, and bond outside of more formal 
community meetings. They can also break down boundaries between the community and the 
outside, by allowing members and guests to socialise together. They may also have a practical or 
educative function, in the case of working gardens, classrooms and workshops. They break down 
dominant boundaries between the public and the private, illustrating an alternative to the atomised 
family unit, particularly in the case of shared kitchens, where people are able to eat with others on a 
daily basis. Play areas and crches meant that childcare could be shared on a regular basis between 
households. Communal spaces also sometimes had more expressly political functions: 
We use the building itself for lots of practical peace projects and environmental projects, like 
the cycle workshop that encourages people to bike. We take in donated bikes and do them up 
and sell them on to people cheaply, so thatÕs our practical environmental project, and then 
weÕve got a night shelter, and the Worldwise project, that is our practical peace project 
(Interview: Penny, Coventry Peace House, 10 May 2007) 
 
I mean essentially we want the focus of it to be an anti-capitalist space. Most of the people 
involved are political, some are anarchists, some are anarcho-communists, and generally non-
aligned people who want to be involved É we want to try and create a political hub É and just 
to make the space open for politically-slanted stuff, but nothing too dogmatic. I mean 
community groups will be able to come in and organise a campaign, we will have different 
facilities, we will have computer facilities and printing, photocopying, all that kind of stuff that 
we will give to people for free. So we will be helping people with campaigns, as opposed to 
trying to run campaigns, weÕll just help them and provide stuff (Interview: Carl, Liverpool 
Social Centre, 10 July 2007). 
 
The above quotes illustrate how spaces can have functions that simultaneously benefit or cater for 
members and users, exist as illustrations of a wider, non-hierarchical logic, and also engage with 
political power directly. Some interviewees, however, were not so confident in their role as 
political agents in a wider sense: 
There was a film years ago called passport to Pimlico, about when part of London declared 
independence from the rest, and there is a feeling sometimes that Laurieston Hall, particularly 
among some people, has declared independence from the rest of the world, but at the same it 
absolutely totally relies on it for a massive amount of its inputs. So I think IÕm a citizen of this, 
IÕm a citizen in almost a humorous way of this funny little place called Laurieston Hall, which 
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is just a pin-prick on the map, and I donÕt think of myself as a citizen of the world in that way, 
I think thatÕs just a bit of an overblown phrase. So thatÕs what IÕm a citizen of, IÕm a citizen of 
Laurieston Hall (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007). 
 
We seem to have two types of political agency operating in the foregoing discussion. Penny and 
Carl show great enthusiasm for wider political activity and engagement with power structures. The 
latter quote from Patrick brings to the fore the way in which communities might be viewed as 
apolitical enclaves, with little wider significance outside their own existence. It is worth noting that 
this quote is somewhat extreme in this respect - in the context of the interviews as a whole, but also 
in relation to the rest of the interview from Patrick, who elsewhere in his interview shows a lot of 
enthusiasm for engagement in wider politics. However, it still raises an important issue. It seems 
that autonomous spaces can have two functions. In the terms of the literature, the first might best be 
termed ÔautonomousÕ, insofar as it engages with hierarchical power structures, but from a position 
of exteriority. The position is exterior since it does not take the limits of the system for granted - 
that is, it does not engage in the representative or hierarchical politics in an attempt at reform but 
rather attacks or resists this system from without. This is made possible partly through having a 
space to practice non-hierarchical, non-representative relationships, as well as to organise for 
action. It is here that the overlap with the ÔutopianÕ function occurs. The utopian function to some 
extent requires an enclave, or a degree of isolation from the outside, in order to practice these 
unmediated relationships, to learn to desire something ÔotherÕ. 
 
Both of these functions have relevance for a critical utopian citizenship. The utopian function 
shows an example of something different, transgresses boundaries, and shows possibilities beyond 
the limits of the system. Communal spaces, shared kitchens, mutual childcare are examples that 
transgress the ontological and methodological individualism of the state-capitalist system and the 
spaces that it builds. The autonomous function engages directly with mechanisms of power, using 
the ideas and energies nurtured and learnt in the utopian ÔenclaveÕ to resist the system from a 
position of relative exteriority. The relationship between utopian and autonomous forms of politics 
does not seem to be adequately theorised in academia, since the two literatures are often treated as 
separate (for discussions of this, see Day, 2005: 215 and passim; Robinson & Tormey, 2009, 
passim). However, it is important to note that in the context of the spaces that I have visited, they 
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co-exist, interweave and overlap Ð often with a third type of politics Ð that is, participation in 
conventional political activities such as voting, lobbying and standing in elections Ð which can also 
be informed and inspired by activities and relationships in communal space. This relationship 
between different forms of politics, or political agency, forms a major theme that runs through this 
project and is discussed particularly in Chapters 8 and 9. At this point, however, most relevant is 
the breaking down of boundaries Ð including spatial boundaries Ð that this implies. When 
communal space is opened up, it is not always easy to predict or dictate what will occur there, or 
what it will be used for. 
 
Bringing spheres of life together in shared space benefits people and communities. It allows people 
to share responsibilities such as cooking and childcare, reduces daily errands for individuals, 
increases enjoyment and sociability, creates bonds and builds community. It is also more efficient, 
better for the environment and can save money: 
3 times a week, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, if you wanted to, you donÕt have to but if you 
wanted to, you can come here and have an evening meal, for £2.50, cooked by people here. ItÕs 
usually very nice food, and also what we do have to do and it is part of the lease agreement, is 
to be part of the team every month that cooks. I do this, and I get to cook with 3 other people, 
and it is great fun, I enjoy it É The main purpose and aim is to be in a community which has 
the co-housing principles, which was to basically share facilities, to reduce the amount of use, 
and therefore to reduce carbon emissions and to reduce the use of valuable resources, to benefit 
from, for example if you are a family, to benefit from good childcare, lots of good role models, 
so for example in Denmark, where co-housing is very popular, the message that you get there 
is that co-housing is a family paradise, certainly I think that the families here really enjoy it, 
because there are lots of people who know the children quite well and so when it comes to it if 
you have to get involved with a dispute or something with the children, you know the 
parenting styles of their parents so, there is lots of childcare (Interview: Max, Springhill, 21 
April 2007). 
 
This historicises the dominant model of citizenship, offering a glimpse of something new, which 
transgresses the too often taken-for-granted separation of spheres of life and individual households. 
It also politicises activities that would usually be relegated to the ÔprivateÕ sphere, and not 
associated with the ÔpublicÕ activities of citizenship. 
 
5.2.2. Forms of ownership and property relations 
In the previous chapter, I considered how dominant notions of territory rest on the ontological 
construction of the physical environment as external to our human subjectivities, but at the same 
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time appropriable and marketable through an ontologically posited ethos of possessive 
individualism. This leads to unequal distribution of economic and political power and the enclosure 
and destruction of public places of politics and social commons, and therefore the reduction of 
citizenship to a series of market rights and entitlements at the expense of participation and 
responsibilities. I also considered critical utopian approaches that offer alternatives to possessive 
individualism by adopting an ethos of stewardship or custodianship and practice of collective 
ownership and self-governance. Theoretical approaches that I considered also offered the 
possibility of reaching out from spaces to reconstruct social commons at a local level by providing 
cheap or free services. There was also a possibility of the appropriation of space through squatting 
as a mode of resistance to capitalist modes of ownership. Here, I will concentrate on resistance to 
dominant models of the ownership of land and property and the creation of alternative models with 
a concentration on the following questions: 
¥ What alternative models of ownership do autonomous communities use? 
¥ What are the implications of different forms of ownership for everyday praxis, 
participation and belonging in autonomous communities? 
 
5.2.2.1. What alternative models of ownership do autonomous communities use? 
The typology shows four different models of ownership of spaces: squatting, renting, the Ôfully 
mutualÕ model and private ownership. Each of these implies a means of appropriation. Since 
models of property and ownership often derive from community histories and are based on legal 
models, I will mainly be using information gleaned from documentary analysis and notes from 
participant observation. 
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Squatting 
None of the communities I visited were squatted
52
. Liverpool Social Centre
53
 had considered 
squatting a space, but found a space available to rent relatively cheaply that was in the cellar of a 
radical bookshop called News From Nowhere, within the city centre, and this was appealing since 
Ôboth kinds of things would complement each-other, that is the bookshop and social centre could 
form a radical partnership, so we pursued thatÕ (Interview: Carl, Liverpool Social Centre, 10 July 
2007). Kebele was originally squatted. The reasons for the communityÕs purchase of the place are 
stated on its website: 
Through resisting certain eviction and after negotiations with the owners, the Housing Co-op 
was formed to buy the building with a mortgage. Frantic fundraising ensured a significant 
deposit. By providing secure affordable housing for its resident members, the Housing Co-op 
was able to cover the mortgage repayments. This has ensured the continuation of Kebele as a 
secure space ever since. (Kebele Community Cooperative, History from 
http://www.kebelecoop.org/History.html accessed July 30, 2009) 
 
The way in which Kebele eventually bought the property was very similar to many of the other 
communities, and they now use the fully mutual model. 
 
Fully mutual ownership 
Fully mutual ownership is a legal model, which requires a community to own a place either 
outright or on a mortgage, so although it differs greatly from private ownership in terms of the 
mode of ownership, the initial methods of appropriation for the two methods are the same. The 
ways in which communities organised their resources in order to purchase land and properties on 
the market varied drastically. As the typology shows, this model holds for the majority of the 
communities that I visited, including Kebele, Coventry Peace House, Findhorn Foundation, 
                                            
52
 I have, in fact, visited squatted spaces, but have not undertaken any formal research. None of the squatted spaces that I contacted 
during my period of formal research agreed to be part of the study. From what I was able to gather the reasons for this were threefold. 
Many squats are temporary, and do not have internet access, so initiating contact is difficult. The temporary nature of squatted places 
also means that membersÕ reaching consensus to partake in research is more difficult. Secondly, this is possibly symptomatic of the fact 
that squatted spaces are not as widespread in the United Kingdom as elsewhere (this was mentioned during interview by Tim and Ingo at 
Kebele). Third, due to the complex legal nature of squats, inhabitants are more reluctant to allow access to external researchers who they 
do not know. A study of squatted spaces could potentially form the basis of further research with a narrower remit focused solely on 
squatted spaces, allowing more scope to overcome these difficulties.  
53
 At the time of my research, Liverpool Social Centre had very recently, within the previous month, secured the space that was going to 
form its base. This space was still under construction. At the time of writing, however, the Social Centre has become established within 
this space, and has been renamed Next To Nowhere, which reflects its relationship with, and position next to the News from Nowhere 
bookshop (see Appendix 1 for more detail). 
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Mornington Grove, Liverpool Social Centre, Corani and Laurieston Hall. This is a legal model, 
where a small fee, usually £1, is paid for membership (this is a legal requirement). Once somebody 
is a member, they own a ÔshareÕ in the community property along with the other members, and in 
this sense are both landlord and tenant simultaneously. Many fully mutual cooperatives are also 
non-equity sharing, which means that were the community to dissolve for any reason, no member 
would make a profit, and any wealth that had been generated in the duration of the communityÕs 
existence would then be distributed to a similar organisation or organisations.  
 
Within this model, communities operate differently. If there is a mortgage to be paid, usually 
members pay something analogous to rent, often termed Ôcost-shareÕ, which is then pooled to pay 
the monthly installments. If there is no mortgage, there is usually still a contribution to be made 
towards cost-share for bills, food, council tax and other expenditures involved in owning and 
maintaining a property. All members are involved in decisions concerning the level and use of 
cost-share, usually through consensus. There is often also an expectation that a certain amount of 
time will be invested in the co-operative: 
On a strict level people donÕt share their income, but everybody pays the same rent regardless 
of what space they are inhabiting, each pays the same rent to the housing co-op which is us, so 
itÕs a fully inclusive housing co-op, fully mutual, which means that you have to be a member to 
live here, and to live here you have to be a member, so it goes round in a circle which is very 
important. So people then, within that structure, can earn what they want, but at the same time 
there is an expectation that you give about half your working week to the group, É two or 
three days a week, what I do is primarily for no money, but it goes towards the co-op and in 
return the rent is kept low because of that giving of the work, É So then outwith that people 
can earn in theory what they want but because it does mean that almost, you canÕt have a full-
time job while you live here but you can have jobs where you can be a consultant or whatever 
you want (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston, 22 September 2007). 
 
In return for cost-share, which is usually relatively low, and the time commitment to the co-op, 
members of Laurieston Hall get to live in a beautiful Edwardian 73-Roomed mansion, with 150 
acres of land and two lochs in a beautiful area of South-West Scotland. There was a feeling in 
many of the fully mutual co-operatives that although all members should be entitled to their own 
income, drastic inequalities would cause problems: 
It wouldnÕt work if some people here were earning an awful lot more than other people. There 
have been a very few times, there was once a time when that happened, and it doesnÕt feel 
good, so whilst we donÕt go around declaring everything we earn, nobody knows exactly what 
everybody earns, we are aware, nobody lives an ostentatious lifestyle in relation to other 
people, so thatÕs quite important (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston, 22 September 2007). 
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Most of the co-operatives do not income-share54. There was frequently, however, a feeling that 
non-monetary goods should be shared: 
There is definitely a sense of things being shared, and there was an example recently where a 
member got given a second-hand computer and one of the other members was looking to have 
that themselves, which wouldn't have been a problem we would just have discussed it, but 
because they were a bit impatient they were suggesting that they might just go out and buy one, 
and I suppose there was still that whole thing about encouraging communal ownership of 
things (Interview: Nick, Coventry Peace House, 9 May 2007). 
 
Amongst the communities I visited, and indeed within the United Kingdom as far as I and the 
members of this community are aware, there is only one co-operative that shares income Ð Corani. 
Members of this co-op are obliged to income share. In theory they can be part of any income-
sharing group, but in practice there is only one in operation, the Snowball Income Sharing Group. 
The Snowball Income Sharing Group operates according to a fairly specific set of procedures, 
which require participants to specifically declare all intended expenditures that are above the 
(very!) basic weekly allowance of £25, so that these can be prioritised (see appendix 9 for an 
outline of procedures). Snowball had three members at the time of my visit, two of these presently 
living at Corani, and one ex-member who continues to income share. Although there are more than 
two people living at Corani, and income sharing is a requirement of membership, one of the people 
living at the housing is retaining long-term guest status since he does not want to income share. 
Membership of the income-sharing group has fluctuated in the past, with the lowest membership 
being two, and the highest sixteen. Income sharing meetings are usually held every two weeks, 
although sometimes they are every 3 weeks in order to fit them neatly into calendar months. 
Income sharing meetings rely on trust and honesty. Although many would see this kind of process 
as very restrictive upon personal autonomy, the opinion of the member who I interviewed was 
quite the opposite: 
The main aim is to house people in a way that removes the oppression of ownership, because 
youÕre your own owner, because as a group we insist on income sharing, which is a speciality 
almost of this particular housing co-op (Interview: Guy, Corani, 7 July 2007). 
 
                                            
54
 The exception is Corani, and this is discussed in more detail below. See Appendix 9 for income sharing procedures at Corani. 
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This idea of being your own owner, in the absence of private ownership is particularly interesting, 
and reflects a vision of autonomy in equality similar to that put forward in the critical utopian 
literature discussed in the previous chapter. This view was not widespread however. Members of 
other communities interpreted the practice of income sharing as a distinct loss of personal freedom: 
At one point Peace House had, almost like a kind of an allowance which was your own money 
which was only about 20 pounds a week, and anything over that you had to justify to other 
people. That seems very radical to me, I would give it a go, but whether and how anyone ever 
put it into practice, I just don't know, because that seems quite amazing to me, in terms of the 
personal freedom you would be giving up! (Interview: Nick, Coventry Peace House, 9 May 
2007). 
 
The member was referring to an income sharing scheme that had many years previously been in 
place at Peace house, but had long since been discontinued. Members of Corani and a founding 
member of Peace House informed me that income sharing had previously been a fairly popular 
practice amongst co-ops, mainly during the 60s and 70s, but this was no longer the case. 
 
Private ownership 
As can be seen in the typology, private ownership is also a model used in some of the communities, 
where one buys into the community simply by buying a property, or renting from someone else 
who owns. This was the case for the New Findhorn Association (NFA), which will be discussed 
later and also for Springhill Cohousing Community55 and Hockerton Housing Project. In these 
cases, however, it is important to note that the community originally bought the land collectively 
before the houses were built. There is also usually some kind of mediation when a property is put 
up for sale, rather than it being available on an open market, so that the community has a say in 
who joins. I will discuss the example of Hockerton Housing Project to illustrate how private 
ownership can work for communities. 
 
All of the houses at Hockerton are owned by their inhabitants, either outright or through mortgages. 
The main goal when the project started was to build ecologically sustainable houses at no extra cost 
to a conventional new build, in line with the membersÕ consensual decision to demonstrate that 
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 More information on the ways in which Sprinhill procured land and approaches property relations can be found in Appendix 1. 
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sustainability could be achieved by ÔordinaryÕ families. To date the projectÕs costs have been 
remarkably close to the budget that was set at the outset: 
Three-bed home (171 m²) cost breakdown: 
¥ Basic house construction:      £51k 
¥ Conservatory      £12k 
¥ Landscaping, water systems and amenities   £9k 
¥ Set-up costs and Supervision     £20k 
(High due to extended timings in both planning and construction phases) 
¥ Estimated construction costs     £450/m² 
(Very favourable compared to conventional build) 
(Source: HHP Launch Brochure 1999: 5) 
Each of the households was responsible for raising the capital for their own home. For some 
families, this meant selling their houses and living in caravans on the site while construction was 
taking place. It should also be taken into account that most of the members were involved in the 
construction phase, which cut costs, but was expensive in terms of time. Each dwelling has an 
associated 999-year lease. Although the leases have a lot in common with standard leases, they 
have also had to incorporate elements of the innovative set up of the project. These include specific 
conditions, such as restriction on fossil-fuelled cars and an obligation to contribute a minimum 
number of hours to the co-operative56.  
 
Mixed 
Findhorn community uses a combination of models so does not fit easily into any of the above 
categories. The nature of ownership varies between the Foundation and the New Findhorn 
Association (NFA). The NFA is the wider community that has developed around the Findhorn 
Foundation.  
 
The NFA has developed in the local surroundings, and members tend to own their own property, or 
rent from a private landlord, yet express an affiliation with the community. A significant proportion 
of the NFA live on ÔThe Field of DreamsÕ, a piece of land owned by the Foundation, which sells 
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 Thanks are due to Paul Chatterton for pointing out that at Hockerton the high prices are due to the absence of a social process to 
determine resale value.  
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building plots to interested parties, and mediates the sale of built houses, according to various 
conditions. Land and houses are bought, owned and sold as they would be anywhere else in the 
UK. The only real differences being that a fee of £100 per year, per member, is paid for NFA costs 
yearly to cover administration costs. Also, for those living on the Field of Dreams, plots are bought 
and houses have to be built according to certain ecological stipulations. Houses are bought from 
The Housing Company, a subsidiary of NFD Ltd. (Walker, 1994a: 71-3). 
 
The Findhorn Foundation can best be viewed as the ÔcoreÕ of the community, and espouses 
collective ownership, and members work full time for the community. The property owned by the 
Foundation, including the Park and Cluny college, Cullerne gardens, and properties now used for 
the Moray Steiner School, Newbold house, a separately run educational and holistic therapy centre, 
was bought over the years as the Foundation gained more money, particularly through the success 
of educational courses during the 1970s (Riddell, 1994: 64-5). The Park, where the community was 
founded and the majority of members lived and still live, was finally bought in 1983. At this time, 
the owner of the land knew that the purchase of this land would be almost imperative for the 
Foundation, and drove a very hard bargain. Foundation income was supplemented by a sustained 
period of fundraising in order the raise the sum (Ibid: 69). The Park is now owned by all members 
of the Foundation according to the fully mutual model.  
 
5.2.2.2. What are the implications of different forms of ownership for everyday praxis, 
participation and belonging in autonomous communities? 
Interviews suggest that private ownership encourages a different relation to the maintenance of 
space to other ownership models outlined above Ð that is comparatively more individualistic, and 
oriented towards the maintenance of oneÕs own particular portion of space: 
So, you know, I own my own home, whereas in the Foundation nobody owns because 
everybody owns and everybody has a say in whatÕs done about that. Nobody could tell me 
what to do with my house, so if I decided to paint it pink with blue stripes, whilst it may not be 
popular, they couldnÕt really stop me doing that because we donÕt have an agreement that can 
control how people paint their houses (Interview: Kay Kay, NFA, 18 June 2007). 
 
The fully mutual model appeared to encourage a particular sense of responsibility in caring for the 
community property - for fellow members and also for future members. This appears to be 
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analogous to the models of common ownership, custodianship and stewardship put forward by 
Ostrom (1990), Ward (2005 [2002]) and Day (2003) as discussed in the previous chapter. The 
association of collective ownership or ÔcustodianshipÕ with immediacy of relationships and self-
activity within a small-scale community suggested by evolutionary anarchists is also apparent, 
since fully mutual ownership stipulates decision-making by all members and tends to encourage 
consensus as a procedure. I was also told (and observed) in several of the places I visited that a 
feeling of equality in ownership/ÕcustodianshipÕ/ÕstewardshipÕ tends to encourage a willingness to 
participate in tasks related to maintaining the physical space of the community. I will explore this 
dynamic using the example of Mornington Grove Community (MGC) in Bow, London. This is a 
particularly interesting example, since the community (a housing co-operative) was particularly 
longstanding, at 27 years old. For this reason it can possibly be seen as a success story for the 
principle of custodianship, although the ethos was fairly widespread throughout those following the 
fully mutual model: 
[we aim to] get better, obviously, and look after the houses, and make them greener, thatÕs for 
sure, you know make them more energy efficient, so I think thatÕs the main purpose at the 
moment, to keep it going. And we have a lot of other things, and a lot of maintenance too, but 
thatÕs something that happens anyway because they are old houses (Interview: Angela, MGC, 
8 July 2007). 
 
I think heart
57
 was two-folded, one it was about caring about each other, and two it was about a 
sense of continuity and maintaining our link with what went before, not necessarily by 
following old traditions but more about maintaining a sense of what the community was born 
out of and whatÕs gone before and that everything that we do will have an impact of what will 
happen in the future, so when we are making changes, we need to realise that maybe we wonÕt 
be here for the outcome and it is going to have an impact on people who are here in the future, 
you know what are we creating for others (Interview: Kate, MGC, 8 July 2007). 
 
It is important not to idealise the model, however, and at last once during interviews at MGC, the 
problem that collective ownership, far from encouraging commitment, could conversely lead to a 
problem of abdicating responsibility, or free-riding: 
We need money for kitchens to be re-done and that has been held over and held over for the 
last few years. And then it is up to someone to say Ôlook, this has not been done, I want it done 
now and IÕm really upset that itÕs not been done!Õ Because again the scared ones would want 
lots of money in the bank but nothing so spend on the community for the people that live here, 
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 ÔHeartÕ was agreed as an aim and a principle of the community during a consensus meeting on values which had been held a week 
prior to my visit. This information was gleaned from interviews, and from a series of cards that had been posted on the wall after the 
meeting that I was shown during my visit. 
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or for the building ... Officially, it all makes sense on paper, but then come the personalities, 
the fears and the realities of people and relationships (Interview: Kenny, MGC, 8 July 2008). 
 
The themes of custodianship and stewardship, and the importance of individuals feeling that they 
had Ôa stakeÕ, or more specifically Ôan equal stakeÕ in the physical space of community came up 
frequently during interviews and informal conversations. This was particularly the case in 
communities using the fully mutual model of ownership. At the level of the domestic sphere this 
was seen by many to encourage participation and collective endeavour, since people felt that their 
activities were going towards something of which they had part and equal ownership. This might 
be seen to contrast with dominant models of citizenship, where individual ownership, competition 
and inequality in property ownership are often seen to inhibit participation in the public sphere, and 
also result in a vision of citizens as consumers, rather than political actors.  
 
It is important to note, however, that however much collective ownership might transgress, 
critique, and sometimes directly oppose capitalist modes of citizenship by offering alternative 
public space for participation, organisation and dissidence, and also creating a physical barrier to 
the encroachment and enclosure of capitalism, fully mutual ownership is still a legal model, so in 
some senses might be seen as being complicit with state power, or as offering a compliment to, or 
parody of, state citizenship, rather than a radical alternative form of political subjectivity. The drive 
for autonomy therefore occurs at the nexus between social utopianism and capitalism: 
So following on from this question of tension between the values that we in Corani hold and 
the values of capitalist society, we view that it does create a conflict, it creates a conflict with 
the state, the state will be minded to not be supportive of what we do and to, certainly if it 
doesnÕt actually set out to destroy us, to minimise our impact, unless we persuade those that 
govern that actually capitalism is not the right way, that our course is a better course, then there 
will be a conflict (Interview: Guy, Corani, 7 July 2007). 
 
This interview extract reflects issues from the autonomous spaces literature discussed in the 
previous chapter, that there is always a tension between resistance and creation, and that rather than 
being seen as complete self-sufficient blueprints for a better future, autonomy is better 
conceptualised as a constant interplay between self-reliance and embededdness (Pickerill and 
Chatterton, 2006). One way in which communities help to build self-reliance and autonomy is by 
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contributing to the local community, opening up spaces for the provision of cheap or free services. 
This reflects themes of horizontality, solidarity and mutual aid discussed in the previous chapter: 
So itÕs six houses, five of them are joined together at the top, which is our living area; everyone 
has a room each to sleep in. And downstairs, two of the houses are for the community space, 
which is like one large room. The next house is a cycling workshop, and the next two houses 
are co-op kitchen and living room, and then the end house which is separate houses the 
Worldwise office and also another peace project office upstairs. And thatÕs it, so every part of 
the building is functioning doing lots of useful work, and it means lots of people come here. So 
we have a night shelter for example, every night, and two volunteers come and thatÕs for 
refused refugees and also Eastern Europeans who are destitute and sleeping in the park, but 
they can work so we just help them until they can get back on their feet (Interview: Penny, 
Coventry Peace House, 10 May 2007). 
 
Coventry Peace House in particular provides an invaluable service for refugees and asylum seekers 
who might otherwise be destitute, and the night shelter was a huge project requiring enormous 
input from dedicated volunteers, both living within the housing co-operative and from the local 
community. The practice of providing welfare and services to local communities was widespread 
throughout the communities that I visited, particularly urban housing co-operatives and social 
centres, and included but was not limited to: cafs providing cheap and healthy vegan food, bike 
repair workshops, computer access and open-source software workshops, art and cultural events, 
music gigs and events, craft workshops, benefit and debt-handling advice, asylum advice, refugee 
shelter, temporary accommodation for visiting activists, holistic therapies and alternative health 
education, childcare and crches, radical libraries and infoshops, meeting space for organising 
protests, film nights, gardening workshops, home education workshops. In many places these were 
provided free or for a donation, in other cases they were paid services provided by a workersÕ co-
operative associated with the community. Although some negotiation with the state and capital is 
always necessary in the opening up of these spaces, even in the case of squatting (Chatterton and 
Hodkinson, 2007: 212-3), alternative economic models can then be set up, that are based on need 
rather than profit, on responsibilities and bottom-up participation rather than on claiming rights and 
entitlements from an abstract state.  
 
5.2.3. Creation and modification 
In the previous chapter (section 4.2.3), I discussed how dominant territorial approaches assume a 
separation between the roles architect, planner or designer of a place and the intended users. I 
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argued that the ability to plan and dictate the shape of community surroundings was imbued with 
the logic of money and power. Citizens are alienated from the processes of building the spaces in 
which they are to live, as well as from places of society and politics. They may feel disempowered 
and alienated from by their physical environment. Critical utopian approaches, rather than offering 
spatial blueprints, emphasise processes by which places can be designed and built from the Ôbottom 
upÕ, through modification of existing spaces according to the changing needs or desires of 
inhabitants (Barker, 2000), or through the building and design of new places through consensus 
design involving users and experts (Day, 2003). Such processes, it was argued, produce an 
outcome that is more suited to users, empowers them with a sense of pride and stewardship over 
their physical environment, and participation in the procedures can build a feeling of community 
that is vital to the sense of a place. Here, I will consider practices relating to the design and 
building of space in autonomous communities using questions drawn from the theoretical 
discussion as a basis: 
¥ Do autonomous communities challenge the hierarchical imposition of the built 
environment? 
¥ How do autonomous communities account for differing and changing desires in the layout 
of spaces? 
¥ What are the implications of different models of spatial design for everyday praxis, 
participation and belonging? 
 
5.2.3.1. Do autonomous communities challenge the hierarchical imposition of the built 
environment? 
The foregoing discussion considered how spaces both reflect, and form, subjectivities. I considered 
how opening design processes to the input of potential inhabitants and users might encourage 
participation and belonging, through the process itself and also through the opening up of public 
space. This may have implications for citizenship, disrupting the usual organisation of space 
associated with dominant models of citizenship and opening up a new space for different, critical, 
creative and transgressive modes of self-governance. As the typology shows, some communities 
were purpose-built for the community, and some were adapted from previous structures.  
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As a Co-housing community, Springhill was an interesting example of intentional design. Co-
housing communities are intentional communities where particular attention is paid to design, and 
how the architecture and layout of the community can facilitate a sense of community amongst 
residents. The modern theory of cohousing originated in Denmark in the 1960s among groups of 
families who were dissatisfied with existing housing and communities that they felt did not meet 
their needs (Scotthanson & Scotthanson, 2005: 2). The basic design principles of Cohousing are:  
á Neighbourhoods are designed and created by the future residents. 
á Neighbourhoods are managed by the residents, through a body corporate. 
á Self-contained private houses are bought and sold on the open market. 
á Selected shared amenities are co-owned where people can meet their neighbours and more 
economically share particular equipment 
á Cars are usually located at the periphery of the site, with internal circulation being 
predominantly pedestrian. 
á Houses are built in clusters and often adjoining and are usually built to a medium density 
standard in order to protect open space.  
á Kitchen windows face the pedestrian street. 
(McCamant & Durrett, 1994: 35-43) 
 
Some of these factors are intended to support community, and were evident at Springhill. 
Involvement of initial residents in the design process meant that the community building process 
could begin before residents even moved into their homes. Negotiations between residents and 
architects produced a generic house design plan for all on the site, which indicated the walls that 
were structural and those that could potentially be moved around by individual households. 
Prospective residents were then free to design the houses as they willed within the constraints 
stipulated. One of the houses I was able to visit was an Ôupside downÕ house, with the bedrooms 
and bathrooms downstairs, and the kitchen and living area upstairs, since the resident had requested 
this at the time of design. Cars are located on the periphery of the site, allowing children to play 
around the site, and minimising the social impact of cars on the site more generally. Having an 
active area of the home (the kitchen) facing the pathway aids security and allows adults to observe 
children playing outside. There is a centrally located common house with three storeys. The space 
on the ground floor is used as a work and games space. It can be used by people requiring larger 
work areas than they might have in their own house, for example for art or do-it-yourself projects. 
Chapter 5: Transgressing Territory: Practice 117 
There is also a play space with a snooker table and table-football game. The second floor has a 
large common room, for music, theatre, dance, yoga and various workshops and events. The third 
floor contains a kitchen and dining room that can seat up to fifty people. Shared facilities allow 
residents to socialise and eat with other residents when they prefer, or to retreat to their private 
homes and facilities at other times.  
 
The architectural design of Springhill also has some environmental credentials, and was described 
by a resident as Ôsort of medium green, in terms of buildingsÕ (Interview: Max, Springhill, 21 April 
2007). This includes triple-glazed windows, high levels of insulation, photovoltaic panels on the 
roofs and a Sustainable Urban Draining System (SUDS), which replicates the way that rain would 
naturally fall into a field, and circulates under the ground. This contrasts to conventional new-build 
estates, where the use of hardstanding and pipes means that water is channelled into rivers, leading 
to the depletion of low-level aquifers; a particular problem in the South-East. Thus geographical 
situation can raise particular concerns in terms of co-existing sustainably with the environment, as 
well as global concerns, and these were taken into account during the design and building of 
Springhill. Hockerton Housing Project is another example of intentional design, where ecological 
credentials were paramount, and earth-sheltered housing means that no artificial heat is needed to 
maintain temperatures throughout the year, and a reed-bed lake provides sewage filtration.  
 
As can be seen in the typology, groups and communities whose physical environment was 
intentionally designed with the needs of the community in mind are in a minority of those I visited. 
Most groups have had to adapt a previously standing structure. This process of adaptation is 
something that often takes a lot of time and energy initially. Coventry Peace House hosted activity 
weekends where young people and asylum seekers could attend to help out whilst at the same time 
learning building skills: 
So itÕs evolved over the years, but we have always done stuff here, even when we moved in 
and it was in a really really awful state because it had been empty for three and a half years, so 
it was all stripped out and everything and bare, it was just awful. We very quickly, within that 
Easter time, March or April, we put on two weekends of courses. So weÕve always had people 
coming here and people have always been involved in it, so itÕs much bigger than just the 
people that live here. And weÕve done lots of things over the years. So the houses themselves 
have got renovated through activity weekends that we have on the first weekend of every 
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month and through projects we have run with excluded young people whoÕve learnt building 
skills, or refugees and asylum seekers, we have got funding from the Home Office bizarrely 
for, to get them volunteering, so weÕve had lots of clever ways of getting the place renovated, 
and so now itÕs, well everywhere is used, which is great (Interview: Penny, Coventry Peace 
House, 10 May 2007) 
 
5.2.3.2. How do autonomous communities account for differing and changing desires in 
the layout of spaces? 
The above quote illustrates just one example of several innovative schemes that groups and 
communities have devised to deal with the expensive and time-consuming tasks of initially 
adapting a space to suit a communityÕs needs, and also the continual maintenance and adaptation to 
changing needs and desires that is necessary over time. These processes are often at least as 
inclusive as those for intentional design. Since a lot of the work is done by members of the group 
themselves, there is not the same kind of separation between the skilled architect and the client, as 
is still often the case in the initial stages of intentional design (note how although residents at 
Springhill were involved in the process of design, they still employed a clearly professionalised 
architect). An interesting example of changing the way a space is used was evident at Kebele: 
WeÕre already adopting being a community co-operative, because it is a housing co-operative 
already, so because housing is an issue, and this is how it started, because people needed 
housing and they also wanted to do some really cool stuff then they started doing meetings and 
campaigns and stuff. We already are a co-operative but to stay a housing co-operative we have 
to do stuff with housing. ThereÕs some rooms upstairs but we came to the decision not to have 
residents anymore because it made it feel like someoneÕs house, with people coming in and out 
and you feel like you canÕt do stuff. So now we have more rooms to do things (Interview: 
Tash, Kebele, 7 April 2007). 
 
This quote serves as a perfect example of how needs and desires can change over time. Housing 
was always central to KebeleÕs history, since it started as a squat for homeless activists, then 
became a housing co-operative. However, even such a central aspect of its identity was not 
sacrosanct or immune from changing needs and desires, as activities such as the caf, infoshop and 
library gained popularity. The idea that having housing made the place Ôseem like someoneÕs 
houseÕ is interesting; it implies that a conflict existed between the ÔpublicÕ and participative aspects 
of the space, and the ÔprivateÕ or household aspects. Another issue that arose in several of the 
communities that I visited, particularly Findhorn and Laurieston Hall, was the issue of an ageing 
population. As the average age of members in these places was rising, they were beginning to 
consider how their housing and access needs might change, as they got older, and the ways in 
which the design and layout of the spaces would have to be altered to adapt to these. 
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A problem with consensus as a process for changing physical surroundings is that it can often be 
very slow: 
ItÕs really slow getting round to maintenance, and you have all these great ideas about ÔletÕs to 
this, letÕs do thatÕ, but actually getting round to implementing things can be a really slow 
procedure. I think thatÕs where consensus decision-making can really slow things down and 
thatÕs one of the things you just have to accept if you are living in a community, that the pace 
is just much slower and you canÕt just go Ôright letÕs do itÕ, even if itÕs a great idea everyoneÕs 
got to agree, everyoneÕs got to talk to the right men, and then by the time they get back to you, 
you have got 2 weeks before you have another meeting. Anyway I think that is one of the big 
bugbears we have here is trying to get maintenance work done (Interview: Kate, MGC, 8 July 
2007) 
 
The difficulties of consensus decision-making as a process for initiating change will be further 
discussed in Chapters 6 & 7.  
 
Intentional design has its own problems. As well as also being a potentially very slow process it is 
also often very expensive, requiring huge investments of money and, for the initial owner or 
founding group, the investment of personal time and energy during the design and building 
process. This was particularly the case for Hockerton, where residents were involved in building 
their own houses. Since several members had to sell their previous homes in order to invest, this 
meant that they had to live in caravans on the site for up to two years. Perhaps mainly due to this 
high investment level, a glance at the typology will show that intentional design appears to be 
associated with private, rather than collective ownership, allowing residents to recuperate their 
investment through private sale fairly easily. During interview, a member of Springhill stated that 
the community as it stands Ôis a very capitalist arrangement and I will make no bones about itÕ 
(Interview: Max, Springhill, 21 April 2007).  
 
5.2.3.3. What are the implications of different models of spatial design for everyday praxis, 
participation and belonging? 
I did not find any evidence that intentional design did facilitate feelings of belonging or 
participation any more than adapted buildings. Although the pedestrianised streets of a cohousing 
community possibly facilitate community integration, and the common room also allows for shared 
activity, bonding, and participation in several activities, shared facilities and safe outdoor areas 
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were certainly not lacking in other communities that I visited. Perhaps the greatest advantage of 
newly and intentionally built communities is the ability to build-in environmental credentials 
(although it might be worth considering the environmental costs of building from scratch); at 
Hockerton, Springhill, and the eco-village at Findhorn it was possible to integrate sustainable 
technology into the initial design of buildings, whereas groups such as Kebele, Corani and 
Coventry Peace House were gradually adding features such as insulation or solar panels as and 
when they could afford to do so.  
 
What seems to be more important than intentional design is adaptability; having a space which is 
amenable to being used in flexible ways, to account for changing desires, but more importantly 
having discussion and decision-making procedures in place which allow members to discuss their 
changing needs and desires and translate these into action when necessary. This in itself requires 
space for meetings and for informal discussions. The importance of common space in each and 
every one of the groups and communities that I visited was pronounced, and often seemed to 
revolve around the kitchen - there appeared to be a distinct affinity between cooking, eating, 
socialising and making decisions! Formal meetings often took place in kitchens after dinners.  
 
5.3. Implications 
What does all this mean for a critical and transgressive citizenship? In this section I will consider 
what dynamics we have in operation here, summarising the ways in which actualisations either 
replicate and parody, or critique and transgress, dominant state-centred models of citizenship as 
well as critical utopian theoretical alternatives58. I will also consider whether there are any 
implications for wider social change. All this will be done with a particular awareness of the 
implications of the dialogue I have undertaken between theory and practice. 
 
                                            
58
 Although I aim to recognise complexity, complicity and co-optation, there is however an emphasis throughout the thesis on where 
critical utopian alternatives are actualised. This is in line with the critical utopian methodology articulated in Chapter 2 and further 
explicated in footnote 42, as well as with the ethical imperative of a poststructural anarchist approach of valorising difference and 
promoting alternative practices (May, 1994: 133). 
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5.3.1. Territorial sovereignty versus autonomy 
The way in which we perceive space is an ontological concern. Using a utopian approach we can 
question the apparent ÔtruthÕ or verifiability of an ontology and instead concentrate on its 
desirability. By studying practice we can consider the effects of theories. Critical utopian theories 
and practices serve an important function of historicising and undermining the ontological 
foundations of dominant formations of territory and citizenship. They also simultaneously point to 
new possibilities. Critical utopian theory transgresses dominant models of territorial sovereignty 
and cultural unification by stressing the normative problems of this approach: the alienation of the 
rights of the individual to an abstract entity, the suppression of difference, desire and creativity, the 
disempowerment of citizens and the oppression of excluded groups. Theory also provides an 
ethical basis for a potential praxis: the appropriation of autonomous spaces and the articulation of 
desire for a wider ethic of non-hierarchy, creativity, peak experience, solidarity and immediacy.  
 
Critical utopian practices potentially actualise such theory: they offer a means by which it can be 
brought into reality. Although there is no clear evidence that any of the individuals and groups that 
I interviewed and observed were in any way informed by theories that I considered, they often had 
similar concepts as part of their discourse: autonomy, non-hierarchy and equality are all terms used 
in interviews. Critical utopian practices also highlight new problems: the problems of engaging 
with power in specific situations and the tension between autonomy and embededness. They also 
raise yet new possibilities for praxis: an interweaving of different types of politics.  
 
Like critical utopian theory, these practices transgress the self-evidency of the nation state as the 
pre-eminent scale of citizenship. They illustrate different scales at which human beings can 
participate and belong: consider the Ôfolk citizenÕ and the Ôcitizen of Laurieston HallÕ 
conceptualised by my interviewees. There was a clear critique of conventional models of 
citizenship as a status and identity of nationhood, and a normative vision that expressed the 
importance of respect and responsibility for all people, regardless of their nationality of citizenship 
status: 
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Citizenship isnÕt about being patriotic and understanding the systems by which each country 
runs, it is about respecting each other and thinking about what we need to change to reach 
proper equality. But I donÕt think people think of that when they think of citizenship, I donÕt 
think thatÕs anybodyÕs definition. ItÕs not looking at the voting system and stuff, and saying 
whatÕs crap about it, itÕs just saying Ôyou must understand the voting system if youÕre going to 
be a citizenÕ. But then understanding is not the same as understanding to the level of knowing 
how to be able to challenge, and to suggest better alternatives (Interview: Penny, Coventry 
Peace House, 10 May 2007) 
 
This quote resonates with the project of critical utopian citizenship. The idea of both challenging 
and suggesting alternatives raises new avenues for citizenship, which will be further discussed in 
throughout the thesis and in the conclusion. 
 
A vital issue lies at the heart of citizenship debates: Is citizenship a relation to a territorial 
community, or is it a process and a practice? The latter understanding always overflows and 
problematises the former; relationships and practices do not fit easily into clearly delineated 
boundaries. The segregation of sovereignty into clearly delineated territorial nation states is 
reflected in the separation from the urban from the rural, the public from the private, work from 
play, industry form art, separation, alienation, and the all-encompassment of Ôthe spectacleÕ Ð a 
term drawn from situationist theory that refers to a condition of capitalist society where one 
experiences life as Ôa frozen moment of history in which it is impossible to experience real life or 
actively participate in the worldÕ (Plant, 1992: 1). Critical utopian theories argue for immediate 
resistant practies rooted in a critical subjectivity informed by theory. Theory can offer a no-place 
that distances the reader allowing him or her to reflect upon dominant spatial formations from a 
position of critical distance. Utopian spaces can form a similar function, whilst simultaneously 
opening up space for grassroots participation. I considered how utopian spaces removed some of 
the traditional boundaries between the public and the private by creating communal space for 
shared activities, from organising political activities to fixing bicycles. This is done without 
following fixed or hegemonic spatial or theoretical blueprints, but rather through an ethos of 
process and experiment. This amounts to a politicisation of everyday life. Having highlighted the 
historical situatedness of dominant formations of citizenship, we might well ask, what are the 
contemporary historical dynamics that most require collective action? If we feel that environmental 
degradation is one such issue, as many of the communards that I spoke to did, then this 
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politicisation of the small-scale level at which we produce, consume, and produce waste is highly 
important. This comes close to what Andrew Dobson calls Ôecological citizenshipÕ (Dobson, 2003, 
passim), which Ôdeals in the currency of non-contractual responsibility, É inhabits the private as 
well as the public sphereÕ and is Ôexplicitly non-territorialÕ (Ibid: 89). I will further consider issues 
of ethical responsibility in Chapters 8 & 9. My main point here is how inhabiting space differently 
Ð for example, by living in an shared community with a permaculture garden Ð can have desirible 
political effects. The fact itself of inhabiting space differently sometimes brings people and groups 
into conflict with the sovereign territorial state Ð consider the example of squatting, discussed in 
this chapter, or protest activities that are considered elsewhere in this thesis (Chapters 8 & 9). 
Under these circumstances, powerful structures will probably be minded not to regard such actions 
as ÔcitizenlyÕ Ð a sovereign claim on a monopoly of territory also implies a claim on a monopoly of 
citizenship. A critical utopian citizenship, like ecological citizenship, is based on a transgression of 
territory however, and on process rather than fixity: ÔEcological citizenship É obliges us to rethink 
the traditions of citizenship in ways that may, eventually, take us beyond those traditionsÕ (Ibid: 
90). 
 
5.3.2. Claims and stakes 
Dominant notions of citizenship tied to territorial sovereignty posit possessive individualism as an 
ontological reality and the enclosure of land and accumulation of property as instrumental 
necessity. This has political and ethical effects: the destruction of social commons, the enclosure of 
everyday life and the physical alienation of governors from the governed. This reduces citizenship 
to a sum of rights and entitlements at the expense of community, participation and responsibility. 
Critical utopian theoretical approaches advocate a process of reappropriating land for common use, 
and imply decentralisation, autonomy and egalitarianism. The picture in critical utopian practice is 
somewhat more mixed. The absence of an ÔidealÕ model in practice seems partly to derive from the 
difficulties of dealing with power structures whilst simultaneously attempting to think and live 
differently Ð to exceed the limits of these structures. In the context of territorial sovereignty, some 
kind of Ôtactical compromiseÕ or negotiation is always required, even in the case of squatting 
(Chatterton and Hodkinson, 2007: 210). However, the absence of a single, ideal model may also 
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have been very much to do with differing needs and desires. Whilst members of Corani took part in 
income sharing, to others this was somewhat less than desirable. There was a culture of sharing 
non-monetary goods, and also sharing costs in many of the communities, particularly those that 
used the fully mutual model. Members a particular relation to the place that they lived in Ð they 
articulated feelings of ÔstewardshipÕ or ÔcustodianshipÕ rather than ownership. This model also had 
internal problems, such as the reluctance of members to invest in large maintenance projects. 
 
Communities also shared their properties, spaces and time with non-members (including myself!), 
in an effort to provide welfare and services at a local level Ð what theorists have termed rebuilding 
Ôsocial commonsÕ (Chatterton & Hodkinson, 2007: 202). These practices speak to a theory of 
critical utopian citizenship, since rather than attempting to take the limits of the system for granted 
and working within the system for change, individuals and groups are re-inventing citizenship from 
the bottom-up, by attempting to forge a space ÔoutsideÕ and ÔunderneathÕ the state and capitalism 
that is run according to different values. This happens within the communities through the various 
alternative property models (such as cost-share and income sharing), and also outwith the 
communities in the local outreach initiatives. Compromise seems inevitable between the negative 
aspects of autonomy (reclaiming physical space from capitalism) and the positive and utopian 
aspects of creating something new, and opening up space for unmediated self-activity and 
participation. What does seem to be notable, however, is how grassroots models of property 
ownership seem to be under-theorised in academia Ð the theories that I considered do not seem to 
account for the extent to which individuals engaged in radical practices do still wish for a degree of 
economic independence. It is arguable that this is a symptom of living within a capitalist economy, 
but considering the vast amount of sacrifices that many of the people have been willing to make in 
other areas (time, energy, career, to name but a few) it seems that this point does merit further 
consideration, and could form a basis for further study.  
 
5.3.3. ÔTop-downÕ versus Ôbottom-upÕ design 
Physical space both reflects and shapes needs and desires - In David HarveyÕs words ÔAs we 
collectively produce our cities, so we collectively produce ourselvesÕ (Harvey, 2000: 159). Thus, 
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appropriating, producing and reproducing alternative, resistant spaces can be seen as a basis for the 
formation of a critical political subjectivity: a critical citizenship. Harvey argues, however, that Ôto 
materialize a space is to engage with closure (however temporary) which is an authoritarian act É 
If, therefore, alternatives are to be realized, the problem of closure cannot endlessly be evadedÕ 
(Ibid: 183). He argues that we cannot Ôleap outside of the dialectic and imagine we are not 
embedded and limited by the institutional and built environments that we have already createdÕ 
(Ibid: 159). However, following Marx, he argues we cannot evade the issues of utopianism and the 
imagination either, for Ôwhat distinguishes human labour and the worst of architects from the best 
of bees is that architects erect a structure in the imagination before realizing it in material formÕ 
(Ibid: 159). 
 
Critical utopian theory and practice emphasise the importance of self-activity and opening up 
physical space for participation. Planning, creating and designing spaces themselves become modes 
of participation, with the potential to facilitate belonging and feelings of ownership or having a 
stake in the community. These processes can take place either at the initial stages, in intentional 
design, or older buildings can be adapted.  It is important, however, that this is not a closed process, 
which takes place at the start of a groupÕs lifespan, but remains open to the changing needs and 
desires of inhabitants. Spatial utopias are political phenomena. They engage with the future by 
making the present a better place, and in so doing create a space from which reflection on the 
problems of the present Ð both within, and outwith the utopian space Ð can occur.  
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6. Transgressing Authority: Theory 
 
6.1. Introduction and working definitions 
This chapter is a theoretical exploration of the concept of authority, and the ways in which 
formations of authority impact upon citizenship. In this first section, I will begin by summarising 
the relationship between citizenship and authority, and offering a working definition of authority, 
as a starting point for analysis. This preliminary definition will be expanded upon throughout the 
chapter. Marshall and Bottomore define the political element of citizenship as Ôthe right to 
participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political 
authority or as an elector of the members of such a bodyÕ (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992 [1949]: 8). 
This sentence implies that through the institution of citizenship, political authority is made 
legitimate since it reflects decisions made by the body upon which authority is to be exercised. It is 
important to reach a working definition of authority here, but also to note that this is a complex 
concept debated throughout the history of political thought and is essentially contested (Connolly, 
1993: 107-116). A fairly standard definition of authority is Ôthe right or capacity, or both, to have 
proposals or prescriptions or instructions accepted without recourse to persuasion, bargaining, or 
forceÕ (Reeve, 2003a: 30-1). This will form the basis of my working definition, although I intend to 
expose its normative aspects, particularly with respect to the terminology of ÔrightÕ. Definitions and 
debates upon the subject of authority invariably include some reference to legitimacy: authority is 
differentiated from power since it is in some sense justified or ÔrightÕ (Heywood, 1999: 130; 
Christiono, 2004), or simply believed to be justified or right by those who are motivated to act by 
authority (Weber, 1948: 324). An important distinction is often drawn between de jure and de facto 
authority (Heywood, 1999: 136; Reeve, 2003a: 31), where de jure authority describes the existence 
of a law or rule which ascribes authority that can be applied to, and de facto authority describes a 
degree of practical success. There is also an important distinction to draw between being an 
authority and being in authority (Connolly, 1993: 108). Both forms of authority have in common, 
returning to the original working definition given above, that they involve getting someone to do 
something they might not otherwise do without recourse to persuasion, bargaining or force. The 
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difference is that the former involves the subject of the authority Ôvoluntarily obeying a command 
because one thinks it is the proper thing to do even if it is against oneÕs interestsÕ (Ibid: 109) 
whereas the latter involves Ôthe idea of responding to coercive powers that are justifiably appliedÕ 
(Ibid: 109). The latter comes closer to a specifically political form of authority, the analytical 
importance of which lies in Ôits presumptive claim to be the authority of last resort, able to exert its 
commands within all other such relations and thus reconfigure them, if only momentarily, in the 
public realmÕ (Smith, 2003: 107). This connects to the idea of territorial sovereignty, discussed in 
previous chapters Ð a political authority is that which can claim to hold sovereign power over a 
given territory. This chapter will focus mainly on specifically political authority, although there 
will be some overlap with other forms of authority. 
 
Theorists of political authority often focus their arguments around different accounts of legitimacy. 
Max Weber divided legitimate authority (which he defined as the belief in authority, rather than its 
actuality) into three types; rational-legal authority depends upon formal rules and established state 
laws (Weber, 1948: 294-5), traditional authority relies upon long-established customs, habits and 
social structures (Ibid: 296-7), and charismatic authority relies on the personal appeal of a strong 
leader (Ibid: 295-6). Weber argues that although these bases of legitimacy are analytically separate 
categories, Ôthe majority of empirical cases represent a combination or a state of transition among 
several such pure typesÕ (Ibid: 299-300). This intermingling of analytic categories in practice is an 
important theme that I will return to later.  
 
Contemporary theorists put forward different theories of authority, but at least three important 
potential bases for the legitimacy of political authority recur throughout the literature: contractual 
consent, democratic representation and instrumentalism (Connolly, 1993: 107-116; Green, 1998: 
585; Christiono, 2004: 245-6). Although these are analytically distinct forms of justification for 
authority, in practice they overlap and intertwine. The structure of this chapter will be based on 
these categories. A fourth category will also be drawn out as a common feature of all theories of 
authority Ð that they all presume hierarchy and the subordination of the autonomy of the individual 
to the state, another individual or a community. This theme is drawn from some forms of 
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anarchism, which reject all forms of authority over the individual (Godwin, 1985 [1798]; Wolff, 
1998). In this chapter, similarly to the other thematic chapters on Territory and Rights, I will begin 
by outlining dominant theorisations of the concept of authority. The structure of this argument will 
be based upon the themes given above, with relevant literatures drawn from the canon of political 
theory. Although these imply differing views on what makes authority legitimate, they all take the 
structural limits of the state-capitalist system as given rather than thinking or desiring an ÔoutsideÕ 
to authority, and are therefore grouped together as ÔdominantÕ theories. Relationships of authority 
embodied in decision-making structures and processes will be criticised from the standpoint of 
anarchism, in particular philosophical anarchism, which argues for the illegitimacy of state 
authority over the individual through an immanent critique. 
 
The second part of the chapter considers critical utopian alternatives that imagine or desire an 
ÔoutsideÕ to authority, and formations of citizenship that assume authority, yet do so without 
attempting to blueprint or hegemonise. As a critical utopian alternative to contract theory, 
voluntarism is proposed; small group size and collective decision-making are counterposed to 
representation; immanence  is opposed to the external goals of instrumentalism and non-hierarchy 
or disorganisation to hierarchy. As the anti-authoritarian body of theory par excellence, much of 
the theoretical basis for critical utopian alternatives will be drawn from anarchism. Critical utopian 
alternatives will mostly be drawn from the works of Deleuze and Guattari
59
, post-left anarchism 
and ÔpracticalÕ anarchism Ð activist literature that has arisen from movements. Post-left anarchism 
is useful because it provides a normative theoretical starting point for thinking about an outside or 
beyond to authority. Rather than simply analysing or deconstructing structures of power and 
authority, as is the case in much post-structuralism, these thinkers do offer something in the way of 
positive proposals for a potential politics. However, the language used by these thinkers is 
complex, metaphysical and figurative, which sometimes obscures the recommendations for praxis. 
Literature written by and for activists, that has emerged from movements engaged in social change, 
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 The work of Deleuze and Guattari thought is very difficult to categorise as belonging to any discrete ÔbodyÕ of thought - see Tormey, 
(2006: 154) for a brief footnote discussing different ways in which other theorists have attempted (and largely failed) to ÔpigeonholeÕ 
DeleuzeÕs thought.  However, their work fits my criteria for a Ôcritical utopian approachÕ as outlined in the ÒApproachÓ chapter of this 
thesis.  
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if often less philosophically nuanced and has more simple idiom. There are many parallels and 
overlaps in the alternative visions coming from both the philosophical and practical viewpoints. It 
is unclear from whence these parallels issue: it may be that unknown routes of transmission allow 
for flows of language and discourse between the literature and the movement, or it may be that 
starting from a similar point of criticality with relation to the same dominant system, each has 
independently reached similar inferences. Whatever the source of the commonalities, each holds a 
position that is both critical of the dominant system and also suspicious of any attempts to blueprint 
or hegemomise, so I will consider both as critical utopian alternatives. As with the chapters on 
Territory and Rights, this theoretical discussion will form the basis for a consideration of praxis in 
utopian, autonomous communities, which again, through either coincidence, unknown transmission 
or similar critique reflects a critical  utopian standpoint. 
 
The foregoing discussion, which is in no way exhaustive, shows two predominant themes that run 
through debates on authority: power (as in power over)60 and legitimacy. These again are contested 
concepts. In this chapter, as in the other thematic chapters of this thesis, authority is used as a 
sensitising concept (Bruyn, 1966: 38; Plummer, 2003: 58), or a variable tool through which 
different formations of politics and citizenship can be examined (Sassen, 2006: 4). Most accounts 
of authority, even when they are explicitly critical and view it as essentially contested and/or 
variable through time, do not consider that a society without any kind of authority is possible (see, 
for example, Pateman, 1985 p. 135; Connolly, 1993: 134). Authority is therefore widely seen to be 
a foundational concept. The purpose of this chapter, as with other thematic chapters, is not to 
evaluate the possibility of a society without authority, but rather to consider the value of imagining 
an ÔoutsideÕ or alternative to authority, and the implications of desiring decision-making without 
authority for a critical utopian conception of citizenship.  
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 This is, of course, not the only whay in which power can operate. The idea of Ôpower toÕ as the ability to achieve desires individually 
or collectively is an important one within political theory (Heywood, 1999: 123) as are poststructuralist ideas surrounding the dislocation 
of power and its diffusion throughout society (Newman, 2001: passim). ÔPower overÕ, however, is the form of power most associated 
with the idea of political authority, which is the focus of this chapter. 
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6.2. Dominant approaches 
6.2.1. Contractarianism 
Contractarianism is the political and/or moral theory that the legitimate authority of government 
and social moral norms must derive from the consent of the governed. Contractarianism originates 
from the Hobbesian line of social contract thought (Hobbes, 2006 [1651]) and continues through 
the classical contractarians Locke (2002 [1689]), Rousseau (2004 [1762]) and Kant (1970 [1797]) 
to contemporary thinkers such as Rawls (1971) and Gauthier (1986). Contractarians do not agree 
on the nature of the social contract. For the subjects or citizens of a contract theory, the choice to 
enter into the contract may create society (Rousseau), civil society (Locke), a sovereign (Hobbes 
and Rousseau), procedural rules of justice (Rawls), and even morality itself (Hobbes) (Boucher & 
Kelly, 1994: 2). The variety does not end here: 
The reason why it is such a flexible tool in the hands of the theorist is that the choice posited, 
when one is posited, is variable É it may be a choice of contract that binds in perpetuity, or 
one renewed with each succeeding generation. The choice may be historical, ideal or 
hypothetical, expression explicit or tacit É motivation may be religious duty, personal 
security, economic welfare, moral self-righteousness (Ibid: 2). 
 
Hobbes (2006 [1651]) is often viewed as the classic contractarian (Ibid: 1) and his defence of the 
social contract rests on the assumption that individuals are primarily self-interested, and are 
motivated by passions. Fear of othersÕ passions in a state of nature will lead humans rationally to 
consent to governmental authority, and to act morally, where the moral norms are determined by a 
maximisation of mutual self-interest and are enforced by legitimate coercion on the part of the 
sovereign (Hobbes, 2006 [1651]: 70-80). Individuals in the state of nature are therefore seen to 
alienate their right, and also the right of future human beings, to make their own decisions, in 
favour of the authority of the sovereign who is subsequently entitled to coerce dissenters 
legitimately (Ibid: 98).  
 
Locke (2002 [1689]) attempts to create a contractarian argument that rests on the consent of the 
individual, rather than upon historical consent. Although LockeÕs contract differs from HobbesÕ in 
many ways, he still agrees that persons in a state of nature would willingly form a state. The 
authority of the state is also given legitimacy by subsequent generations through the consent of 
Chapter 6: Transgressing Authority: Theory 131 
each person. The way in which Locke defines consent is somewhat controversial. Although express 
consent seems favourable, and makes a man [sic] Ôa perfect member of that societyÕ (Locke, 2002 
[1689]: 55), Locke also makes provision for individuals who do not explicitly consent to 
government through the idea of Ôtacit consentÕ: Ôevery man that hath possessions, or enjoyment of 
any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth 
obliged to obedience to the laws of that government during such enjoyment as anyone under itÕ 
(Ibid: 55). 
 
For Rawls (1971), as for Kant (Kant, 1970 [1797]), persons have access to universal reason that 
allows them to formulate principles of justice from a universal point of view. This allows Rawls to 
formulate an Ôoriginal positionÕ where consent for legitimate governance is given from a situation 
of an epistemological veil of ignorance which corresponds to social contract theories except that it 
is Ôa purely hypothetical construct characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justiceÕ 
(Rawls, 1971: 12). 
 
All of these notions of ÔconsentÕ make provision for assuming or enforcing consent upon those who 
have not provided it expressly: they promulgate non-voluntary or indeed compulsory application of 
the outcome of public decisions to citizens, and to other residents excluded from the status of 
citizenship. What characterises the social contract tradition and modern contractarianism is Ôthe 
philosophical search for foundationsÕ (Boucher & Kelly, 1994: 13). It is for this reason that I have 
grouped these theories under Ôdominant approachesÕ Ð they contain implicit utopian visions that are 
obscured through foundational discourse. 
 
Philosophical anarchists highlight the fictional basis of contract theory and the normative effects of 
positing fictional or hypothetical contracts as truth. For Godwin, it is the nature of obligation that is 
particularly problematic since it precludes spontaneous moral decisions in light of further 
information or better knowledge (Godwin, 1985 [1798]: 214). This reflects WolffÕs concern that 
authority is incompatible with personal autonomy, which is the primary moral obligation of the 
individual (Wolff, 1998 [1970]: 13). Contract theory is, to a certain extent, reflected in 
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contemporary democratic practice, which is open to similar criticisms. First, the notion of 
voluntary support for the system by all (or indeed any) citizens is hypothetical. Although 
ÔdemocraticÕ choice is possible within the system, consent for the system itself is assumed as 
always-already given (as in Hobbes and Locke), or at the limit, unnecessary, because the system is 
viewed as just in itself (as in Rawls). This leads to a second point; that the system as overall frame 
is beyond question, and in this sense is space-determining, defining an outer limit to the possible, 
and therefore not only limiting the decisions that can be made by citizens, but also by rulers or Ôthe 
sovereignÕ. In a sense, the system therefore becomes sovereign, rather than any individual or 
collection of individuals, leading to a structural bias that impedes citizensÕ agency. This is even 
more the case with some particular citizens. Pateman (1989) in The Sexual Contract and Mills 
(1997) in The Racial Contract show how contract theory both reflects and plays a role in group 
oppression, and that the political, moral and epistemological terms of social contracts have tended 
to justify the domination and exploitation involved in systems of patriarchy and white supremacy 
respectively. 
 
6.2.2. Democratic representation  
A second way in which dominant political theory attempts to legitimise authority is through the 
democratic method of decision-making. Democracy, again, is an attempt to ground the state in 
empirical foundations: Ôfor liberals (and indeed non-liberals) the answer was to create a unified 
aggregate, The People, which could then be represented by those who governÕ (Tormey, 2006: 
144). This need to ground authority in something other than tradition arises with the modern 
thinkers in the need to ground authority in something other than tradition or religion (Ibid: 144; see 
also Wolff 1998 [1970]: 22). Democracy is an attempt to reconcile individual autonomy with 
authority; Ôinsofar as a man [sic] participates in the affairs of the state, he is ruler as well as ruledÕ 
(Wolff 1998 [1970]: 22). 
 
The notion of representation is important, and usually takes the form of political representation Ð a 
physical alienation of choice, expression, action and decision-making which occurs when political 
actors speak, campaign, act and decide on behalf of others in the political arena. This form of 
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representation is prevalent within canonical and contemporary liberal theory as well as 
contemporary political practice (see, for example, Hobbes, 2006 [1651]: 96-97; Rawls, 1971: 199-
200). In liberal democratic theory, representation (which is a form of authority, as well as a method 
of ligitimising authority) is made legitimate through the fair inclusion of the people to be 
represented in the processes through which representatives are chosen and decisions are made 
(Christiano, 2004: 266) Ð usually through voting in elections. There is the implicit assumption that 
power is solely reflected in concrete decisions.
61
  
 
Representative democracy is the most widely used in western liberal states, but is of course not the 
only possible form of democracy, and I would like to justify my inclusion of ÔdirectÕ or 
ÔparticipatoryÕ democracy under this heading before I proceed to highlight some problems common 
to both models of democracy. Rousseau (2004 [1762]), criticises the notion of political 
representation altogether, saying that sovereignty rests in the hands of the people, and public choice 
must be performed by all: Ôwill cannot be represented Ð either it is the general will or it is 
something else Ð there is no intermediate possibilityÕ (Rousseau, 2004 [1762]: 112). Like the other 
contractarians, Rousseau bases the authority of his community in an original social pact involving 
the alienation of the rights of the individual Ôto the whole communityÕ (Ibid: 15). His notion of 
direct democracy by majority voting leads to the contention that such a thing as a ÔgeneralÕ will, 
that all ÔrationalÕ individuals would agree to, is indeed possible, resulting in the paradoxical 
contention that someone (irrational) who dissents can be Ôforced to be freeÕ (Ibid: 19). This rests 
upon an understanding of the general will as an ontological proposition Ð direct democracy is not 
only desirable because it is fair that all citizens are included in decision-making, but also because it 
allows the community to discover the right decisions, embodied in the Ôgeneral willÕ (Ibid: 30-31).  
 
RousseauÕs theory is taken up by contemporary participatory democrats such as Carole Pateman, 
who favours RousseauÕs Ôsubstantive equality of active citizensÕ over Ôthe formal equality of 
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 The quintessential statement of power-as-observable-decisions is put forward by Dahl (1961), who is comprehensively criticised by 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Lukes (1974), who show that power is also exerted through hidden dynamics, such as agenda setting 
and hegemonic interest formation. 
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political subjects of liberal theoryÕ (Pateman, 1985: 151). Pateman overcomes some of the 
criticisms of Rousseau, since she allows a role for minority voices, and views dissent as a 
constructive force in the political process: Ôthe transformation of consciousness brought about 
through political participation is itself a source of strengthÕ (Ibid: 159). However, Pateman, still 
assumes the necessity of integration into a higher unity, and disobedience and dissent are 
ÔevaluatedÕ in terms of Ôwhether they are compatible with the principles of political morality 
ordering the association, and whether they contribute to the democratic ideals and goals of the 
communityÕ (Ibid: 162).  
 
6.2.3. Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism refers to theories based on the premise Ôthat the way in which democratic 
decisions ought to be made is entirely a matter of what will produce the best outcomesÕ (Christiano, 
2004: 266). It derives from the Hobbesian idea that rational individuals leave the state of nature in 
order to achieve peace and stability. Instrumentalism in the contemporary context encompasses 
functionalist, utilitarian and operationalist approaches, and usually evaluates functional efficacy in 
terms of economic and/or social goods and the accumulation and distribution of wealth and 
resources. Authority is thus legitimate to the extent that it produces whatever is stated as the best 
outcome, rather than in terms pertaining to the fairness or justice of the procedures undertaken to 
reach this goal. Joseph Raz (1986) provides the prototypical contemporary statement of 
instrumentalism as the justification for legitimate political authority. His argument has two parts: 
the dependence thesis and the normal justification thesis. The dependence thesis states that Ôall 
authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already independently apply to the 
subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the 
directiveÕ (Raz, 1986: 47). This is linked to the second part of the thesis, called the Ônormal 
justification thesisÕ: 
The normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves showing 
that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him É if he 
accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow 
them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly (Ibid: 53). 
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Merton, also a canonical functionalist, echoes this thesis, when he states that authority is effective 
to the extent that the orders issued by authority are consistent with group norms (Merton, 1957: 
339). According to Raz and Merton, then, the state is justified in exerting authority when its 
commands and laws enable citizens to do what they already would reasonably desire to do; citizens 
have good reasons to wish for the personal well-being of themselves and other members of society, 
so the government is justified in helping them to achieve these goals through establishing an 
efficient and fair system of redistribution (Ibid: 313-320). Individuals also have an interest in 
having certain constitutional rights upheld, so the state is justified in passing laws and employing 
enforcement agencies that will uphold citizensÕ rights (Ibid: 261-263). There is a perceived duty to 
obey authority regardless of oneÕs own assessment of the right or just thing to do in a particular 
instance, since a person with authority has the advantage of a transcendental viewpoint of the 
overall rationality of a group (Merton, 1957: 346; Raz, 1986: 61). The instrumentalist approach to 
decision-making and governance thus conceives of the whole of society as the integrated totality of 
disparate parts; a sort of problem-solving machine, seen to embody rationality and efficiency in 
relation to a transcendental goal such as increased production, economic growth or technological 
progress, which is seen as external to the machine itself and its constituent parts and citizens, and 
yet determines their structure and interactions. 
 
Functionalism also assumes the division of society into separate, but inter-related and apparently 
integrated components as a necessary feature for the maintenance of stability and fulfilment of 
individual and collective needs: ÔA formal, rationally organized social structure involves clearly 
defined patterns of activity in which, ideally, every series of actions is functionally related to the 
purpose of the organizationÕ (Merton, 1957: 195). Such organisation also assumes that authority 
should inhere in clearly defined roles rather than in individuals (Ibid: 195). In the public sphere, 
bureaucratic departmentalisation and technical specialisation creates clearly defined and separated 
spheres for economic, political, legislative, judiciary and executive activities. There is also a 
complex social ritual of formality that manifests a division between the public persona of 
individuals and their private social lives: Ôformality facilitates the interaction of the occupants of 
offices despite their (possibly hostile) private attitudes towards one anotherÕ (Ibid: 196). The 
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division between public/private, formal/informal, (discussed in more detail in Chapter 8) is 
mirrored in certain other divisions, for example work/leisure, production/consumption. In the social 
field, this is paralleled in a very distinct organisational separation between (and within) such fields 
as social work, medicine and education as well as in intra-field bureaucratic division such as the 
division of the university into separate disciplinary departments. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari offer us some useful concepts for thinking about criticisms of 
instrumentalism. Segmentarity refers to the way in which phenomena are divided in order that 
sensing subjects can get a grip on them and applies to semiotics, perception and society (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988: 233). They draw a distinction between primitive, supple segmentarity, and state 
segmentarity. Primitive segmentarity functions through polyvocal codes that emerge from 
relationships that exist in local divisions that overlap rather than through a discrete state with 
dedicated political institutions. Communication and the formation of interests and desires occur 
immanently within such societies via a process of shifting relationships and experimentation rather 
than via a centrally organising power. State segmentarity, on the other hand, comes close to the 
instrumentalist vision.  It is organised through an overarching and unifying logic of global 
capitalism that defines and motivates desires according to a unifying global economic logic, 
situated in an abstract field external to local groups. It then defines and organises groups according 
to their function in the machine (the bureaucratic departments of functionalism) and fixes people 
into formalised roles and identities that operate through fear and insecurity: 
The administration of a great organized molar security has as its correlates a whole micro-
management of petty fears, a permanent molecular insecurity, to the point that the motto of 
domestic policymakers might be: a macropolitics of society by and for a micropolitics of 
insecurity (Ibid. p. 237). 
 
There are clear pointers here to a criticism of instrumentalism and functionalism. Whatever realm 
the segmentarity occurs in, its effects intertwine with and spill into other realms. At the frontier of 
segmentarity is the use of authority to organise bodies through the concept of Ôincorporeal 
transformationsÕ which are Ôthe expressed of statements but are attributed to bodiesÕ (Ibid: 95). 
These are decisions such as prison sentences and doctorsÕ diagnoses, which are applied to 
embodied subjects against their wills and desires, categorise them and then limit their potential 
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interactions (see also Foucault, 1979 [1975]: 19 and passim). The idea, put forward by Merton, that 
formalised roles allow people to interact efficiently (in terms of the organisation) when fixed into 
formal roles, despite any personal grievances may be underwritten by a harmful psychological 
dynamic of fear and insecurity, fixing people into unitary (but schizophrenically divided), 
working/consuming identities, at the expense of psychological integration and self-creativity. State 
segmentarity is seen to block the flourishing of difference and newness at micro-political and 
macro-political levels. The previous example of dividing the university into clearly defined subject 
departments, preventing the interdisciplinarity and cross-over that might occur in a system with 
more supple segmentarity, gives an example of ways in which state segmentarity causes an 
increase in overcoding, so that segments Ôlose their ability to budÕ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 
233).  
 
State segmentarity leads to a technocratic mode of decision-making where certain decisions are 
taken out of the public, democratic remit and relegated to distinct sectors - stratified or segmented, 
expert-led fields and areas of knowledge, each to be thought of, worked in and engaged with 
separately. This has implications for citizenship. Separation and mediation leads to a technocratic 
politics and society where experts, elites, professionals, or those with particular technical 
knowledge take on the task of representing othersÕ interests and making decisions within a 
particular sphere, leaving few unmediated choices for citizens to exercise in public democracy. 
Rather, citizen decision-making becomes an individualised and consumerised choice oriented to 
the desiring-goals of the transcendental capitalist economic machine. This was made explicit as a 
state policy in the 1991 CitizensÕ Charter, a British political initiative launched by the then Prime 
Minister, John Major, ostensibly to improve public services by publicising service standards. This 
was couched in the discourse of citizenship, but seemed to empty citizenship of its immanent 
political aspects, in particular through its use of the term Ôcitizen consumerÕ (HMSO, 1991). 
 
6.2.4. Hierarchical organisation 
In the foregoing discussion I have considered common justifications for authority from dominant 
bodies of thought. Although these are to some extent competing views of legitimacy in theory, in 
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liberal-democratic practice they overlap and intertwine. Dominant theorists of authority start with 
the premise that the state is inevitable, and then attempt to make it legitimate, which leads to a 
series of different theories that share the same methodological inability to think outside established 
structures of authority. All imply and are implied by an almost defining feature of all forms of 
authority: hierarchy.  
 
Hierarchy comes in various forms and is arguably present in all of the liberal justifications for 
authority given above. Contractarianism implies the moral and epistemological authority and 
coercive agency of the sovereign over subject-citizens. Representation implies a division between 
embodied subjects and the source of decisions and codes that partly control their bodies: there is a 
hierarchy of control between the representative and the represented. Wherever separation occurs 
within this model, for example between representative/representee and between public/private, one 
of the terms is elevated to the domain of agency, endowed with decision-making power, where the 
other is depreciated as the passive element to which the decision is merely applied. In 
instrumentalism, separation of society into various specialised spheres also implies hierarchy, not 
only often between different fields, but also within them through expertise, official positions, 
division of labour, variegated roles, differentials in economic reward and relations of command and 
respect.  
 
The case against authority comes predominantly from anarchism. For Wolff, authority is always 
illegitimate, as it undermines the duty of autonomy, or the Ôfundamental assumption of moral 
philosophy É that men [sic] are responsible for their actionsÕ (Wolff, 1998 [1970]: 12). Stirner 
objects to authority because it oppresses self-creativity and uniqueness, which are of primary 
importance (Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 5). Anarchists have been accused of radical individualism and an 
inability to deal coherently with social relationships (Pateman, 1985: 135). However, this criticism 
fails to grasp some of the complexities and nuances of the anarchist analysis of authority, which 
Stirner, at least, sees to be injurious of relationships and collectivity as well as the individual: 
Never does the State aim to bring in the free activity of individuals, but always that which is 
bound to the purpose of the State. Through the State nothing in common comes to pass either, 
as little as one can call a piece of cloth the common work of all the individual parts of a 
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machine; it is rather the work of the whole machine as a unit, machine work. In the same style 
everything is done by the State machine too; for it moves the clockwork of individual minds, 
none of which follow their own impulse (Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 227, italics in the original). 
 
It is the idea of transcendence - a value or purpose that is hierarchically abstracted from the 
embodied subject and his or her desires and relationships - that draws together state and capital and 
defines dominant models of authority and decision-making. Although the case against authority is 
refuted and dismissed by most normative political theory, political activism shows many instances 
of people trying to find an ÔoutsideÕ or beyond to the various forms of hierarchy embodied in 
structures of ÔlegitimateÕ authority, for example the Zapatistas of Chiapas who are experimenting 
with models of politics that defy hierarchy and representation (Tormey, 2006) or the Ôthird waveÕ 
of cultural politics marked by a desire to think affirmatively about difference without being fixed 
into static identities or recuperated into a higher unity by the Ôhegemonic ÒotherÓÕ (Isin & Wood, 
1999: 14-5), as well as many of the groups and communities discussed in this thesis. 
 
Anarchists have also been criticised for viewing authority as solely a property of individuals, and 
therefore failing to distinguish between political authority and the authority of someone who has 
special knowledge or skills (Pateman, 1985: 136). However, anarchists and others who attempt to 
conceptualise an ÔoutsideÕ to authority often view the authority of the state as arising from the 
micro-political level (Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 165 and passim; Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 235). This 
provides a theoretical basis for resistance and the creation of alternatives. 
 
 In the upcoming section, I will discuss critical utopian alternatives to hegemonic attempts to 
ground authority that act as an immanent critique of hierarchy. Critical utopian approaches begin 
from a different logic, which asserts the possibility of an outside to authority, which is not fixed or 
grounded in unifying truth-claims. Critical utopian approaches begin from a standpoint of 
resistance Ð in this case resistance to hierarchy and authority. However, they are also active and 
creative. Here, I use ÔactiveÕ in the Deleuzian sense of resisting subordination to transcendental 
forces. This point is important as it guides my theory selection in the upcoming section (see 
Chapter 3 section 3.3). For Deleuze, critique is not a reaction, but an affirmation of difference, Ôthe 
active expression of an active mode of existenceÕ (Deleuze, 2006 [1983]: 3). What is important is 
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that this requires continuous critique - continuing to resist authority, representation and fixed 
identity in a process that Deleuze and Guattari call ÔbecomingÕ. This involves an ongoing process 
of active affirmation of difference through rejecting attempts to fix oneÕs difference to a 
denumerable set, or majority (in the atypical understanding discussed previously in this chapter) by 
becoming-minor, by refusing to consent to being represented or fixed into a higher unity or 
purpose: Ôbecoming minoritarian as the universal figure of consciousness is called autonomyÕ 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 118). Autonomy is therefore seen to be a process of flux rather than a 
fixed state, blueprint or outcome. The upcoming section will focus on alternative theories which 
attempt to conceptualise an ÔoutsideÕ to authority, through autonomy, but do not posit this as a 
blueprint or a final state. Much of the theory is anarchist, as this is the body of thought that has 
most consistently attempted to think outside or beyond authority. I have purposefully selected 
literature from both high theory and from anti-authoritarian activist movements. Although often 
phrased differently, both types of literature resonate with the critical utopian approach that I am 
taking insofar as they attempt to conceptualise an ÔoutsideÕ to relations of authority without 
positing a new hegemony. They emphasise creativity, self-activity and experimentation. 
 
6.3. Critical utopian approaches 
6.3.1. Voluntarism 
Under dominant approaches, I considered how many theorists ground the rise of the state and the 
legitimacy of authority in a pre-historical past, a hypothetical situation or through the notion of 
Ôtacit consentÕ. All these theoretical models provided a foundation for the legitimacy of authority in 
the consent of the governed, without this consent actually having to be expressed, or indeed 
believed. In contrast to this, I would like to consider theorists who put forward voluntaristic models 
of group membership that do not rely upon legitimate authority to cohere the group, but rather upon 
elective autonomy. These theories are chosen because they do not attempt to ÔfixÕ people to a 
specific group or identity and attempt to enable spontaneous self-creativity, autonomy and 
becoming. The approaches I will consider are critical utopian, because they posit alternatives not as 
blueprints for a better future but rather as processes, beginning from a different logic. They do not 
posit fixed ontological foundations but rather the possibility for continual reassertion of difference. 
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A notable articulation of voluntary, non-hierarchical community is StirnerÕs vision of a union of 
egoists, where self-interested individuals
62
 unite for some common purpose, which they set out to 
achieve without competition or domination. He criticises production models in which economic 
competition and division of labour alienate one from the processes necessary for the sustenance of 
life. For Stirner, involvement in the production of all of the goods we desire is important for 
personal empowerment:  
Bread is a need of all the inhabitants of a city; therefore they might easily agree on setting up a 
public bakery. Instead of this, they leave the furnishing of the needful to the competing bakers. 
Just so meat to the butchers, wine to the wine-dealers, etc. É If I do not trouble myself about 
my affair, I must be content with what it pleases others to vouchsafe me (Stirner, 1993 (1844): 
275-6, italics in the original).  
 
Stirner favours a state of affairs where each one is involved in the processes that matter to that 
individual: 
In the guild baking, etc., is the affair of the guild-brothers; in competition, the affair of chance 
competitors; in the union, of those who require baked goods, and therefore my affair, yours, 
the affair of neither the guildic nor the concessionary baker, but the affair of the united. 
(Stirner, 1993 (1844): 275) 
 
Decisions are therefore taken and implemented at a level that is not abstracted from the individual. 
Each individual fundamentally chooses which areas of lifeÕs activities concern him or her, and 
enters into a voluntary agreement with other individuals in order to settle these issues. The groups 
would have to be small without complex organisational structures in order to avoid mediation or 
alienation of the individual from their original purpose or desire: ÔWhat every one requires, every 
one should also take a hand in procuring and producing; it is his affair, his property, not the 
property of the guildic or concessionary masterÕ (Ibid: 276). There is therefore no notion of ÔtacitÕ 
consent such as we find in classic social contract theories, nor is there any issue of representation 
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 The word ÔindividualÕ has liberal connotations, and suggests atomisation and a degree of self-identification and abstract stable 
subjectivity that I do not always mean to imply when I use the term. Although Stirner is popularly known as an ÔindividualistÕ anarchist, 
he does not actually use the term ÔindividualÕ very often, and does so mostly when he is considering liberal ideology (for example, 
Stirner 1993 [1844]: 200-201). He is more prone to using terms such as ÔIÕ, ÔoneÕ, Ôthe only oneÕ (Ibid: 5) and Ôthe unique oneÕ (Ibid: 
361). However, as Bob Black says ÔLike it or not Ð personally (and ÒpersonalisticallyÓ), I like it Ð thereÕs an irreducible individualistic 
dimension to anarchism, even social anarchism É if it sounds as if anarchism has É filiations with liberalism, thatÕs because anarchism 
does have filiations with liberalismÕ (Black, 1997: 41). The problem comes when Ôthe individualÕ and Ôthe citizenÕ become statuses and 
terms abstracted from individuals themselves and their relationships Ð through the state, and become a representative identities. For these 
reasons, I will continue to use the term ÔindividualÕ with the proviso of this disclaimer. 
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or hierarchy. There is also no separation of the agencies of decision and action; if one is interested 
in eating bread, one joins a group where bread is made and does not have to follow orders from 
elsewhere. Each individual may therefore be involved in several groups, but not necessarily the 
same as any other individual, depending on where his or her interests and desires lie. StirnerÕs 
thesis has many parallels with contemporary anarchist models of affinity groups63. 
 
The voluntary nature of these imagined and practised groups is important, and avoids many of the 
problems of tacit consent discussed above. Voluntarism means that an individual need not be 
subject to any decisions that they do not agree to; in the last instance they can simply leave the 
group and join or form another
64
. This also links in with the idea of physical space, discussed in a 
previous chapter. As a spatial strategy, voluntarism defies centralisation and territorial sovereignty 
since it requires multiple groups to exist within unbounded space. In terms of a transgressive and 
critical citizenship, this would tend towards multiple overlapping affiliations, none of which was 
sovereign over another, and would ameliorate problems of exclusivity associated with state-centred 
views. This comes close to Derek HeaterÕs view of Ômultiple citizenshipÕ. Heater argues that when 
citizenship is understood as a social relationship involving a mutuality of rights and duties, it 
becomes possible and desirible to view citizenship as a practice that can occur within overlapping 
                                            
63
 I thank Tony Burns for pointing out that my apparent endorsement of StirnerÕs Ôunion of egoistsÕ raises the issue of whether members 
of the autonomous communities studied herein might be considered to be ÔegoistsÕ in StirnerÕs sense, especially since it is evident in the 
chapters on ÔpracticeÕ that I do not consider them to be ÔnihilistsÕ. This is connected to the previous footnote and rests on a complex and 
unconventional interpretation of Stirner. In particular it is important to move away from negative associations of the translated word 
ÔegoÕ with ÔegotisticalÕ in the English language (Acosta, 2009: 32). Rather, the emphasis is shifted to StirnerÕs conceptualisation of the 
ÔUniqueÕ: Ôfrom the perspective of an empty and creative self, we are thinking of multiple selves already going on in one body. There is 
no particular reason to think of (always imperfectly) individual bodies as the best or highest instance of the Unique, as opposed to 
unique desires and impulses Ð or unique groups...Thus what ends up being I or me Ð my Cause, my property, owness, finally Ð has to be 
redifined beyond the individual bodyÕ (Ibid: 36). The suggestion is that Stirner is implying something similar to the anarchist concept of 
voluntarism and Ômutual aidÕ (Ibid: 34) through simultaneous recognition of the otherÕs irreducible otherness and the recognition of 
mutually constitutive subjectivity and need for collective realisation of shared desires. This is best articulated by Stirner when he refers 
to the meeting of unique ones: ÔThe last and most decided opposition, that of unique against unique, is at bottom beyond what is called 
opposition, but without having sunk back into ÒunityÓ and unisonÕ (Stirner, 1993 [1845]: 208-9). Stirner thus offers us a reversal of 
perspective that goes beyond opposition or nihilism, but qua critical utopianism overcomes the binary division of inside/outside and 
objective/subjective through unmediated experience. A similar concept from anarchism is articulated later in this project (chapters 8 & 
9) in terms of ÔaffinityÕ and is also linked to ethical discourse through comparison with the thought of Levinas. Insofar as they advocate 
or experience such experience I do consider practitioners to be like Ôunions of egoistsÕ although as stated elsewhere such 
conceptualisations are always partial and incomplete. I would refer the yet unconvinced reader to the excellent (2009) article by 
Alejandro de Acosta. 
64
 This idea is, of course, also present in Locke, who states that the owner of land in a commonwealth, having given only tacit consent to 
a government, may sell his land and is then Ôat liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth, or agree with others 
to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world they can find free and unposessedÕ (Locke, 2002 [1689], p, 56). The problem 
with this view is that it is not particularly realistic when the majority of the world has been territorialised under the jurisdiction of nation 
states, and again implies being ÔfixedÕ into yet another territorialising entity. The important point about the kinds of group under 
discussion is precisely that they are not territorial, but are rather in process; indeed, to use Deleuze and GuattariÕs terminology, they 
constitute a de-territorialisation: Ôin a becoming, one is deterritorializedÕ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 321). The difficulty still arises with 
these theories, however, of how to deal with intra-group dissent or the desire of a member of a group to change the group that they are 
in. These are problems that do arise in practice and will be discussed in the upcoming chapter. 
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entities at different scales, for example local initiatives, EU-wide welfare and global environmental 
protection (Heater, 1999: 179). I find this idea of multiple citizenship compelling, but it becomes 
contradictory when associated with a soveriegn state. Heater argues for a soveriegn world state as a 
Ôuniversal polityÕ to which civil alleigance will be tranferred (Ibid: 155). The problem with this 
view is that it remains state-centric, and therefore continues to rely on the same foundational 
premises as contract theory, and necessarily priviledges an exclusive form of citizenship above all 
others (Hoffman, 2004: 131). What is needed is a way of conceptualising group membership that 
does not involve centralisation and the alienation of selfhood to an abstracted entity. This also 
brings up issues of avoiding or warding off the formation of centralised authority. Such issues are 
common within activist literature that has arisen from groups and movments involved in 
voluntaristic affinity groups
65
. 
 
6.3.2. Small groups and collective decisions 
Previously, I examined a body of mainstream political theory that attempts to ground the 
legitimacy of authority in the inclusion of citizens in decision-making through the process of 
democracy. I criticised democratic theory, saying that it presupposes some form of representation, 
which can oppress minority voices and self-creativity. A wider critique of ÔrepresentationÕ such as 
that put forward by Tormey (Tormey, 2006) encompasses the theories of participatory democrats 
such as Rousseau and Pateman as well as the early liberals. The act of representation occurs when 
Rousseau assumes that a body of people can exist as a unified aggregate, ÔThe PeopleÕ (Rousseau, 
2004 [1762]: 51-63 passim)
66
. The idea of a singular ÔpeopleÕ who share a singular will or set of 
desires is what Max Stirner would term a ÔspookÕ (Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 39) - an ideological 
construction to which the self-creativity and contingent desires of embodied subjects are 
subordinated. One can only be said to be a part of Ôthe peopleÕ to the extent to which one conforms 
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 See Chapters 8 & 9 for an explicit discussion of the concept of affinity as a logic and strategy of ethics and resistance. The Ôsmall 
groupsÕ discussed in this chapter might also be termed Ôaffinity groupsÕ. In this chapter I am concentrating more on internal organisation 
(or dis-organisation) as transgressive alternatives to relations of authority and hierarchy. 
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 Indeed, this is the basic premise of all democratic theory, which translated from the Greek literally means Ôrule by the peopleÕ 
(Rittberger, 2003: 139). 
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to the desires of the majority. This is in itself an act of representation Ð one is represented to oneÕs 
self as a member of an imagined community with interests and desires that are not oneÕs own.  
 
Representation of any kind (including both the political and ideological forms discussed above) 
leads to what Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 70) call overcoding Ð the loss of an excess of meaning 
through translation. In the context of political representation, overcoding is happening in at least 
two respects. First, there is the overcoding of the population at large, the excess being citizens (and 
non-citizens!) who did not vote for the winning party, and therefore have played no role 
whatsoever in decisions that will govern their lives. We also have the excess of individualsÕ own 
subjectivities even when they did vote for the winning party, insofar as fluid and multiple desires 
cannot be re-presented by a fixed and static other, be it another individual, party line, ideology and 
so forth, without a loss of excess meaning. Even the very idea of a fixed subjectivity, a single 
subject who speaks when (s)he says ÔIÕ, is brought under question by Deleuze and Guattari, and 
seen as imposing a false unity on multiplicity, and stasis on flows and variance: 
The only assemblages are machinic assemblages of desire and collective assemblages of 
enunciation. No significance, no subjectification: writing to the nth power (all individuated 
enunciation remains trapped within the dominant significations, all signifying desire is 
associated with dominated subjects). An assemblage, in all its multiplicity, necessarily acts on 
semiotic flows, material flows, and social flows simultaneously (Ibid: 25). 
 
Unified subjectivity is seen to be a product of arborescent Western thought and results in stagnant, 
oppressive social forms. Power relations and social forces are able to express a personÕs identity. 
They are represented to themselves and are organised. Deleuze and GuattariÕs atypical 
understanding of the concept of ÔminorityÕ is important here, is it allows us to gain access to the 
ways in which democratic representation does not only lead to the authority of either an elite group 
of people over a smaller number, nor the majority over the minority, but to the authority of 
ideology over agency. 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, difference is conceptualised by an act of comparison to a dominant set. 
The dominant set is termed by the authors ÔmajorityÕ and is a standard measure against which all 
variants are assessed Ð the majority is therefore always lesser in number than minorities. This 
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atypical understanding of the term ÔmajorityÕ rests on an understanding of difference and 
multiplicity as ontologically prior to sameness or identity: to perceive two (or three, or nÉ) things 
as Ôthe sameÕ suppresses or obscures the difference presupposed by there being more than one thing 
in the first place: ÔA determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered 
minoritarian, by nature and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or an outsystemÕ 
(Ibid: 117). This has implications not only for the oppression of minority individuals, but also for 
the quality of decisions, in that the majority status blocks flows of creativity and desire by fixing 
people into predetermined identities. To substantiate this in the context of decision-making: people 
are making decisions every single moment of every day, and their choices will vary from minute to 
minute depending on mood, context and so on. To imagine that another individual, or even an 
abstract party line, can always speak for multiple others in their multiple states of being or 
represent their interests and desires is problematic, and results not only in the suppression of 
desiring subjectsÕ choices, the oppression of those subjects to the outcome of decisions, but also the 
limitation of choice itself, which can only be multiplied by uninhibited experimentation.  
 
This has implications for citizenship. Contra theorists such as Young (1989) and Kymlicka (2005), 
who propose that the problem of minority be solved through special citizenship rights and 
representation for variously defined social or cultural ÔgroupsÕ, a Deleuzoguattarian framework 
denies static modes of individuation altogether. What Tormey (2006) calls the Ôpost-
representationalÕ politics of Deleuze and Guattari stands against any forms of fixed identity: ÔA 
singularity is something active, something one becomes, whereas an identity is something that is 
passive, something that others construct for youÕ (Tormey, 2006: 9). I will be further considering 
the alternative politics that might be offered by a post-representational politics under critical 
utopian alternatives. I would like at this point to note a parallel between post-representational 
theories and what has been called a Ôthird wave of cultural politicsÕ (Isin & Wood, 1999: 14) that 
also resists the identity politics of previous eras, exhibiting Ôa growing dissatisfaction with these 
efforts to accentuate difference and a desire for thinking affirmatively about identity without either 
freezing or dissolving difference among groupsÕ (Ibid: 14). Critical utopian citizenship may have 
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something to offer here, by thinking beyond traditional static structures of representation and 
identity.  
 
Literature written by and for anarchistic activists also tends to cover the issue of decision-making 
structures explicitly and extensively. Two texts have been particularly important in informing 
anarchist ideas about group organisation and decision-making structures in movements for social 
change. These are ÒThe Tyranny of StructurelessnessÓ written around 1970 by Jo Freeman, a 
woman engaged in the womenÕs liberation movement, who argues on the side of structure and 
formal organization. A follow-up text to this was written by Cathy Levine called ÒThe Tyranny of 
TyrannyÓ, which refutes the premises and political conclusions made by Freeman
67
. Although 
LevineÕs is the seminal reply, FreemanÕs controversial article has provoked other demonstrative 
replies, such as that of McQuinn (2002), which I shall also discuss.  
 
FreemanÕs analysis revolves around the idea that informal groups without clear organisational 
structures are susceptible to power struggles and undemocratic hierarchies. She argues that a lack 
of formal structure encourages Ôunquestioned hegemonyÕ, since Ôthe rules of how decisions are 
made are known only to a few and awareness of power is limited to those who know the rulesÕ 
(Freeman, 2005 [1970]: 2). She also argues that lack of formal structure leads to the formation of 
elites, where cliques of friends dominate groups and decisions, and also encourages a ÔÓStarÓ 
systemÕ (Ibid: 3; capitalisation and quotation marks in the original) where certain members are 
perceived to be representative of a whole group or movement, without having to undergo 
democratic election. Her final criticism is that informal groups are not politically effective, and are 
only useful for a consciousness-raising phase of a movement, rather than for achieving any real 
change (Ibid: 4). She then proceeds to recommend seven principles of Ôdemocratic structuringÕ. 
These are: delegation of authority for specific tasks by democratic procedures, requiring those in 
                                            
67
 The precise date for LevineÕs essay seems to be unknown, as is sometimes the case for texts emerging from activist movements. The 
two essays were published together in 1984 in a paperback edition by rebel press called ÒUntying the Knot: Feminism, Anarchism and 
OrganisationÓ. The Anarchist Federation produced a freely distributed pamphlet based on this edition, with additional commentary. That 
this pamphlet is still in wide circulation in radical activist movements attests to its influence. I will be referring to the 8-page Anarchist 
Federation version of the texts in the upcoming section. The pamphlet is undated, but was obtained from The Anarchist Bookfair, 
London 2005, so I will refer to this date in the text.  
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authority to be responsible to those who selected them, the distribution of authority among Ôas 
many people as is reasonably possibleÕ, rotation of tasks, allocation of tasks along Ôrational 
criteriaÕ, frequent diffusion of information and equal access to resources (Ibid: 5). 
 
FreemanÕs essay has been widely criticised, particularly by those tending towards an anarchist 
viewpoint. In her reply to the essay, Cathy Levine argues that small, structureless groups are not as 
Freeman seems to argue, ineffective and unintentionally oppressive, but are rather Ôa valid, 
conscious strategy for building a revolutionary movementÕ (Levine, 2005: 5). Small groups, 
without leadership or organisation, are in fact seen to be less ÔtyrannicalÕ than large, hierarchical 
groups that alienate their members through size and organisation:  
A large group functions as an aggregate of its parts Ð each member functions as a unit, a cog in 
the wheel of the large organisation. The individual is alienated by the size, and relegated to 
struggling against the obstacle created by the size of the group Ð as example, expending energy 
to get a point of view recognised. Small groups, on the other hand, multiply the strength of 
each member. By working collectively in small numbers, the small group utilises the various 
contributions of each person to their fullest, nurturing and developing individual input, instead 
of dissipating it in the competitive survival-of-the-fittest/smartest/wittiest spirit of the large 
organisation (Ibid: 5). 
 
It is interesting that in the above quote, the metaphor of the ÔmachineÕ re-emerges, which is also 
evident in Deleuze and Guattari (see particularly (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004 [1984]: 1-57) and 
Stirner (Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 227, quoted previously). When tasks are too far removed from an 
abstracted transendental goal, and divided up between too many people who play only a small part 
in its realisation, these authors argue, the individual is estranged from her autonomous activity and 
experiences alienation. The small group, for Levine, is the antidote to mass hierarchical 
organisations with centralised control - such as the capitalist, imperialist state - but also, Levine 
argues, traditional (male) Left party politics (Ibid: 5). Levine argues that Freeman fails to recognise 
that small groups are particularly fitting for the social politics of the womenÕs movement, which 
involves a rejection of the patriarchal values of the male left and therefore also of their 
organisational structures. Organising, for Levine, should not concentrate exclusively on a 
revolution or power takeover, but rather become a matter of personal development and Ôbuilding a 
womenÕs cultureÕ (Ibid: 6). This culture should be resolutely opposed to mainstream culture and 
defy cooptation. Working at this micro-level is seen to be vital, since Ôthe ruling class has 
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representative pigs inside the head of every member of societyÕ (Ibid: 6). Again, we have the theme 
of representation and the idea that authority operates on and at the micro-political and 
psychological level of the embodied subject. 
 
Small groups are seen to be the point at which Ôpsychology intersects political involvementÕ (Ibid: 
6), and therefore the best space for making and implementing decisions. The problems of implicit 
elitism and hidden hierarchies are not solved by instituting formalised hierarchies, but rather 
something which should also be addressed at the micro-level, by recognising personality 
differences and insecurities and working with them (Ibid: 7). This idea that psychology is political, 
and we should attend to the micro-politics of personalities and relationships when organising in 
groups is repeated by another critic of Freeman, who attacks the Ôfear of freedom, friendship and 
community, as well as the fetish for sterile, reified, rule-bound relationshipsÕ (McQuinn, 2002, 
http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/tyranny.html, accessed July 2, 2009) that emanates from her 
article. McQuinn argues that FreemanÕs Ôprinciples of democratic restructuringÕ, listed above, are 
on the whole better accomplished by smaller groups than the large, organised groups that Freeman 
advocates, bar two of her suggestions that he argues are explicitly based on authoritarian 
assumptions (they are, indeed, the two of the principles that explicitly refer to the term ÔauthorityÕ): 
Òdistribution of authority among as many people as is reasonably possibleÓ (anathema to 
anarchists in the sense of political authority that she apparently includes in her definition) and 
Òrequiring all those to whom authority has been delegated to be responsible to those who 
selected themÓ Tell that to the politicians you elect, suckers! (Ibid) 
 
There is a tendency amongst FreemanÕs critics, in common with Stirner, to repudiate structure and 
mediation in favour of spontaneity. Bringing decisions down to the level of the small group allows 
for the integration of the politics of organisation and decision-making with the politics of 
personalities and personal relationships. Although the problem of authority is raised, it is seen as 
something that should be acknowledged, brought into the open, and overcome, rather than reified 
into formalised and rule-bound roles. This is appropriate to feminist politics, which often insists 
that the personal is political. 
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The foregoing discussion posits small groups as an alternative to large, centralised representative 
democracy. However, it might be noted that Rousseau, whom I also included under dominant 
approaches, also proposed a limit to the size of states (Rousseau, 2004 [1762]: 109). Small groups 
for decision-making do not preclude representation of the type considered previously, and majority 
voting, even in a small group would exclude and oppress the desires and self-creativity of 
minorities. For this reason, activist groups in movements of resistance often rely on the process of 
consensus decision-making. In a recent book written by and for activists, the reasoning behind 
consensus is explained: 
At its core consensus it a commitment to find solutions that are acceptable to all. Instead of 
voting for an item, consensus works creatively to take into account everyoneÕs needs. 
Consensus is about finding common ground with decisions reached in a dialogue between 
equals, who take each other seriously and who recognise each otherÕs equal rights. No decision 
will be made against the express will of an individual or minority. Instead the group constantly 
adapts to all its membersÕ needs (The Seeds for Change Collective, 2007: 53). 
 
Consensus means that all members of a group have to agree to a decision before action is taken. It 
means that minorities have the power to veto and so cannot be ignored, but that creative solutions 
must be found to their concerns through a (sometimes long) process of negotiation, before any 
action can be taken.  
 
There are many different procedures for consensus, some of which will be discussed in the next 
chapter when I move on to a consideration of practices in the communities that I visited. At this 
point, it is important to note that consensus differs from both representative and direct democracy 
in that it does not involve representing the group as a coherent and unified body, or Ôa peopleÕ 
before the decisions are made Ð conflict is indeed assumed and can lead to more creative solutions. 
The process itself builds commitment to the group and empowers individuals since decisions must 
be fully supported by all members before action is taken. It also helps to avoid the formation of 
hierarchies (Ibid: 62). It is a critical utopian process, because decisions are made immanently, with 
no presumed outcome and no foundational grounds are posited that limit the outcome. The process 
opens decisions to the assertion of difference and criticism from any angle. It also heralds a new 
kind of politics and a transgressive role for critical citizens. By practising and showing something 
new and different, that works, groups who make decisions by consensus are also engaged in the 
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political act of exiting from the dominant system, in what Deleuze and Guattari would call a Ôline 
of flightÕ, whilst simultaneously creating and illustrating something new, that allows for the 
autonomous becomings of all members within the context of the group. Consensus favours creative 
ideas over opinions, as termed by Alfredo Bonanno in the following passage:  
What is an opinion? It is a flattened idea, an idea that has been uniformed in order to make it 
acceptable to the largest number of people. Opinions are massified ideas. It is important for 
power that these opinions be maintained because it is through opinion, the control of opinion, 
that they obtain given results, not least the mechanisms of propaganda and electoral procedures 
through the use of mass media (Bonanno, 1998 [1996], 
http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/tension.html accessed April 8, 2009). 
 
Consensus means understanding our own desires, needs and ideas but also being willing and open 
to listen and to modify and negotiate these in the light of what others have to say, and their needs, 
desires and ideas. No memberÕs needs or desires are represented, fixed or oppressed by founding 
myths that limit the decisions that can be made but are rather assumed to be open to negotiation 
and creativity within the context of the group.  
 
6.3.3. Immanence 
I have previously considered the instrumentalist view of legitimate authority, which posits that 
authority is legitimate to the extent that it embodies and enforces group rationality as defined in 
relation to a transcendental goal or outcome. This leads to a splitting of functions and formalised 
organisational structures and integrated components, turning the group into a kind of problem-
solving machine. A critical utopian alternative to this comes from a body of theory, or more 
accurately a grouping of concepts, sometimes referred to as immediatism Ð associated with post-
left anarchy, and also found within literature arising from activist movements. There is a particular 
emphasis on the immanent articulation and realisation of desires, rather than the transfer of 
authority to abstract structures, as in instrumentalism and in the vanguardist politics of the 
traditional left. Bey articulates this in his idiosyncratically poetic language: 
A utopian poetics helps us to know our desires. The mirror of utopia provides us with a kind of 
critical theory which no mere practical politics nor systematic philosophy can hope to evolve. 
But we have no time for theory which merely limits itself to the contemplation of utopia as 
Òno-place placeÓ while bewailing the Òimpossibility of desireÓ. The penetration of everyday 
life by the marvellous Ð the creation of ÒsituationsÓ belongs to the Òmaterial bodily principleÓ, 
and to the imagination, and to the living fabric of the present (Bey, 1994: 4) 
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A problem with instrumentalism highlighted in the foregoing discussion was that it separated the 
individual from his or her immediate desires which were then abstracted to a distant goal (an 
implicit and obscured ÔutopiaÕ) that is then deferred and separated from individualsÕ autonomous 
activity. Consumerism is offered as a promise of self-fulfilment, but one which is separated from 
the productive work which individuals have to undertake in order to partake in its pleasures: ÔThe 
Totality isolates individuals and renders them powerless by offering only illusory modes of self-
expression, modes which seem to promise liberation of self-fulfilment but in fact end by producing 
more mediation and alienationÕ (Ibid: 27). Immediatist approaches not only criticise the separation 
of different spheres of economic activity, but the separation of production from consumption, and 
of work itself from leisure or Ôfree timeÕ (Bonanno, 1998 [1977]: 16-25; Black, 1996, passim). Like 
Deleuze, Bonanno shows how we can move from negation to autonomy through a logic of 
creativity and autonomy: 
Through the need for communism the need for non-work moves from the negative aspect 
(opposition to work) to the positive one: the individualÕs complete availability to themselves, 
the possibility to express themselves absolutely freely, breaking away from all models, even 
those considered to be fundamental and indespensible such as those of production (Bonanno, 
1998 [1977]: 19) 
 
These approaches are critically utopian because they start from a different logic Ð a logic which is 
anti-authoritarian, anti-hierarchical, anti-mediation and anti-alienation, but they do not simply 
define themselves in opposition, nor imagine an impossibly distant blueprint for a better future, but 
extol the joys of realising it in the here and now, through practice and continual experimentation. 
These themes have echoes in activist literature.  
 
The Anti-Mass: Methods of Organizing for Collectives, usually referred to simply as Anti-Mass is a 
pamphlet written in the 1970s (the exact date of origin is unknown) by members of the 
countercultural scene in Berkley, California, who were critical of both Leninism and Liberalism 
(The Red Sunshine Gang, 1999 [c. 1970]). The authors of the pamphlet make an innovative 
distinction between ÔmassÕ and ÔclassÕ, using an atypical understanding of the concept of class: a 
distinction that is seen to be fundamental to revolutionary practice but previously neglected. Mass 
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denotes a specific form of organisation; that of dominant culture and society. It is characterised by 
the atomisation of individuals and households:  
Most people think of the mass in terms of numbers Ð like a crowded street or a stadium. But it 
is actually structure that defines its character. The mass is an aggregate of couples who are 
separate, detached and anonymous. They live in cities physically close yet socially apart.Õ 
(Ibid: 1). 
 
The mass is a product of hierarchical organisation and unequal capital, an instrumental machine 
geared towards the maximisation of economic growth: ÔThe social existence of the mass Ð its rules 
and regulations, the structuring of its status, roles and leadership Ð are organised through 
consumption (the mass market)Õ (Ibid: 1). To this idea of mass Ð atomisation and hierarchy Ð is 
opposed class; a Ôconsciously organized social forceÕ, which is composed of what the authors term 
Ôsmall groupsÕ, very similar to StirnerÕs union of egoists or contemporary affinity groups. The 
function of a small group is to Ôbreak out of the mass Ð specifically from the isolation of daily life 
and the mass structure of the movementÕ (Ibid: 2). The small group develops into a ÔcollectiveÕ 
when it manages to create an independent existence and purpose of its own, and neither defines 
itself exclusively in negative or oppositional terms, nor in relation to a transcendent goal: Ôthe 
formation of a collective begins when people not only have the same politics, but agree on the 
method of struggleÕ (Ibid: 2). 
 
This brings up an important point concerning authority and decision-making. Despite the fact that 
this section aims to concentrate on forms of decision-making that offer an alternative to 
hierarchical, statist forms, it is very difficult to discuss these without also discussing wider social 
change. Decision-making implies processes that are organised in some way, and organising 
decision-making processes in a way that is different from the hierarchical dominant modes of the 
status quo is always-already a mode of resistance. It implies structural renewal and the wilful 
privileging of the social principle over and against the political principle. There is therefore no 
separation between decision-making for daily life, and decision-making for social change, nor is 
there a separation between the organisational structures before Ôthe revolutionÕ or after: Ôthe answer 
to alienation is to make yourself the subject, not the object, of historyÕ (Ibid: 2).  
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This spatial strategy also removes the separation or mediation of spheres of life and activity that 
occur through orientation to a deferred and transcendental goal: Ôthe priority of local action is an 
attempt to unify everyday life and fragment the mass. This level of consciousness is a result of 
rejecting the laws of mass behaviour based on Leninism and TV ideologyÕ (Ibid: 8). Decisions are 
taken by the group, for the group, and not for any externalised aim or purpose dictated by an 
authority with access to a transcendental reason68.  
 
Wider social change may be perceived as desirable, but this is not the sole or primary aim of the 
group, since the group has immanent pleasure. The fact that there is no segregation of fields of 
activity and no division of labour also means that no group is subordinate to another group. 
Although hierarchies may emerge in this model, of the informal kind which Jo Freeman instances, 
this spatial strategy does not allow them to escalate: ÔSmall size restricts the area which any single 
individual can dominate. This is true both internally and in relation to other groupsÕ (Ibid: 4). The 
small group size means that Ôrelations of inequality can be seen more clearly and dealt with more 
effectivelyÕ (Ibid: 4). The solution to inequality and emergent authority becomes one of personal 
and group development, rather than one of mass politics, abstracted identities and formalised roles 
Ð a critical utopian citizenship of presence and activity, rather than representation, absence and 
inactivity. This is a politics that acts upon dominant models of citizenship both by defining itself 
against the abstract individualism and alienated status of the concept of citizenship whilst 
simultaneously positing an alternative practice of activity, creativity and participation in everyday 
life.  
 
                                            
68
 The way that such groups might engage with one another and with wider society is through the network form, as theorised by Juris 
(2008) and Robinson & Karatzogianni (2010). The communities in this project were involved in networks such as Radical Routes 
(http://www.radicalroutes.org.uk/ accessed 11 February 2010) and Diggers and Dreamers (http://www.diggersanddreamers.org.uk/ 
accessed 11 February 2010). Issues of networking and connection are not the focus of this thesis but do overlap with some of the issues 
raised in chapters 8 & 9 in sections on ethics, community and politics.  
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6.3.4. Non-hierarchy 
In the previous section on dominant approaches, I considered how many thinkers view hierarchy as 
a natural state of affairs, both in terms of the state and within personal relationships. I also began to 
consider how theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari and Stirner have conceptualised ÔbecomingÕ 
and autonomy, which undermine authority by asserting difference, self-activity and 
experimentation as a mode of resistance to authority which is always-already creative and 
affirmative. It is important to note that anarchists are also suspicious of power that arises at the 
micro-level of personal relationships, and not only of state authority.  
 
This does not mean that an anarchist would necessarily deny the authority of someone with special 
knowledge or skills. Bakunin, for example, in his essay on authority states that he would happily 
submit to a boot-maker in the matter of boots, and an architect or engineer should he want to build 
a canal, yet would Ôallow neither the boot-maker nor the architect nor the savant to impose his 
authority on meÕ (Bakunin, 2004 [1971]: 19). However, the same reason that would persuade him 
to accept the authority of the knowledge of a specialist, he argues,  
forbids me É to recognise a fixed, constant and universal authority, because there is no 
universal man, no man capable of grasping in all that wealth of detail, without which the 
application of science to life is impossible, all the sciences, all the branches of social life. And 
if such universality could ever be realised in a single man, and if he wished to take advantage 
thereof to impose his authority upon us, it would be necessary to drive this man out of society, 
because his authority would inevitably reduce all the others to slavery and imbecility (Ibid: 
20). 
 
Authority, and hierarchies of knowledge in relationships should be fluid and changing, according to 
this view. There is still an explicit suspicion of authority, even at this micro-political level, should 
it be allowed to accumulate. The avoidance or warding-off of accumulating and stultifying 
authority is thus something that critical utopian approaches have to address in the positing of any 
alternative. It will not do to simply posit a utopian society with no forms of authority Ð again, this 
reflects the critical utopian approach, which begins from a different logic to the dominant society 
but views this as contingent and open to constant negotiation. 
 
Chapter 6: Transgressing Authority: Theory 155 
Some recommendations for a continual reappraisal and critique of conditions of hierarchy and 
authority can be found in Deleuze and Guattari and Stirner, and these have previously been 
outlined in terms of ÔbecomingÕ and Ôlines of flightÕ. More lucidly practical advice can again be 
found in activist literature. The authors of Anti-Mass set out some particulars for organising 
collectives in a way that operates against the mass. First and foremost comes the issue of size, 
which should: 
not be larger than a band Ð no orchestras or chamber music please. The basic idea is to 
reproduce the collective, not expand it É the difference between expansion and reproduction is 
the difference between adding and multiplying. The first bases its strength on numbers and the 
second on its relationships between people (Ibid: 4).  
 
The collective should reject mass politics and vanguards, and focus on local action and micro-
politics: Ôthe aim of the collective is to feel new thoughts and act new ideas Ð in a word create its 
own spacesÕ (Ibid: 7). The collective should also recognise difference rather than attempting to 
impose unity, both in internal relations, and in external relations with other groups (Ibid: 9). There 
should be a concentration on Ôself-activityÕ, which is opposed to work/labour and defined as Ôthe 
reconstruction of the consciousness (wholeness) of oneÕs individual life activity. The collective is 
what makes the reconstruction possible because it defines individuality not as a private experience 
but as a social relationÕ (Ibid: 15-16). It is also important to turn criticality inward, to the micro-
political relationships of the group, in order to avoid emergent hierarchy and stultifying authority: 
One of the hardest things to do is see social relations Ð those within the collective Ð in political 
terms. The tendency is to be sloppy É about relations between friends. Rules can no longer be 
the framework of discipline. It must be based upon political understanding. One of the 
functions of analysis is that it can be applied internally (Ibid: 16). 
 
Again, we have the theme of ongoing critique and the recognition that even in a small group with 
similar political views there will always be difference and disagreement, and that these must be 
recognised, and worked out in practice. This has implications for a critical utopian conception of 
citizenship Ð the emphasis on activity and working out differences without mediation suggests an 
active and participatory form of membership beyond the mere rhetoric of neo-liberal governmental 
discourse, exposing citizenship as a process and a relationship, rather than simply a formalised and 
static status. I will consider this more in the concluding section of the next chapter, on 
transgressing authority in practice. 
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6.4. Summary of chapter 
In this chapter, I have attempted to address two of the research questions put forward in section 1.3 
of this thesis: Ôout of what historical conditions do dominant models of citizenship arise, what do 
they have in common, and what are their effects?Õ and Ôwhat alternatives are offered by critical 
utopian theory?Õ I have done this by concentrating on how formations of authority affect the 
institution of citizenship, particularly in terms of participation and belonging. Dominant 
theorisations of authority were judged to draw on four potential bases for legitimacy: 
contractarianism, democracy, instrumentalism and natural inequality of hierarchy. The practices 
associated with these theorisations were seen to have political and ethical effects on citizenship: 
citizens become subject to a determinate system that they play no role in forming or selecting, 
minority voices and belonging are further suppressed or oppressed by being subjugated by the 
majority, citizensÕ desires and interests are subjugated to a transcendental goal, and citizens are 
excluded from areas of knowledge and decisions that affect their lives. Many of these problems 
were seen to originate from an implicit utopianism based in ontological and foundational 
assumptions resulting in a static and fixed vision of citizenship as a legal status and identity within 
a hierarchical and differentiated state rather than as a relationship and a process in a face-to-face 
society. This vision of citizenship is exceeded and transgressed by practices and processes of 
everyday life. Critical utopian theories attempt to account for this complexity by offering 
possibilities for non-hierarchy and anti-authoritarian processes of governance that begin from a 
position of critique but simultaneously offer creative alternatives. These included voluntarism, 
collective decision-making in small groups, the immanent expression of desire through the 
trangression or removal of boundaries between spheres of life, such as work/leisure, 
governing/living, and an ethos of non-hierarchy in personal relationships.  What draws critical 
utopian approaches together is an emphasis on everyday life and practice. For this reason, it is 
important to consider examples of critical utopian practices (as defined in the ÒMethodsÓ chapter 
section 3.4.1.) in order to address how they speak to, and even more importantly, how they 
transgress and further critique, critical utopian alternatives to formulations of citizenship founded 
on the idea of legitimate authority. The upcoming chapter, ÒTransgressing Authority: PracticeÓ, 
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addresses in terms of authority the third and fourth research questions of section 1.3 of the 
Introduction: ÔWhat theoretical and practiced alternatives to dominant models of citizenship are 
offered by political agents in autonomous spaces?Õ, and Ôwhat can a dialogue between theory and 
practice tell us about the conditions for a critical utopian citizenship?Õ.  
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7. Transgressing Authority: Practice 
7.1. Typology 
 Kebele S.hill HHP CPH Find.n  MGC LSC Corani  LH 
Formal/ written 
procedures for 
meetings 
X 
occasio
nal 
X 
Coloure
d cards 
X 
unused 
 X   X  
Informal/ 
unwritten 
conventions 
X  
X 
in 
practice 
X  X X  X 
Delegation of 
decisions to 
subgroups 
X X   X  X  X 
No formalised 
delegation 
  X X  X  X  
Representation for 
some/all decisions 
  X  X     
Full participation X X  X  X X X X 
Full consensus 
required to pass a 
decision 
X   X  X X X X 
Majority vote 
sometimes/always 
sufficient to reach 
decision 
 X X  X     
Interpersonal 
session 
   X X X   ? 
Group size <10 
for decisions 
  X X  X X X  
Group size 10-19 
for decisions 
X      X   
Group size 20-49 
for decisions 
 X     X  X 
Group size >50 
for decisions 
    X     
Figure 7-1: Typology showing forms of organisation in autonomous communities 
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7.2. Actualisations: transgressing authority in utopian practice 
The foregoing discussion has outlined how dominant state-centred models of authority define this 
concept by reference to its legitimacy. Theories of legitimate authority included notions of consent 
given through historical or hypothetical contracts, notions of fairness through forms of inclusion in 
democratic decision-making, instrumentalism as orientation to a shared transcendental goal, and 
hierarchy as inequality of personal skills or knowledge. I contrasted these to critical utopian 
models, which are voluntaristic, non-representative, rely on immanent social relations and self-
activity rather than the separation of spheres of life and mediation between deciders and doers, and 
attempt to overcome emerging relational hierarchies. In this chapter I turn to a discussion of how 
practices within autonomous communities address these themes. 
 
The sources for the information given in this chapter include interviews, participant observation 
and documentary analysis. Interviews are most important for considering the effects of structures 
of authority and decision-making upon individuals, and how individualÕs beliefs and desires are 
either actualised or suppressed through these processes. They are also important for obtaining 
factual information about community organisation and processes, although this is verified through 
participant observation and documentary analysis. Some interviewees have more knowledge in 
certain areas than others, which is also an integral part of structures of authority, and I will try to 
take this into account. Formal structures and processes are often accessible through documentary 
analysis of publications by the community or written constitutions. These must also be triangulated 
or verified through observation and interviews, however, as the fact of something being written 
down does not confirm its establishment in practice. The first part of the chapter attempts to 
address the given themes descriptively, and also provides some interpretation of the effects of 
various structures and processes, with a particular concentration on the quality of decisions and 
inclusion (these themes have been drawn from the previous chapterÕs theoretical discussion as 
being important effects of structures of authority). The second part of the chapter takes a more 
analytical approach, considering the importance of the dialogue between theory and practice for the 
central theme of this thesis: critical utopian citizenship. Here, I will try to account for how practices 
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address or parody either dominant or critical utopian theoretical models, and where they diverge 
from and transgress theory.  
 
7.2.1. Consent 
In the previous chapter, I considered how some dominant models of authority attempt to justify the 
legitimacy of the state by positing some kind of foundational consent. Consent was seen to be 
given in either a pre-historical past or hypothetically, and was usually grounded in discourses of 
rationality or reason. I criticised these notions by highlighting the fictive nature of their posited 
ontological bases and then by highlighting their excluding and oppressive effects upon minorities. 
As an alternative to these theories I considered the critical utopian approach of voluntarism that 
relied upon elective autonomy to cohere groups, which allowed for spontaneity and self-creativity 
of group members. From this discussion, I have drawn out the following questions, which I shall 
use to structure a discussion of practices in autonomous communities: 
¥ Do autonomous communities challenge contractarian models of consent, and if so, how? 
¥ What are the effects of alternative models upon inclusion, belonging and commitment? 
 
7.2.1.1. Do autonomous communities challenge contractarian models of consent, and if so, 
how? 
All of the communities that I visited had voluntary membership. Members choose to join
69
. As a 
spatial strategy, voluntarism means that members of a group might be united by shared values, 
aims or purposes
70
, rather than by birth or nationhood or the fact of sharing a territory. These are 
often instituted in a ÔcontractÕ or constitution
71
 of some sort, which will pre-exist membersÕ joining 
(except for founding members) and so preclude them from the process of deciding on the content at 
the point of joining, although they may have opportunity to change the constitution once they are a 
                                            
69
 A notable exception would be children of members who were under an age of independence, although I will have to exclude children 
and young people from this analysis, because I did not have the opportunity to interview any during my fieldwork.  
70
 The variety and nature of communitiesÕ shared beliefs, principles and goals and the ways in which they are constitutionalised are 
considered further in Chapter 9. 
71
 Examples of community constitutions that I was able to access can be found in appendices 5, 6, 7 & 8. 
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fully fledged member. Unlike the historical or hypothetical consent models of contractarianism, 
members expressly and voluntarily Ôsign up toÕ the ÔcontractÕ:  
In joining you would be [signing up to the agreed aims and principles]. I mean you are taking 
on the full package if you join, and the joining process is not quick for that reason. One, we 
wish to get on together and two, we have particular aims, so unless, well, somebody could get 
involved with us, challenge us about our aims, convince us all to change them and then join on 
that basis, but itÕs more likely to be the other way round, people come along and find out what 
we are about, they are attracted to it, and then they join (Interview: Guy, Corani, 7 July 2007).  
 
Long joining processes are typical to all of the residential communities
72
 that I visited during 
fieldwork, for example Mornington Grove Community website provides the following outline of 
membership procedures: 
¥ First we ask all enquirers to write us a letter saying something about yourself and why you 
would like to live communally. 
¥ This is followed by an invitation to an open afternoon. 
¥ If both the community and the enquirer wish to continue the process, you are then invited to 
a meal at each house. 
¥ The next stage is to spend four days living in the community. 
¥ The enquirer can then apply, and a consensus decision about their application is reached at a 
meeting. 
¥ After moving in there is a 6 month probation period. A review meeting at the end of the 6 
months gives the new member and the rest of the Community a chance to raise any issues. 
Membership may be terminated at this time, but chances are youÕll be accepted as a full 
member. 
(Morning Grove Community, 2006, How to Join, from 
http://www.morningtongrovecommunity.org.uk/join.htm accessed July 4, 2009) 
 
Although the lengths and timing of each stage vary between communities, this example serves as a 
fair illustration of the procedures involved. These procedures exist so that the community members 
and the applicant can have time to get to know each other, and also so that the applicant can be 
fully aware of the commitment that they making. 
 
Voluntarism also implies an exit strategy for discontented members. A member of the New 
Findhorn Association (NFA) mentioned the potential for departure at the last instance if someone 
disagreed with a decision
73
: 
                                            
72
 See typology in Chapter 5, ÒTerritoryÓ for a list 
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RF: What would happen if somebody refused to abide by a decision which had already been 
made? 
 
KK: Well, I mean people usually leave by that point. The thing is that we do so much together, 
and if you are not together youÕre outside. We wouldnÕt deliberately, or I hope we wouldnÕt 
deliberately, push someone to feel outside. But they would probably feel outside anyway 
(Interview: Kay Kay, NFA Findhorn, 18 June 2007).  
 
Leaving a group or community is not easy, particularly if it is your home, and is something that is 
only done as a last resort. Most communities lose members due to conflict or inability to come to 
terms with a decision. Most groups have decision-making and conflict-resolution structures, 
procedures and processes in place, which aim to be as inclusive as possible, which will be 
discussed in section 7.2.2. on Ôdecision-makingÕ.  
 
It is clear that autonomous communities do offer an alternative to the consent models of 
contractarianism. In joining, a person would be voluntarily signing up to the aims and principles of 
group, rather than consent being assumed as always-already given through foundational discourses 
of rationality and historical/hypothetical consent. However, it is also clear that residential 
communities at least, do not exhibit the spontaneity proposed by some critical utopian theoretical 
models. Kebele and Liverpool Social Centre were non-residential communities. However, even 
these groups had procedures and conditions that applicants would have to undertake in order to 
become Ôcore membersÕ. These were usually more informal than for residential communities, but 
involved someone frequenting the group for long enough to come to be known and trusted, and 
then committing a certain number of hours to the group each week. Commitment is clearly an 
important issue for communities, as joining procedures usually revolved around ascertaining 
commitment
74.
  
 
                                            
73
 Findhorn has a complicated organisational structure with two bodies that operate according to different principles, the Findhorn 
Foundation and the New Findhorn Association. The nature of these and the relationship between them is discussed more fully elsewhere 
in this thesis and also in appendices 1 and 4. 
74
 For an historical study on the importance of commitment for building successful communities, see Kanter (1972). 
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7.2.1.2. What are the effects of alternative models upon inclusion, belonging and 
commitment? 
Joining processes are designed to ensure that new members are committed to the community. 
Commitment is important, and a lack of commitment can have injurious consequences for the 
community, even in the cases of non-residential communities: 
[A good member is someone who is] going to make a commitment to be involved in Kebele on 
a consistent basis for a period of time, because otherwise you get people who come for a short 
period with lots of enthusiasm and ideas and they start things off, then they piss off, because 
they move on, or they travel, or decide to do something else, and like somethingÕs been coming 
to shape and it falls back to the same core group to carry through (Interview: Tim, Kebele, 7 
April 2007). 
 
Joining and commitment-building processes can institute hierarchy between probationary or new 
members and more established members: 
I would definitely say I have felt different once I had done my 3 months and become a full 
member, now I feel that I can be more vocal with my opinion, and more fully expressive, 
which is strange because it is still just my opinion (Interview: Nick, Coventry Peace House, 9 
May 2007). 
 
Long joining procedures are also in place to make sure that all existing members are happy for the 
new person to join. It must be remembered that in residential communities, these are peopleÕs 
homes Ð commitment is not only requisite from the prospective member, but on the part of those 
who will have to live with the new person. The decision on whether to let someone new join or not 
was often cited as the one instance in which a single member could veto a decision without social 
pressure to negotiate, compromise or find a creative solution: 
Well we run by consensus and consensus decision-making about everything, except inquirers, 
who are people looking to move in, and then thatÕs like one vote can veto that (Interview: 
Layla, Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007). 
 
This quote is interesting, as in theory consensus always mean that one ÔvoteÕ
75
, or more accurately 
one voice, can veto Ð this quote illustrates the extent to which in all circumstances except decisions 
concerning new members, the minority veto is rarely used or settled upon. This theme was a 
frequent one throughout the interviews: it was an accepted norm that existing members had the 
                                            
75
 ÔVoteÕ is perhaps a misleading term here, although used by the interviewee Ð as has been shown in the previous chapter, section 6.3.2, 
the purpose of consensus is to priviledge process over the aggregation of interests, and the process does not usually involve voting. 
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absolute right of refusal concerning who they would and would not be willing to live with. Even 
Bey, who places great emphasis on spontaneity and immediacy, recognises the importance of being 
able to choose who we live with:  
People probably ought to choose the people they live with. ''Open-membership" communes 
invariably end up swamped with freeloaders and sex-starved pathetic creeps. PAZs [Permanent 
Autonomous Zones] must choose their own membership mutually - this has nothing to do with 
"elitism". The PAZ may exercise a temporarily open function - such as hosting festivals or 
giving away free food, etc. - but it need not be permanently open to any self-proclaimed 
sympathizer who wanders by (Bey, 1993, http://www.hermetic.com/bey/paz.html accessed 
May 5, 2009). 
 
Joining procedures that attempt to build commitment therefore do seem to exhibit some tendencies 
towards exclusivity, hierarchy and conservativeness. There is always, however, potential for 
prospective or new members to change the group: 
Sometimes, you know one person if they are really strong then they can turn around the whole 
body. And it happens, I have seen it a couple of times in the Foundation where one person has 
managed to turn around the whole thing (Interview: Kay Kay, NFA Findhorn, 18 June 2007).  
 
As a fairly new member I think it takes a while before you feel fully confident and 
knowledgeable to really stand for your point of view É I suppose thereÕs that whole ÔweÕve 
done this before and it didnÕt workÕ, although there is always the eye to everybodyÕs viewpoint 
is equally valid and fresh blood can sometimes flip something around (Interview: Layla, 
Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007). 
 
This issue links with the issue of hierarchies, and the most commonly mentioned hierarchy was 
longevity within the community. This is discussed more fully in section 7.2.4 of this chapter. At 
this point the important point to make is that communities are almost certainly closer to 
voluntaristic than contractarian models, since there is no obligation to join the group, consent is not 
assumed as always-already given, indeed it is much harder to actually join the group than not to! 
This approach has its own problems, however, including hierarchies of authority between 
longstanding members and probationary or new members. 
 
7.2.2. Decision-making 
In the previous chapter, I considered how dominant political theory attempts to legitimise authority 
through the democratic model of decision-making, which includes citizens in decision-making 
processes, either directly or through elected representatives, through majority voting procedures. 
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Both direct and representative democratic models were seen to have in common that they presume 
the existence of a unified aggregate (ÔThe PeopleÕ) to which ÔminorityÕ desires are subordinated.  
Critical utopian approaches attempt to resist this approach whilst simultaneously experimenting 
and creating an alternative spatial strategy that is based on small groups and consensus decision-
making. This model allows desires to be articulated immanently from the group in a manner that 
allows for the becoming or autonomy of individual members, leads to more creative decisions, 
whilst simultaneously building group belonging and commitment to decisions. I will focus this 
section on practices in autonomous communities around the following questions drawn from the 
theoretical discussion: 
¥ Do autonomous communities challenge conventional models of democratic decision-
making, and if so, how? 
¥ What are the implications of alternative models of decision-making for the process and 
outcome of decisions? 
¥ What are the implications of alternative models of decision-making for inclusion and 
commitment? 
 
7.2.2.1. Do autonomous communities challenge conventional models of democratic 
decision-making, and if so, how? 
As the typology shows, most of the communities that I visited did not employ representative 
structures for decision-making. In these cases, all members, or all available members would 
participate in decision-making. The two exceptions were Hockerton Housing Project and Findhorn. 
At Hockerton, each household (usually a family) would choose one representative to send to 
meetings
76
. At Findhorn, the structure is a lot more complex, and also differs, as do most 
organisational procedures, between the Foundation and the New Findhorn Association (NFA)
77
. 
Due to its complex and exceptional nature, I will consider Findhorn as an example of a community 
with representative decision-making structures. I will here concentrate on the Findhorn Foundation 
                                            
76
 Unfortunately I was unable to undertake any recorded interviews at Hockerton to ascertain why this was the case. During informal 
discussions with members, I gained an impression that what members referred to as Ôcommunity aspectsÕ of the project were viewed as 
being of secondary importance to environmental aspects (see also Hockerton Housing Project. (n.d.) from 
http://www.hockertonhousingproject.org.uk/SEFS/ID.780/SEFE/ViewItem.asp accessed August 3 2009), where only a small section is 
dedicated to Ôcommunity aspectsÕ.  
77
 See appendices 1, 3 & 4 for further information on the complicated organisational structures of Findhorn Community. 
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(the NFA structure is fairly similar) consisting of an elected committee and advisory board. After 
considering Findhorn as an example of representative decision-making in voluntary autonomous 
communities, I will turn to the more usual model, consensus. 
 
Representation 
At the Foundation, the ÔManagement TeamÕ consisting of 11 people makes decisions that affect the 
organisation as a whole. This team consults with a ÔCouncilÕ of committee members, 
approximately 40 in number, who are elected by the approximately 120 members of the 
Foundation. The Council and Management Team meet regularly to discuss issues and to participate 
in team-building activities. The Management Team are responsible to the ÔTrusteesÕ of the 
Foundation, who meet four times per year. The management team has a ÔFocaliserÕ, somewhat akin 
to a general manager
78
.  
 
In meetings of representatives, the aim is to make all decisions by consensus, which has been 
defined as Ôeveryone involved agreeing to the course of actionÕ, or those who do not agree with the 
decision agreeing to be a Òloyal minorityÓ, that is, registering their disapproval, but agreeing to go 
along with the whole (Walker, 1994b: 373). After decisions have been made, those who are going 
ahead with whatever project has been decided upon are encouraged to continue liaising with and 
listening to the views of loyal minorities. Loyal minorities cannot be constituted of people who 
agree to a decision then attempt to subvert it afterwards: 
We ask them [those who disagree or dissent] to be a loyal minority, and that is this thing that 
we have had for many years now. We said, Ôobviously you donÕt have enough support for this, 
and can you be a loyal minority?Õ, so you donÕt agree, but you wonÕt sabotage the thing. You 
wonÕt say behind out backs, Ôph what a bad decisionÕ. So usually people accept to be loyal 
minorities (Interview: Kay Kay, NFA Findhorn, 18 June 2007).  
 
If consensus, including a Ôloyal minorityÕ cannot be reached amongst representatives in NFA, 
Foundation and community-wide (NFA and Foundation) meetings, the decision can be made by a 
                                            
78
 Information gleaned from notes taken during unrecorded conversations and participant observation. A more detailed account of 
decision-making procedures at Findhorn is given by Walker (1994b), although some of the information given in WalkerÕs account was 
out of date at the time of my visit. 
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90% majority of those voting at a subsequent meeting. Individual departments
79
 are smaller and 
tend to make all decisions by consensus. In all cases where a decision is made by a majority, rather 
than consensus vote, the chairperson is obliged to place an article in the Rainbow Bridge, the 
FoundationÕs weekly internal newsletter, explaining the background, reasons and decision. I will 
consider the implications for process and outcome, as well as inclusion, of FindhornÕs 
representative system in a later section. First, I will consider the alternative model used by most of 
the communities that I visited Ð consensus. 
 
Consensus 
Most of the communities use some form of consensus. Consensus as a process, rather than an 
ethos, is not wholly incompatible with representation, as consensus amongst representatives might 
be used. This combination of consensus and representation is used at both Findhorn and Hockerton, 
who use representatives. Interestingly both Findhorn and Hockerton have allowances allow for 
varying degrees of majority to pass a decision when consensus cannot be reached, which is not the 
case for any of the communities that do not use representation, with the exception of Springhill. 
This may be due to the fact that communities who use representation are not committed to the ethos 
of consensus to the same extent that communities who always use consensus are.  
 
Consensus decision-making is a group procedure that seeks the agreement of all participants. In the 
upcoming interview fragments, it may be observed that participantsÕ use of the term ÔconsensusÕ is 
interesting. The term tends to be defined as both the process of decision-making, and the outcome, 
which reflects the fact that consensus is an ongoing process. The practical details of consensus vary 
from group to group. In nearly all cases there will be a ÔfacilitatorÕ; something like a chairperson, 
whose role is to make sure that everyone has an equal chance to speak and that procedures (if any) 
are followed correctly. Some groups have very informal procedures, literally just discussing a 
subject until agreement is reached. Others have certain procedures that are designed to make sure 
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 Findhorn has a system of delegation. Delegation will be discussed in more detail in section 7.2.3 of this chapter. 
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everyoneÕs voice is heard, for example Springhill used a convention involving coloured cards. 
There are two ways of using the cards, one during the process or debate and one at the point of 
decision-making to decide on the outcome. The process was described in detail by one of my 
interviewees: 
During the debate, a red card can interrupt, but that is quite rarely used. A green card means 
Ôyes I agree, ok move onÕ. A yellow card means ÔI have something to say or a questionÕ. A 
chairperson picks up on the cards and asks the people to do whatever they have indicated. 
Then, when it comes to decision-making, a green card says Ôyes, I fully agree with the 
proposal, I vote for itÕ. A yellow card says ÔI still have some doubts, IÕm not sureÕ, and a red 
card says ÔI block itÕ (Interview: Max, Springhill, 21 April 2007). 
 
This is a fairly widespread convention for consensus and is used by other communities, although 
none of the other communities that I visited used coloured cards. There are analogous procedures 
for consensus that use hand signals instead of coloured cards Ð these were used by most of the 
communities that I visited that did have formalised procedures for meetings (see typology)
80
. The 
intention behind these procedures is to stop people from interrupting verbally, which allows each 
speaker to have their say, and when well facilitated prevents louder voices, dominant personalities 
and those who are more confident and assertive from dominating.  
 
Interpersonal sessions 
Some groups have procedures for ensuring clear communication that occur before decision-making 
procedures (see typology), for example attunement at Findhorn: 
Attunement involves a meditation in which each person is encouraged to let go of 
preconceptions, and to find an inner state in which feelings of goodwill are uppermost and any 
decision will be one which is not based on selfish desires, but a perceived outcome which will 
be best for all of those involved. This sometimes involves holding hands in a circle, with 
closed eyes, whilst a ÔfocaliserÕ voices some themes for meditation, often involving Ôletting goÕ 
of any previous stresses and strains of the day, feeling oneself to be fully present with the 
group and surroundings, and sometimes giving a brief summary of the aims and purposes of 
the coming together of the group. There is then a short period of silent meditation. This might 
occur before any task, including working duties such as cooking or gardening, before joint 
leisure activities, before a decision-making process, and even before eating together the entire 
group holds hands around the table of food for attunement  (Extract from participant 
observation notes: Findhorn, 11 June 2007).  
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 I was able to observe this process in action in three of the communities: Coventry Peace House, Corani and Liverpool Social Centre. 
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During decision-making, the hope is to produce a unanimous decision after attunement, but if this 
does not happen, then there will be further discussion and attunement: 
If itÕs a controversial and unclear issue then [attunement] is time to pause, or meditate, or tune 
in and double check, and if itÕs not clear then itÕs not clear and it means it waits, because 
something is missing, or it goes around the room again and everybody speaks to it and 
sometimes you get things that you wouldnÕt get in a ping-pong discussion, and you just slow 
down and say Ôoh, I didnÕt see that, didnÕt feel that.Õ So we trust our intuition at least as much 
if not more than our rational head, and we know that the history of this place is full of irrational 
things coming good and rational things not working out (Interview: Mari Hollander, Findhorn 
Foundation, 18 June 2007) 
 
Coventry Peace House had a similar convention of having a Ôheart sessionÕ at before meetings 
began, where each member would have time to say how the week had been for them emotionally, 
and discuss any important events or news, without being interrupted by another member: 
We start off with a heart session before we get on to deciding decisions, because if anybody is 
feeling particularly low for some reason or angry or whatever, or there is something they really 
need to sort out, it is much better to start off by sorting it out, and then the rest of the meeting 
will flow easily. If we try and do all the decision-making stuff first, we will only be acting it all 
out and it wonÕt get resolved anyway (Interview: Penny, Coventry Peace House, 10 May 
2007). 
 
This idea of a pre-session where personal anxieties, resentment or other psychological perspectives 
are revealed is interesting and important. Often, exerting authority might be a symptom of an 
underlying anxiety, and an interpretation of PennyÕs quote would be that revealing our hidden 
worries or agendas can help to overcome this through self-reflexivity and a deeper understanding 
of others. In a meeting that I observed at Peace House, the response of the first member to speak 
during the heart session in fact turned out to take up the entire meeting: 
The meeting you were at last night wasnÕt that typical actually, I was only just thinking this 
morning we didnÕt actually go round in the heart session at all, because the big issue that we 
really needed to deal with came up, and then by the time we had dealt with all that everybody 
just wanted to get on with the business. But that was ok, I think if anybody else had wanted to 
say something else they would have, but I ought to have given them the chance, that was my 
fault, I should have said Ôdoes anybody else have any issuesÕ (Interview: Penny, Coventry 
Peace House, 10 May 2007). 
 
Informal conventions and political culture 
Some groups had neither a heart session nor any formal conventions for meetings, yet they all 
strove to proceed with an ethos of openness and inclusiveness, and a culture of reflexivity: 
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Gender hierarchies obviously emerge most in meetings for example, all the myths are true, 
men tend to talk to men and ignore women and men tend to be more confident. ThereÕs also 
class hierarchies and people that are more educated will tend to dominate meetings. The way 
we deal with that or try to get around it is that we all try to be aware of it. The consensus 
decision-making does help to overcome that because everyone has an equal say. And so the 
way that we do it, thereÕs a lot of ways to get around it but the way that we do it is that those 
who are aware that they are more articulate, like myself for example, we try and regulate 
ourselves in meetings and allow space for people who may be a bit more reticent (Interview: 
Boyd, Kebele, 7 April 2007). 
 
This idea of reflexivity and self-criticism is important and forms a central theme in what I am 
calling critical utopian citizenship. It involves opening ourselves up to our own darker, dominating 
sides as well as to the needs and desires of others. This is echoed in Deleuze and Guattari, who see 
the psychological state of the unconscious repression of desire as the basis of authoritarianism: 
Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, 
from micro-formations already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic 
systems, etc. É ItÕs too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist 
inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both 
personal and collective (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 237). 
 
There are, of course, problems with consensus. These will be discussed further below. It is notable, 
however, that in my observations, most interviewees were satisfied with the consensus process, and 
although many reported hierarchies in other situations and spaces within their groups and 
communities (which will be further discussed in Chapter 9), relatively fewer reported implicit 
hierarchies during meetings where consensus was used. I will further consider the parallels and 
divergences between practices and theory, and the implications for critical utopian citizenship, in 
the latter part of this chapter. 
 
Group Size 
Group size is something that is given great theoretical importance by the critical utopian thinkers 
who I considered earlier. Group size has relevance for all of the sections in this chapter. It has 
particular significance for models of decision-making, so I will consider the relevance of group size 
at this stage, referring back where appropriate in later sections. 
 
Representation appears to be necessary when groups reach over a certain number: 
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We would all try to aim for consensus, because we do. Consensus of around 400 people can 
take years. And bear in mind, itÕs a floating population. When I first came, the average length 
of stay was seven and a half months, because people would come to the Foundation for a week. 
Now, because we have built 50-odd houses, and there are businesses here, and people are 
growing their children up here, the length of stay is much longer than it used to be, much much 
longer now. But even still there is a tremendous turnover of people who come for a while and 
then leave. So you might have got nearly a consensus decision on this particular issue at this 
meeting. Three or four people leave and three or four new people come and you are back to 
where you were before (Interview: Kay Kay, NFA Findhorn, 18 June 2007).  
 
The extent to which consensus is viable rather than majority voting also appears to be associated 
with group size, since it is very hard to reach consensus in a large group. During a visitor tour at 
Findhorn, the guide claimed that it took a floating population of 400 people two years to decide on 
the colour of a new carpet for the lounge at Cluny hotel Ð this being the event that sparked a move 
away from full consensus
81
. Critical utopian normative theories tended to recommend small groups. 
Findhorn, which strays furthest from the normative position regarding organisation - for example 
they use representation in decision-making, have greater and more reified separation of different 
spheres of activity - is the group that is the largest. 
 
7.2.2.2. What are the implications of alternative models of decision-making for the process 
and outcome of decisions? 
Consensus decision-making is slow 
Full consensus is very difficult and time-consuming, and this aspect of consensus was noted 
repeatedly in interviews. People joked, laughed, and expressed frustration about consensus: 
It took us a long time because not only do we have to reach consensus, but the Radical 
Bookshop is a workersÕ co-op so the decision-making process is quite slow there as well! 
[Laughs emphatically] And it took us several months to really secure the place (Interview: 
Carl, Liverpool, 10 July 2007). 
 
The extension that we have [a glass conservatory], that took 20 years to reach consensus, 
because even when they were almost reached the decision, and then someone moved in and 
started to disagree. From the moment they started talking about it to the moment they finished 
it, it was 20 years! Such a long time! (Interview: Angela, Mornington Grove Community, 8 
July 2007).  
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 I have been unable to independently verify that this decision took place, nor that it was the deciding event in the decision to abandon 
full consensus. However, this time scale is certainly not unrealistic, and as shall be seen later in this chapter much smaller communities 
have taken significantly longer to reach similar decisions. 
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Inclusive forms of decision-making are certainly time consuming, even for those groups that do not 
aim for full consensus. It could, however, be argued that all forms of decision-making are time 
consuming, but that in dominant models, we delegate the task to others (who make a full-time 
career of the activity) by voting in few and far between elections. In autonomous communities, 
people are taking charge of their own decisions. 
Consensus can yield creative and empowering decisions 
Despite the fact that decisions tended to take a lot longer, often over seemingly trivial things such 
as the colour of a carpet, or the colour of paint for a wall, there seemed to be a general agreement 
that, all in all, this was a positive thing, and that the quality of the decisions is much better. Quality 
tended to be defined by participants in terms of the wellbeing of the community itself, rather than 
in terms of any external goal or outcome: 
If we had anything that was based on voting, I donÕt think you would have anything like the 
stability that we have got now (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007).  
 
We know that if a decision is made itÕs an inclusive decision and not a stupid democratic 
decision where 51% can tell 48% what to do (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 
September 2007) 
 
Consensus is a powerful decision-making process because everyone has to agree before 
something changes. It may seem slow, but itÕs effective (Interview: Guy, Corani, 7 July 2007). 
 
Consensus is a mode of decision-making that therefore resists hierarchy, representation, and 
overcoding, as is expressed in the quote above. Decisions are also often perceived to be of better 
quality Ð people are more likely to abide by a decision if it is something that they have personally 
agreed to, and there is also the chance that a discussion and compromise might lead to surprising 
solutions which would not have been thought of otherwise: 
That is a fundamental thing about consensus, that you are thinking in a group-way, you are 
thinking not only ÔI donÕt like this at all and I donÕt know if I can put up with itÕ, but also 
thinking ÔI think we can find a better decisionÕ (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 
September 2007) 
 
Everybody has a say about a decision and what they think, and often decisions do turn round 
the other way because everyone really does think about what other people have to say an 
sometimes they say something they hadnÕt thought about before, and if people do think really 
differently then you just keep going until thereÕs a group agreement (Interview: Angela, 
Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007) 
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The idea that the group can provide space for mutually creative becomings, in which no personÕs 
desires are suppressed, recalls the ideas from Deleuze and Guattari, that representation and forms 
of organisation associated with the ossification of the majority status block flows of creativity and 
desire, turning them against themselves, and that these can be freed through resistance and the 
assertion of difference. However, another interpretation of consensus decision-making contradicts 
this viewpoint, and the following interview quote arguably comes somewhat closer to RousseauÕs 
General Will: 
And sometimes you do have to say that you might not particularly like something but you can 
see that other people in the group like it, and you can see that it is in the interests of the 
community, so you will say yes. And really consensus is about reaching a point where 
everyone is in agreement about what is best for the community (Interview: Kate, Mornington 
Grove Community, 8 July 2007).  
 
This quote seems to suggest that sometimes there is a ÔgoodÕ or a general interest for the 
community that can contrast with that of an individual, and that an individual, or individuals, in 
these circumstances would be right to subordinate their personal desires. I will consider further 
implications of the relationship between theory and practice later. Consensus can also result in 
blockages of a different kind, which I will turn to now. 
 
Decision-making is conservative 
Consensus decision-making processes can be very conservative Ð sometimes a long time is spent 
over a decision that is never actually reached, and nothing is changed, because agreement cannot be 
reached, and because a minority of one has the power to veto any decision, where full consensus is 
required. There are several examples of decisions that failed, and were discarded, since it became 
impossible to reach consensus: 
Consensus is sometimes terribly conservative because itÕs a restrictive form of decision-
making, it tends to be in favour of what is because making changes when you need consensus 
decision is damn hard (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007). 
 
I am a big fan of efficiency and with consensus things just take ages to get things done and I 
find myself very frustrated. But itÕs a very good concept and we do try to work like that. 
Sometimes people have different points of view and with consensus someone has got to give 
in, thatÕs how it is. In theory it is good but I am not sure how it is in practice. So itÕs quite 
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difficult if there isnÕt consensus over consensus in some ways! How do you change it? 
(Interview: Angela, Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007) 
 
These, and other descriptions of consensus somewhat undermine the idea of spontaneity in thought 
and action that were put forward by radical alternatives to dominant models, and the latter quote 
also draws an interesting parallel to the critical utopian critique of dominant models Ð what do you 
do to question or change the system itself? Is the consensus process also space-determining insofar 
as the overall frame is beyond question? 
 
7.2.2.3. What are the implications of alternative models of decision-making for inclusion 
and commitment? 
When decisions are made at this face-to-face level issues have to be resolved in immanent social 
relations, rather than at an abstract level. This can be emotionally exhausting and destructive, and 
can sometimes result in people having to leave. Several of the respondents offered stories during 
their time in one community or another about a very stubborn or aggressive personality, or simply 
someone who truly could not agree to a decision, who had dominated, ÔhijackedÕ, or ÔhoodwinkedÕ 
the consensus procedure, or repeatedly blocked a decision. This sometimes resulted in long periods 
of unhappiness for all involved: 
It can be hijacked, the consensus, by the minority, so you could spend ages trying to find 
consensus on a subject and there could be just one person saying Ôno, noÕ on a subject. Just 
before I moved in there was a person who was always saying no, it was his way or no way, and 
in the end he had to leave because it wasnÕt working (Interview: Angela, Mornington Grove 
Community, 8 July 2007). 
 
RF: Do you ever get somebody who blocks decisions so that they cannot be made, and just 
keeps blocking it? 
G: Yes. IÕve been there myself, I think everybody has. 
RF: YouÕve been the blocker? 
G: Yes, if you think that things are not going in the right direction. You get to a point where if 
everybody else thinks that youÕre wrong, you perhaps have to leave, and that has happened for 
me, IÕve left and come back. Perhaps ÔleftÕ is not quite the right word, I have never actually 
resigned, but I have got very close to it, probably I was a meeting away from having to resign. 
I ÔwithdrewÕ would be more correct perhaps, to describe the situation, I was not getting 
involved in decision-making because I thought things were going in the wrong direction. 
Interestingly I came back, and things changed. I came back realising that I could influence 
things without being withdrawn, and without going, was what was happening, and then the 
others did swing back to my view, which was pleasing (Interview: Guy, Corani, 7 July 2007). 
 
So consensus, if itÕs working well, works in that way, and part of that working well, is in the 
skill of the facilitator of the meetings makes that work well, and partly itÕs our skill as a group 
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to be inclusive and to hear people well enough, and for those who are in the minority to realise 
when they use that power, that awful power, which is terribly difficult and can alienate them 
from other people to block something (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 September 
2007). 
 
When decision-making is not alienated from the individual through centralised mediation, they take 
full responsibility for their decisions in the eyes of others, which can have implications for their 
relationships outside of the decision-making field. This can lead to difficulties, and can put a strain 
on the whole community. Examples that I was given of this having happened resulted in people 
leaving, having to call in external facilitators, and even legal action having been taken against 
someone. However, a more typical view was that consensus was a worthwhile and valuable 
procedure when done properly, and as can be seen from many of the foregoing interview extracts, 
the process as well as the outcome is participative and empowering. 
 
7.2.3. Orientation to desires 
In the previous theoretical chapter, I argued that one means by which dominant models of authority 
construct legitimacy is through instrumentalism, or orientation to a deferred and abstracted goal or 
unified set of interests. This creates a vision of a whole society integrated into a complex and 
highly differentiated ÔmachineÕ, seen to embody rationality in relation to the goal. This leads to the 
separation of rationality from desire, work from leisure, and the segregation of society into distinct 
departments relating to spheres of activity. I criticised instrumental theories with a critical utopian 
approach, highlighting the implicit utopianism of transcendental goals. Instrumentalism was judged 
to have deleterious effects upon inclusion and belonging, such as inhibiting the flourishing of 
difference, damaging psychological integration and blocking creativity and experimentation. 
Critical utopian alternatives advocated the formation of small groups that cohere through shared 
orientation to unmediated desires generated immanently. In this section, I will consider the 
orientations to desires in the groups that I visited, with a focus on the following questions drawn 
from the theoretical discussion: 
¥ Do communitiesÕ orientation to desires challenge instrumental models of rationality, and if 
so, how? 
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¥ What are the implications of orientation to desires for inclusion, belonging and 
commitment? 
 
7.2.3.1. Do communitiesÕ orientation to desires challenge instrumental models of 
rationality, and if so, how? 
The theoretical discussion of Chapter 6 focused on how hierarchical modes of authority have a 
tendency to separate and segregate different areas of life. Critical utopian theories posit greater 
integration of the activities and processes needed to sustain and enable life, so that an individual 
might be involved in decisions governing the production of most aspects of their life, and not 
subject to the decisions of another in which they did not play a role. A parallel to the separation of 
spheres of activity is the practice of delegation, which transgresses both dominant and critical 
utopian theoretical approaches.  
 
Delegation 
Delegation in the context used in the groups I visited means the formalised assignment of authority 
and responsibility to smaller group or subgroup for certain decisions, functions or tasks. The person 
or group who has been given the responsibility usually remains responsible to the whole collective, 
and has to report back to community-wide or core group meetings. One example of a group that 
had successfully used delegation for a long time was Kebele. The established sub-collectives at the 
time of my visit were the caf, infoshop, bike workshop, finance, IT and library sub-collectives. 
There were also sub-collectives that were still in their infancy, but were aiming to become 
permanent, such as the art, maintenance and permaculture collectives. People can participate in 
these without being core members. The sub-collective scheme was started in the summer of 2006, 
with the aim of creating a structure which allowed Kebele to run more efficiently, yet still through 
a horizontal structure which did not introduce unnecessary hierarchies
82
. Collectives are seen to 
make meetings more functional and more accessible to newcomers who want to get involved in 
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 See Kebele Community Cooperative, (n.d.), History. Accessed June 16, 2009 from Kebele Community Cooperative website: 
http://www.kebelecoop.org/History.html 
Chapter 7: Transgressing Authority: Practice 
 
177 
specific aspects of the community, and also for people who want to be involved yet are unable or 
do not want to commit to the four hours per week participation requirement for core membership. 
One interviewee explained the process at Kebele: 
And thereÕs obviously a horizontal organisation, everyone has got an equal Ð well, one person 
one vote I suppose, we make decisions by consensus, but thatÕs how itÕs organised, and 
everything flows from that core group meeting but then below that we have a series of semi-
autonomous sub-collectives so thereÕs a caf collective, an infoshop collective, a bike 
workshop, etc. etc., and they are responsible for their particular activity and they sort of put up 
a monthly or bi-monthly report to the core group saying, this is what we have done, this is 
currently who is involved, weÕre applying for a loan, or this is our incomings, this is our 
outgoings and stuff like that. And then they need to bring decisions to the core group if they 
want to do something dramatically different. So say if the Caf group decided they wanted to 
open and run a caf every day, they would bring it to the core group and say look, this is a 
proposal, do we have the support of the core group because we need you to help us [laughs]. 
But basically they function quite smoothly on their own and they could always do with more 
people (Interview: Tim, Kebele, 7 April 2007).  
 
There was often a large amount of overlap between subgroups, with some people involved in three 
or four of the subgroups at once, and many people in the subgroups would also be involved in the 
ÔcoreÕ group, although some people who had less time to devote would be members of subgroups, 
but not of the core group. In residential communities all resident members are obliged to attend 
general meetings, and where formal delegation takes place are also obliged to be involved in one or 
more subgroups or committees, or to take individual responsibility for a set of tasks. A carefully 
managed delegation process was seen by a member of the fledgling Liverpool Social Centre as a 
method to prevent the emergence of hierarchies: 
At the moment what we have got is a couple of groups that are trying to set up, weÕve got a 
builder group thatÕs involved in trying to get the place all sorted so that we can open properly 
and thereÕs going to be a caf group, so we can have a caf in there. Anything though that 
people need to do, we will probably develop an entertainments group, and there will be a lot of 
crossover. We need to try and not have too many people involved in all of the groups, so that 
power is dispersed essentially. ItÕs about recognising that some people can be more dominant 
than others, and having those structures there (Interview: Carl, Liverpool Social Centre, 10 
July 2007). 
 
As the largest group, Findhorn had greater separation of spheres of activity than the remainder of 
the groups, insofar as there were more different departments, and less overlap of personnel between 
the departments. I will quote the following passage at length, since it provides rich material for 
interpretation, and despite FindhornÕs rather exceptional status as the (significantly) largest and 
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most rigidly organised of the communities, it also addresses some themes common to all 
communities: 
Ultimately itÕs not so easy to have a hundred people make a decision on the budget of one and 
a half million pounds with zillions of detailed lines, you know a small group is going to do 
that, so even within the management team things might be mandated and just the bigger issues 
are aired in the management team, and as much as possible is delegated to the groups that are 
actually doing it, so the education area looks at what programmes are running and what 
conferences are running, and the management team doesnÕt do that unless thereÕs an issue, you 
know a financial issue or a publicity/promotion kind of issue or an image issue or something 
then the management team might get involved but if itÕs all running smoothly then the kitchen 
plans their budget and education plans theirs and so on. Once their budgets are set then people 
are as autonomous as possible. So this is more an ideal, of course you get all sorts of 
whammies in the field, but that would be the model. So the bigger group makes the overall 
consensus or expresses concerns which should be addressed, and the smaller team is actually 
going to deliver, and be responsible and see it through, theyÕre the ones who make the final 
decisions and then get on with it. And itÕs been quite liberating over the past five or six years to 
get the level of trust up enough to have that be functional. It just means that things can actually 
happen. At all. As opposed to happen never, because it all just gets so bogged down, and itÕs so 
frustrating that by the time you get anything done it feels more like a defeat than as though 
youÕve achieved your goal. So to just kind of zip it along (Interview: Mari Hollander, 18 June 
2007) 
 
This is a highly organised and differentiated structure, which might remind some readers of a large 
corporation (Baker, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/942cf75e-2a9a-11dc-9208-000b5df10621.html accessed 
July 5,
 
2009). The foregoing interview extract without doubt parodies, reflects, or resonates 
somewhat with instrumental theories of authority. Consider in particular that Òthe bigger group 
makes the overall consensus or expresses concerns which should be addressedÓ and that Òthe 
smaller team is actually going to deliverÓ (extracted from the interview above). This suggests a 
smaller authoritative group with a transcendental rational viewpoint that enables or empowers, 
through the exertion of authority, the community to achieve goals or interests defined externally to 
subjects, as in instrumentalism. However, there is something else going on here that merits further 
interpretation. 
 
7.2.3.2. What are the implications of orientation to desires for inclusion, belonging and 
commitment? 
It is important first to emphasise that Findhorn is not a sovereign community, as are nation-states, 
so has no ability to enforce its decisions.  The Findhorn model might be interpreted as almost 
artisanal, reminiscent of historical city-states, in that the lower-level groups seem to have a lot of 
autonomy, but autonomy which is defined by their function (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 454), 
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creating a series of autonomous sub-communities.  It is very much arranged as segments, and is a 
segmentary system in the sense used by Deleuze and Guattari: 
The notion of segmentarity was constructed by ethnologists to account for so-called primitive 
societies, which have no fixed, central State apparatus and no global power mechanisms or 
specialized political institutions. In these societies, the social segments have a certain leeway, 
between the two poles of fusion and scission, depending on the task and situation; there is also 
a considerable communicability between heterogeneous elements, so that one segment can fit 
with another in a number of different ways; and they have a local construction excluding the 
prior determination of a base domain (economic, political, juridical, artistic); they have 
extrinsic and situational properties, or relations irreducible to the intrinsic properties of a 
structure; activity is continuous, so segmentarity is not grasped as something separate from a 
segmentation-in-progress operating by outgrowths, detachments, and mergings (Ibid: 230-1). 
 
This idea of primitive segmentarity is contrasted by Deleuze and Guattari to state segmentarity. 
This has already been considered in the theoretical section, but is worth returning to in more detail 
here due to its relevance for interpreting these interview quotes and the process of delegation more 
generally. State segmentarity is seen to occur when the supple and fluid segments of the ÔprimitiveÕ 
society are substituted for Ôfixed or ideal essencesÕ (Ibid: 233) Ð for example, were there to be no 
overlap between sub-group memberships, and also when arithmetic and private property assume 
command functions and become space-determining (Ibid: 233). The above quote from Carl at 
Liverpool Social Centre mentions that segmentary structures lead to diffusion of power, which is 
an important point.  It might be that Findhorn differs in assigning functions like management and 
budget allocation as if they were functional tasks.  If these are actually command tasks, then we see 
the emergence of rule by specialists (ÔmanagersÕ), but in a partial way, because the other sub-
groups have a lot of autonomy and the system operates on trust rather than coercion or threat of 
coercion (this theme of ÔautonomyÕ is mentioned explicitly by both Tim and Mari in quotes above). 
This is also evident in TimÕs previous quote, who mentions the example of the Caf sub-collective 
applying to the core group for funding, implying the emergent authority of the core-group over the 
sub-collective. It is important to note however, that in most cases membership of the core-
collective is elective, in that members can choose to be part of the core group if they want to, so 
that memberships in different groups at different scales reflects the ideas of supple of primitive 
segmentarity put forward by Deleuze and Guattari. The more stable and fixed positions of 
Chapter 7: Transgressing Authority: Practice 
 
180 
representatives at Findhorn might reflect a slightly more rigid form of segmentarity, although not 
nearly as much so as in states. 
 
An interesting issue is that there seems to be somewhat of a tension between the autonomy of those 
doing the work, and consensus of the whole group. This is a tension that might possibly always 
arise with autonomous communities. If a worker or group has no autonomy from the collective 
then they would be slaves to the group (somewhat akin to minorities in the analysis of Rousseau), 
but this seems unlikely to happen in a group with strong anti-hierarchical orientations. Similarly 
anti-hierarchical groups would want to avoid a dictatorship of specialists, so there is a need to find 
a point somewhere between the two. The ideas also link to links also to the issue of splitting or 
growing raised in the pamphlet Anti-Mass, phrased in terms of reproduction/growth or 
addition/multiplication in the previous chapter (The Red Sunshine Gang, 1999 [c. 1970]: 10). This 
pamphlet suggests that a human (small) scale is very important to non-alienated group-formation, 
and so advises dealing with growth by sprouting off new groups rather than the existing group 
growing beyond human scale Ð a bit like a Deleuzoguattarian rhizome sprouting another rhizome 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 233). In the pamphlet the discussion is of actually splitting into groups 
(for example, one housing coop into two), but it seems the communities I have studied adopt a 
similar but distinct strategy of splitting by functional differentiation, reflecting but transgressing 
StirnerÕs union of egoists who unite to make bread. Deleuze and GuattariÕs ÔsuppleÕ or ÔprimitiveÕ 
segmentarity is distinct from ÔstateÕ or ÔrigidÕ segmentariy because there is a lot of overlap and 
interweaving between segments Ð they are localised as they do not function as discrete parts in a 
highly unified and centralised machine. There is some evidence that this is true of functional 
groupings within the communities: 
Across the board participation, I mean IÕve run out of new things to do pretty much, I think 
IÕve done pretty much everything that you can do here, and I participate in every area, and in 
some ways itÕs still, being able to be wise and humble at the same time, I suppose is what I try 
to achieve here, I know a lot about a lot of things, about how things work and can be, and yet 
itÕs still important that I still work at the same level as the person who joined yesterday, and I 
think thatÕs important, very, to use your experience carefully, so I do everything here, from 
cooking to cleaning, to childcare, gardening, forestry, maintenance, the lot (Interview: Patrick, 
Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007). 
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Laurieston Hall, a community of around 25 members, did have formalised sub-groups, but as was 
the case with most communities (including Findhorn) members could swap and change as they 
liked, or could change at a yearly meeting when these things were decided. In the above quote, 
Patrick, a very long-standing member, exemplifies the fluidity that this involves, and also the desire 
to avoid being seen as a specialist, or Ôan authorityÕ but rather to Ôwork at the same level as the 
person who joined yesterdayÕ. At the same time, however, one might note the frequency with 
which I have quoted PatrickÕs interviews Ð partly a result of his wide knowledge and his articulacy 
Ð indicating a degree of emergent authority. Where the foregoing discussion has considered 
transgressions of authority related to formalised division of labour, I would now like to turn to 
unintended hierarchies within personal relationships and group dynamics. 
 
7.2.4. Relationship and community dynamics 
In the previous chapter I contended that canonical theories of authority rest on the underlying 
presumption that hierarchy is a natural or foundational part of human relationships. This 
presumption was often used as a justification for the ossification of authority in fixed structures. 
Anarchist approaches, which I considered to be Ôcritical utopianÕ, were suspicious of authority not 
only at the macro-level of state-capitalism but also at the micro-level of human relationships, 
undermining the necessity of a foundational viewpoint by positing the desire for non-hierarchy as a 
creative and affirmative alternative. In what follows, I would like to consider attitudes towards 
relational hierarchies in the communities that I visited, with a particular focus on the following 
questions, drawn from the theoretical discussion: 
¥ Do communities challenge dominant models of hierarchical authority based in social 
relationships, and if so, how? 
¥ What are the implications for inclusion and autonomy? 
 
7.2.4.1. Do communities challenge dominant models of hierarchical authority based in 
social relationships, and if so, how? 
Most of the groups do not have formal hierarchies, indeed they tend to have core values or aims 
which focus on inclusiveness and egalitarianism, and have organisational and processual features 
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for overcoming hierarchies, such as consensus decision-making, facilitation and courses in 
nonviolent communication
83
. Findhorn appears to be the exception, as it does have features of 
hierarchical organisation, in particular representation, as discussed. However, as with all 
communities and often even more so, Findhorn has set procedures for overcoming hierarchies (in 
particular, attunement, discussed previously). Other communitiesÕ members did profess to there 
sometimes being unintended hierarchies in decision-making, but this was something which groups 
aimed to recognise and overcome: 
There are always hierarchies because of the world that we live in, but the boast that we have is 
that we try and overcome them and override them (Interview: Boyd, Kebele, 7 April 2007).  
 
The hierarchies that were mentioned most often were age, articulacy, longevity (time spent in the 
community), education, gender, confidence, and experience. It is important to note, however, that 
most of the people interviewed did not consider hierarchy desirable, and that communities had 
various strategies and tactics for attempting to minimise the influence of hierarchies. This reflects a 
passage from Buber:  
There is no form of social activity which cannot, on some side or at some moment, become 
political; ... But it is most essential that we recognise the structural difference between the two 
spheres in regard to the relationship between unity and multiformityÕ (Buber, 1951: 11).  
 
The difference between the operation of power in many of these communities, and that of the state 
(that is, state as stasis; the crystallisation of the political principal) is that conscious efforts and 
mechanisms are often put in place to prevent power from ossifying and to retain flux and 
contingency of power relations.  
 
I have already discussed how the consensus process and delegation to sub-groups are conscious 
organisational strategies that attempt to overcome Ð not the emergence of hierarchy Ð but the 
ossification of hierarchy into something oppressive. When hierarchy did become oppressive, 
communities would often bring in external mediation, facilitation, or members would take courses 
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Courses in nonviolent communication are offered by an organisation The Centre for Nonviolent Communication or by accredited 
facilitators, More information can be found on their web site: http://www.cnvc.org/ accessed 9 August 2009. 
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in nonviolent communication. Other particularly interesting processes for the warding-off of 
hierarchies occurred before discussion takes place, such as attunement at Findhorn, and the Ôheart 
sessionsÕ at Coventry Peace House. These practices illustrate ways in which some groups have 
attempted to acknowledge that decisions are not abstracted from the embodied subjects that are 
making them.  
 
7.2.4.2. What are the implications for inclusion and autonomy? 
The topic of fluctuating and contingent hierarchies was a recurring theme of interviews. 
Interestingly, hierarchies of this sort were sometimes seen to be potentially empowering, enabling 
autonomy without inhibiting the inclusion of others: 
There are flexible and probably fluctuating hierarchies, and depending on which way you are 
looking at things from, there might be, if you say Ôdescribe the Òability to fix itÓ hierarchyÕ, and 
clearly I could give you names within that large ... IÕm talking mechanical things or broken 
things... a large amount at the top of those would be male, an certain long-term males who 
have much more ability than others, so there is a fix-it hierarchy there, there is probably a 
supportive hierarchy, thereÕs probably a hierarchy based on weakness, which is something IÕve 
always been quite interested in, where people who are often less able to, or state that they are 
less able to do things, manage to get their way by being weak, so they use that as a tool to 
either avoid things happening or to get things done, because they must be supported because 
they are weak. Those sorts of things, theyÕre more interesting than the ordinary hierarchies; 
thereÕs a gossiping hierarchy, and thereÕs a backstabbing hierarchy, thereÕs probably a 
monetary hierarchy, how much money people have, thereÕs a health hierarchy. Just because 
you can order those things into a hierarchy doesnÕt mean they operate distinctly in that way, 
you donÕt seek to go up the illness hierarchy for example, but they are there, and all those 
factors are important in the way we interplay in interpersonal relationships and go about things 
(Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007). 
 
A very important hierarchy is longevity, obviously, I mean thereÕs people, for example Richard 
and Leslie and myself and Jude are two very long-running couples, and weÕre terribly 
comfortable and supportive round each other and have two daughters who have grown up and 
been like sisters and stuff, so thatÕs a very, very strong core, and there are plenty of other 
strong cores, which are across families and across groups or across individuals, thatÕs just one I 
picked out, and they are almost latitudinal, as opposed to hierarchical, and theyÕre essential. 
YouÕve got these hierarchies which may be the backbone in that way but without these other 
ones going across, which I would cite that as one example, then the whole thing would just 
topple over. So these things, those latitudinal relationships, for example in the winter we donÕt 
all eat together, but various groupings of people eat together so many times a week in various 
ways, so just keeping something going as simple as that is terribly important in terms of 
friendship and support within a group. The worst thing that could happen here to anybody is 
that they feel theyÕre on their own, and there isnÕt anybody they see, or anybody they connect 
with well, or anybody they can cry with or laugh with or whatever. (Interview: Patrick, 
Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007) 
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These quotes from Patrick illustrate how the splitting of the group into sub-groupings, this time 
implicit or informal, alleviates to some extent the ossification of power. Themes of informal sub-
grouping, and also informal, contingent and flexible authority occurred throughout the interviews: 
The organisation is based also on the power and ability of the people who live here and the 
strengths of them to make things happen through committees or with committees depending on 
what theyÕre doing. So there are sub-organisations as well which arenÕt written down and 
arenÕt necessarily present and are slightly different for each person, but theyÕre there anyway. I 
mean for that, if I want to get something done, say in a particular area, I donÕt go to the 
committee and say Ôcould you come and do this please?Õ, IÕll either go and do it myself, or IÕll 
go and find someone who I know will help me do it to do it, but you donÕt go through a formal 
committee for everything, itÕs not dull and drab like that, committees are there as a backdrop 
(Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2009) 
 
Most of the influence you have here is verbal and by character/personality/force of will/action. 
IÕve often said and still continue to say that itÕs often easier to receive forgiveness than 
permission so a lot of people just go off and do things, and then people say ÔthatÕs interestingÕ 
and eventually say Ôthank you that was a wonderful thingÕ (Interview: Mari Hollander, 
Findhorn Foundation, 18 June 2007). 
 
These two quotes are interesting as they bring to light the fact that not all decisions are taken to 
meeting. Indeed, individuals make decisions during every minute of every that will have a greater 
or lesser impact on others, and upon the community. This is, of course, something that occurs 
within everyday life, everywhere. There was a great deal of reflexivity over these issues in 
communities. 
 
Relational hierarchies in communities could also be highly problematic. I found that in Mornington 
Grove, perhaps more than any of the other places I visited, there was a heightened awareness of 
implicit hierarchies and even domination or bullying. This was mainly expressed in conversations 
about a previous member, or following on from this. This man, I was informed, had tended to 
hijack the consensus procedure, and even bullied members into agreeing to things they were not 
happy with, and had created fissures in the community: Ôit was his way or no way, and in the end 
he had to leave because it wasnÕt workingÕ (Interview: Angela, Mornington Grove Community, 7 
July 2007). I was told that even after several attempts at mediation, the community was unable to 
solve the issues raised by this particular member, and indeed some other members left the 
community before he was eventually asked to leave. There was still a feeling that relationships and 
trust were still being rebuilt after this difficult time. 
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7.3. Implications 
The foregoing section of this chapter adopted an interpretive approach, bringing practices in 
autonomous communities into dialogue with theoretical approaches and attempting to understand 
how data from interviews, observation and documents speak to both dominant and critical utopian 
approaches to authority. In this concluding part of the chapter I would like briefly to recapitulate 
some of the important themes and also take a step back, adopting a wider analytical perspective on 
the relevance of this dialogue for the subject of the thesis Ð critical utopian citizenship. Again, this 
section will be structured around the themes drawn out from dominant approaches, and their 
critical utopian creative counterparts. In each section, I will consider the relevance that the 
interchange between dominant theory, critical utopian theory and critical utopian practice might 
have for a critical utopian conception of citizenship. This will involve thinking about the 
implication for a critical conception of citizenship both within, but also outwith autonomous 
communities. What advice and ideas do these themes offer for the would-be utopian citizen who 
for whatever reason does not live in an autonomous community? What can the foregoing 
discussion offer mainstream citizenship theory? Such a discussion will raise more questions than 
answers, as is apt for a methodology that extols the merits of interminable critique. 
 
7.3.1. Consent: voluntarism versus contract 
The dominant theories that I considered in Chapter 6 attempted to ground authority in discourses of 
rationality, and were thus seen to be foundational rather than contingent. They involved the 
compulsory application of the outcome of public decisions to citizens. Critical utopian theories, 
practices and methodologies allow us to question foundational discourses by imagining and 
articulating an ÔotherÕ or ÔoutsideÕ to that which is posited as essential. Voluntarism is a theory and 
a practice defies centralisation and territorialised sovereignty, through the creation of multiple 
overlapping small groups in unbounded space, a bit like HeaterÕs (1999) Ômultiple citizenshipÕ but 
without the centralised states and larger scale power structures. Unlike cultural or interest groups 
that petition the state for rights and representation (Young, 1989; Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka & 
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Norman, 2005) voluntaristic groups do not seek integration into a higher unity or structure, but 
rather to multiply and reproduce, fulfilling desires immanently. To a certain extent, this was 
observable in autonomous communities. This poses a question to citizens and to citizenship theory: 
how can we, as theorists and citizens, think about and live in groups without centralisation and 
alienation of selfhood to an abstracted identity? 
  
7.3.2. Decisions: representation versus small groups and consensus 
Mainstream citizenship theory usually connects citizenship to the nation-state, which is seen as the 
primary political unit to which individuals belong. Participation has thus generally been supposed 
to be oriented around and directed towards local and national governments and bureaucracies. This 
has taken the form of voting for representatives within these structures. In mainstream theory, such 
participation is seen to make the stateÕs authority legitimate since it relies upon equal participative 
consent of the governed. However, it is widely accepted that citizen participation in traditional 
democratic political processes is declining, an issue that that has been the subject of quantitative 
political research (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002; Pattie, Seyd, & Whiteley, 2004). This has led 
many commentators to decry a widespread apathy amongst Western publics and the decline of 
political participation in industrialised nations: Ôcrisis of democracy theories have consistently 
predicted the weakening of representative democracies, and ultimately the role of citizens, in 
Western nationsÕ (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002: 7). However, there is widespread evidence that 
participation in other forms of politics, which are non-representative, are on the rise, such as such 
as signing petitions, joining lawful demonstrations and taking part in consumer boycotts (Ibid: 6-7). 
There is also evidence that people attempt to fulfil their interests and desires through the social, 
rather than political field: 
People are active in trying to improve the quality of their daily lives as far as the services they 
receive and their own working conditions are concerned. Their actions, however, are less likely 
to be channelled through the orthodox, and perhaps traditional, route of contacting a politician 
and more likely to involve contacting the professionals, in other words, the teachers, doctors or 
employers, fellow parents, patients and workers and finally, others immediately around them, 
in other words, friends or family members. (Pattie, Seyd & Whiteley, 2004: 118-9). 
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Much mainstream political theory and liberal democratic practice subsumes such activities in a 
discourse of ÔactiveÕ citizenship: ÔParticipation legitimates decision-making which is a key 
requirement of active citizenshipÕ (Ibid: 6). The notion of Ôactive citizenshipÕ arose in the 1980s 
with the New Right, and was heavily influenced by rational choice theory, thus encompassing the 
belief that individuals Ôrationally calculate the costs and benefits of a given course of action before 
deciding what to doÕ (Lucey, 2004: 88). ÔActiveÕ citizenship is an individualistic discourse, 
emphasising Ôcompetitive self-interest, individual rights and personal responsibilities and 
obligationsÕ (Ibid: 88). The state ostensibly takes on the role of enabler and facilitator, encouraging 
and providing incentives for citizens to participate in their own welfare. This can often disguise 
structural inequalities preventing people from doing this and have oppressive or exclusive 
consequences. In dominant contemporary political discourse, a Õrhetoric of self realisationÕ 
(Dukelow, 2004: 25) that focuses on individual psychologies is aligned with the political project of 
active citizenship and its emphasis on grasping opportunities and accepting obligations (Ibid: 26). 
This has implications for citizenship: Ôthe qualities and attributes attached to being a citizen are 
thus less dependent on being a member of a community É but are rather increasingly based on 
individual psychological characteristics such as motivation, self-esteem, confidenceÕ (Ibid: 26). 
Thus setbacks and social problems are often viewed as personal inadequacies: ÔUnemployment 
ultimately becomes the personal inability or unwillingness to take up the opportunities being 
offered by the stateÕ (Ibid: 39). Active citizenship, because it is ultimately a recuperative discourse 
that seeks to integrate citizens into the higher unity of state-capitalism and thus alienate us from 
one another, relies on an abstract and mediated individualism which disguises structural 
inequalities such as class, race and gender that in practice inhibit individuals abilities and 
confidence in the public sphere. Paradoxically, ÔactiveÕ citizenship in fact promotes passivity in 
large sections of the population: Ôthe individualisation of political action tends É to reinforce the 
trend towards a middle-class profileÕ (Pattie, Seyd & Whiteley, 2004: 79). 
 
In light of the foregoing discussion of critical utopian theories and practices, there seems to be 
something missing in mainstream theory Ð an unwillingness to think beyond representative politics, 
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and attempts to recuperate autonomous activity back into the realm of representation, hierarchical 
structures and hegemony:  
Rather than witnessing an emerging literature on Ôpost-representationÕ, we see merely the 
remodelling of representation in ever more baroque fashion, so that groups, minorities or 
diverse interests can be integrated into existing representative systems of governanceÕ 
(Tormey, 2006: 139).  
 
I am highly alert to the danger that my conception of Ôcritical utopian citizenshipÕ could be 
interpreted as yet another articulation of Ôactive citizenshipÕ. That Ôautonomous communitiesÕ are 
able to flourish under neo-liberal governance might be seen as a manner of legitimising its 
authority; that they take steps towards self-sufficiency might be seen as a justification for further 
retreat of state welfare provision and social functions. Any discourse is of course subject to the 
potential of co-optation and recuperation. Critical utopian citizenship must stringently be 
distinguished from Ôactive citizenshipÕ in that it does not seek to be integrated into a higher totality, 
be that state or capitalism, but rather actively and affirmatively seeks an outside to all forms of 
domination through the constant assertion of difference. This is something that must by definition 
be achieved from the Ôbottom upÕ rather than imposed form the Ôtop downÕ through state policies as 
with neo-liberal Ôactive citizenshipÕ discourse. This does not preclude using the tools of the system 
against itself so long as this is done consciously and with reflexivity (Robinson, 2007, passim). 
Group size is important here: individualism can only thrive as a non-abstracted mode of 
individuation when groups are small enough for the personal and psychological aspects of politics 
to be articulated and heard. This can be further revealed through a critique of instrumentalism. 
 
7.3.3. Desires: instrumentalism versus immanence 
Instrumentalism as a justification for authority focuses on outcomes rather than process. There is an 
assumed break or deferral between process and outcome, or means and ends. Outcomes or ends are 
justified and defined in naturalistic and foundational terms of ÔrationalityÕ. There is an implicit 
utopianism at work here: a particular construction of economic and social good is put forward but 
is couched in hegemonic and truth-claiming discourse, leading to a unifying logic that denies and 
suppresses different desires. In order to embody rationality in relation to the posited transcendental 
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goal, society is segmented into a series of highly specialised and formalised roles creating a fixed 
and static division of labour, preventing flows of ideas, people, interests and desires between fields. 
This has the effect of creating a technocratic politics and society led by experts, elites and 
professionals who take on the task of representing othersÕ interests and making decisions in a 
particular sphere, leaving few unmediated opportunities for the articulation of desires. Critical 
utopian theories and practices transgress the separation of spheres of activity, positing an 
alternative where there is no separation or contradiction between desires and the processes by 
which these are attained. This points towards a critical utopian citizenship of presence and activity 
rather than representation, absence and inactivity Ð simultaneously a line of flight from abstract 
individualism and alienated status and a reconstruction of participation in everyday life. Concrete 
suggestions for would-be critical utopian citizens outside the kinds of autonomous spaces 
considered in this study might be to recreate spaces elsewhere in life where the integration of 
spheres of activity can occur. A favourite example is the university: although embedded in a 
hierarchical institution the critical citizen might seize opportunities for interdisciplinarity and the 
flow of ideas between departments (see Mohanty, 2003).  
 
7.3.4. Organisation: hierarchy versus non-hierarchy 
Hierarchy is not only a feature of state-politics and representative decision-making, but also of 
personal relationships. Dominant theories assume that hierarchy is a necessary and foundational 
structuring element in the political and social fields. Often formalised, institutional authority is 
legitimised by the argument that hierarchies also exist in personal relationships, as though this 
automatically means that there is neither point nor value to continuing to desire an outside. Critical 
utopian approaches sometimes recognise the empowering aspects of hierarchies in knowledge Ð in 
helping, for example, Bakunin to have his boots fixed, or his canal built. Authority was still 
regarded with suspicion by these approaches however. There is certainly a tension between 
authority and autonomy. In DeleuzeÕs interpretation of Nietzsche, the argument against hierarchy is 
not based on assumptions of natural equality but is a matter of doing the best that we can: ÔThe 
least strong is as strong as the strong if he goes to the limitÕ (Deleuze, 2006 [1983]: 56). This 
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involves being ÔactiveÕ rather than ÔreactiveÕ. Reactive force is utilitarian, limited, alienated from 
its own autonomous activity, and turned against itself in a neurotic moment of insecurity and 
submission. Active force, on the other hand, is: Ô1) plastic, dominating and subjugating force; 2) 
force which goes to the limit of what it can do; 3) force which affirms its difference, which makes 
its difference an object of enjoyment and affirmationÕ (Ibid: 57). Only in the latter case is the 
master/slave relationship transgressed.  
 
In the communities that I visited, there were several hierarchies. Where these differ from dominant 
models of authority is that relational hierarchies were not viewed as natural and essential but rather 
as surmountable issues to be recognised and reflected upon.  The abstract identity endowed by the 
term ÔcitizenÕ in state-centred models is a status that is undermined by the very real inequalities and 
oppressions that underlie it, creating an informal hierarchy of, for example, active and passive 
citizens. This hierarchical model also extends to formal hierarchy through the exclusivity 
citizenship as status, with citizens being placed above non-citizens. This paradox, of citizen as 
equal yet unequal, underlies the ongoing tension between the idea of citizenship as a status 
(associated with the state as stasis, reification and ossification of power), and the parallel, yet 
contradictory, understanding of the concept as a process and a relationship. In DeleuzeÕs 
terminology, the former of these is ÔreactiveÕ, in StirnerÕs terminology a ÔspookÕ, since the 
approach separates the citizen from what (s)he can do: it subjugates the person to the status of 
ÔcitizenÕ, limiting her or his identity and self-creativity through the constraints of the system to 
which it is directed. The latter, processual formation of citizenship is (potentially) active in 
DeleuzeÕs terminology and critical utopian in mine. Individual autonomy is not incompatible with 
relationships where neither party is separated from what (s)he can do and is able to affirm his or 
her difference within the relationship. The communities that I visited took some steps to ensure that 
this was possible Ð consensus, heart sessions, attunement, and a more general ethos of reflexively 
and consciously attending to the dynamics of personal relationships. The following two chapters, 
on transgressing rights in theory and practice, will further explore the issue of tension between 
citizenship as a status or identity, and citizenship as a process. Where the focus in this and the 
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previous chapter has been on methods of organising and making decisions without or beyond 
authority, the following two chapters will focus on models of negotiating and practicing ethical 
values without or beyond state-mediated institutions of ÔrightsÕ. 
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8. Transgressing Rights: Theory 
8.1. Introduction and working definitions 
In western democracies it is predominantly the institution of rights that defines the legal content of 
the status of citizenship. Preliminarily rights can be defined as Ôlegal or moral recognition of 
choices or interests to which particular weight is attachedÕ (Reeve, 2003b: 468). They are 
entitlements or permissions, which must be granted, respected and upheld by the state and other 
members of society. Rights are often enshrined in law, or claims may be made in absence of legal 
recognition, as demands that the law be changed to accommodate the right in line with perceived 
demands of morality (Ibid: 468). In the classical liberal formulation, rights are applied to 
individuals and are used to arbitrate conflict: they would not be necessary in a situation of 
consensus. This implies a particular type of relationship Ð one that is mediated by the state, which 
decides the boundaries of social ties in terms of those aspects of a subject that can legitimately be 
interfered with, and those that are the private domain of the individual. Rights therefore also have 
implications for the formation of subjectivity, and imply a particular type of subject. The 
possession of rights designates a bounded sphere of autonomy within which the individual is free to 
pursue their own interests, happiness and vision of the good life free from interference from other 
individuals, the state and society as a whole. Thus the concept of ÔrightsÕ in the liberal formulation 
assumes tension or struggle between the individual and community, and a definitive boundary 
between these two clearly distinguishable entities. This is not the only way in which rights can be 
formulated, but clearly questions concerning rights have much to do with the institution of 
boundaries between public and private spheres (which aspects of life can the state and society 
legitimately interfere with, and which should be protected?), and self/other relations (what is it that 
is constitutive of the self that has moral entitlements?).  
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In this chapter, similarly to Chapters 4 & 6 on transgressing territory and authority in theory, I will 
begin by sampling dominant theorisations of the concept of right
84
. The grouping of theories relies 
on a particular understanding of domination as alienation, which has run through this thesis. 
Models will be drawn from the western political canon and from contemporary citizenship theory, 
with an emphasis on the liberal tradition, which has arguably had the most influence on the 
institution of citizenship rights in western democracies (Faulks, 2000: 55). Again, these 
formulations are plural, overlapping and diverse, but I will argue that by assuming a state and 
hierarchical ordering they share certain common characteristics, which are effectively transgressed 
by a critical utopian critique. As in previous chapters, the processes of deconstruction and 
reconstruction are complimentary, since the deconstructive process which groups together the 
dominant notions under a common critique assumes a critical and estranged ÔoutsideÕ from which 
these rights-formulations can be observed and considered. As in previous chapters, this chapter will 
first outline common characteristics of dominant notions: universalism and foundationalism 
leading to excessive overcoding; binary, oppositional thought and subjectivity 
formation/performance; a separation of rights and responsibilities in the context of mediated and 
thus alienated societal relationships; the confounding of right and privilege; and a politics of 
demand which assumes an unassailable state and reactive atomised subjectivities, and has the 
tendency to recuperate difference or render it harmless. This first section of the chapter partially 
addresses, through the concept of ÔrightsÕ, the first of my disaggregated research questions in 
section 1.3 of the Introduction: ÔOut of what historical conditions do dominant models of 
citizenship arise, what do they have in common, and what are their effects?Õ I will then attempt to 
sketch the critical utopian theoretical place(s) from which this critique is made possible Ð where 
differences are harmonised through praxis rather than overcoding, where experimentation with 
holistic or non-alienated ontologies vitiates the effects of dualism and where mutual and 
unmediated relationships resolve conflicts through contingent ethics rather than state-imposed 
morality. Areas of thought that I have found particularly useful in these respects are deconstruction 
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 See Chapter 3, section 3.3 for theory selection criteria. 
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and post-structural feminism, which criticise and undermine foundationalism and deal extensively 
with alternative formulations of subjectivity. I have also included critical utopian and anarchistic 
ethical models that effectively challenge dominant paradigms of morality. This section addresses 
the second of the disaggregated research questions: ÔWhat alternatives to these dominant models of 
citizenship are offered by critical utopian theory?Õ As in the foregoing thesis, the chapter will form 
a basis for a study of critical utopian praxis in the next chapter, where I consider how unmediated 
societal relationships are actualised in small-scale self-purposive communities.  
 
8.2. Dominant approaches 
8.2.1. Foundationalism and universalism 
Although criticising foundationalism has been a theme throughout the thesis, it particularly applies 
to dominant conceptions of rights. The very term ÔrightsÕ implies an opposing ÔwrongÕ
85
, and thus a 
hierarchical and Manichean conceptual ordering. It is important to note that the argument in this 
section relates mainly to ideas about ÔhumanÕ or ÔnaturalÕ rights, rather than a wider concept of 
ÔrightsÕ, and I begin by considering the historical process by which dominant formations have been 
rooted in a view of ÔcorrectÕ, ÔrealÕ or ÔtrueÕ human nature posited as universal, through the 
deduction of rights starting from ideas of universal human attributes or natural law. I also consider 
other ways of deducing rights through Kantian deontological and social contract procedures, 
establishing certain rights that have to be recognised for people not to be treated as means, and 
argue that these also share foundationalising assumptions86.  
 
The idea of ÔrightsÕ as a moral claim first arose in the early thirteenth century (Benditt, 1982: 2). 
By the enlightenment period the concept was well established in western political thought, and 
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Right is originally an Òepithet of the hand that is normally the strongerÓ, denoting that which is Òjust, correct, proper; real [and] trueÓ 
(Onions, 1996: 767). The etymology of the term shows how right implies not only the hierarchical binary ordering of the just over the 
unjust, the true over the false, but also strength as opposed to weakness; cf. Stirner (1993 [1844]: 276) for the idea that Ômight is - rightÕ, 
that is, that right is personal strength or ability which has become alienated so that it no longer belongs to oneÕs self or lies within oneÕs 
control. 
86
 I do, however, still see a role for rights, particularly where they are conceptualised as open-ended, diffuse and tactical rather than 
foundational, and I consider this as it relates to the critical utopian ethics outlined later (see particularly footnote 92 and section 9.3.5. 
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notions of ÔnaturalÕ rights permeate the thought of early influential liberals such as Locke (2002 
[1689]), Paine (1984 [1791]) and the authors of the Federalist Papers (Madison, Hamilton and Jay 
1987 [1787]). Locke excludes foundational rights from political analysis by use of naturalistic 
discourse: 
The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, 
which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that being equal and independent, 
no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions. (Locke, 2002 [1689]: 3) 
 
Ostensibly, such theories arose to justify limits on the impact of political institutions upon 
individuals. Without the civil rights of life, liberty and property, the individual would be at the 
mercy of arbitrary political power. While the classical liberals believed that the sovereign state was 
necessary to maintain order, they did not view it as a benign or beneficent force, nor prior to 
morality and justice as early republicans such as Hobbes (2006 [1651]: 100) and Machiavelli (1988 
[1513]: 51) would have it. Thus, a right in a state of law is simply a reflection of an a priori right: 
Ôevery civil right grows out of a natural right, or in other words, is a natural right exchangedÕ 
(Paine, (1984 [1791]): 69). Like the classical anarchists (see section 2.4.1), early liberals believed 
humans to be self-determining before the rise of the state, so that the state arose as a consequence 
of a contract between rational and autonomous actors. The nature and extent of liberty that natural 
right entails is somewhat disputed. For Locke interference is never justified except in defence or 
protection of individuals and their property (Locke, 2002 [1689]: 57), whereas Paine argues that 
natural right begs some intervention to redress the social and economic power which underpins the 
abstract equality of legal doctrine, for example in the realm of employment provision (Paine, 1984 
[1791]: 246). 
 
That natural rights were seen to be given by God and accessed through rationality and right reason 
proposes more of a psychological model than specific moral claims, and is clearly problematic. 
Later centuries saw the gradual decline of natural and religious discourse and the secularisation of 
rights theories. Beginning with Kant, deontological theories attempted to ground ethics in reason 
and laws of the mind rather than in religion and metaphysics (Kant, 1970 [1797]: 132). 
Deontological theories are thus often based in thought experiments which involve rational problem 
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solving, and are general in their application, thus: ÔEvery action which by itself or by its maxim 
enables the freedom of each individualÕs will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in 
accordance with a universal law is rightÕ (Ibid: 133, italics in the original). In contrast to 
consequentialist theories, deontological theories judge the morality of decisions by criteria that 
accord value not to the states of affairs brought about by actions based on those decisions, but 
rather by conformity with moral norms by individual agents. There is to be no maximization of 
utility as in utilitarianism and the emphasis is on the right rather than the good. Despite the fact that 
rights are initially formulated to protect negative liberty, or to free the individual from the 
interference of others, right can be consonant with the freedom to protect it when considered in the 
context of universal law:  
If the use to which a certain freedom is put is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with 
universal laws (i.e. if it is contrary to a right), any coercion which is used against it will be a 
hindrance to a hindrance of freedom, and will thus be consonant with freedom in accordance 
with universal laws Ð that is, it will be right (Ibid: 134). 
 
Kant, however, still presumes a particular formulation of negative liberty to be a self-evident right, 
whereas it more correctly may be considered a specific good, and thus raise questions about the 
distribution of all other social goods. Rawls attempts to address this in his more recent 
deontological theory, which again begins with a Ôthought experimentÕ (Benhabib, 1986: 289). 
Rawls posits an Ôoriginal positionÕ, which corresponds to the state of nature in earlier liberal 
theories, yet attempts no claim to historical acuity. It is posited as a hypothetical construct, to serve 
as Ôa natural guide to intuitionÕ (Rawls, 1971: 139). In the original position, individuals are placed 
behind a Ôveil of ignoranceÕ: 
No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know 
his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the 
like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their 
special psychological propensities (Ibid: 12). 
 
RawlsÕ argument is that the ÔrationalÕ choice in this situation would be a risk-minimising strategy 
that would maximise the position of the least well off. Economic and social distribution is 
described in some detail by Rawls as the provision of various Ôprimary goodsÕ (Ibid: 90-5), which 
are briefly defined as Ôrights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealthÕ (Ibid: 62). 
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Unlike the classical liberals, Rawls attempts to avoid recourse to naturalistic or theological 
assumptions, and does not discount the social inequalities that lie behind theoretical abstractions 
concerning equality and justice. There are, however, several points in RawlsÕ theory that I would 
take issue with from a critical utopian position, in particular the concept of the Ôveil of ignoranceÕ. 
If we view an individual as being in a large part constituted by their social relationships then it 
becomes very difficult to imagine a subject at all in the original position. The notion of a so-called 
ÔrationalÕ subject under these conditions becomes even more difficult. Rawls is once more 
reverting to the naturalistic assumptions he was seeking to avoid; he is positing a self-evident and 
transcendental rationality, which exists over and above constitutive factors such as social position, 
embodiment and psychological propensity. This is particularly apparent in his appeal to ÔintuitionÕ 
(see above). Rationality is seen to lie in a desire for Ôprimary goodsÕ, but needs and wants 
themselves may be socially constructed, particularly when we are positing contested concepts such 
as ÔlibertyÕ, ÔpowerÕ and ÔwealthÕ as primary goods. The extent to which a particular formulation of 
economic wealth could be considered a rational interest, and indeed what kind of wealth this might 
be, could be brought into question: some would argue that this is not an ecologically rational 
interest (see Schumacher, 1974, passim). One passage of RawlsÕ is particularly telling:  
A group of persons must decide once and for all what is to count among them as just and 
unjust. The choice which rational men would make in this hypothetical situation of equal 
liberty (Rawls, 1971: 13, my emphasis). 
 
We seem hardly to have progressed from HobbesÕ social contract, which remains fixed and 
immutable for all time. This leaves a static and fixed view of right that undermines choice, agency 
and action in the face of changing conditions, contexts, and desires. The emphasis on rationality 
over desire or emotion also acts to the exclusion of certain groups and individuals as it places 
theoretical or juridical weight behind the particular desires of a dominant group, which it 
legitimises through the discourse of ÔrationalityÕ. This leads to a second common theme of rights-
based citizenship theory, to which I shall now turn. 
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8.2.2. Binary, oppositional thought and abstract, atomised subjectivities 
As previously argued, the liberal tradition endows rights primarily to individuals with the 
implication that the individual and community are in opposition (Faulks, 2000: 57; Hoffman, 2004: 
29). The fact that the individual and the community are seen to be in conflict by liberal theory is 
indicative of many other oppositions and dualisms, leading not only to a view of the citizen as an 
abstract and atomised individual, but a very particular type of abstract and atomised individual. 
Faulks (2000: 57) sets out a table of ten dualisms of liberal citizenship. Sargisson (2004: 59) also 
sets out a serious of binaries in liberal thought deriving from the division between the public and 
private spheres, which she later connects to citizenship (Ibid: 74). I have drawn on these to 
formulate my own table of dualisms instituted by liberal ÔrightsÕ discourse. This mirrors my 
conceptualisation of the differences between dominant and critical utopian modes of theorising put 
forward in Chapter 2. The emphasis here, however, is on modes of individuation and subjectivity Ð 
the formulation of Ôthe citizenÕ Ð in liberal rights-based theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-1: Subjective dualisms of rights-based citizenship theory 
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 By this, I do not only mean individuals who are excluded from the legal status of citizenship, but also those aspects of citizens which 
are overcoded, ignored, excluded or suppressed by abstract assumptions which accompany the status. I find Giorgio AgambenÕs concept 
of ÔBare lifeÕ (1998, passim) or StirnerÕs Ôun-manÕ (1993 [1844], 139 and passim) sufficient to describe what I am trying to reach here.  
 
88
 ÔOtherÕ here is a polymorphic term used to denote human and non-human animal others and nature more generally. ÔSelfÕ is taken to 
encompass any group that one identifies as belonging to at a given moment in opposition to an ÔotherÕ, cf. Sargisson 2000 Chapter 5 
ÒSelf/Other relationsÓ: Ôthe way in which we approach the Other accounts for relations of domination. This Other may be a human, a 
group of humans, a tree, ÒnatureÓ; it can be anything external to the Self in question.Õ (Sargisson, 2000: 118) 
Citizen  Non-citizen
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Individual Community  
Agency / ÔActive CitizensÕ Structure / ÔPassive CitizensÕ 
Morally and/or legally right Morally and/or legally wrong or irrelevant 
Public Private 
Self Other
88
 
Equality Difference 
Civil and market rights Social and welfare rights 
Rationality, reason, the mind Emotion, desire, the body 
Wage labour Domestic and care work 
Masculine virtues Feminine virtues 
Rights Responsibilities, duties and obligations 
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The institution of rights is central to the institution of these binaries of citizenship since they 
institute legally binding boundaries, which define what is included and excluded, leading to 
dualistic thought and the formation of a certain type of subjectivity. Citizenship, as an institution, 
involves both a theory and a practice, but the boundaries between these are not easily drawn. This 
is particularly the case when dealing with language or theory instituted in law, such as rights, 
which are attributed to bodies, and thus capable of defining and indeed changing, imprisoning and 
dominating bodies (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 95; Foucault, 1979 [1975], passim; Agamben, 1998, 
passim). 
 
Endowing rights to the individual person in order to define him as a citizen has a wide range of 
implications for the relationship of this - now abstracted - individual with the world around him. He 
is now defined as an entity that is separate, and protected from, a potentially hostile community and 
environment. This approach privileges individual agency and universal rationality over structural 
factors such as class, race and gender and the material and subjective constraints that social 
structures can place upon individuals and groups, and their ability to participate. The reason that I 
speak of the abstract citizen here in the male generic pronoun is that the liberal tradition does 
originally conceive the abstract citizen as male, and a particular type of male at that. This has 
implications for further oppositions, and although I do not have space to fully deconstruct all of 
those drawn in the table above, they are implied by and implicated in those that I do discuss here. 
 
The public/private divide instituted through civil and market rights protects that which is defined as 
ÔprivateÕ from public interference and scrutiny and distinguishes what is political from what is non-
political, and thus should be excluded from the political arena and from political debate. The 
classical liberal canon has a clear position on this: 
I think it may not be amiss to set down what I take to be political power; that the power of a 
magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master 
over his servant, a husband over his wife and a lord over his slave. All of which distinct powers 
happening sometimes together in the same man É Political power then I take to be the power 
of making laws É for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of 
the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from 
foreign injury, and all this only for the public good (Locke, 2002 [1689]: 1-2). 
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The rights-bearing citizen who inhabits and has interests in the ÔpublicÕ sphere and participates in 
politically binding decisions, is not only limited to propertied males in this instance, but to very 
specific aspects of that maleÕs life. Whilst many relationships and powers can be perceived 
Ôtogether in the same manÕ (quoted above), implying a split or fragmented persona, only those 
aspects directed towards existing legal institutions concerning the protection of property and 
country are designated ÔpublicÕ and political. Relationships with (and between) women and 
children (and servants and slaves!) are designated to the domestic sphere and exempt from political 
analysis. Not only are particular persons excluded from the public sphere, and who these persons 
are has varied historically, but the constitutive effects of these relationships with others upon the 
citizenÕs subjectivity, and the effects that this might have upon public participation are also 
ignored. 
 
Liberal thought does not ostensibly set out to exclude, oppress and suppress difference and 
individual self-creativity. John Stuart Mill makes it especially clear that the division of the private 
from the public means that the state is able to protect individuality and indeed establishes a 
sacrosanct sphere of liberty within which difference can flourish: 
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no need of 
any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself 
employs all his faculties (Mill, 1974 [1859]: 123) 
 
Despite the instinctive appeal of the sentiment behind MillÕs defence of the private pursuit of 
happiness, the agent-centred individualism which forms the basis of his view of humanity, which 
constructs the public individual in abstract and asocial terms, does not provide a nuanced view of 
the social and economic structures and relationships of the domestic sphere Ð which may be 
intensely hierarchical and even violent  (MacKinnon, 1991: 179 and passim). 
 
The naturalisation of atomised subjectivities and the public/private divide obscures the fact that the 
boundaries between these are in fact political constructs, which are prior to and set the terms of 
political debate. Despite the fact that political rights have now been extended to women and other 
previously excluded groups, the systemic persistence of a public/private divide instantiated through 
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the institution of rights still tends to exclude those who do not live up to the ideal of the propertied, 
ÔrationalÕ individual with freedom from financial, physical and social constraints sufficient for the 
conditions of agency of ÔactiveÕ citizenship. Liberal theory views society prior to the state as 
simply an aggregation of individuals, in the words of Locke: ÔA state of perfect freedom to order 
their actions and dispose of their possessions as they think fit É without asking leave or depending 
upon the will of any other manÕ (Locke, 2002 [1689]: 2). The state, rather than relationships 
between humans, is seen to give consistency to society. This ignores the contradictions and 
inequalities within society that give rise to the state in the first place. The liberal state embodies 
these contradictions and yet disguises them under a barrier of equality of rights for citizens. The 
tendency is to privilege the relationship to state and public sphere as a singular, special, or primary 
affiliation. The division of life into two different spheres is problematic and exclusionary on at 
least two levels even for those who are accorded citizen rights. First, structural constraints in the 
private sphere may impact upon a citizenÕs ability to participate through lack of resources or 
financial independence, lack of education or political/public knowledge (Marshall & Bottomore 
1992 [1949]: 22-3) and time constraints from domestic or care duties (Pateman,1992). Second, the 
inclination, ability or willingness to identify or participate as a citizen may be diminished when 
important aspects of an individualÕs identity are ignored or degraded in the public sphere (Cooper, 
2006; Cronin, 2004).  
 
8.2.3. Rights disguise privileges 
Modern notions of citizenship are tied up with industrialisation and the rise of early capitalism, and 
particularly with the institution of the nation state as the primary and sovereign political institution. 
As we have seen, for Locke, Paine, and the authors of The Federalist Papers, citizenship bestowed 
upon the individual certain rights, one of which was the equal right to acquire and own property. 
The purpose of government was to protect these rights, and otherwise to play a relatively minimal 
role. The equality of opportunity (rather than outcome) presupposed by these authors was a useful 
device in the development of capitalist meritocracy, encouraging competition and the accumulation 
of wealth. The institution of rights, then, despite overtly existing to endow citizens with equality 
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and participatory status, is, when viewed in the context of historical dynamics and social structures, 
in fact producing and legitimising privileges for certain groups.   
 
Some theorists have attempted to view the historical variability of citizenship in a positive light, as 
a progressive phenomenon. Post-war political theorists and practitioners T. H. Marshall and Tom 
Bottomore presented a vision of citizenship in which rights accumulate in linear fashion; the 
establishment of civil rights was seen to be a precursor to the growth of political rights, which in 
turn paved the way for social rights. The latter of these is seen to lead to a more equal and inclusive 
citizenship by Ôaltering the pattern of social inequalityÕ (Marshall & Bottomore 1992 [1949]): 44). 
Faulks argues that Ômodern citizenship is inherently egalitarianÕ (Faulks, 2000: 3; see also 
Hoffman, 2004: 138 and section 2.2 of this thesis). Arguments such as these are based on the idea 
that the internal logic of the concept necessarily causes it to become ever more egalitarian, 
universal and inclusive over time. In some ways, historical evidence may support this to the extent 
that excluded groups (slaves, women, ethnic minoritiesÉ) have often struggled for formal 
citizenship rights and been successful (Sparks, 1997). The introduction of a social element to 
citizenship also may have helped to turn what was initially an abstract and legalistic equality into a 
more concrete redistribution of resources. 
 
To Marx, however, the extension of rights is still only the extension of bourgeois privilege rather 
than the emancipation of the human, which he makes most evident in the early essay ÒOn the 
Jewish QuestionÓ (1975 [1843]). Marx criticises those who petition the state or advocate particular 
rights for certain groups (in this instance, the desire of contemporaneous German Jews for civic 
and political emancipation) for failing to Ôexamine the relationship between political emancipation 
and human emancipation and, [therefore, posing] conditions which can be explained only by 
uncritical confusion of political emancipation and universally human emancipationÕ  (Marx, 1975 
[1843]: 216). The argument in this essay is complex and is particularly relevant to the critique of 
rights and therefore deserves some attention.  
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To Marx, the political state is an expression of what he terms Ôthe species-life of man in opposition 
to his material lifeÕ (Ibid: 220). Thus, through the division of politics from other areas of life; the 
right, or privilege, of private property especially, man [sic] alienates himself from others: 
ÔAll the preconditions of this egoistic life continue to exist outside the sphere of the state in 
civil societey, but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its full 
degree of development man leads a double life É He lives in the political community, where 
he regards himself as a communal being and in civil society, where he is active as a private 
individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means, and becomes a plaything 
of alien powers (Ibid: 220). 
 
Here resides the problem of the ÔJewish QuestionÕ, or the petitioning of equal rights for Jews in the 
political sphere: ÔThe conflict in which the individual believer in a particular religion finds himself 
with his own citizenship and with other men as members of the community is reduced to a secular 
division between the political state and civil societyÕ (Ibid: 220 italics in the original). This conflict 
ultimately reduces itself to the conflict between Ôthe living individual and the citizenÕ (Ibid: 221, 
italics in the original), or Ôthe political state and its presuppositionsÕ (Ibid: 221). Marx extends his 
critique to encompass not only citizen rights, but Ôthe rights of manÕ, as conceived by Paine and the 
authors of The Federalist Papers. 
 
I find this argument persuasive, and it informs my own theorisation of domination as alienation. 
The social democratic solution proposed by Marshall and Bottomore, although it goes some way to 
alieviating inequality, still presupposes a state that grants the rights it deems necessary, therefore 
conflates right with privilege.  
 
However, although Marx comes closer to a critical utopian approach than Marshall and Bottomore, 
by conceptualising domination as alienation, questioning the limits of the system and imagining an 
outside to an institution of rights which presupposes domination, he does not go so far as to 
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imagine an outside to all forms of alienation and therefore domination. This is reflected in his 
characteristically obscured (anti-)utopian solution
89
; that 
Only when the real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself and as an 
individual man has become a species being in his empirical life, his individual work and his 
individual relationships, only when man has recognized and organized his [own powers] as 
social forces so that the social force is no longer separated from him in the form of political 
force, only then can human emancipation be completed (Ibid: 234). 
 
Although I agree with the significance of everyday life as a space for criticism of the universality 
of citizenship, I feel that the discourse in the above passage relies on foundational, abstracted and 
anti-utopian concepts. Marx uncritically uses terms and concepts such as Ôspecies-beingÕ and 
Ôempirical lifeÕ as pre-requisites of a universal Ôhuman emancipationÕ that is awaiting completion. 
It is this abstraction and transcendental humanism which perhaps has lead to claims that this essay 
(and by extension Marx himself) is anti-semitic (Muravchik, 2002: 167). It is doubtful that Marx, 
within his own humanist and materialist epistemology, considers it oppressive to state that Ôin the 
final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from JudaismÕ (Marx, 
1975 [1843]: 237), nor even ÔWhat is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. 
What is the secular cult of the Jew? Haggling. What is his worldly God? MoneyÕ (Ibid: 236). I 
would argue, however, that the truth-claims that underlie MarxÕ analysis of a ÔmankindÕ that 
transcends the (religious) beliefs of particular humans, and of a materialism that transcends 
idealism or spiritualism, have oppressive effects insofar as they block possibilities for self-
creativity and becoming. Truth-claims are hegemonising and represent people to themselves. 
Although MarxÕs criticism of rights-based citizenship theory is useful, his theorisations of 
domination, subjectivity and the relation of equality to difference still rely on abstractions that can 
potentially oppress certain groups whilst veiling priviledge behind a discourse of abstract 
humanism. 
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 Cf. Chapter 2, ÒApproachÓ section 2.3.1, where I argue that whilst concepts and theories are always already utopian, some, within 
which I include MarxÕs thought, attempt to obscure this dreaming and desiring aspect and therefore also exhibit an anti-utopian, or 
blocking function. 
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What Marx does effectively show, is that the extension of rights to excluded groups leaves existing 
structures of domination in place. Even the addition of new kinds of rights, for example the 
redistributive social rights advocated by Marshall and Bottomore, leaves in place a state which is 
definitively separated from civil society, and therefore alienates humans from their own 
autonomous activity and social relationships, leaving them utterly vulnerable. This can be 
illustrated through a consideration of Giorgio AgambenÕs concept of Ôbare lifeÕ  (Agamben, 1998: 7 
& passim), which illuminates a volatile relationship between law and state power, upon which 
modern notions of sovereignty are based. The inscription of ÔnaturalÕ rights into law both limits the 
power of the state whilst extending its influence to claustrophobic intensity by drawing the citizen-
subject into an increasingly proximate symbiotic relationship. Thus the modern sovereign claims 
legitimacy from citizens by ÔincludingÕ them through rights (Ibid: 6). The citizen, Agamben 
continues, can only be constituted by extending Ôthe state of exceptionÕ (the suspension of rights), 
and thus Ôbare lifeÕ (that which is opposed to, or rather obscured by the political being), to Ôevery 
individual body, making it into what is at stake in political conflictÕ (Ibid: 124). That formal rights 
are thus constitutive of citizenship means that the excluded - those who have most need of rights, 
are the least able to draw on them. Whilst the state provides ÔrightsÕ, it is also prone to taking them 
away (Ibid: 126), thus reducing vulnerable individuals to merely biological beings, or Ôbare lifeÕ. 
 
8.2.4. Mediated and alienated relationships 
Linked to the above critique of binary and oppositional thought that universalises the abstract 
individual citizen is the mediation of relationships between citizens by the state. This is particularly 
evident in debates concerning the perceived opposition or division between rights and 
responsibilities. Although my emphasis thus far has been upon critique of the liberal tradition as 
the most influential upon the western institution of citizenship, I will now turn to a debate between 
liberalism and civic republicanism. In liberal theory, the emphasis is often on rights as opposed to 
responsibilities, which connects to many of the other binaries in the figure 8-1 (above), such as 
those between men/women, and wage labour/domestic work. 
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Early republican accounts of citizenship, such as those of Machiavelli (1988 [1513]) and Hobbes 
(1991 [1651]), view citizenship much less as a set of rights and mode of participation. Both appear 
to be ethical relativists, who are not particularly interested in claiming any kind of transcendental 
moral legitimacy for their sovereign: ÔA ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared 
to act immorally if necessaryÕ (Machiavelli, 1988 [1513]: 55; see also Hobbes, 1991 [1651]: 31). 
Since there is no universal ethic or reason to appeal to, both HobbesÕ and MachiavelliÕs sovereigns 
have an epistemic power over citizens, to determine linguistic and moral meanings. MachiavelliÕs 
sovereign is encouraged to Ôforce them to believeÕ (Machiavelli, 1988 [1513]: 21) and HobbesÕ 
sovereign is seen to be an arbitrator of reason (Hobbes 1991 [1651]: 32). It is notable in this 
context that the main function of citizenship is seen to be as a mode of social control, perhaps due 
to the fact that both were writing in times of political and social turbulence, when the promotion of 
stability was seen to be paramount. Such approaches emphasise duty to the sovereign over rights of 
individuals, and the stability and coherence of the political community over the individual. Thus 
the emphasis is different, and the valorised term within some of the binaries outlined above is 
inverted, although there is no radical attempt to redefine or overcome these oppositions.  
 
Although the historical emphasis of republican theory has been on social control and stability, a 
recent strand of citizenship theory called new (or sometimes neo-) civic republicanism attempts to 
appropriate the emphasis on obligation over rights, and community over individual, but with the 
added importance of legitimacy derived through democratic participation (for example, Pateman, 
1970; Prior, Stewart & Walsh, 1995; Crick (ed.) 2001). These thinkers show how participation in 
the spaces of everyday life, such as the workplace, civil society groups, the media and education 
can foster a more participatory and cohesive community. Prior, Stewart and Walsh (1995), argue 
that in liberal societies, Ôthe rights of citizenship are being recast as rights of individual consumers, 
and the obligations of government being seen as tasks of managementÕ (Prior, Stewart & Walsh, 
1995: 1). Through the liberal, rights-based approach, politics is transformed into management and 
public responsibility to private interest and many issues which would previously have been seen as 
belonging to the realm of moral judgement and public negotiation become matters of technical 
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decision and individual consumer preference (Ibid: 2). The authors propose an alternative to the 
market-oriented approach which is based on the notion of community (Ibid: 3) and decry the fact 
that most rights in Britain are defined negatively, in terms of diminishing possible restrictions on 
individuals, whereas positive participatory rights, such as voting, are not compulsory (Ibid: 4).  
 
Although I am somewhat sympathetic towards civic republican models, in particular their emphasis 
on the importance of participation, these models often exhibit problems of paternalism, and do not 
overcome the hierarchies of liberal approaches to citizenship, or state-centred models more 
generally. There is a move towards viewing individuals in relational, rather than atomistic terms. I 
would agree with Prior, Steward and Walsh that individuals are Ôengaged in a range of reciprocal 
relationships with othersÕ (Ibid: 16), and that the constitutive effects of these relationships cannot 
be ignored as they are in many liberal models. However, I would criticise the emphasis on the 
citizenÕs relation with Ôsociety in generalÕ (Ibid: 16), which suggests the sacrifice of difference to 
abstraction once more. There is somewhat of a contradiction in approaches that aim to extend 
grassroots participation through reforms composed by theoreticians, to be implemented by central 
government. It is notable that the means of agency and realisation are in direct contrast with the 
perceived ends of such a project. The attempt is to impose on citizens Ôfrom aboveÕ the means 
whereby they will be enabled to participate Ôfrom belowÕ. 
 
Derek HeaterÕs model of citizenship attempts to reconcile the civic-republican and liberal models 
of citizenship (Heater, 1999: 177). Citizenship is seen to comprise three elements: autonomy, virtue 
and rights. These should be not regarded as in tension but as complementary, since rights are, in 
reality, provided or respected through the obligations of other members of society (Ibid: 177). This 
model of social reciprocation is mirrored by Geraint ParryÕs model of the Ômutual societyÕ which 
starts from the normative principle Ôfrom each according to his or her ability, to each according to 
his or her need for the conditions of agencyÕ  (Parry, 1991: 179). This is seen to resolve the liberal 
contradiction between the individual and the community, formalised in the legal institution of 
rights and the division of rights and responsibilities: Ôif the community empowers the individual Ð 
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contributes to effective agency Ð there is an expectation that the agent will make some return which 
will sustain the empowerment of othersÕ (Ibid: 186-7). 
 
Although I would agree with this model that rights and responsibilities are mutually presupposing, 
both Heater and Parry assume an unassailable state, and thus fail to overcome the conceptual 
differentiation and practical alienation of rights from responsibilities. Although Heater adds that 
other contexts are possible and desirable, such as local initiatives, EU-wide welfare and global 
environmental protection, which he links to his own model of multiple citizenship (Heater, 1999: 
179), he is not clear where absolute sovereignty might ultimately lie in a situation such as this. And 
here lies the difficulty; sovereignty is an absolute concept (Brace & Hoffman (Eds.), 1997) and 
dominant conceptions of rights are based upon the contradictory assumption of a legitimate form of 
sovereignty that is abstracted from the bearer of rights and obligations, which can enforce these 
when necessary. It is this mediation that informs the central tenets of dominant approaches to 
citizenship rights. This can lead to a loss of social support networks and alienated social life, a ÔTV 
nationÕ where life is lived through the screen and the mediation of news reports and technology, or 
Ôthe downloading of consciousness into the machineÕ (Bey, 1994: 36). This can be criticised in 
terms internal to liberal democratic theory as problems of democratic legitimacy through decreased 
political participation, as well as with external critique of the hollowing-out of the social commons 
(Chatterton & Hodkinson, 2007: 204). This leads to a final common feature of dominant 
approaches, which concerns the method by which dominant models presuppose that citizens might 
have their rights-claims recognised and enforced. 
 
8.2.5. Politics of demand 
A particular politics stems from the argument above that the language of ÔrightsÕ is often used to 
disguise privilege. To those whose difference is not recognised within the public sphere, like the 
German Jews of whom Marx spoke, ÔrightÕ may very well feel as though it is simply the ÔmightÕ of 
the powerful (cf. footnote 85). Liberal democracy provides a method by which the excluded might 
have their identities and interests recognised within the public sphere, and be provided with 
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material, legal or ideological resources judged appropriate for equal presence and participation in 
the public sphere. Richard Day terms this Ôthe politics of demandÕ (Day, 2005: 80). This model of 
politics is evident in comtemporary British citizenship discourse, and in particular Ôsocial capitalÕ 
debates. In a 2005 report, the National Council for Voluntary Organizations (NCVO)
90
 (Jochum, 
Pratten, & Wilding, 2005) divide the Ôsocial capitalÕ
91
 of the private sphere into three different 
types. The first two are Ôbonding social capitalÕ, which relates to ÔhorizontalÕ relationships within 
groups and associations based on common identity and shared purpose; and Ôbridging social 
capitalÕ which relates to diversity, or ÔhorizontalÕ relationships between people and groups who are 
different from one another. Both of these are types of relationship that occur within civil society.  
The third type of social capital, Ôlinking social capitalÕ, relates to power, or ties with those in 
authority, ÔverticalÕ participation and access to power institutions and decision-making processes 
(Ibid: 10-2). The theory behind social capital is that Ôsocial ties and shared values or norms (such as 
trust or reciprocity) [bind] people together [and] facilitate participationÕ (Ibid: 10). Social capital is 
seen to be Ôautonomous and spontaneousÕ, and although it cannot be controlled, Ôgovernment can 
influence the conditions in which it can flourishÕ (ibid: 10).  
 
Civil society represents the sphere of private interests of individuals and groups, who petition the 
state for rights (or privileges) and recognition in the public sphere. The state acts as a ÔneutralÕ 
arbiter of these interests, and protects the private interests of citizens. The problems of mediation 
and the alienation of citizensÕ represented identities and interests from their own autonomous 
activity have been considered in Chapter 2 (section 2.5.1). These criticisms apply particularly to the 
NCVO passage quoted above: consider the proposal that the ÔpurposeÕ of social ÔcapitalÕ (also note 
the economic terminology) is to encourage good/active citizenship, and that government can foster 
the conditions in which it will flourish. The discourse undermines the intrinsic value of social 
                                            
90
 As a quasi-independent organization claiming to represent the interests of civil society groups and associations both to government 
and the wider public, I feel that the NCVO has a particular relevance to this debate. Due to the intended audiences of its publications, the 
concepts and discourse used by the NCVO might be viewed as fairly representative of discourse that is accepted and understood by 
government, the associations that the organization represents, and the wider public. Through its research and publications, the NCVO 
also contributes to setting the terms of debate. 
 
91
 This is defined as the relational element of civil society, which operates through formal and informal associations and groups, which 
are seen to facilitate participation and collective action (Jochum, Pratten & Wilding 2005: 10. See also Putnam 1993, passim) 
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bonds. This can be linked to the Marxist view above, which, like theorists of group rights and 
social capital, ultimately seeks to incorporate social difference into a higher unity.  
 
Day defines the politics of demand as Ôa politics oriented to improving existing institutions and 
everyday experiences by appealing to the benevolence of hegemonic forces and/or altering the 
relations between these forcesÕ (Day, 2005: 80). However, Day argues that campaigning for rights, 
privilege or recognition rarely provides the desired effects: 
instead, it defers, dissuades, or provides a partial solution to one problem that exacerbates 
several others. In order to ÔfreeÕ some educated upper-class First World White women to 
participate in the paid workforce, liberal capitalism creates new categories of indentured labour 
designed to import and enslave women from the global South. So that we might achieve 
equality in the posession of private vehichles and air conditioners, the air becomes 
unbreathable and the (newly privatized) power grid collapses in the heat wave associated with 
global warming produced by É cars and air conditioners (Day, 2005: 83; elipsis and 
capitalisation in the original). 
 
According to Day, not only does a politics of demand do nothing to change existing structures, but 
those who participate in it actually perpetuate these structures, Ôwhich exist preceisely in the 
anticipation of demandsÕ (Ibid: 98).  
 
Contemporary post-left and poststructural anarchists, who I have previously associated with a 
critical utopian approach, view the politics of demand and exercise of rights as complicity in oneÕs 
own domination, or as a form of recuperation of oneÕs radical difference by the mainstream 
(Bonanno, 1988: 9; Day, 2005: 83-4). These thinkers advocate, as a utopian alternative, a Ôpolitics 
of the actÕ (Bonanno, 1988: 9-10; Day, 2005: 88-90). This will be discussed below, as I turn to a 
section on critical utopian alternatives in theory, which attempt to formulate an ÔoutsideÕ to statist 
domination.  
 
8.3. Critical utopian approaches 
8.3.1. Experimentation, contingency, and ontological difference 
Previously, I considered how dominant theories of rights use foundational assumptions as the basis 
for producing and assessing moral claims (section 8.2.1). These included universalising portrayals 
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of specific formulations of Ôhuman natureÕ and ÔrationalityÕ, leading to a single, universal moral 
code set out in the language of ÔrightsÕ. I argued that universalising assumptions can naturalise the 
desires of a dominant group, and thus leads to the oppression of minorities and the suppression of 
creativity. Here, I am looking for a critical utopian alternative to foundational formulations of 
rights. It is important to note that non-foundational, diffuse and contingent ethics can be articulated 
in terms of rights (Bonanno, 1988; Guattari, 1996: 104; Vaneigem, 2003). The distinction between 
foundational and diffuse rights echoes MayÕs distinction between morality and ethics (May, 1994: 
142-144) where moral claims are based on implicit foundations and the search for truth, whereas 
Ôethics cannot be defended from the outside; it is holistic in that senseÕ (Ibid, p. 144). Whilst I 
acknowledge that contingent ethics can be articulated in terms of rights, to avoid confusion with 
dominant approaches I tend not to do so here since other terms are available92.  
 
The idea of non-foundational ethics is most strongly articulated by Deleuze and Guattari (1988), as 
well as the poststructural feminism of Rosi Braidotti (1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1994) and the 
poststructural anarchism of Todd May (1994) who each take Deleuze and GuattariÕs conceptual 
framework and imbue it with a more explicitly ethical function. The politics of ontological 
difference and nomadic subjectivities offered by these authors provides a starting point for an 
infinitely critical ethics based on desire and possibility which acts as a critical utopian counterpart 
to the predetermination and rationality of foundational rights discourses. The following sections 
address, through the lens of ethical discourses that offer alternatives to universalist rights, the 
second of my disaggregated research questions in section 1.3 of this thesis: what alternatives to 
dominant models of citizenship are offered by critical  utopian theory? 
 
                                            
92
 It is also important to note that rights can be incredibly important strategically for marginalised groups in struggles for freedom and 
equality, particularly in the global south (Englund & Nyamnjoh eds., 2004; Slymomovics, 2005; Sassen, 2006: 292-3). This is a separate 
point to the previous, and is articulated later in this thesis using Deleuze and GuattariÕs theory of axioms in section 9.3.5. 
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Deleuze and Guattari offer a distinct and utopian
93
 ethical ontology insofar as their work is 
concerned with an investigation into what categories of things there are in the world, and the 
relationships between them, which transgresses many of the taken-for-granted or foundational 
categories of liberal theorisations of rights, such as the Ôrational individualÕ and ÔsocietyÕ. The 
ontology espoused is one of univocality or immanence; everything that exists is seen to be a 
modification, expression or manifestation of one substance, or ÔplaneÕ which is always in a process 
of differentiating, folding and unfolding, organising, disorganising and reorganising itself: 
We call this plane, which knows only longitudes and latitudes, speeds and haecceities, the 
plane of consistency or composition (as opposed to the plan(e) of organization or 
development). It is necessarily a plane of immanence and univocality. We therefore call it the 
plane of Nature, even though nature has nothing to do with it, since on this plane there is no 
distinction between the natural or the artificial. However many dimensions it may have, it 
never has a supplementary dimension to that which transpires upon it. That alone makes it 
natural and immanent (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 294). 
 
This ontology is not foundational since it does not offer a transcendental or fixed criterion from 
which moral concepts might proceed: we cannot distinguish human ÔnatureÕ from artifice, nor 
rationality from desire. Difference is seen to go all the way down to a level of imperceptibility 
(Ibid: 280). Identity, or individuation, is seen to occur when a multiplicity acquires consistency, 
and different components are seen to hold together or resonate in an ÔassemblageÕ (Ibid: 361). 
Consistency also organises assemblages into higher-level systems called strata (Ibid: 45). 
Organisation has to do with both territory and code; each articulation within the system of 
organisation has a form/content (territory) and a substance/expression (code) (Ibid: 46). Neither of 
these exhibits a primary causal relation over the other, the organisation itself is a priori and form 
and expression come after. This is tantamount to saying that reality does not create language or 
ideas from some kind of intrinsic meaning, but neither do our concepts shape (perception of) 
reality: there is something else which is prior. Deleuze and Guattari are thus concerned with the 
question of Ôwhat holds things together?Õ (Ibid: 361), or what principles or forces lead disparate 
                                            
93
 Deleuze and Guattari do not often use the terminology of utopia explicitly. The exception is Deleuze and Guattari 1994, pp. 99-100, 
where they define utopia as the becoming-political of philosophy (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 99-100). This moment of philosophy 
becoming political is particularly relevant for this chapter which is attempting to formulate a non-transcendental ethical discourse: 
ÔUtopia does not split off from infinite movement: etymologically it stands for absolute deterritorialization but always at the critical 
point at which it is connected with the present milieuÕ (Ibid, pp. 99-100). For a selection of others who identify Deleuze as Utopian see 
Patton (2007) and Holland (2005).  
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elements to acquire consistency in territorialised, coded assemblages and higher-level systems of 
organisation in the particular combinations that they do? What are the effects of this? Are there 
other possibilities? Can we effect change? 
 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest a different mode of individuation to the individualistic 
subjectification of the dominant approaches discussed above. This form of individuality is termed 
ÔhaecceityÕ (Ibid: 287) and is a form of individuality that is different from a thing or a subject (Ibid: 
288). Haecceities Ôconsist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or 
particles, capacities to affect and be affectedÕ (Ibid: 288). All assemblages are seen to be 
haecceities, including the human, or the individual subject (Ibid: 289). They are defined not by any 
intrinsic qualities, but by their degree of power and the extent to which this is restricted or 
bounded, the active or passive affects of which they are capable in the individuated assemblages in 
which they exist (Ibid: 283): ÔWe know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in 
other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, 
with the affects of another bodyÕ (Ibid: 284). This has to do not with only power, which provides 
the active force through which potential assemblages ultimately come into play, but more 
importantly with desire, which imagines, or desires the modes of individuation in the first place:    
Assemblages are passional, they are components of desire. Desire has nothing to do with a 
natural or spontaneous determination; there is no desire but an assembling, assembled, desire. 
The rationality, the efficiency, of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the 
assemblage brings into play, without the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them 
(Ibid.: 440). 
 
Desire is what gives consistency to multiplicity. The rational, atomised individual endowed with 
rights is a product not of nature, but of the desires of dominant groups with the assembled power to 
give their imaginings consistency.  
 
The ethical implications of this discourse are more complicated. Deleuze and Guattari are critical 
of the idea of a fixed essence as the basis for either morality or resistance. Since power has a 
positive and creative role to play in the creation of identities as well as a negative role in 
oppressing or suppressing, it becomes impossible to do away with it completely. Power constitutes 
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not only that which should be resisted but also the forms and agents of resistance. State power 
works not only at the level of hierarchical governance but also at the level of the subject. 
Resistance must also take place at this level. For Deleuze and Guattari, resistance involves 
removing blockages that stem the flow of creativity and desire. This involves a kind of 
experimentation that the authors term Ôbecoming-Ô. This is a minoritarian phenomenon: ÔAll 
becoming is minoritarianÕ (Ibid: 117). As a fixed status or identity, one cannot ÔbecomeÕ 
majoritarian since one either is or is not Ð it is an individualistic and fixed status. It is always the 
minor position which allows for flux and creative identity experimentation: Ôwe must distinguish 
between: the majority as a constant and homogeneous system; minorities as subsystems; and the 
minoritarian as a potential, creative and created becomingÕ (Ibid: 117).  
 
Rosi Braidotti and Todd May elaborate upon the ethics of this ontology, and the practices that it 
might involve. Braidotti borrows concepts from Deleuze and GuattariÕs ontological model to 
articulate a radical postmodern feminist ethical practice. This, she argues, requires that Ôattention 
be paid both to identity as a set of identifications and to political subjectivity as the quest for sites 
of resistanceÕ (Braidotti, 1994: 23). As a conceptual embodiment of such a practice, Braidotti posits 
Deleuze and GuattariÕs figure of the nomad as Ôthe kind of subject who has relinquished all idea, 
desire, or nostalgia for fixityÕ (Ibid: 22). A nomadic political ontology is somewhat akin to Deleuze 
and GuattariÕs, as outlined above, but importantly, nomadic consciousness is also an 
epistemological position, which is active and continuous and resists assimilation (Ibid: 25). 
Experimentation, and becoming-minor allow the resistance of oppressive and stagnant social forms 
through the education of desire. It is because of the emphasis placed on articulating difference and 
the process of thinking that comes with the minority position that nomadism resonates with 
feminism, or the figure of the woman (Braidotti, 1994: 29; see also Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 
306). 
 
Thus, contra-Marx, the critical utopian ethical standpoint involves not the assimilation of minority 
into a higher unity (the becoming-human of the Jew) but the disintegration of the fixed dominant 
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position into a series of fluid minoritarian identities; ÔA woman has to become-woman, but in a 
becoming-woman of all man. A Jew becomes Jewish, but in a becoming-Jewish of the non-JewÕ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 321-2). The tactic is to resist closure and to remain open to otherness, 
through the invention of Ônew structures of thoughtÕ (Braidotti, 1994: 180), and through 
Ôreformulating the bodily roots of subjectivityÕ (Ibid: 184). There is an emphasis on bringing 
sensation, the body and experience into the political field in order to assert specificity and 
difference through, and apart from the universal abstract rational rights-bearing citizen. 
 
May disaggregates the ethical principles of what he terms Ôpoststructural anarchismÕ, under which 
the thinkers I have considered here are subsumed into a number of distinct themes. The first is that 
practices of representing others to themselves ought to be avoided (May, 1994: 130); that is, we 
should avoid universalising experience. This leads to the second ethical principle; that Ôalternative 
practices É ought to be allowed to flourish and and even to be promotedÕ (Ibid: 133). Philosophy 
is seen as a practice, and thus is evaluated by its effects rather than its ability to attain truths (or to 
ascertain what is ÔrightÕ). The ethical value of philosophy derives from the alternative ways of 
thinking that its creation of concepts offers. (Ibid: 134-5; see also Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 11 
and passim). Third, there is Ôa generally anticapitalist sentiment amongst poststructuralists that is 
ethically basedÕ (May, 1994: 136) which is based upon an ethical critique of exploitative 
relationships and the inhibition of critical thought (Ibid: 136).  
 
What is interesting about poststructural ethics (as put forward by May, but also in my own 
interpretation) is that they do not proceed from a transcendent or meta-ethical realm of nature or 
reason as do the ÔrightsÕ of liberal theory. Indeed, the view is one of Ôethics as a practice, with its 
own power relationships, and yet one that allows for the possibilty of judging other practicesÕ (Ibid: 
139). An important distinction can be made between morality and ethics. Morality tends to require 
a kind of blind faith, and thus requires (frequently obscured) foundational ontological assumptions, 
leading to a circular axiomatic: ÔTo posit the truth of a moral claim is to do no more Ð but no less Ð 
than to posit that claim itself. At the level of recognizing which claims admit of the possibility of 
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truth, there is nothing to distinguish values from practical judgementsÕ (Ibid: 143). Ethical 
discourse differs insofar as it does not rely on a transcendent ontological realm from which to draw 
its value and is non- or anti- foundational. Thus Ôit entails that no values are immune from scrutiny. 
What that scrutiny will turn up can only be discovered when certain values or principles are played 
off against othersÕ (Ibid: 144-5). Such a view of ethics relies on an immanentist, nonfoundational 
and holistic ontology, not because of the ÔtruthÕ of this ontology but because of the ethical effects it 
can produce. Thus there is a form of resistance to be found in the championing of subjugated 
practices through experimenting with different ways of living, perceiving, thinking and being. This 
has implications for epistemological concerns, and involves transgressing the linguistic and 
perceptual binaries of dominant models of rights. 
 
8.3.2. Transgressing binary, oppositional thought and atomised subjectivities 
In section 8.2.2 I considered how dominant models of rights presuppose conflict and opposition by 
endowing the abstract individual with equal rights in the public sphere and relegating difference to 
the private sphere, implying a particular type of self/other relation. Discourses of rationality and 
Ôthe naturalÕ discussed above have the tendency to binarise subjectivity, placing that which is on 
the side of power within the accepted domain and that which escapes power in the category of the 
implied ÔotherÕ; the ÔunnaturalÕ, or ÔirrationalÕ. This perpetuates dominating hierarchies and 
atomised, competitive subjectivities. Here, I would like to consider theories that posit non-
hegemonic modes of thinking and being in the world that transgress these binaries and offer a 
critical utopian ÔoutsideÕ that resists dominant models of thinking the subject. The critique of 
binary oppositions has formed the basis of much contemporary feminist, anarchist and ecological 
theory. Both poststructural anarchism and poststructural feminism have focused on bringing desire 
(Stirner 1993, [1844]: 50
94
; Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 441; Braidotti, 1994: 182; Call, 2002: 3-4) 
and embodiment (Stirner 1993 [1844]: 64; Cixous, 1991 [1975]; Braidotti, 1994: 180; Agamben, 
1998; Irigary, 2004: 207) into the political sphere. An important common theme is that the images 
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 Although it may be an anachronism to term Stirner a ÔpoststructuralistÕ, many of the themes in his work anticipate those of 
poststructuralism (for a discussion on this see particularly Newman, 2001, pp. 55-74). 
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of desire and the body are not hegemonic, truth-claiming or fixed. We are not provided with a 
single, universal model of subjectivity but rather with desires and bodies that are different, and in a 
constant state of flux: ÔYou canÕt talk about a female sexuality, uniform, homogeneous, classifiable 
into codes Ð any more than you can talk about one unconscious resembling another. WomenÕs 
imaginary is inexhaustibleÕ (Cixous, 1991 [1975]: 334; italics in the original).  
 
To Stirner, there is always the desire to break free from subjectification: a desire that is animated in 
the concept of the Ôun-manÕ  (Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 177). For Stirner, there is no essential subject 
who is unpolluted by power or desire, and any attempt to construct such a subject results in 
oppressive exclusions: ÔTo say in blunt words what an un-man is not particularly hard: it is a man 
who does not correspond to the concept man, as the inhuman is something human which is not 
conformed to the concept of the humanÕ (Ibid: 177). There can thus be no universal morality or 
truth95 to which the pure subject has recourse through rationality, and reason and desire cannot be 
held to be separate nor in conflict:  
It is only through the ÒfleshÓ that I can break the tyranny of mind; for it is only when a man 
hears his flesh along with the rest of him that he hears himself wholly, and it is only when he 
wholly hears himself that he is a hearing or rational being (Ibid: 64). 
 
It has been argued that the kind of anarchism associated with Stirner as well as with those whom 
May identifies as poststructural anarchists is, like liberalism, a form of extreme individualism, and 
therefore in an irreconcilable conflict with community and the environment (Bookchin, 1995: 34 & 
passim). Bookchin argues that many anarchists today are more concerned with individual ÔlifestyleÕ 
and hedonism than with social and ecological problems. However, this contradiction only occurs 
where the modernist dichotomies between the individual and the community, self and environment, 
the public and private, substantiated through state-mediated relationships are upheld
96
. Although it 
would be potentially despotic to argue that individual rights should be revoked within the context 
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 As mentioned previously (footnote 63) this does not preclude the possibility of ethical discourse Ð see also NewmanÕs interpretation 
of Stirner in terms of poststructural ethics (Newman, 2001: Chapter 3). 
96
 For an entire polemic that specifically point-by-point refutes BookchinÕs binary distinction between ÔlifestyleÕ and Ôthe socialÕ, see 
Black (1997). 
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of the state and capitalism (I will discuss this later in sections 8.3.3 & 8.3.4), a critical utopian 
approach emphasises the importance of thinking and living outside existing hierarchies hegemonic 
concepts and practices: 
I [donÕt offer] any ultimate resolution of the tension between the individual and the social. No 
theory will ever accomplish that a priori, although theory might inform its resolution in 
practice É We need, not for people to be less selfish, but for us to be more selfish in the most 
effective way, together. For that, they need to understand themselves and society better Ð to 
desire better, to enlarge their perceptions of the genuinely possible, and to appreciate the real 
institutional (and ideological) impediments to realizing their real desires. By Òreal desiresÓ I 
donÕt mean Òwhat I want people to want,Ó I mean what they really want, severally and 
together, as arrived at É by unconstrained, general, unhurried reflection (Black, 1997: 56). 
 
Although poststructural and post-left anarchism, post-feminism and deep ecology use different 
terms such as ÔdesireÕ, Ôthe bodyÕ (see above) and Ôflux of natureÕ (Botkin, 1990: 62), there is 
particular manner of using these concepts that acts against representative and hegemonic 
assumptions. Although Bookchin seems to take the side of ecology and community against 
individualism, where the hegemonic or foundational assumptions are removed from both ÔsidesÕ 
there is no necessary dichotomy. Both the holism of deep ecology, and the embodied individualism 
of poststructural feminism and anarchism can be interpreted as methods of transgressing the 
dichotomy between the ÔindividualÕ and the ÔcommunityÕ, ÔpublicÕ and ÔprivateÕ or ÔselfÕ and 
ÔotherÕ. Where poststructural anarchism and feminism posit disruptive subjectivities as the 
ubiquitous contradictions that undermine simplistic binary subjectivities, deep ecology posits a 
disruptive and ungovernable nature (Fox, 1995: 50; Botkin et. al., 2000, passim). The method, 
however, is a similar blurring of the ontological distinction between thinking and being/desiring, 
the effect of which is a non-hegemonising utopian imagining of subjectivity, which disrupts the 
image of the abstract, rational, asocial individual of liberal theory by exposing its actual specificity.   
 
Agamben (1993), I feel, is unsurpassed in his ability to use specificity as both an epistemological 
framework and a critical utopian method, in a manner that blends the models of poststructural 
theories and deep ecology. Where Stirner embodies that which escapes given concepts in the Ôun-
manÕ, and Braidotti in the ÔnomadÕ, Giorgio Agamben (1993) uses the term Ôwhatever singularitiesÕ 
(Agamben, 1993: 1 and passim). AgambenÕs style is poetic and aesthetically beautiful, which 
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endows this concept of Ôwhatever singularityÕ with a kind of life, or a particular sense of being-in-
the-world which is hard to articulate; but it is notable that the form of his writing resonates with the 
content, which regards the potentiality of all life. Unlike other theorists, he neither accepts nor 
completely rejects conceptual dichotomies of individual/community (Ibid: 17-20), 
particular/universal (Ibid: 9-11), self/other (Ibid: 1-2), actual/potential (Ibid: 53-6) right/wrong 
(Ibid: 5-8), subject/object (Ibid: 47-50), or state/non-state (Ibid: 85-7), but rather disrupts them by 
narrating the regions where they become indistinguishable: 
One can think of the halo É as a zone in which possibility and reality, potentiality and 
actuality, become indistinguishable. The being that has consumed all of its possibilities, thus 
receives as a gift a supplemental possibility É This imperceptible trembling of the finite that 
makes its limits indeterminate and allows it to blend, to make itself whatever, is the tiny 
displacement that every thing must accomplish in the messianic world (Agamben, 1993: 55). 
 
It is important to emphasise that Agamben views his concept of the singularity, like the 
subjectivities theorised by Braidotti and Stirner, as fundamentally disruptive: 
Whatever singularity, which wants to appropriate belonging itself, its own being-in-language, 
and thus rejects all identity and every condition of belonging, is the principle enemy of the 
State. Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there will be 
Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear (Ibid: 86). 
 
AgambenÕs method has particular implications for the practice of a politics of resistance, which 
will be considered later (section 8.3.5). At this point, however, I would like to come back to the 
theme of the relationship of humanity to nature, self to other, and individual to community by 
considering how vulnerable others might be protected if not through a politics of rights and 
representation. 
 
8.3.3. Ethics of care and infinite responsibility 
In section 8.2.3 I considered how rights often disguise the political and economic privileges of a 
dominant group (such as citizens, or indeed, particular citizens). Here, I concentrate on critical 
utopian ethical models that offer alternatives to rights. Two theorists who are utopian in the critical, 
non-finalisable sense outlined previously (Chapter 2 passim and Chapter 3 section 3.3) insofar as 
they priviledge process over closure, full presence over mediation, and present practice over future 
goal are Levinas and Bakhtin. For Levinas, foundationalism cannot be the basis of ethical 
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discourse: Ôtaking principles of method for affirmations on the foundation of things É is certainly 
an act of simple hasty mindsÕ (Levinas, 2006: 59). Levinas and Bakhtin both provide methods of 
engaging with Ôthe otherÕ which do not involve representation and thus allow for the continual 
critical affirmation of difference. To Levinas, ethics is prior to philosophy and is derived from 
experience of the other. The other is not knowable, so cannot be made into an object of the self, as 
in dominant models of morality outlined in section 8.2.3. For Levinas, the encouter with the other, 
which he articulates in terms of an epiphany during the face-to-face encounter  (Levinas, 2002 
[1961]: 206-7) produces a form of ethics independent of the state to the point where responsibility 
and an ethic of care are integral to the subject:  
the intersubjective relationship is a non-symmetrical relation. In this sense, I am responsible 
for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair. It is 
precisely insofar as the relationship between the Other and me is not reciprocal that I am 
subjection to the other; and I am a ÒsubjectÓ essentially in this sense  (Levinas, 1985: 98). 
 
Responsibility and care therefore precede any ÔobjectiveÕ searching after truth; the other is valued 
presicely for its unknowability and irreducible heteronomy. Obligation to the other is what gives us 
life and experience, and founds our own subjective experience by giving a meaningful direction 
and orientation. An ethical experience thus cannot seek to impose identity or normative behavioural 
codes upon this other. The potential source of oppression, therefore, lies not (or not only) 
externally, but internally; it is part of ourselves that must be overcome in order enter into the 
ethical relation and be open to the otherÕs becoming and potentiality. This process of relating 
ethically does not, and indeed cannot involve representation, mediation, or any attempt to fix the 
other into a single or desired mode of being. This acts as a utopian critique of dominant models of 
citizenship: one becomes responsible by opening oneself up to the experience of the other, rather 
than being protected and alienated from the other by legal rights. 
 
Bakhtin (1984 [c. 1929]) articulates similar ideas differently, through the genre of literary criticism. 
I feel that his account offers a valuable addition to Levinas in the articulation of an ethics of 
difference which accords moral value to multiple ÔothersÕ. Bakhtin credits Dostoevsky with the 
creation of a new kind of novel, which he terms Ôthe polyphonic novelÕ  (Bakhtin, 1984 [c. 1929]: 8 
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& passim). Bakhtin views this conceptual creation as having a significance wider than the creation 
of a new genre, but also Ôin the development of the artistic thinking of humankindÕ (Ibid: 270, 
italics in the original). This Ôartistic thinkingÕ creates utopian space for the artiulation of a wide 
range of different voices and standpoints without the positing of one single voice or position, 
including that of the author, as truthful or objective. Thus, the thinking of the human in artistic, 
rather than traditional philosophical terms, allows for an understanding and a practice of individual 
humans, and humanity, as potentiality rather than a finished or essential product or object, or one 
which is moving dialecticaly towards a predetermined future in Hegelian fashion (Ibid:  26-27). 
This offers a model of ethics that might have relevance for a critical utopian citizenship that is not 
based on the presupposed division of rights from responsibilities. 
 
The viewpoint has an affinity with critical utopian approaches, insofar as utopia is not something to 
be seen as a finalised goal which can be located somewhere in the future, but is a process which 
occurs at the intersection of a multitude of competing and converging viewpoints in the present: 
This trait expressed itself in DostoevskyÕs eschatology, both political and religious, and in his 
tendency to bring the ÒendsÓ closer, to feel them out while still in the present, to guess at the 
future as if it were already at hand in the struggle of coexisting forces. 
DoestoevskyÕs extraordinary artistic capacity for seeing everything in coexistance and 
interaction is his greatest strength É but none of these contradictions and bifurcations ever 
became dialectical, they were never set in motion along a temporal path or in an evolving 
sequence: they were, rather, spread out in one plane, as standing alongside or opposite one 
another, as consonant but not merging or as hopelessly contradictory, as an eternal harmony of 
unmerged voices or as their unceasing and irreconcilible quarrel. DostoevskyÕs visualizing 
power was locked in place at the moment diversity revealed itself Ð and remained there 
organizing and shaping this diversity in the cross-section of a given moment (Ibid: 30). 
 
Bakhtin and Levinas suggest politics of recognising the otherÕs ÔrightsÕ or entitlements as existing 
not as a product of a hierarchical, alienated and stagnant political sphere which imposes these 
through a legal system and the status of citizenship, but at the immediate level of interaction with 
the other or others. This leads to an ethic that is internal to the subject and his or her relationships 
rather than imposed by external forces: an ethic of care or infinite responsibility, which is 
groundless and immanent rather than based on an assumed or imposed ÔessenceÕ. This ethic might 
be seen as a processual, non-hegemonic, critical utopian and anarchistic ÔoutsideÕ to the liberal and 
Marxist ethical theories outlined earlier. These were judged to rely on a foundational claim to 
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ÔtruthÕ imposed through either legal discourse of ÔrightsÕ or moral discourse of Ôhuman natureÕ and 
thus lead to the privileging of the desires of a particular dominant group. Levinas and Bakhtin, 
amongst others
97
 offer an immanent critical utopian alternative that relies on unmediated 
experience of, and interaction with others and thus rests on responsibility, care or obligation, which 
is internal to the subject rather than externally and hierarchically imposed. Instead of an objective 
epistemology of morals and legal rights, we can imagine an intersubjective epistemology of ethics 
of infinite responsibility98. I will consider what this might mean at the level of political practice in 
the following chapter (9) on ÒTransgressing rights: practiceÓ. In the upcoming section, however, I 
will further consider what unmediated relationships might mean in the context of a utopian praxis 
of critical resistance, and how this has been theorised in alternative utopian theory. 
 
8.3.4. Beyond and beneath mediation 
Under dominant approaches, section 8.2.4, I considered how the alienation of political power from 
the citizenry leads to a separation of rights from responsibilities and an increasing emphasis on the 
former as consumer or market rights and the latter as the technical responsibilities of a small 
number of experts. Governing and processes needed for the sustenance of life are separated from 
everyday processes of living and being. This can lead to diminished participation in both social and 
political life, and a hollowing-out of social commons and welfare support networks.  Having 
considered the possibility of an ethical relation within which new possibilities for subjectivity can 
be imagined, it becomes pertinent to think about the kind of communities that might arise from 
such relations (Day, 2005: 179; see also Deleuze, 1995: 115). Here, I would like to consider 
                                            
97
 Other thinkers, who I have not had space to fully include, articulate similar ideas. These include Buber (2004 [1937], passim) whose 
distinction between the I-It relation and the I-Thou relation mirrors LevinasÕ and BahktinÕs distinctions between viewing the ÔotherÕ as 
an object of the self and viewing the ÔotherÕ as a fully autonomous subject in his or her own right.  See also Irigary (1996) who 
introduced the word ÔtoÕ into the traditional phrase ÔI love youÕ; thus Ð ÔI love to youÕ - in order to Ôavoid falling back into the horizon of 
the reduction of the subject to the object, to an item of propertyÕ (Irigaray, 1996: 111). 
98
 Thanks are due to Paul Chatterton for raising the important issue that interpersonal relationships can also be violent and oppressive. It 
is important to distinguish the idea of an interpersonal ethics from interpersonal relationships without allowing one to become 
transcendent or fixed; it is therefore possible to posit the desiribility of a utopian ethics that is contingent on listening to the position of 
the other Ð with which violence would be incompatible Ð whilst acknowledging that violence can emerge in practice (Heckert, 2008). I 
discussed processes that some of the communities I visited engage in to deal with the possibility of violence in section 7.2.4. There is no 
easy answer to the problem of dealing with violence, either within our outwith the state, yet thinking and desiring an ÔoutsideÕ to 
violence is an ethical and political imperative.  
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theorists who offer an alternative to alienated politics through an emphasis on immediate 
experience and actions, and creating alternatives in the present.  
 
This emphasis on practice and immediate action is something that has a long tradition from utopian 
socialism and classical anarchism (Day, 2005, passim). The importance of unmediated social 
relationships for forms of anarchism was considered in Chapter 2, ÒapproachÓ (see particularly 
Buber 1996 [1950], Kropotkin 1987 [1902],  Landauer, 1983 [1911]). This was usually articulated 
as Ôthe social principleÕ: Ôa living togethernessÕ constantly renewing itself through Ôthe immediacy 
of relationshipsÕ (Buber, 1996 [1949]: 135). Although I find these thinkers useful for imagining 
unmediated relationships, and particularly forms of life which are not separated from processes of 
governing, I feel that their emphasis on the village community (Buber, 1951: 6, Kropotkin, 1970 
[1896]: 235), or the Kibbutz (Buber, 1996 [1949]: 147)  does not provide sufficient account of how 
the unalienated self and unmediated, non-hierarchical relationships can exist in the context of the 
kind of multiple identities and communities which, we are often told, are increasingly becoming a 
part of Ôthe postmodern conditionÕ: ÔNo self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations that is 
now more complex than ever beforeÕ  (Lyotard, 1984 [1979]: 15). Deleuze and Guattari articulate 
the proliferation of multiple identities and relationships in different terms: ÔOurs is becoming the 
age of minoritiesÕ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 518). The globalisation of the capitalist axiomatic 
means that deterritorialised flows of materials, people, information and labour through territorial 
spatial units undermines these bases for identity and belonging (Ibid: 517). Thus, any talk of 
community in the singular as the basis for an emerging movement of resistance is undermined 
(Day, 2005: 178). 
 
In line with my critical utopian approach, the question, then, is: what kind of communities might 
exist in the present that attempt to deal with difference without hierarchy and mediation 
presupposed by state-based approaches to rights? Or, in the words of Day, where might we find 
Ônon-hegemonic modes of constructing communal identifications?Õ (Ibid: 80). For Day, this should 
be based on the desire to break free from subjectification: Ôit is what breaks us out of the societies 
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of discipline and control, and urges us toward creating our own autonomous spacesÕ (Ibid: 181). 
This is what Day calls affinity
99
 (Ibid: 182).  
 
Affinity groups are somewhat analogous to what Deleuze would call deterritorialised assemblages 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 367: 556 & passim) or Ôactive forceÕ (Deleuze, 1983: 54: 56 & passim). 
They compose Ôa bodyÕ or Ôan assemblageÕ for as long as they have a common goal or purpose, and 
then they have the ability to disintegrate, split or multiply before they stagnate, reterritorialise, or 
become oppressive. What is significant about affinity groups is that they are not based on 
hegemonic or fixed identities, such as class in Marxism, or interest or ethnic groups in the identity 
politics of liberal multiculturalism (Day, 2005: 181; Agamben, 1993: 85; Bonanno, 1998 [1996]). 
Instead, they construct more fluid identifications (Day, 2005: 181), based upon deepened 
knowledge of the other, a critique of the dominant system, a shared desire for something better and 
an orientation towards action. This is most strongly articulated by Bonanno: 
That is why we maintain there is a need for the formation of small groups based on the concept 
of affinity, even tiny groups made up of very few comrades who know each other and deepen 
this knowledge because there cannot be affinity if one does not have knowledge of the other. 
One can only recognise one's affinities by going into the elements that determine one's 
differences, by frequenting each other. This knowledge is a personal fact, but it is also a 
question of ideas, debate, discussions. But É there can be no going into ideas if there is not 
also a practice of bringing about actions. So, there is a continual reciprocal process of going 
into ideas and realising actions  (Bonanno, 1998 [1996], 
http://www.geocities.com/kk_abacus/ioaa/tension.html accessed April 8, 2009) 
 
A person can be a member of more than one affinity group, oriented to different purposes, at one 
time and there is no prerequisite that affinity groups be composed solely of anarchists (Ibid.). What 
is essential to affinity groups, however, is that they do not become reactive
100
 or hegemonic. What 
defines an affinity group is that it maintains a state of permanent conflict with the hegemonic or 
dominant system; that it maintains autonomy and does not form relations with political parties, 
trade unions, or other fixed identity-based programmes that subordinate difference, and that it does 
                                            
99
 The term is not originally DayÕs. Although he does not provide an etymology, the term seems to originate from the groupos de 
afinidad that emerged in Spain during the 1880s (Alexander, 1999: 60). It has been used in activist circles for many years, but usually 
not in formal academic works. However, the term has been used in published pamphlets of anarchists and post-left anarchists prior to 
DayÕs usage; see particularly Bonanno (1998 [1996]).  
100
 In the Deleuzian sense outlined in sections 2.5.2 and 7.3.4 of this thesis. 
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not itself propose Ôplatforms or generic claimsÕ but rather faces problems Ôone by oneÕ (Ibid.). 
Thus, what defines affinity groups is that, unlike liberal and republican political models, there is no 
separation between governing and living, being and doing, belonging and acting, identitfication and 
participation, rights and responsibilities, or Ôactive force from what it can doÕ (Deleuze, 1983: 53). 
There is a critical and transgressive utopian orientation towards a solidarity based upon 
simultaneous critique and creation, and a post-left utopian orientation towards action in the present. 
These orientations serve as the cohesive force for communities driven by what Day (2005: 188) 
following Elam (1994: 105) calls Ôgroundless solidarityÕ: an ethic of relation which reaches beyond 
the affinity group towards all people and groups engaged in struggle, regardless of, or rather 
precisely because of, unmediated diversity. The question remains, however, of how such groups 
might aim to achieve change if denied recourse to a politics of demand and representation by their 
own fundamental logic? 
 
8.3.5. Active creation of alternatives 
I have previously argued that dominant approaches to rights rely on a politics of demand, where 
competing claims and identities battle for ÔrightsÕ of recognition in the public sphere (section 
8.2.5). This form of politics assumes the desirability of the integration and incorporation of 
difference into a higher unity (the state) and endows citizens with an abstracted identity that 
separates them from their own autonomous activity and undermines the intrinsic value of social, 
community and friendship bonds. Although a politics of demand often appeases discontent, I 
argued that it does not always produce the desired effects, and also perpetuates hegemonic and 
hierarchical structures by presupposing them. The question here is: How might affinity-based 
communities compel the realisation of their desires, and wider social change, without resort to a 
politics of demand? 
 
A first step, returning to the consideration of ontological difference, is to recognise and assert the 
impossibility of integration: there will always be something that overflows or escapes 
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hegemonising forces and subjectification. This can be done through the celebration and enjoyment 
of friendship, solidarity or social bonds without the need for common identity:  
Whatever singularities cannot form a societas because they do not possess any identity to 
vindicate nor any bond of belonging for which to seek recognition. In the final instance the 
state can recognize any claim for identity Ð even that of a State identity within the State (the 
recent history of relations between the State and terrorism is an eloquent confirmation of this 
fact). What the State cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that singularities form a 
community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable 
condition of belonging (Agamben, 1993: 86). 
 
That is, affinity groups have the intrinsic ability to undermine hegemony through their very 
existence. Another step is the creation of active alternatives in the present which mitigate the need 
for the kinds of resources that might otherwise be conceded by the state; to literally undercut the 
State by replacing the goods and services that it offers with active alternatives at the ÔlowerÕ, 
unmediated level of the social bond or affinity group.  
 
The theory of action-oriented affinity groups based on non-hegemonic political action resonates 
with the contemporary practice of direct action and Ôdo-it-yourself cultureÕ as empirical referents. 
Direct action is perhaps a better-known term, but is often defined negatively, as protest or reaction 
against the established system. Direct action: 
rejects reformist politics such as electing representatives as ineffective in bringing about 
change. It involves us taking responsibility for solving problems and achieving demands using 
strikes, occupations, blockades and other forms of public protest (The Trapese Collective, 
2007a: xii; see also McKay, 1996: 128).  
 
Direct action can be seen as a part of the wider phenomenon of a Ôdo-it-yourself culture, which 
embraces not only protest activities but also more creative, autonomous practices which exist 
ÔoutsideÕ the traditional political framework and provide critical utopian alternatives to the 
dominant system (The Trapese Collective 2007a: xii; McKay, 1996: 1-2; McKay 1998: passim). 
Direct action and do-it-yourself culture are potentially political manifestations of the critical and 
transformative functions of utopia, which simultaneously criticise the present, whilst pointing 
towards alternative futures. 
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Examples of direct action and do-it-yourself culture include: Ôdumpster-divingÕ
101
 (Black, 1997: 
141) to obtain free food rather than relying upon capitalist food production; squatting to provide 
social housing for the homeless (Ward, 1973: 67-73 and Ward 2005 [2002], passim), permaculture, 
sustainable living and Ôappropriate technologyÕ (Gilroy-Scott, 2007) which attempt to provide 
critical alternatives to environmentaly destructive industrialisation; health collectives and Ôradical 
medicineÕ that criticise and try to overcome some of the power relations inscribed in traditional 
medicine and the capitalisation of the drug industry (Gordon & Griffiths, 2007); popular education 
that is overtly critical of the staus quo (The Trapese Collective, 2007b); growing vegetables in 
community gardens to provide food and demonstrate more sustainable ways of living (Bryan & 
Cutler, 2007); cultural activism that opens space for non-capitalistic information, alliance-building 
and fun (Verson, 2007); appropriating and using autonomous spaces for organising and 
participating in many of the aforementioned actions (Bey, 1985; Chatterton & Hodkinson, 2006; 
Chatterton, 2007; Chatterton & Hodkinson, 2007; Cavallo, 2007), producing independent media to 
disseminate radical ideas (Carey, 1998; Harding, 1998; Feeney, 2007; Fuzz, 2007), and 
ÔreclaimingÕ unused spaces for illegal free parties or celebrations (Maylon 1998; Wright 1998; 
Rietveld 1998). The list is seemingly endless, and possibilities are limited only by the imagination 
and desires of participants. State prohibition and interference can often obstruct the realisation of 
desires, although the anarchistic assertion of permanent conflict and continuous critique-based 
practice affirms that creative alternatives will continue to surface102. Key to direct action is 
prefiguration Ð that its means are in accordance with the desired ends Ð which differentiates it from 
civil disobediance (Franks, 2003: 18). Another key feature is that Ôfor it to be properly ÒdirectÓ, the 
act intends to effect the individuals carrying it outÕ (Ibid: 20), which differentiates it from 
consequentialist revolution (Ibid: 23). What is critical utopian about these activities is that they 
both criticise the status quo, but simultaneously offer something different, which has benefits for 
                                            
101
 This is the American term for the practice of obtaining food from commercial waste disposal units that might otherwise have gone to 
waste. In the United Kingdom the practice is more often referred to as ÔskippingÕ. 
102
 It is important to note that not all direct action is anarchist, and the tactic has also been used by groupings on the right, such as fuel 
tax protesters and the Countryside Alliance (Franks, 2003: 28-9). Although these groups also consider themselves to be oppressed in 
some manner and take direct steps to overcome this, anarchist forms of direct action can be distinguished from these forms since they 
promote non-hierarchical alternatives and reject vanguard actions (Ibid: 29) and do not rely on a universalist construction of the 
oppressed group (Ibid, p. 31), and yet they do attempt to forge links between differently oppressed groups (Ibid, p. 29).  
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participants and the wider community, and also an estranged or alternative perspective from which 
further criticism can emerge.  
 
All this is done through immediate, and unmediated action undertaken in the present. Where 
groups and communities have identified a lack, a need or desire, they have taken steps to fulfil own 
requirements through self-management and self-organisation, rather than petitioning the state for 
initially abstract ÔrightsÕ, which may take some time to materialise into the goods or serivces 
promised, if at all. This offers a distinct criticism of, and alternative to, conventional models of 
citizenship that seek integration into the state through ÔrightsÕ. This is what I am calling Ôcritical 
utopian citizenshipÕ. Some of these actions may only serve the needs and desires of the affinity 
group themselves, whereas others may reach out to a wider population, providing opportunities for 
new links, networks and affinities to form on the basis of infinite responsibility, care, and 
groundless solidarity.  
 
8.4. Summary of chapter 
In this chapter, I have attempted to partially address, with regards to formulations of rights, two of 
the research questions put forward in section 1.3 of this thesis: Ôout of what historical conditions do 
dominant models of citizenship arise, what do they have in common, and what are their effects?Õ 
and Ôwhat alternatives are offered by critical utopian theory?Õ I have considered how legal rights 
are central to the prevailing institution of citizenship, how formulations of rights have effects upon 
citizens. Dominant theorisations of rights were judged to have certain features in common: They 
are founded on universalising myths, they assume a particular type of atomised, rational individual 
to which rights apply, abstract rights can disguise concrete privileges, rights are upheld by the state 
which mediates relationships, and finally dominant institutions of rights rely on a politics of 
demand. The practices associated with dominant rights formations were seen to have political and 
ethical effects on citizenship: they reify social structures in the state-form which undermines choice 
and agency, and inhibits change; they exclude non-citizens and suppress certain aspects of citizensÕ 
identities and desires leading to diminished belonging and participation, they alienate citizens from 
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one another and diminish personal responsibility, and they lead to a politics that is not always 
effective in securing belonging for certain groups and perpetuate existing inequalities. This state-
centric vision of legal citizenship is exceeded and transgressed by practices and processes of 
everyday life. Critical utopian theories attempt to account for this complexity by offering bottom-
up, active possibilities that begin from a position of critique but simultaneously offer creative 
alternatives. These include a politics of ontological difference that judges theory by its effects 
rather than its truth, disruptive subjectivities that transgress boundaries and defy fixed 
subjectification, an ethics of unmediated care and responsibility for the other, multiple and 
overlapping small communities of immanent social relations and a do-it-yourself politics of 
practical action. Critical utopian approaches afford primacy to practice and action in everyday life 
that runs in dialogue with alternative beliefs and theoretical propositions. For this reason, it is 
important to consider examples of critical utopian practices (as defined in the ÒMethodsÓ chapter 
section 3.4.1) in order to address how they speak to, transgress, critique and develop critical 
utopian alternatives to rights-based formulations of citizenship. The upcoming chapter, 
ÒTransgressing rights: practiceÓ, addresses in terms of rights the third and fourth research questions 
of section 1.3 of the ÒMethodsÓ chapter: ÔWhat theoretical and practiced alternatives to dominant 
models of citizenship are offered by political agents in autonomous spacesÕ, and Ôwhat can a 
dialogue between theory and practice tell us about the conditions for a critical utopian citizenshipÕ. 
Some, but not all of the ideas and practices considered above are engaged in by the communities 
that I discuss in this thesis. These communities also engage in some activities not on this list. This 
illustrates the potentially infinite variety of unalienated experiences, practices and actions that 
might be viewed as critical utopian.  
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9. Transgressing Rights: Practice 
9.1. Typology 
 Kebele S.hill HHP CPH Find.n  MGC  LSC Corani  LH 
Explicitly Spiritual  
(constitution) 
    X     
Beliefs unspecified X X X X  X X X X 
Specify diversity as 
an ethos  
X  X X X X X X ? 
Individualist ethos 
evident 
 X X  X X   X 
Collectivist ethos 
evident 
X X X X X X X X X 
Holistic Ethos 
evident 
  X  X X   X 
Income sharing        X  
Other deep sharing 
ethos 
X   X X X X X X 
Limited sharing  X X       
Aim of self-reliance 
in 
production/consum
ption 
  X X X   X X 
Provision of cheap 
or free services to 
wider communities 
X   X  X X X  
Provision of 
charged services or 
educational courses 
to wider 
communities 
  X  X  X  X 
Attempt to 
avoid/bypass statist 
politics 
X       X  
Engage in state 
politics 
X X X X X  X  ? 
Acceptance of 
government or 
corporate funding 
X X X X ?  X  ? 
Figure 9-1: Typology showing ethical values and practices of autonomous communities 
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9.2. Actualisations: transgressing ÔrightsÕ in utopian practice 
9.2.1. Ontologies 
In section 8.2.1 I considered how dominant theorisations of rights are based on a foundational 
ontology of moral truth and fixity. Utopian alternatives to rights discourses rest on the idea of 
ontological difference, which emphasises potentiality, contingency and flux (section 8.3.1). I would 
now like to consider the relation of ontology to ethical relationships in utopian practice. In so 
doing, I will attempt to answer the following questions using evidence from interview transcripts 
and participant observation: 
¥ Do autonomous communities offer a space in which dominant political ontology can be 
questioned? 
¥ What kinds of alternative ontologies (if any) do communities and their members espouse? 
¥ What are the effects of these ontologies upon everyday life and ethical praxis, and do they 
challenge foundational rights discourse? 
 
9.2.1.1. Do autonomous communities offer a space in which dominant political ontology 
can be questioned? 
Many of the communities do not explicitly engage with particular belief systems in their founding 
principles, aims or constitutions, but there was often an enthusiasm for discussing beliefs and 
values during interview, and also during everyday life within the collectives. Autonomous 
communities quite clearly offered environments where ideas, beliefs and values could be discussed 
openly, criticised and experimented with, and an atmosphere of acceptance of enthusiasm for a 
variety of views, as illustrated in the following quotes from interviews: 
I suppose our basic shared value is that it doesnÕt matter what peopleÕs views are, or who or 
what somebody is, so long as they are respectful towards themselves and others (Interview: 
Ali, Kebele, 7 April 2007) 
 
It doesnÕt matter what your reasons for wanting to live here are, I donÕt think they need to be 
absolutely shared values because then youÕd just end up with a load of clones living here 
(Interview: Anna [name changed to preserve anonymity], Laurieston Hall, 22 September 
2007). 
 
I think we all have our own inspiration and personal development paths and spiritual paths 
(Interview: Layla, Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 1007) 
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As a person living in this house, Peace House, you have to be ready to disclose some of the 
prejudices that sometimes we carry round, you have to be ready to accommodate anybody, and 
live with anybody, and be respectful to anybody (Interview: Frank, Coventry Peace House, 10 
May 2007) 
 
Such views were fairly widespread, and indeed more than half of the communities explicitly stated 
diversity of backgrounds, beliefs, and/or values as a founding principle in constitutions, whilst all 
of the communities apparently pursued this principle without documenting it explicitly, as 
evidenced in interviews and observations103. This kind of openness to ontological difference and 
experimentation could be seen to emulate the utopian theories that I discussed earlier. Equally, 
however, they could be interpreted to reflect liberal notions of multiculturalism and deontology 
which were considered dominant; both of which were seen to condone the maintenance of 
individualsÕ and groupsÕ ÔrightsÕ against uniformity, yet still relied on implicit foundations. It is 
hard to tell, when beliefs are left to the individual, whether certain accepted foundations remain. As 
can be seen in the typology, the only community that espoused a community-wide belief system, 
specified within its constitution
104
 was Findhorn. Findhorn is a particularly interesting case, since it 
is the only explicitly spiritial community, so is worth considering in more detail. 
 
9.2.1.2. What kinds of alternative ontologies (if any) do communities and their members 
espouse? 
Although explicitly spiritual, Findhorn community does not specify any particular spiritual path 
that must be followed: ÔI commit myself to active spiritual practice and to align with spirit to word 
for the greater goodÕ (see appendix 5). It is interesting that even in this first sentence of the 
constitution, ontological value is defined in terms of ethical effects rather than foundations; that is 
in terms of ÔgoodÕ rather than ÔtruthÕ. This theme continues throughout the commonground: 
I commit myself to the expansion of human consciousness, including my own, and I recognise 
and change any of my personal attitudes or behaviour patterns which do not serve this aim. I 
                                            
103
 It is important to note that an over-reliance on explicit textual commentary can lose some of the nuances of how the place works in 
practice Ð those who do not identity with the strong political identity of a place like Kebele might feel implicitly excluded Ð a dynamic 
sometimes articulated in terms of the Ôactivist-ghettoÕ (Chatterton and Hodkinson 2007: 214; see also this thesis sections 9.2.4 and 
9.3.5). It is also important to note that althoguh these interviewees emphasise inclusiveness in these quotes, it is unlikely that they would 
extend this to others whose own political views were exclusive or oppressive, such as extreme right-wing racists and Nazis. 
104
 See Appendix 5 for ÒThe Common GroundÕ, which is the constitutional set of aims and beliefs, as well as a code of conduct, for both 
Findhorn Foundation and the New Findhorn Association (see appendices 1 and 4 for diagrammatic explanations of the different agencies 
that make up the Findhorn Community). The document is very important for the community, was decided by consensus by members 
present at the time of its composition, and all new members must agree to abide by it. 
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take full responsibility for the spiritual, environmental and human effects of all my activities 
(Ibid). 
 
Despite a commitment to spirituality, there does not seem to be the same degree of abstraction and 
universalism as is conventionally associated with religion. Spiritual discourse and concepts at 
Findhorn do not seem to disguise the desires of a dominant group, but more often seem to refer 
back to the self: 
I recognise that anything I see outside myselfÑany criticisms, irritations or appreciationsÑ
may also be reflections of what is inside me. I commit to looking at these within myself before 
reflecting them to others (Ibid). 
 
I commit wholeheartedly to respect other people (their differences, their views, their origins, 
backgrounds and issues), other peopleÕs and the communityÕs property, and all forms of life, 
holding these all to be sacred and aspects of the divine (Ibid). 
 
The discourse seems to have some commonality with poststructural anarchism, insofar as the value 
of ontology is based upon its effects, including a flourishing of difference, rather than upon claims 
to foundations and veracity (May, 1994: 116). 
 
9.2.1.3. What are the effects of these ontologies upon everyday life and ethical praxis, and 
do they challenge foundational rights discourse? 
The idea that belief systems were political was articulated by one interviewee at Findhorn: 
I mean the term we have been playing with for the last few years is Ôspiritual activistÕ, you 
know it often felt like if you were politically active then you werenÕt on the spiritual level, and 
we have struggled to bring the whole meta-view of we are all spiritual, we are all one and 
interconnected, into some kind of arena (Interview: Mari, Findhorn Foundation 18 June 2007) 
 
Spiritual beliefs play an integral part in all day-to-day activities at Findhorn, particularly in 
practices of ÔattunementÕ (see section 7.2.2). The somewhat pantheistic ontology expressed through 
the belief in and respect for the divinity within all life and nature often leads to practices aimed at 
preserving nature and allowing life to flourish. During my participation in gardening work, the 
ÔGardening FocaliserÕ (somewhat akin to a Ôhead gardenerÕ) held that life is even within tools, and 
that after working in the garden with a tool, for example a trowel, must thank the tool for its use, 
wash and coat it with oil before replacing it. The ostensible belief-basis of the action being spiritual 
(respect for the ÔlifeÕ or divinity within the tool), the effects would be that tools and lasted longer, 
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which also meant less waste (extracted and adapted from participant observation notes, 11 June 
2009). This is just one example of how a belief system can provide a basis for political actions, 
based upon respect for and protection of the ÔotherÕ (in this case, the physical environment) which 
do not rely upon hierarchically imposed rights but rather upon something (a belief system, for 
example) that emanates from the self. This theme will be further elaborated upon below. 
 
9.2.2. Subjectivity 
Previously (section 8.2.2) I discussed how dominant notions of rights rest on epistemological and 
methodological individualism, which sets up an opposition between the individual and the 
community, leading to an ethical relation between self and other that presupposes dominance and 
hierarchy. This categorises the individual in a specific manner that fixes him (or her) into a specific 
role or identity, leading to the oppression of self-creativity and the oppression of difference. 
Critical utopian theoretical approaches, by contrast, emphasise the desire to break free from 
subjectification and to disrupt any attempts to represent or hegemonise identity (section 8.3.2). 
Here, I would like to consider how utopian practices disrupt binary thought and subjectivities 
through a consideration of the following questions: 
¥ Do autonomous communities offer a space in which binary thought and atomised 
subjectivities can be questioned? 
¥ In what ways do communities and/or their members disrupt or challenge the 
epistemological framework of subject/object? 
¥ What are the ethical effects of any such disruption, and do they challenge conventional 
rights-based models? 
 
9.2.2.1. Do autonomous communities offer a space in which binary thought and atomised 
subjectivities can be questioned? 
To a greater or lesser extent, all intentional or autonomous communities have one thing in 
common: a belief in community as having the potential to offer something different, and the 
willingness to adopt this as a lifestyle. Interviewees articulated this variously: 
The theoretical base was to live our politics and to live our ideas of social change and to 
develop those in a place where it was possible to do it. So we didnÕt move to the country to get 
away from the city, we moved towards being a social change co-operative with a very political 
slant, and we were happy to be seen as part of a movement for social change revolution, and 
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that was what it was about that I was really keen on, and why I came here. So it was the 
actuality of breaking down roles in the family, of breaking down roles between adults and 
children so they werenÕt just within the family, breaking down expectations about power 
structures, challenging sexist norms, everything. (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 
September 2007) 
 
Communities have different aims and principles, and the desire to break down traditional roles and 
identities may be expressed differently, or less explicitly. All, however, are united by a willingness 
to live differently, in a different type of community, and to explore the implications of this in 
everyday life, through practice. Indeed this point is almost definitional within my case selection 
criteria for autonomous spaces (section 3.4.1). 
 
9.2.2.2. In what ways do communities and/or their members disrupt or challenge the 
epistemological framework of subject/object? 
PatrickÕs passage above shows how communities intentionally attempt to offer space where 
traditional binary or hierarchical roles can be transgressed by practices that offer new relationships. 
This was also apparent in the theoretical chapter that considered how holistic or imminent views of 
the self/other relation deviate from Manichean practices based upon the liberal, rights-bearing 
citizen (section 8.3.2). Other respondents expressed the effects of social relationships upon 
subjectivity: 
[A good community member is] somebody who does care about the people they live with and 
the people that they donÕt live with and recognises really that we are all social beings and we 
canÕt live without each other, we are interdependent, we are not our own little island, and that 
what affects or hurts one hurts all of us (Interview: Penny, Peace House, 10 May 2007) 
 
If you want to live in a community, all of you has to turn up and there has to be a willingness 
to be an integral and proactive part of the whole (Interview: Kay Kay, New Findhorn 
Association, 18 June 2007) 
 
What is particularly worthy of note, is that although the interview quotes above, as well as the 
constitutions of most communities, expressed a belief in the utmost value of community (however 
defined), there was simultaneously a very noticeable emergent individualism (see Pepper, 1991: 
162-72). This was, however, somewhat different to the atomised and competitive individualism of 
liberal ÔrightsÕ discourse and dominant approaches to citizenship outlined in the previous chapter: 
Self-awareness I think, I mean that is the key, for me that comes before anything else, and 
being capable of recognising what goes on with myself and then if I have an issue with 
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someone, being able to tell them without being rude to them but also taking responsibility for 
myself because there are always two people involved. Self-awareness and community need to 
exist in a respectful way. And also wider community, because it is very easy to just project our 
stuff onto people but actually there are other issues. But it is really hard to get to that stage, it 
took me many many years of self-development work. And I still do that, I do project stuff, but 
I am quite aware of my patterns. Yeah and so that comes before anything. You can do 
community, like doing the gardening days, and coming to the meetings and doing the 
community jobs but then if I resent someone, that I consider not nice, in my point of view, and 
I carry this resentment, then whatÕs the point? I would rather be clear with people than just 
doing the community, this is about being as well, and being comes through self-awareness and 
honest communication (Interview: Angela, Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007) 
 
IÕm no longer going to be responsible for other people in that way and just tell the truth, and 
whoever gets fucked up, well I hope they can turn it around and do something about it, but if I 
donÕt tell the truth then itÕs almost like IÕm stealing from them as well as myself (Interview: 
Kenny, Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007) 
 
I commit myself to the service of others and to our planet, recognising that I must also serve 
myself in order to practise this effectively (Findhorn 1996, see Appendix 5). 
 
A theme in the foregoing quotes, and indeed throughout many more interviews that space prohibits 
me from citing, was the importance of looking after or caring for oneself, and clearly expressing 
your own needs and desires within the context of mutually developmental relationships. This is 
somewhat analogous to what Sargisson calls Ônew individualismÕ  (Sargisson, 2000: 145), which is 
Ôunderdeveloped in academic termsÕ (Ibid: 145). I shall examine the implications that this might 
have for a critical utopian theorisation of subjectivity in the later section on implications (section 
9.3.2), but at this stage it is important to note that the reconciliation of individualism with 
community and a more holistic ethos seems to be made sense of in the unalienated, unmediated 
relationship. A careful reading of the quotes above reveals how the self is almost always 
contextualised within a relationship with another, or with the community as a whole, rather than in 
terms of atomised needs and desires. One does not only express what one desires in order to get it, 
but also in order to develop, and to offer an authentic experience to those with whom one is 
communicating (similarly to the ideas expressed by Levinas and Bakhtin). This is reflected in an 
accepted convention at Findhorn community, which I encountered during the first meeting at 
Experience Week, and which Sargisson (1996: 147) also cites Ð that people should always speak in 
the first person singular, using ÔI statementsÕ, rather than generalising experience by saying, for 
instance, Ôone likesÕ, Ôyou would think thatÕ or Ôit feels likeÕ. This is a surprisingly difficult task at 
first, and is contrary to the register in which most academic and political theory and discourse (a 
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notable exception would be Stirner), as well as everyday conversation, takes place. It encourages 
the speaker to take ownership of their own thoughts, feelings and desires, rather than projecting 
them onto others (see AngelaÕs quote above for a recognition of the dangers of projection), and 
without abstraction and universalisation. There is an emphasis on the value of authenticity, which 
will be considered later.  
 
This is also a vision of the self in process, as unfinalised and contingent; awaiting the unpredictable 
and disruptive experience of the other which allows both parties to the relationship to develop: 
Self awareness [is and important value], and respect, honest communicaton, kindness É and 
freedom, and freedom of change sometimes. I moved here two years ago and É things change. 
I grew up in a household where É youÕre not allowed to change, and thatÕs not very nice 
(Interviews: Angela, Mornington Grove Communtiy, 8 July 2007) 
 
ItÕs a really good opportunity to hold a mirror up to the relationships in your life, and go, well 
this is that, and when you recognise it you can begin to change how you respond to it, and I 
think thatÕs a really powerful thing about communities (Interviews: Isabelle, Mornington 
Grove Community, 8 July 2007) 
 
Communities offer a space for unmediated relationships, which transgress the dominant image of 
the atomised, rational rights-bearing citizen by bringing disruptive influences such as emotions, 
desire, and messy social relationships into play. This can have positive and negative implications.  
 
9.2.2.3. What are the ethical effects of any such disruption, and they challenge 
conventional rights-based models? 
Interestingly, despite the resonance with liberal individualism (Sargisson, 1996: 149), this focus on 
the ÔIÕ appears to have the effect of disrupting atomised subjectivity; even with sometimes quite 
dramatic and worrying effects: 
I think as well I think that everyone in the community just ends up being like some part of your 
family, and they kind of represent that person for you, so if you havenÕt worked out stuff with 
your mum or your dad or your brother then people in the community will start to actually 
represent those things for you, so itÕs actually a tremendous opportunity to deal with your shit, 
for example you think that Ôthat person IÕm always railing against for telling me to do this or 
that, you know IÕm bringing my stuff from when I was a kid in, when my mum used to tell me 
to do this or thatÕ. (Interview: Isabelle, Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007).  
 
Also [I came here] to get over my shit, because I would rather get over my shit here, which is a 
family replacement in a way, and in any group one would ordinarily project their families, so I 
thought IÕd rather fuck up here than fuck up my own family once I make one (laughs), fuck 
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these people up instead (laughs) (Interview: Kenny, Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 
2007). 
 
Sometimes people come because they are really seeking something that will make sense to 
them and sometimes here where they are loved and supported and they have never felt so ok, 
they may flip out and can become erratic, and we just, you know, help them through, to get 
over that, or not (Interview Kay Kay, New Findhorn Association, 18 June 2007) 
 
The final quote in particular resonates with a warning from Deleuze and Guattari, that 
experimenting with alternative forms of subjectivity can lead to madness through a loss of 
subjectification altogether (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 178). More positive viewpoints on the 
effects of disrupting dominant models of relationships and subjectivity (as we have seen the two 
are blurred in this context) often centred around children and families: 
I think for children itÕs amazing, because one of the ways the world is going to be changed is 
through children, through giving them the right environment and the right education, and itÕs 
something rounded, and something very grounded, because when you live communally thereÕs 
so many people around you, so many elders and so many examples, it just breaks the 
individual isolation. There are so many single mums, and even living in a couple itÕs tough, 
and itÕs tough on the child, and to have lots and lots of other adults that the child can go to and 
spread out that reliability, and just to reach out to (Interview: Isabelle, Mornington Grove 
Community, 8 July 2007) 
 
Our children
105
 were just here last week, who have left and gone out, and what they bring into 
their business, their school, their charity or whatever they are involved with, and are just more 
centred people, and must be a useful presence in the hubbub of the day, and just letting things 
be ok. ThatÕs already a big piece of work (Interview: Mari, Findhorn Foundation, 18 June 
2009). 
 
It was interesting to meet young people who had grown up on communities, and although I did not 
have the opportunity to interview any, I was lucky enough to have my visit to Findhorn coincide 
with the annual Ôyouth reunionÕ. I also met some young people at Laurieston Hall who had returned 
from University for the summer. Many of these young people seemed to have a particularly 
outstanding emotional awareness and maturity, as well as social and political awareness and 
interest, which at Findhorn were commented upon extensively by some of the other guests with 
whom I shared the ÔExperience WeekÕ. None of the young people I spoke to had chosen to 
                                            
105
 It is important to note that Mari is here referring to children brought up in Findhorn Foundation, rather than to her own children. 
Chapter 9: Transgressing Rights: Practice 
 
239 
continue living in community
106
, and had forsaken this lifestyle for more conventional 
arrangements. Some stated their intention to join a different community when they wanted to have 
children themselves. There was a feeling that living in a community was ÔboringÕ for teenagers and 
young adults: 
it can be difficult to get the stimulus you want from just living here, so you might eye-up the 
outside world for pursuing some aspect of your career or your personality which you canÕt do 
all the time here (Interviews: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007).  
 
Indeed, it would perhaps seem odd or unhealthy if many young people chose to stay at the 
community in which they had been born, since it would bring into question somewhat the 
ÔintentionalÕ, voluntary and anti-hegemonic values of these places.  
 
This interposition of a layer of community between the individual and the state also challenges the 
liberal public/private divide, or notions of space that separate a ÔprivateÕ, family or household 
sphere from the ÔpublicÕ political arena. The fact that community boundaries are often very porous, 
with the comings and goings of several long- and short- term guests, visitors, probationary 
members, meeting attendees and membersÕ friends and family means that it is sometimes difficult 
to differentiate the ÔprivateÕ space of the community from the ÔpublicÕ space of the wider world: 
It's almost like a cross between living in a big family and in a community centre (Interview: 
Nick, Coventry Peace House, 9 May 2007).  
 
From my experience I think that there is a feeling amongst many people that a community is a 
place that you can go and be safe. And you can probably go and hide a bit. And in some 
respects that is true, because you are part of a collective rather than just Mrs Smith in a house 
on a high street. But on the other hand it is like joining a bigger family and in those 
circumstances, nowhere to hide (Interview: Kay Kay, Findhorn, 18 June 2007).  
 
I struggled quite a lot with the politics of the place when I first came here, although I initially 
had this kind of honeymoon period of thinking it was all fantastic, yippee, super, and then 
reality bit, and I really struggled for about 6 months and thought, I just donÕt know if I can live 
here, itÕs too challenging, a bit like walking round with no clothes on really, and because IÕve 
never lived in community before, it was suddenly like going from a very private, nuclear-
family type lifestyle to being very much in the public arena, inasmuch as public of the 
                                            
106
 Interestingly, two of the young people who I met, as well as the daughter of one of my interviewees, who I did not meet, had chosen 
to study intentional communities for their undergraduate or MastersÕ dissertations at university. Others were making careers in 
alternative technologies, sustainability and in NGOs, which could quite conceivably have been inspired by the environment and values 
of their upbringings. 
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community, and I found it really difficult to cross over that thing of letting people get to know 
me, and get to know all of my foibles as well as the good side, and being really honest with 
people in a sort of very blatant way, and I struggled with that for quite a while, and also found 
the backbiting that goes on very difficult to deal with, because again it was this thing of people 
would have all this aggression and resentment and anxiety, and not actually confront the 
person, so it was all being talked about behind peopleÕs backs and not actually being dealt 
with, and I really struggled with that for months and thought that I just couldnÕt deal with it, it 
was taking up too much of my emotional energy and, how am I going to live with it and keep 
doing all of the things that I need to do (Interview: Anna [name changed to preserve 
anonymity], Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007). 
 
I find this image of nakedness, and being unable to hide (articulated in the previous quote) 
compelling. It presents a stark contrast to traditional models of citizenship operating through 
mediation and representation; the screen of the universal ÔcitizenÕ whose primary public/political 
relation is to the abstract state, rather than with other individuals with whom he/she shares land, 
facilities, and resources. The latter quote shows that there are also some difficulties; that ÔprivateÕ 
life can become ÔpoliticalÕ in a negative sense - destructive feelings might play a part in decision-
making processes or lead to exclusions, and the emotional input can be quite exhausting. It is 
important to note, however, that after this phase the interviewee in question, after deciding to leave 
the community and almost doing so, later came out feeling stronger, and now lives in the 
community very happily: 
I feel IÕve come out the other side and IÕm really glad IÕve done it, itÕs been a real growth 
process for me, really interesting getting to know myself better and also realising that it was a 
process that I had to go through in order to be able to settle here, and I think different people 
do it in different ways but I think that that was the way that I needed to do it, and even just 
down to the very thing of putting a note up saying IÕm leaving really liberated me, because I 
was then able to relax and just be who I was and then realised, Ôoh, itÕs ok, people actually 
donÕt hate me and itÕs ok and I can manage it,Õ and slowly realising that itÕs ok and I can do it. 
But I think also a lot of it had to do with that thing of feeling, because it is as I have said a very 
work-oriented place, I felt, because IÕm quite a conscientious person I always felt like I wanted 
to give as much as I possibly could and I was really just doing too much physically, and so I 
was just burning out basically, because everyone has such different ideas of what it is to be a 
good member, and you just canÕt ever fulfil everybodyÕs criteria. When I first came, thatÕs 
what I was trying to do basically, so it had to come to an end at some point (Interview: Anna 
[name changed to preserve anonymity], Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007). 
 
A micropolitics of disruptive subjectivity works as a critique of dominant modes of relating and as 
the basis for resistance. This theme was recurrent throughout interviews, and is expressed 
particularly clearly here: 
WeÕre still really into change the world one person at a time or change the world by looking at 
it differently, see it differently and the world has changed is still the motif (Interview: Mari, 
Findhorn Foundation, 18 June 2007). 
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The effect of disrupting traditional subjectivities through unmediated and unalienated relationships 
can be seen as a basis for wider social change, through experimenting with and exemplifying new 
types of ethical relationship, through the subtraction of power from the state and the creation and 
potential proliferation of self-managing communities, and through engagement with wider society 
and politics. The following sections will discuss these avenues, beginning with the first. 
 
9.2.3. Privilege, equality and difference 
Previously (section 8.2.3), I considered how dominant notions of ÔrightsÕ in fact serve to disguise 
and legitimise the desires and privileges of dominant groups, to the exclusion of other groups from 
ÔfullÕ or ÔactiveÕ citizenship. This is done through a discourse and practice of Ôequal rightsÕ, which 
presumes an equivalence and homogeneity of citizens that in actuality is a myth. Critical utopian 
alternatives valorise difference by privileging the unalienated experience of self and of other, 
which results in an ethics of care and infinite responsibility to the other, regardless, or rather 
because of, their difference and irreducibility. In this section on utopian practices, I would like to 
consider the relation of difference to equality through an examination of the following themes: 
¥ Do autonomous communities offer a space for processes which allow for the negotiation of 
difference and (in)equality? 
¥ What are these processes (if any) and how do they work? 
¥ What are the ethical effects of such processes? Do they challenge conventional moral 
relationships? 
 
9.2.3.1. Do autonomous communities offer a space for processes which allow for the 
negotiation of difference and (in)equality? 
Related to the above section on subjectivity and transgressions of binaries relating to self/other and 
individual/community, are the ethical relations that follow from unmediated community relations. 
This can have implications on physical, material and ideological levels.  
 
On the material or economic level, an extreme example of responsibility or care for the needs of 
the other can be found in the practice of income sharing; a practice adopted by some of the 
communities that I visited during their histories, but only at one Ð Corani Ð at the time of my visit. 
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Income sharing at Corani relates to the wider aims and principles of the community (see 
Appendices 8 & 9). In particular, income sharing is seen to promote equality and sustainable living 
and to reduce reliance on the state and external agencies. Here, the immediate, rather than state-
mediated relationship, at the scale of the community where seen to be conducive to a particular 
type of ethical relation:  
I think one way we certainly try to deal with [the state] is minimising the influence (long 
pause). That shows É in the more immediate example of the income sharing group where we 
would seek for people to minimise or even avoid altogether, taking benefit from the state, and 
being dependent on the state. And instead of being dependent on the state, to actually be 
dependent on the group, I mean to be interdependent with the group É there is one of our 
members who actually limits their income in order to avoid paying tax, because they disagree 
with certain things that the government does with that tax money. And the rest of us support 
that person in that view, by being prepared to share our income which has been taxed with 
them (Interview: Guy, Corani, 7 July 2007) 
 
This ethical interdependence with, and respect for the other, can also operate on the level of ideas 
and beliefs, and interviewees stressed the importance of Ôtrying to understand in terms of 
everyoneÕs realitiesÕ (Interview, Ingo, Kebele, 7 April 2007). There was also an important 
emotional, or pastoral element of responsibility and care for the other: 
I think thereÕs a shared value to care for each other at some level, if you accept someone to be a 
member, and we all have to accept someone to join, then you are accepting a level of care for 
that person. So whilst by no means everybody here is best friends with each other, and I know 
there are plenty of, well not exactly huge hostilities, but there are certainly antagonisms as in 
any groups, there is a shared thing that if there was a person in trouble on the edge of this clan, 
or tribe, we would gather round to support them (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 
September 2007). 
 
Thus, to a certain degree, communities can offer a space where responsibility and care take the 
place of transcendental models of value and the hierarchical mediation of conflict. The above 
quotes show how, in the last instance, responsibility and care for a community member are primary 
values, and are often viewed as more important than personal wealth and antagonisms. 
 
9.2.3.2. What are these processes (if any) and how do they work? 
Although care and responsibility are often seen to be primary values, many communities embed 
processes and practices which ensure that this can be carried through, even when communication or 
empathy break down. Consensus decision-making, as described in more detail in the Chapter 6 
(section 6.3.2), could be seen to speak directly to BakhtinÕs notion of the polyphonic concept of 
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truth. Having previously considered the process of consensus, I would like to concentrate here on 
the ethical implications and effects upon relationships, as well as the ways in which consensus 
offers an alternative to state-mediated, transcendental concepts of ÔrightÕ. 
 
One interesting theme that ran through the interviews in this respect is that of ÔauthenticityÕ and 
genuineness, particularly in the context of consensus decision-making: 
[A good member is] committed and genuine. There is no room for deception here. Everyone is 
completely open and honest (Interview: Boyd, Kebele, 7 April 2007). 
 
[An important value is] integrity, so when you say you will do something then sticking to it. 
Also commitment, [indecipherable] and people who communicate openly and honestly as well, 
itÕs all about respect for other people and being able to anticipate things that might upset other 
people and communicating if something has upset you (Interview: Kate, Mornington Grove 
Community, 8 July 2007). 
 
The idea of personal authenticity as an important value or contribution to the group links to the 
theme of Ônew individualismÕ discussed above, and particularly the idea that suppressing personal 
emotions, feelings and viewpoints is akin to subtracting value or even ÔstealingÕ from the group. A 
process for acknowledging personal baggage and biases also exists, to facilitate decision-making: 
we start off with a heart session before we get on to deciding decisions, because if anybody is 
feeling particularly low for some reason or angry or whatever, or there is something they really 
need to sort out, it is much better to start off by sorting it out, and then the rest of the meeting 
will flow easily. If we try and do all the decision-making stuff first, we will only be acting it all 
out and it wonÕt get resolved anyway (Interview: Penny, Coventry Peace House, 10 May 2007) 
 
This emphasis on authenticity and personal expression is interesting; in some ways it is extremely 
individualistic insofar as it focuses on expressing our own needs and desires as though they are a 
priori to any kind of community relation or relationship with the other. In other respects, however, 
the opposite is true, since through the process of consensus one must always enter with a 
willingness to negotiate, modify and transform oneÕs needs and desires for the good of others and 
the group as a whole. Like BakhtinÕs polyphonic concept of truth, this process allows for the 
articulation of a wide range of voices and standpoints without their incorporation into a higher 
unity. Although a single decision may have to be made, this is not one that is predetermined or 
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prior to the process of articulation. This indicates a need for a willingness to be open to the needs 
and desires of the other: 
You canÕt unlearn what you know. Like IÕve been to India, and I have seen the poverty in India 
and I canÕt pretend I havenÕt. It isnÕt just about reading about stuff or seeing stuff on the 
television, you canÕt pretend you havenÕt seen it. But we do pretend we havenÕt seen it because 
we have to function, and we switch off a bit and that sort of thing, we all do that to some 
degree in order to survive. But being a good citizen is trying to break down some of those 
defences I think (Interview: Penny, Coventry Peace House, 10 May 2007). 
 
Here, defences, or blocking the emotions aroused by experience of the other, are seen to come after 
the ethical relation, both within and outwith the community. This resonates somewhat with the 
thought of Levinas discussed previously. I will consider this more in the concluding section of this 
chapter (section 9.3), which takes a more analytical approach. 
 
This receptiveness to the other is a necessary part of consensus decision-making, and indeed living 
in community. However, sometimes communication can break down, and conflicts arise which 
cannot be resolved through the process of consensus. In these cases, communities often will resort 
to some kind of mediation. Community members can take courses in Ônonviolent communicationÕ, 
or otherwise a facilitator can come to mediate discussions between community members who are in 
conflict (this was discussed in section 7.2.4). Sometimes, however, resolution of conflict is taken 
further, and can involve appeal to state institutions. This is even the case for Corani, which is 
surprising considering the fact, previously evidenced in an interview quote and also in their 
constitution, that Corani views autonomy from the state, including particularly financial autonomy, 
as a core value: 
I mean we may get in mediation, that has happened, not within the context of the housing co-
op, but within the income sharing group. It may become legal, that has happened within the 
housing co-op situation where there was a split, and to resolve a situation it was carried 
forward legally. I suspect in the end that it wasnÕt resolved legally, it was more resolved by 
people in the end accepting certain decisions and trying to create an elegant solution, but it 
certainly went, you know, went to involving legal process. ItÕs a challenging situation if 
somebody wonÕt go with a decision (Interview: Interview: Guy, Corani, 7 July 2007). 
 
I mean if it is sort of violent and aggressive and all the rest then we will do our best to 
negotiate and da da da da da but thereÕs a point where we draw the line and call in the police 
(Interview: Mari, Findhorn Foundation 18 June 2009) 
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It is important to note, however, that only three interviewees from a total of 22, and from several 
other informal interactions, mentioned the possibility of state intervention. The remainder were 
split fairly equally between those who reported no experience of conflict that could not be resolved 
through the process of consensus, and those who said that conflict resolution would always centre 
around the independent mediation process. 
 
9.2.3.3. What are the ethical implications of such processes? Do they challenge 
conventional moral relationships? 
It is interesting that many of the above quotes illustrate that participants, like Levinas and 
Bakhtin
107
, recognise the claim of the other upon the self as being prior to selfishness and 
competition, which are often articulated as ÔunnaturalÕ or as ÔdefencesÕ. Processes are in place to 
try to overcome these and access or reaffirm the ethical self and relation with the other. This 
relationship is seen to begin from an unmediated relationship or encounter, perhaps within the 
community. The mode of relating however, is often felt to have a wider reach: 
The whole ethos of the housing co-op, of Corani, and especially its income sharing element is 
contrary to what the wider society is saying is the best way to go about things. We view that 
the wider society is unsatisfactory, it actually harms human beings, it diminishes your 
humanity, and we believe that sharing and only consuming what you need is a much sounder 
way to go about things, and inherently more humane (Interview: Guy, Corani, 7 July 2007). 
 
In a manner, community relationships based on unmediated experience of difference must rely on a 
different kind of moral relationship to one that is mediated by the state through legal rights. It is 
important to note however, that most relationships within wider society are not mediated by the 
state (Graeber 2004: 76). The police are usually only called at the last instance when there is 
perceived to be Ôno other optionÕ. This appears to also be the same in communities.  
 
It is also important to point out that although in some quotes, interviewees articulate something 
akin to a relational construction of ethical subjectivity, this is also often mixed with a discourse of 
abstract humanism and common needs, desires and interests. The quote above illustrates this, and 
                                            
107
 I am not trying to imply here that respondents are in any way influenced by these thinkers - which is possible but for which I have no 
evidence. Instead, I am noting that similar ideas and concepts were part of the discourse of interviewees. 
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there were many further examples. In terms of the critical utopian theory I considered earlier, this 
could be viewed as unsatisfactory, since it involves the practice of uncritically representing the 
other to him or herself through ideological constructions of humanity (May, 1994: 130). The 
strange mixture of discourses of humanism, individualism and holism again comes to the fore, and 
I will later argue that theorisation might benefit from an unlikely theoretical discussion between 
Stirner and Levinas (section 9.3.2). Presently, however, I consider the notions of belonging and 
identity that form, and are formed within, autonomous communities. 
 
9.2.4. Community 
In the foregoing sections, dominant rights-based approaches to citizenship were seen to rely on a 
notion of community which is mediated by an abstract entity; the state. This was judged to alienate 
citizens from one another, and the processes of governing from those who are governed. 
ÔBelongingÕ to such a community rests upon an abstract identity that is far removed from the 
practices of maintaining the community. Critical utopian alternatives theorise a different kind of 
community, which emphasises the non-separability of the processes of community formation and 
the life of the community itself Ð through the principle and practice of affinity, the affinity group 
exists. The bond that sustains the affinity group is one of shared desire, critique and action, rather 
than a passive and imposed hegemonic (or indeed, counter-hegemonic) identity. I will seek to 
explore further the potential of the affinity-based community by exploring the following questions 
in utopian practice:  
¥ How do autonomous communities sustain feelings of belonging in members? 
¥ What kinds of, and whose, desires and actions sustain such communities? 
¥ What are the political and ethical effects of these communities, and do they challenge the 
state as the primary arena for belonging? 
 
9.2.4.1. How do communities sustain feelings of belonging in members? 
In Chapter 7, I considered how communities intend and attempt, through organisational factors, to 
exist through unmediated and non-representational relationships. The focus here is on how people 
can exist as a ÔcommunityÕ, without a hegemonic or representative identity; or without relying on 
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state mediation of difference. This connection was often seen to result from shared beliefs, goals 
and mutual activity. Internal activity to a large extent depends upon the nature of the community, 
its purposes and aims, and whether people live there or not. It also depends upon the environment 
of the space itself; the activity needed to maintain life within a rural space is very different to that 
within an urban space. All spaces however had some activities in common including cooking and 
eating, cleaning, dealing with finances, and property maintenance. Despite the different types of 
activity made possible by the different types of community, two important themes emerged from 
the interviews that seemed to be shared by all of the communities and recur throughout the 
interviews. First was that participating in tasks oriented to maintaining the community was often 
seen not only to have the intrinsic value of necessity, but also as means of strengthening 
relationships. Some examples of ways in which this was expressed: 
It's really nice when you are all together, and you really get this real sense of community, it's 
not something you would get in the meetings, because the meetings are all very procedural and 
kind of the business-end of co-op, but it's nice at the weekends when everyone is around and 
we are doing stuff and hanging out together, you get that really nice sense of doing things 
together (Interview: Nick, Coventry Peace House, 9 May 2007). 
 
I didnÕt just want to come to some hippy community where you just sit around and smoke pot 
and didnÕt get anything done, because I like doing things and I like seeing things reach fruition, 
and I love the communal tasking aspect of living here and the whole thing of sharing skills and 
resources makes total sense to me, and itÕs just a fantastic feeling when you get together with a 
bunch or twenty or so people and build something, or make a garden, or even just dung a 
garden for the winter (Interview: Anna [name changed to preserve anonymity], Laurieston 
Hall, 22 September 2007). 
 
The activity weekends are really great, É you know that you are all going to work together on 
it on that weekend. ItÕs nice for team building as well, itÕs just good to be doing it, it puts a bit 
of structure into how it works (Interview: Penny, Coventry Peace House, 10 May 2007). 
 
In this respect then, the community itself can be seen as a kind of affinity group, which relies on 
shared goals and action as well as beliefs and goals to facilitate belonging. The second theme, 
paradoxically, was that activity was not only seen as a source of bonding, but also potentially 
divisive, in that differences in individualsÕ levels of participation could introduce unwanted 
hierarchies: 
You tend to have quite a lot of kudos if you are someone who does quite a lot of work, which I 
donÕt think is necessarily a good thing, because there are people here who arenÕt quite so able-
bodied, or who are just less into doing hard work and stuff in the garden or looking after the 
animals or whatever, and so they get sidelined and criticised far more often than people who 
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are gun-ho and just do everything (Interview: Anna [name changed to preserve anonymity], 
Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007). 
 
The other hierarchy that is harder to get over is the sort of feeling of ownership is you feel that 
you do more work than everyone else, so that people can sometimes people can see you as 
hierarchically higher than them, because you are taking on more responsibility and that is part 
of the reason we brought in the minimum hours decision, so we can be sure that everyone puts 
the same work in (Interview: Boyd, Kebele, 7 April 2007).  
 
The Ôminimum hours decisionÕ at Kebele was a procedure to ensure that only volunteers who spent 
four or more hours a week doing work for the co-op could be considered Ôcore membersÕ, and 
could participate in community decision-making meetings (those who spent less hours could still 
participate in the sub-collectives). Many other communities had similar rules and guidelines for the 
amount of time that members were required to participate, yet hierarchies based on differential 
enthusiasm and ability were still reported in around half of the interviews. One interviewee had a 
term for this tension, the idea of a Ôdo-ocracyÕ: 
A friend who went on anarchist websites told me about the notion of a 'do-ocracy' which is 
basically politics which revolves around people who do things, so if you never do anything 
then basically your opinion doesn't mean anything, you are just talking the talk and not walking 
the walk. I guess to some extent there is a danger that that can happen when you live in a co-
op, because obviously the people who are putting the most energy in, and are taking most 
responsibility, or make decisions without consultation, not out of any deliberate intention to 
subvert the decision-making process, but because of the position they are in, for example if no-
one is around and they kind of think, oh well, and just assume that it is ok... well that can 
obviously degrade that sense that everyone is equal, and obviously some are more equal than 
others naturally I guess because of the people that they are (Interview: Nick, Coventry Peace 
House, 9 May 2007) 
 
This is an interesting insight, and in some respects seems unavoidable. As Nick points out, not all 
decisions can be raised in meetings, since sometimes decisions are required to be made quickly in 
everyday situations, and a person who participates regularly will more often be in situations where 
decisions need to be made. However, most of the communities did have conscious procedures in 
place in the hope of attempting to prevent power hierarchies from developing and power ossifying 
(see also section 6.3.4). 
 
9.2.4.2. What kinds of, and whose, desires and actions sustain such communities? 
Although, as I have argued above, it is possible for autonomous communities to be seen as a kind 
of affinity group, since their notion of belonging often rests on goals, beliefs, participation and 
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action rather than passive identity, it is notable that they are still territorial communities. As such, 
they can still exhibit problems of exclusivity, which interviewees expressed the need or desire to 
overcome: 
To me that is my ideal ambition for this kind of community, that you do take part in the wider 
community, rather than little communities with nothing in common (Interview: Kate, 
Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007) 
 
Theorists of affinity or other processes of non-hierarchical affiliation, such as Day, Bonanno, Bey 
and Deleuze and Guattari, showed how groups must continually avoid reterritorialization upon 
hegemonic identities (section 8.3.4). Awareness of the dangers, and indeed the actuality of 
stagnation seemed widespread throughout the communities that I visited, and was articulated in 
different terms by community members: 
WeÕre a bit monochrome, weÕre a bit middle class, white, predominantly English (Interview: 
Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 September 2007). 
 
ItÕs all very middle class really, itÕs all a little bit, in places, itÕs quite pretend, in other places 
itÕs very real. But I havenÕt found many working class people in communities, apart from their 
own families, their own communities and you know, normal unintentional natural communities 
(Interview, Kenny, Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007). 
 
Some communities were explicitly involved in attempting to overcome this perceived exclusivity 
of communities, and the worry that they were catering for the desires of a fairly homogeneous 
group only: 
Coming from a multicultural background myself, itÕs quite difficult as the background of many 
of us here, they are often, say over 70% are from a white middle class background. But over 
the last years I have seen people from the community, and people from different minorities 
taking part, for example for the bike workshop, or just coming to see what is going on, so from 
that point of view I think that it is getting better (Interview: Ingo, Kebele, 7 April 2007). 
 
Its other main aim is to take anti-capitalist and anarchist ideals out further into the wider 
community and try to break out of the so-called Ôactivist-ghettoÕ, which has had partial success 
so far (Interview: Tim, Kebele, 7 April 2007). 
 
Although the predominant identity upon which concerns of restratification seemed to focus was 
something akin to Ôwhite middle classÕ, some interviewees cited other concerns: 
We had a whole meeting once about the word feminist, I mean we say that the community is 
feminist on the website and on diggers and dreamers but because sometimes that can have a 
negative connotation, although the word itself, if you go and look at a dictionary, is actually 
really beautiful, and most people would say, yeah, actually I really agree, but it does have a 
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negative connotation out there. So for some people it is really important to have the actual 
word there, but for me it is also actually really important to make sure that also men feel 
welcome, so they are not scared, and I think that if I was a man I would be a bit worried 
(Interview: Angela, Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007) 
 
9.2.4.3. What are the political and ethical effects of these communities, and do they 
challenge the state as the primary arena for belonging? 
Concerns about the restratification of communal belonging upon a hegemonic identity - feminism, 
in the case of Mornington Grove - were seen by one interviewee to play out in the daily dynamics 
of the community, to his disadvantage as the only male:  
ItÕs time that things changed and that it is a community and not a big bully machine. And itÕs 
not an aggressive place at all, but itÕs hugely passive aggressive. Generally I am very happy 
here, and it just works very, very well. I love the people I live with, I love my life, I love the 
building, I love the area, it really very, very works for me É I know that a lot of my male 
friends donÕt really want to come and hang out here, because it has, well thereÕs a funny thing 
about this community, men donÕt apply, and when they have it doesnÕt go through. But itÕs like 
thereÕs a male curse on it, and especially masculine males. And I think there are a few girls in 
the community, who were betrayed in a community, so their husbands or boyfriends ran off 
with someone else in the community, so thatÕs something that goes on here. I think a lot of the 
girls now have relationships, where for a long time they didnÕt, so it was man-hating, man-
chasing and man-fearing, and being the only male here, I will cop it basically (Interview: 
Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007). 
 
Some of the quotes above might seem to suggest that autonomous communities serve the desires of 
only, or primarily, their members. This would not necessarily be inimical to the concept of affinity; 
although if, as some of the quotes above suggest, the desires are reflections of a dominant or 
majority identity rather than common values, goals and desire for change and action, the theoretical 
positions would suggest a loss of radical potential. What alleviates this potential loss of radicalism 
is the fact that the communities and their members on the whole recognise this homogeneity or 
exclusivity as a problem and have the shared goal of acting upon it, qua affinity. This action 
usually takes the form of outreach activities, which will be considered further in section 9.2.5. At 
this point it is most important to emphasise how outreach activities or the provision of voluntary 
services play a huge part in the day-to-day running of many of these communities; whether these 
are cheap or free services provided voluntarily, or educational services that must be paid for (see 
typology). Contact with non-community members in such situations can also be seen as a type of 
affinity, and a particularly moving example comes from the work that Coventry Peace House does 
with refugees. Peace House gives up around a quarter of its space to a refugee shelter run by 
volunteers (including the housing co-op members), and not for profit, and the only remaining 
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founding member of the community spends nearly all of her time in social and advocacy work for 
refugees, for little or no payment. Despite such forfeits, community members articulated their 
relationships to other people or groups not in terms of aid or dependency, but rather of mutual 
enrichment, common goals and solidarity: 
It has some interesting connections. I always feel itÕs an honour to have as much contact with 
refugees as we have, because they bring the rest of the world to us in that global sense, and we 
can learn about all sorts of cultures, and IÕm just learning all the while, learning more about 
BritainÕs role in it all, which has been so awful, so thatÕs good to learn about. ItÕs fantastic to 
be able to make those kinds of bridges with people in other countries (Interview: Penny, 
Coventry Peace House, 10 May 2007). 
 
[We have connections with] the Easton cowboys, which are another group from Easton 
surprisingly, theyÕre not cowboys though. TheyÕre organising an international solidarity 
football tournament later on this year, including matches in Chiapas and Lebanon, which is 
great (Interview: Boyd, Kebele, 7 April 2007) 
 
This notion of affinity or solidarity with other groups ran through interviews from most of the 
communities. The idea that people from very different backgrounds could work (or play!) together 
to criticise the status quo and to achieve something different was endemic, and resonates somewhat 
with the literature on affinity groups discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
9.2.5. Politics 
In the previous chapter (section 8.2.5) I argued that dominant notions of rights rest on a notion of 
political change that presupposes alienation and abstraction. Excluded or oppressed individuals and 
groups have recourse to changing the processes that govern their lives through a politics of 
representation and demand, involving appeal to the state. This was judged to perpetuate the 
hierarchical structures and fixed identities upon which the state depends. Alternative approaches in 
critical utopian theory seek to bypass hierarchical structures, by creating non-hierarchical 
alternatives in the present that ameliorate the need for appeal to statist structures, by reconstructing 
social commons at a non-abstracted level. Here, I will consider groups that are self-consciously 
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engaged in this kind of creation108, and will consider their potential involvement in social/political 
change by considering the following questions: 
 
¥ Do autonomous communities espouse a model of social change that bypasses state politics, 
which engages with them, or a combination of both? 
¥ What is offered, and whose needs or desires are fulfilled? 
¥ What are the implications for wider social and political change? 
 
9.2.5.1. Do autonomous communities espouse a model of social change that bypasses state 
politics, which engages with it, or a combination of both? 
The issue of the relation of autonomy to embededness within hierarchical structures is complex, 
and my fieldwork showed that neither can be seen as absolute in the realm of practice. Rather, each 
can be seen as moments and aspects. Autonomy can be conceptualised as moments of creation, 
inspiration and action that channel a critical utopian process of becoming. However, autonomous 
communities exist not only within networks and relationships with other autonomous communities 
and affinity groups, as discussed above, but are also embedded within formalised hierarchical 
structures and institutions: most notably within the neo-liberal state and capitalist economy that 
many of them seek to resist:  
There is still the challenge that although we are involved in this organisation with values that 
challenge capitalism, we are having to live within a capitalist society, and hence we get you 
know, regulated by the Financial Services Authority, we have to do accounts, we have to deal 
in money, all those sorts of things are going on, which always brings in a tension, between 
doing what you wish to do, and what you have to do (Interview: Guy, Corani, 7 July 2007). 
 
Autonomy was therefore more often expressed in terms of desire and aims, or ÔtryingÕ, rather than 
actuality: 
Kebele is a social centre thatÕs run autonomously, by which we mean we try to avoid 
assistance from the council or government or anybody (Boyd, Kebele, 7 April 2007). 
 
                                            
108
 Although my cases are very different politically (the reasons for which were discussed in section 3.4.1) there was a recurrent theme 
throughout interviews and observations of the politicisation of everyday life. Sargisson (2003) notices a similar dynamic in a study on 
intentional communities: Ôlife in these communities disrupted and challenged and (perhaps) transformed conventional interpretations of 
the political, politics and in particular the role and status of the private and domestic realmsÕ. It is this politicisation of the everyday Ð 
articulated in terms of autonomy - that I concentrate on in the following sections. It is important to note, however, this operates very 
differently in different communities, and indeed is sometimes based upon somewhat different political imperatives. For the interested 
reader, further information on the differences in political aims, beliefs and imperatives underlying the communities can be found 
throughout, particularly in sections 5.2.2, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, and 9.2.5; the typologies in the opening sections to ÔpracticeÕ chapters and also in 
Appendix 1. 
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Resisting capitalism and asserting autonomy involve the creation of a do-it-yourself culture, which 
brings power down to the level of individuals and groups. In section 8.3.5 DIY culture was seen as 
an alternative to both state politics and vanguardist revolutionary politics of the traditional left, 
which also relies on a logic of (counter-)hegemony (Day, 2005: 8). DIY culture is simultaneously 
an ethical stance and an alternative politics, and themes in the literature were reflected in 
community constitutions and interviews. For example: 
Instead of waiting for that ever far away big moment of revolution, or for leaders and 
authorities to sort out our problems, we recognise that we can make fundamental changes here 
and now, in the ways we organise, communicate, interact and take action. This is the everyday 
revolution (Kebele, n.d., see Appendix 6).  
 
the way that we live at the moment is wrong, itÕs not good for any individual itÕs not good for 
the society we live in and itÕs not good for the planet we live on, and it needs to change. How 
we do that is a process that evolves. I feel that it has to be from the bottom up, it canÕt be a 
revolution in the classic sense that is led by Lenin on his white horse or whatever, it has to 
come from everyone participating and everyone making their own decisions, not being carried 
along with things, everyone making their own mind up (Interview: Boyd, Kebele, 7 April 
2009).  
 
The foregoing interview and document extracts on the topic of social change mirror somewhat the 
discourse of theorists of affinity such as Bonanno and Day, insofar as there is a valorisation of 
autonomy and evidence of attempts to avoid or shun hierarchical and representative politics. 
However, activity directed towards social change not only involved creating workable alternatives 
and a do-it-yourself culture. It also sometimes involved contesting the status quo directly through 
protest. For example: two of the Peace House members, Nick and Penny, are among the Coventry 
12 who were charged with breach of the peace when they tried to blockade Trident in February 
2007, which was to be heard in court after my visit to the community on July 18
th 
2007
109
. In a 
seemingly contradictory manner, the very same communities or even the same interviewees would 
extol the virtues of strategic engagement with state politics, or funding from the state or from 
capitalist enterprises. Despite the quote from a core member of Kebele above and the extract from 
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 Arrests for anti-nuclear protest are sometimes viewed as ways to influence or change the legal system. An illuminating paper on this 
topic, entitled ÔActivism and international law: The case of Trident PloughsharesÕ was given by Dr Adriana Sinclair (University of 
Bremen, TransState Project) on 28 July 2007 at a Loughborough University Centre for the Study of International Governance 
conference, ÔCivil Rights, Liberties and DisobedienceÕ. 
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the constitution, which emphasise the desire to avoid state and capital completely, the websiteÕs 
finance page includes a ÔcaveatÕ: 
Recently, as part of ongoing and productive discussions about the future of Kebele, members 
have talked about the possibility of re-thinking the funding issue. With so many quango type 
pseudo community organisations squandering free money on bottomless cash pit projects (read 
expenses), perhaps it's time to redistribute the wealth, and put it to good use? In the context of 
upcoming significant building repairs and organisational changes, we agreed, at a Kebele core 
meeting in April [2007], to accept funding from now on for specific projects, on a case-by-case 
basis. We recognise the importance of not allowing funding to compromise our politics or to 
undermine our efforts towards autonomy, and this will be at the forefront of any decisions we 
make. (Kebele Community Cooperative Finance Collective, (n.d.) from 
http://www.kebelecoop.org/collectives_finance.html accessed May 1, 2009). 
 
The group adds the proviso that funding would only be accepted where it was strategically useful 
for the cooperative, and in now way instrumental for the donors. This was reflected in the 
conditions of acceptance: that there would be no interference or conditions from donors, no 
publicity for donors and careful consideration of the ethical implications of each case (Ibid). 
Kebele was not the only community to accept funding from state or corporate donors. Other 
examples included Hockerton Housing ProjectÕs acceptance of sponsorship by Powergen for 
electric cars, Coventry Peace HouseÕs acceptance of local government and Home Office funding 
for its work with refugees, and Liverpool social centreÕs use of local government funding for a 
catering project to promote healthy eating. 
 
As well as acceptance of state and capitalist funding for strategic reasons, some interviewees 
expressed a willingness to engage with local, national and international hierarchical governmental 
politics. These were seen as potential avenues for radical or progressive social change, and often 
articulated in terms of ÔrightsÕ: 
[The community is] a space where people are involved with different things and it is run in a 
non-hierarchical way, gives you a space for political activism, mainly itÕs a good thing, being 
part of the community itself trying to organise political things like rights (Interview: Ingo, 
Kebele, 7 April 2007) 
 
[The original aims were] about a centre to use as a basis for campaigning on the Peace 
movement, but also tied up with that to do with environmental campaigning as well and right 
from the beginning about rights for refugees as well and having the shelter (Interview: Nick, 
Coventry Peace House, 9 May 2007) 
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We are also on the world map thanks to the CIFAL organisation, which is an organisation 
created by the United Nations, and it has ten training centres in the world and we are one of the 
ten. Amazingly they came here and decided to choose us as a training centre for local people, 
local councillors, local authority, local government, so we train them in sustainable 
environmental development and so forth (Interview: Fabien, New Findhorn Association, 11 
June 2007). 
 
This willingness to engage in the discourse and practices of state-centric institutions of ÔrightsÕ at a 
strategic level for achieving radical goals, or for limiting state intrusions whilst engaging in more 
radical tactics elsewhere, is under-theorised in academia and has particular relevance for critical 
utopian citizenship. The implications will be further considered in section 9.3.5. 
 
9.2.5.2. What is offered, and whose needs or desires are fulfilled? 
I considered above how groups and communities are seen by members to offer a space wherein 
activities and practices oriented to autonomy and a do-it-yourself ethos can be engaged. Following 
is a list in table form activities and practices based on this ethos, with the information obtained 
from interviews and notes taken during informal conversations and observation. The activities at 
the top of the table are oriented to self-sufficiency and autonomy, and those in the lower part 
towards outreach and providing wider services. These are not easily separable, however, and often 
overlap, with the same activities simultaneously benefiting members and wider communities. 
Activity Where practiced Intended users Rationale 
Income sharing Corani Members Self-sufficiency; to reduce reliance 
upon the state and capitalism. 
The intrinsic enjoyment of sharing. 
Consensus-based 
decision-making (see also 
Chapters 6 & 7) 
All communities to some 
extent 
Members The intrinsic value of the practice, as 
well as its ability to critique the 
status quo and exemplify something 
other. 
Gardening, farming and 
food production 
Findhorn 
Hockerton Housing Project 
Corani 
Laurieston Hall 
Members Help the community to be self-
sufficient; to reduce outside reliance.  
Cut the environmental impact of 
food from further afield. 
Provide members with top-quality 
organic and ethical produce. 
Entertainment events; e.g. 
street parties, benefit gigs, 
concerts 
Kebele 
Springhill 
Coventry Peace House 
Findhorn 
Mornington Grove 
Community 
Liverpool Social Centre 
Sometimes members only, 
but more often open to 
local and wider 
community 
Strengthening relationships between 
members, or members and wider 
community. 
Raise money for causes. 
Intrinsic value of enjoyment. 
Promoting ideas or causes. 
Bicycle workshops Kebele  
Coventry Peace House 
Community members and 
local community 
Promote the use and maintenance of 
bicycles, and recycling of old 
bicycles, for environmental reasons 
Cafs and catering 
services 
Kebele 
Coventry Peace House 
Findhorn 
Liverpool Social Centre 
(planned) 
 
Members and local 
community 
Provide cheap or free food 
Foster a sociable environment 
Promote a healthy, often vegetarian 
or vegan, diet 
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Activity Where practiced Intended users Rationale 
Radical libraries and 
infoshops 
Kebele Members and other 
activists 
Provide cheap or free books, 
pamphlets and music. To contribute 
towards the spreading of radical 
ideas 
Promoting community 
land trusts 
Springhill Any interested party Allow people who might not 
otherwise be able to afford to live in 
sustainable housing to do so; also to 
encourage communities to get 
together and grow on pieces of 
communally owned land. 
Education, promotion and 
expertise 
Findhorn 
Hockerton Housing Project 
Coventry Peace House 
Laurieston Hall 
Often charged services, 
for interested parties 
Educate others in skills that have 
been learnt through community 
living. 
Providing a refugee 
shelter 
Coventry Peace House Destitute refugees Directly benefit people left destitute 
by the asylum system. 
Provide a space for advice and 
advocacy 
Figure 9-2: Autonomous/Do-It-Yourself politics 
 
What is interesting about the table above is that most of the actions have two distinct but related 
kinds of rationale. The first is oriented towards the intrinsic value of the activity for the intended 
users; usually articulated in terms of enjoyment or usefulness. A second purpose is directed 
towards wider social change - through setting an example or through directly reaching out to wider 
communities or audiences. These are often complimentary rather than contradictory.  It is also 
notable that most of these activities and practices have quite clearly identifiable intended users, 
which is not always the case for activities that involve engaging with power. One way of engaging 
with power, which does not fit neatly into the active creation of alternatives, since it occurs at the 
nexus between utopia and the state, is protest: 
Figure 9-3: Politics of resistance 
Activity Where practiced Who undertakes 
the activity 
For what or 
whose benefit? 
Rationale 
Protest Some communities as 
a whole encouraged 
this through e.g. travel 
grants; particularly 
Corani and Coventry 
Peace House. Kebele 
offered space and 
events for activists to 
plan activities 
This was usually 
the remit of 
individual members 
and other interested 
parties. 
Depends on 
purpose of protest, 
which varied 
greatly. Examples 
include 
campaigning for 
nuclear 
disarmament, 
government action 
on climate change, 
animal welfare and 
refugee rights. 
To contest undesirable policies or 
corporate practices through raising 
awareness or using direct action to 
attempt to prevent practices from 
taking place. 
 
Organising for protest often involves many of the same modes of organisation that occur within 
communities (non-hierarchy and consensus decision-making, for example). Richard Day argues 
that the Ônewest social movementsÕ (Day, 2005: 8) often organise using many of the same tactics 
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and non-hegemonic (dis-)organisational structures that they might seek to promote in any 
alternative social model. Even though it is often limited to a single issue rather than the creation of 
a way of living, protest can involve the same do-it-yourself ethos and utopian outlook as the active 
creation of alternatives. This cannot be said, however, for engagement within the state, which by 
definition involves representative, hegemonic strategies and a politics of demand. Interestingly, 
however, community members engaged in a wide range of such politics. Often the same members 
who engaged in protest activities, including those previously mentioned who had been arrested for 
protesting, also engaged in actions within state structures and the more traditionally conceived 
political arena. Below is a table listing some of the activities that involve taking part in 
ÔrepresentativeÕ politics.  
Figure 9-4: Politics of demand and representation 
Activity Where practiced Who decides or 
undertakes these 
activities 
For whose benefit? Rationale 
Engaging with local and 
national governments 
through lobbying and 
having members stand in 
elections 
Springhill 
Coventry Peace House 
Findhorn Community 
 
 
Often the remit of 
individual members, 
but communities as a 
whole often had a 
culture that would 
encourage or 
discourage 
conventional political 
participation 
Depends on policy. 
Examples include: 
standing as a green 
party representative 
in local elections, 
lobbying for refugee 
rights  
To influence government 
policies through the 
established system. 
Engaging with schools 
through national 
curriculum ÔcitizenshipÕ 
classes. 
Coventry Peace House 
 
Individual members of 
community 
School Children 
Others at an indirect 
level 
 
 
To raise awareness of 
global inequality 
Acceptance of funding 
from the state or from 
capitalist enterprises 
Kebele Social Centre 
Hockerton Housing 
Project 
Where an offer is 
made, its acceptance is 
usually dependent on 
a consensus decision 
by the whole 
community 
Examples include 
accepting funding for 
environmental 
technologies or 
funding for resources 
for refugees 
To provide benefits 
(environmental, or for 
other people) that the 
community might not 
have been able to afford 
otherwise.  
 
The intended ÔusersÕ of these activities are not so clear, since the potential beneficiaries of such 
actions are alienated through the political process from those undertaking the actions. I have thus 
identified those who take part in these actions and the potential beneficiaries as separate categories 
in the table above.  
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9.2.5.3. What are the implications for wider social and political change? 
The types of politics I discussed in the foregoing section can be interpreted through three different 
models of social change. The most interesting point to keep in mind is that none of these are seen 
to be mutually exclusive: community membersÕ discourses and practices embraced all three as 
viable strategies, usually justifying them strategically in terms of social change. 
 
ÔDo-It-YourselfÕ politics tends to benefit someone very directly; this might be the person 
undertaking the politics or it might be a specific individual or group who is engaged with directly. 
In many cases, both of these apply. I find it useful to term this kind of process ÔactiveÕ politics, for 
two reasons. First, it usually involves immediate action, in a very hands-on, participatory way. 
Secondly, it corresponds to DeleuzeÕs  definition of an Ôactive forceÕ, as a process whose capability 
is not mediated by or integrated into another force or process (Deleuze 2006 [1983]: 57). The 
impact of direct benefit on wider social change is not always obvious. Interviewees sometimes 
expressed pessimistic views about wider relevance, particularly where predominant community 
activities are oriented more towards self-sufficiency than outreach: 
I sometimes think that it would be great to do something in a community kind of way that is 
helping other people as well as just ourselves, because it sometimes seems slightly insular and 
selfish to be just doing this self-sufficiently, because you could do that and also do, kind of, 
say, like LÕArche communities
110
 having people who are mentally or physically disabled, and 
helping them do the same (Interview: Anna [name changed to preserve anonymity], Laurieston 
Hall, 22 September 2007). 
 
However, just having a space and a community perceived to be different state or capitalist space 
was seen as both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable by many members for a variety of 
reasons: 
So [an aim is] to practice living together and certainly to encourage co-ops, because they are a 
good way of being, and to provide housing for people and a space for people to live together 
and the energy created in that kind of a space can do lots of other things (Interview: Penny, 
Coventry Peace House, 10 May 2007). 
 
If IÕm being idealistic about it then I would think that what IÕm doing [by living in community] 
is making an impression on the word as a whole because I am trying to be as environmentally 
                                            
110
 An international network of communities where people with learning disabilities and their assistants all live together in community.  
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conscious as I can be (Interview: Anna [name changed to preserve anonymity], Laurieston 
Hall, 22 September 2007). 
 
The more communities the better, I think itÕs just such a natural way of being. I think the best 
way to change the world is by living it, not just talking about doing it academically (Interview: 
Isabelle, Mornington Grove Community, 8 July 2007). 
 
From the above passages, at least four ways in which the ÔDo-It-YourselfÕ model of social change 
functions can be ascertained: setting an example, helping to house people, providing an space and 
social interactions that can inspire people to do other things, and living environmentally. These 
activities provide examples of critical utopian citizenship: they are simultaneously critical of the 
status quo and creating something different. They offer alternatives to the politics of demand 
assumed by dominant models of citizenship, that is unmediated, does not blueprint and allows for 
contingency, process and continual critique. 
 
A second model of social change, which might be termed ÔresistanceÕ (Katz, 2004: 251), was 
evident in the form of protest and direct action. This can be seen as an overlap between active and 
reactive (in DeleuzeÕs terminology) or autonomous and embedded politics. It is reactive insofar as 
protest is usually a reaction to something - an undesirable government policy for example. It can 
also have visionary and utopian aspects, however, insofar as many contemporary protest 
movements attempt to avoid hierarchical organisation and hegemonic strategies in favour of 
experimenting with forms of association that activists would like to see in the future; akin to the 
affinity group theorised previously.  
 
The third model of social change is gradualist and operates through the representative democratic 
system and a politics of demand. This is reactive since it operates within the established system and 
takes for granted, or even perpetuates, existing structures. What is particularly interesting, is that 
whilst theorests of affinity such as Day and Bonanno suggest that engagement in hegemonic 
politics through campaigning for citizenship rights is incompatible with a Ôpolitics of the actÕ (Day, 
2005: 88; Bonanno, 1988: 9), members of communities tended not to view this as a contradiction. 
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The following interview extract articulates particularly clearly what was a fairly general tendency 
in communitiesÕ discourse and practices:  
And thatÕs also what attracted me to stay was É to be constructively engaged in making our 
little corner of it as fruitful as possible, it just felt like much more fun. And within the whole 
social change movement you need the protesters, which is people under 25, and you also need 
people willing to educate themselves, and work with the system and you know, step by step 
make the little changes that make things a little bit better. And you need the idealists, the 
utopians, the communitarians who go and try something that may not catch on, you know we 
are doing something that people were doing a hundred or three hundred years ago, you know it 
may not catch on right away but it shows that it can be done and that leaves an imprint 
somewhere in the psychic field and enables the next group to flourish more easily É So being 
a piece of that puzzle just seems like good work, and more enjoyable (Interview: Mari, 
Findhorn, 18 June 2007). 
 
In this passage, Mari indicates that all three forms of social change are simultaneously important, 
but that different people might undertake them. It was also common, however, for a person to take 
on all three roles at once. This echoes KatzÕ theory of ÔreworkingÕ and ÔresistanceÕ, which are 
viewed as potentially complementary rather than contrdictory. ÔReworkingÕ is defined as those 
practices that Ôalter the conditions of peopleÕs existence to enable more workable livesÕ but are 
Ôenfolded into hegemonic social relations because rather than attempt to ... call them into question, 
they attempt to recalibrate power relations and/or redistribute resourcesÕ (Katz, 2004: 247). Where 
reworking can help to Ôcreate viable terrains of practice, resistance takes up that terrain with the 
invocation of a critical consiousnessÕ (Ibid: 251). Some interviewees, however, expressed concerns 
about de-radicalisation due to the influence of wider politics upon the community and members: 
IÕd say [the communityÕs wider role] has become much less, much, much less, in that we used 
to be part of a revolutionary social web, which was connected, connected through radical 
magazines, through the feminist movement, through the men against sexism movement, 
through movements for social change, all sorts, the anti-nuclear movement, lots of stuff that we 
were part of that was all messing around together, even whole-food shops, even that sort of 
stuff, whole-foods and health foods and cafes, and a kind of information service that was going 
on, just anything that was going on that was of us, it felt like and was to a certain degree an 
alternative social network, probably running within the state, rather like fungus running 
through the ground, certainly with a strong amount of inter-linking, so lots of us would always 
be going off to see other places, other communities, we were doing lots of swaps with 
communities, lots of swaps with friends working in radical theatre, I donÕt know, anything, and 
that would be going on a lot, so our links there would be strong because the movement was 
strong, but rather like the rest of society, the onset of Thatcherism and the decline of positive 
views of the 60s and 70s towards the more socially self-centred views of the 80s, they were 
more able to figure here, people also began to draw influence, people came and didnÕt tend to 
see themselves in that place and began to look at themselves more, people tended to think of 
Laurieston Hall in relation to other things (Interview: Patrick, Laurieston Hall, 22 September 
2009) 
 
Such worries about de-radicalisation were articulated in many communities. Strategies for 
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avoidance of this were rarely articulated. This is perhaps one point amongst many where a dialogue 
with radical theory might be useful. It is to the implications of the study of practice for theory, and 
of theory for practice, and the dialogue between theory and practice for critical utopian citizenship 
that I will now turn. 
 
9.3. Implications 
The purpose here is to consider the potential of dialogue between dominant and critical utopian 
theories with utopian practices, in order to address the final of the disaggregated research questions 
in section 1.3 of the Introduction: What can a dialogue between theory and practice tell us about 
the conditions for a critical utopian citizenship? The links between utopian theory and utopian 
practice are important, but there is a further bridge to be built between utopianism and everyday 
life. ÔEveryday lifeÕ is not something that is separate from utopianism, indeed the way in which I 
have been theorising critical utopianism suggests that it permeates, and is permeated by, everyday 
life. Everyday life is something that occurs within, as well as outside, utopian communities. We 
have seen that utopian communities in particular offer a space where alternative ethical models 
transgress traditional concepts of rights. The following section adopts a wider analytical 
perspective on the relevance of this dialogue for the subject of the thesis Ð critical utopian 
citizenship, both within, but also outside autonomous communities. 
 
9.3.1. Ontology: moral truth versus ethical effects 
In the theoretical discussion I argued that dominant models of rights espouse a secular attitude 
towards ontology, which ostensibly relegates ontological difference to the private sphere but relies 
on an implicit foundational morality. Alternative approaches extol a politics of ontological 
difference, where ethical value resides in the proliferation and flourishing of difference; the worth 
of a belief system consists in its ability to enable or encourage this. Ethical discourse thus does not 
rely on a transcendent signifier (May, 1994: 127). In section 9.2.1 of this chapter, I identified two 
attitudes towards community belief systems. At Findhorn, the approach was to constitutionalise 
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spirituality, although in a manner that allowed for many different belief systems. The other 
communities had no specified model. 
 
There are two important questions to consider when thinking how best to interpret these models. 
First, could communities that do not espouse a set belief system be termed ÔsecularÕ, in the 
conventional sense? Second, how does the idea of a community-wide belief system such as that of 
Findhorn, whose value is judged by its effects rather than truth, differ from the civic religions of 
early republicans such as Hobbes (2006 [1651]), Machiavelli  (1988 [1583]) and Plato (1992 [c. 
380 BC])? 
 
In response to the first issue, it is useful to refer to my previous observations of how communities 
tend to offer a space where open discussion upon belief systems and the ways in which these affect 
membersÕ actions and decisions can take place. Secularism has been defined as Ôthe detachment of 
a state or other body from religious foundationsÕ (Byrd, 2003: 481). The term usually has statist 
connotations, such as the relegation of religion (and other difference) to the private sphere, which 
do not seem to apply here (see Connolly, 1999: passim). As was evident in the foregoing 
discussions, the unmediated relationships within communities mean that there is no unambiguous 
division between the public and the private. Nor is discussion of belief systems slienced by such a 
division. Indeed, discussion of differing belief systems seemed to be positively encouraged within 
communities, and diversity was often articulated as a value rather than as a fact or predicament. 
This could be theorised in terms of the critical utopian function of experimentation and 
contingency. 
 
In the case of Findhorn, there is a clear difference from civic republican models of civil religion, 
insofar as all kinds of different belief systems were articulated, as well as an attentiveness to the 
psychological and social effects of these belief systems within unmediated relations with others. 
This did not rely upon assimilation into a higer unity, but rather was played out in day-to-day 
interactions and practices. The value of specific belief systems were orientated towards the good of 
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the flourishing of diversity within all of life rather than the desires of a specific dominant group. 
This is somewhat akin to a critical politicisation of the spiritial within everyday life. It is this 
politicisation of the spiritial that dominant approaches to ontology, whether based upon secularism 
or civic religion, tend to eschew.  
 
The unspecified belief systems of most communities, and the spiritual heterodoxy of Findhorn can 
be each theorised as a Ôpositive ethos of engagement between multiple faithsÕ (Connolly, 2005: 7). 
This is what Connolly calls Ômultidimensional pluralismÕ (Ibid: 6)
111
.  He posits strategies for a 
wider engagement with existing structures and through horizontal relationships. If these are used in 
a strategic manner, they might have a wider relevence for critical engagement with different 
ontologies both within and outside autonomous communities. These strategies do seem somewhat 
abstract, however, and might benefit from dialogue with practical experiences in communities. The 
first of these strategies is micropolitical and psychological; Ôagonistic respectÕ. This is a Ôrelation 
between interdependent partiasansÕ (Ibid: 123), and unlike liberal multiculturalism, which assumes 
an authoritative majority, there is a mutual recognition and respect amongst coexisting minorities 
who may fundamentally disagree (Ibid: 123).  The second strategy, somewhat analogous to the 
first, is Ôcritical responsivenessÕ, which is Ôappropriate to the politics of becoming while it is still 
underwayÕ (Ibid: 126, emphasis in the orginal). This is seen to involve careful listening to 
Ôconstituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of 
recognitionÕ (Ibid: 126). Whilst I would argue that the politics of becoming is always-already 
underway, Connolly does have an interesting point that some voices do remain unrecognised, even 
within the creative space of communities. It is notable that the prevailing ontologies were atheism, 
agnosticism and New-Ageism, and there were few alternatives. A wider movement of ontological 
difference (I prefer this term of Braidotti (1994) to ConnollyÕs ÔpluralismÕ), in solidarity with 
others from different faiths, might begin from something akin to ConnollyÕs critical 
                                            
111
 Where ConnollyÕs theorisation appears contradictory from the standpoint of a critical utopian approach, is that although he claims to 
avoid Ôfaith in the powers of transcendenceÕ (Connolly, 2005: 7) he ultimately views the purpose of multifaith negotiation as the 
Ôshaping of that ethosÕ that he calls Ôdemocratic pluralismÕ, (Ibid: 7). ÔDemocratic pluralismÕ sometimes appears to be a transcendental 
principle that is recuperated into the state domain (Ibid: 155-6). This undermines somewhat the intrinsic and ethical value of unmediated 
ontological diversity in the daily lives of community members. 
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responsiveness. This could lead to a channelling of energy for wider social change: ÔCitizens must 
address plural sites of action, depending on the scope of the issue, including local action, 
associational organization, state pressure, and cross-state citizen networksÕ (Ibid: 155). I will 
discuss the debates surrounding engagement with the state in section 9.3.5. Here, I would like to 
note that the idea of critical responsiveness might offer a critical utopian strategy from the 
standpoint of belief systems that could have wider relevance for social change if considered as a 
strategy by those both within, and outwith, autonomous communities.  
 
It is interesting that Connolly articulates movement for change in terms of ÔcitizenshipÕ. Although 
he does not define the term explicitly, it appears that he is at least partially referring to something 
that exceeds state citizenship, since he refers to Ôcitizen activistsÕ existing outside specified 
territories, and to Ôcross-state citizen movementsÕ (Ibid: 156). Although Connolly also frequently 
advocates appeals to the state through citizenship (Ibid: 7: 156 & pp. 134-5) at least part of his 
understanding of citizenship seems to be imbued with the critical utopian function. Critical 
responsiveness as a civic virtue thus seems to be a method of bringing others (perspectives, beliefs, 
people) into the space of the political that might have a wider relevance for a critical utopian 
citizenship. Autonomous communities offer an example of how the negotiation and celebration of 
ontological difference can work in practice. Connolly offers some ideas on how this could be 
widened to encompass more or different belief systems in more and different spaces. 
 
9.3.2. Subjectivity: atomised versus situated self 
In the theoretical discussion I considered how the liberal tradition bestows rights primarily upon 
the individual, assuming a static and unchanging abstract person who is in some degree of conflict, 
opposition or competition with those around him or her. This also assumes various other 
boundaries between differing areas of existence, such as public/private, self/other, humanity/nature, 
rationality/emotion. Alternative approaches transgress these binaries and the abstract 
subjectification of the atomised, rational individual, either through positing disruptive forces at the 
individual level such as desires and emotions or through a holistic conception of a complex and 
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ungovernable environment, or, in the case of Agamben, highlighting the zone of 
indistinguishability between these fields of existence. All of these approaches were seen to lead to 
a critical utopian imagining of the subject.  
 
Practices within autonomous communities were seen almost by definition to desire if not actualise 
a transgression of liberal individualism through the value placed on communal existance as a way 
of life. Interview extracts illustrated how community members viewed this lifestyle as a way of 
breaking down traditional roles, and distrupting individualistic and competitive structures and 
providing something new. This did not involve, however, undermining the individual as an 
epistemological category. This is what Sargisson (2000) calls the Ônew individualismÕ of Ônew age 
conceptions of self and otherÕ (Sargisson, 2000: 145-151), and was most evident at Findhorn but 
also widespread amongst most other communities. As something which is under-theorised in 
academic terms (Ibid: 145), this imagining of the subject perhaps has a lot to offer scholastic theory 
as well as a practice of critical citizenship in everyday life (within and outwith the autonomous 
community). 
 
Particularly relevant in this respect, I would argue, is practice at Findhorn of taking ownership of 
oneÕs own views. Day highlights this, stating that Ôthose who enjoy a structural privilege must 
strive to identify and work against this privilege if they hope to establish relations of solidarity with 
those who do not share itÕ  (Day, 2005: 11). As such, he uncovers his own voice as Ôa White male 
university professor living and working in the relative ease and comfort of a G8 countryÕ (Ibid: 11). 
Stirner articulates almost every statement in terms of the embodied and desiring ÔIÕ. There is a 
danger however, both in theory and practice, that an emphasis on individualism could Ôequally be 
described in terms of Self-centred individualismÕ (Sargisson, 2000: 149, capitalisation in the 
original). This is seen to sit somewhat curiously with the holism of deep ecology (Ibid: 151). 
 
Reconciliation between these seemingly contradictory views (individualism, collectivism, holism) 
does seem possible. In my interviews this came through in the critical utopian theme of the self-in-
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process. Interestingly, this is also a theme within theory, and allows a partial reconciliation of 
theorists who might otherwise be seen as incongruous bedfellows. Take, for instance, Stirner, who 
is frequently read as the individualist par excellance, whose Ôegoism is ultimately too limited to 
embrace the whole of human experienceÕ and Ôcould lead to violence and the oppression of the 
weakÕ  (Marshall, 2008 [1992]: 233), and LevinasÕ Ôunremitting critique of all the more or less 
subtle circuits of self-love, self-satisfaction, and self-relationÕ (Cohen, 2003: xxvii). Although 
typical readings of these thinkers tend to view them as having little or nothing in common, both 
emphasise the importance of unmediated experience of the other, and of an unfinalisable self which 
is always in process. This reflects the self-developmental views of members of Findhorn and other 
communities. Consider the following: 
In the measure that the face of the Other relates us with a third party, the metaphysical relation 
of the I with the Other moves into the form of the We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, 
which are the source of universality. But politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself; it 
deforms the I and the other who has given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal 
laws, and thus in absentia  (Levinas 2002 [1961]: 300). 
 
I love men too Ð not merely individuals, but every one. But I love them with the consciousness 
of egoism; I love them because love makes me happy, I love because loving is natural to me, 
because it pleases me. I know no Òcommandment of love.Ó I have a fellow-feeling with every 
feeling being, and their torment torments, their refreshment refreshes me too  (Stirner, 1993 
[1844]: 291, emphasis in the original). 
 
Never does a State aim to bring in the free activity of individuals, but always that which is 
bound to the purpose of the State. Through the State nothing in common comes to pass either, 
as little as one can call a piece of cloth the common work of all the individual parts of a 
machine (Stirner, 1993 [1844]: 227, emphasis in the original). 
 
 
Each of the statements could concievably have been written by the other author. What I am not 
trying to do here is to generalise the thought of infinitely complex theorists whom I much admire. 
Nor am I trying to reduce the outlooks of my interviewees, who I also much admire, to any 
political theory. What I am trying to do is illustrate something that I have found lacking in 
reductive political theory and academic discourse, and that came through strongly as a theme 
during fieldwork. This resides in the epistemological anarchism and an anarchy of the subject that I 
have identified as a key theme of the critical utopian approach: ÔWhat is great in man is that he is a 
bridge and not a goalÕ (Nietzsche, 1997 [c.1891]: 8). Here, the self, and the relations with others 
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that the self encounters, are seen as sites for resistance, which can be found to unite theorists as 
seemingly diverse as Stirner and Levinas. It is perhaps BahktinÕs polyphonic concept of truth that 
best articulates the importance of maintaining criticality in everyday life. Indeed, the ÔotherÕ is 
essential for this, in that unmediated experience of the other introduces the element of the 
unexpected that is necessary to enable us to question elements of our own subjectivity that may 
have become fixed or oppressive; the Ôstate withinÕ. Thus, critical utopian theory and practice 
offers us a mode of resistance that orginates within the subject. The relation of this to hegemonic 
identities is important: can Ôthe citizenÕ, Ôthe humanÕ or Ôthe womanÕ become a critically resistent, 
rather than an oppressive identity?  
 
There does seem to be a manner in which identities can be used strategically without being 
recuperated, although there is a delicate boundary. Braidotti explains how hegemonising, dominant 
philosophy and high theory aim to ÔcannibalizeÕ and assimilate Ônew discoursesÕ such as Ôwomen, 
postcolonial subjects, the audiovisual media, other new technologies, and so onÕ (Braidotti, 1994: 
33). She argues, however, that Ônomads É cannot be assimilated easilyÕ (Ibid: 33). Whilst the 
nomad Ômakes those necessary situated connections that can help her/him to survive É s/he never 
takes on fully the limits of one national, fixed identityÕ (Ibid: 33). Within the strategic field, 
Braidotti uses the example of the project of WomenÕs studies existing within the mainstream 
academic arena, whose sustenance requires Ôa pragmatic mixture of autonomous structures and 
integrated practicesÕ (Ibid: 34). This framework could be seen equally to apply to utopian 
communities, as well as to the critical citizen. Operating strategically can lead to very clear 
pragmatic advantages and priviledges, such as generous state grants (Ibid: 34), but should not be 
seen as a way of avoiding confrontation with Ôthe very real ideological and structural constraits 
under which one has to operateÕ (Ibid: 34). Resistance can originate from this strategic straddling 
of hegemonic identity and integration with unrecuperated difference and autonomy: Ôpolitical 
agency has to do with the capacity to expose the illusion of ontological foundationsÕ (Ibid: 35). 
Insofar as identities can be used strategically to facilitate this capacity, they are valuable: ÔNomadic 
politics is a matter of bonding, of coalitions, of interconnectionsÕ (Ibid: 35).  
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Thus, state citizenship could potentially be used as one medium (amongst many) for critical 
citizenship. This strategic use of identities and the funding or ideological resources that can come 
with them was certainly a practice that was evidenced within communities: ÔIn the talk on Global 
Citizenship we also do things where kids are taught in schools about Third World development, 
and how to live harmoniously as friendsÕ (Interview: Frank, Coventry Peace House, 10 May 2007). 
 
9.3.3. Ethics: privilege versus responsibility 
In section 8.2.3 I considered how modern rights theory is tied in with the historical processes of 
capitalism, leading to the prioritisation of rights concerned with the protection of private property 
of dominant groups. The depoliticisation of difference leads to a de facto exclusion of 
underprivileged and minority groups from full civic and political rights due to domination within 
the private sphere, or total exclusion from the public sphere. There is a separation of the abstract, 
rights-bearing citizen from the embodied, biological being which both legitimises the sovereignty 
of the state and renders Ôbare lifeÕ vulnerable to its whims. Critical utopian ethical theories attempt 
to negotiate difference without reliance upon transcendental models of value and the hierarchical 
mediation of conflict through an intersubjective ethical epistemology of responsibility or care, the 
creative thinking of humans and society as potentiality and an emphasis on the intrinsic value of 
difference. 
 
Practices in autonomous utopian communities had to negotiate difference at both material and 
ideological levels. More frequently than reliance on set procedures or mediation was discourse and 
practice of arbitration in everyday life, running through many of the day-to-day activities that took 
place in communities. There was a particular emphasis on personal authenticity and being genuine 
in communication, backed up with the idea that to suppress or lie about oneÕs own feelings would 
be to deprive the group of something important. This was seen to tie in particularly with BakhtinÕs 
polyphonic concept of truth and is most evidently actualised through the practice of consensus 
decision-making. However, I also noted that communities had also resorted to mediation. Often, 
this was some kind of independent mediation or facilitation, involving an individual or agency who 
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was experienced and involved in communal or co-operative living. This kind of mediation did not 
assume authority or transcendental truth but was a process to enable members to resolve conflicts. 
Such processes again do not assume an a priori or transcendental morality into which differences 
must be incorporated in order to be resolved, and thus can still be seen to reflect a processual 
openness to the other and contingency that is valued by the critical utopian approach. 
 
Some interviewees, however, did articulate experiences of having to call in authoritative agencies, 
such as police or the legal system. This would happen when resolution procedures and negotiation 
broke down, and perhaps involved cases of violence. Resort to an external hierarchical procedure 
of mediation presumes a pre-existent and transcendental model of moral value and falls back on the 
dominant model of ÔrightÕ as presupposing an opposing ÔwrongÕ. This is where the symmetry with 
critical utopian theorists breaks down. It is important to note that the divergence from radical 
theory occurs not at the moment that the outside agencies arrive, but at the point where negotiation 
breaks down Ð for example, if violence is involved, it is the violence itself might be seen as the 
point where utopian relations break down. Statist, dominant, or anti-utopian relations can thus be 
conceptualised as occurring within the autonomous community at the moment where ongoing 
criticality is blocked, rather than at the point where the police or external agencies arrive.  This 
constant potentiality of the re-emergence of the state, or violent dominating relations is well 
theorised (Clastres, 1977 [1974], passim; Bey, 1985: 97; Levinas, 1985: 98; Deleuze & Guattari, 
1988: 47) and indeed this constant possibility of the state, and the necessity of warding it off, is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of the other to the state (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 474 and 
passim, Bey, 1995: 3). This is what I have been conceptualizing as critical utopianism. Bey (1993) 
offers some potential strategies for avoiding the re-emergence of domination in non-temporary 
communities, including avoidance of media attention, selective membership, and maintaining 
spontaneity and intensity through holding festival-type activities as often as possible. Clastres 
(1977 [1974]) also considers through ethnographic studies the several ways in which ÔprimitiveÕ 
societies have warded off the emergence fo hierarchy. However, practical strategies for dealing 
with dominatory conflict within the utopian space, and within everyday life in other spaces, are 
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somewhat under-theorised. Practice might have a question to pose to theory here: Can utopian 
relations be restored at the point where dominating attitudes or behaviour come to the fore without 
the need or resorting to still further dominance or hierarchy? Are there any strategies to enable 
this? In the terms of my project, this might be articulated as, how might the critical utopian citizen, 
when involuntarily entered into a relationship of domination, reinstate nonviolent criticality 
without resort to an external hierarchy? One answer appears to lie in the practices of Ônonviolent 
communicationÕ advocated by some community members, which parallels the theories of Levinas. 
Although there is always the danger that such communication might be broken down through 
unassailable violence, the method constitutes a utopian possibility that might be of use to the 
critical citizen. 
 
9.3.4. Community: identity versus affinity 
In theorising dominant approaches to citizenship, I considered how the assumption of an 
unassailable state leads to the alienation of citizens from the processes that govern their lives, as 
well as from one another. Critical utopian theory offers possibilities for a praxis that unites living 
and governing, bringing power down to the level of the community that engages in action, in the 
simultaneous move that forms that body of people into a community. Such communities are not 
based upon fixed identities, but rather upon mutual goals and shared action, and thus are active 
rather than passive. 
 
In the communities I visited, there was a definite orientation towards mutual activity, and a 
belonging based on shared goals and action rather than dominant identities. This was actualised 
through an unfinalised drive for autonomy. In some senses then, it is appropriate to conceptualise 
the communities as particular kinds of affinity groups. There were problems of exclusivity, 
however, and worries of restratification upon homogeneous identities were articulated. Partial 
resolution was attained through involvement in wider affinity groups or solidarity networks and 
through outreach activities. It is through the encouragement of flows through the territorial 
community that stagnation can be resisted: ÔTerritorialities, then, are shot through with lines of 
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flight testifying to the presence within them of movements of deterritorialization and 
reterritorializationÕ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 62).  
 
This has implications for, and indeed attributes an essential role to, the critical utopian citizen. Just 
as resistance cannot solely be performed within the strucutres and limits of the neo-liberal state, nor 
can it reside in a retreat to a static and fixed utopia. It is, perhaps, at the nexus of utopianism and 
citizenship that the most critical and radical site of resistance lies. What might this mean in 
concrete terms? Perhaps recognising that as political agents, we are constituted by and have 
relations and obligations within a number of overlapping and intersecting communities, not solely 
the abstracted, public and political arena of the state, and our private, social households. Then, by 
maintaining an attitude of constant criticality towards all ontological or hegemonic formations as 
and when they arise. This presupposes a radical politicisation of all spheres of life and interaction: 
the university, the hospital ward, schools, the voting booth, the affinity group, and the utopian 
community.  
 
9.3.5. Politics: demand versus self-activity 
In the theoretical section 8.2.5, I considered how dominant liberal approaches to rights provide a 
method by which excluded difference might come to be recognized in the public sphere, and thus 
appropriate material, legal or ideological resources deemed requisite for equal presence and 
participation. This method has been termed Ôthe politics of demandÕ, which is ultimately 
recuperative since it defines identities in the terms of the state, unites difference into a higher unity, 
and assumes the benevolence and necessity of hegemonic forces, thus perpetuating these structures. 
 
Poststructural and post-left anarchist theorists such as Day (2005) and Bonanno (1988) criticise this 
form of politics on both a pragmatic level (it does not produce the desired effects) and at the level 
of principle (it involves complicity in oneÕs own domination and in the domination of others). 
Contemporary forms of anarchism offer a critical utopian alternative: a Ôpolitics of the actÕ. This 
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form of politics takes as its point of departure the affinity group, through the expression of 
friendship and solidarity without the need for common identity. The affinity group enables (and is 
enabled by, or exists through) the creation of active alternatives in the present that bypass the state, 
rebuild social commons, and mitigate the need for resources provided by hierarchical 
organisations. Such alternatives are both pragmatic and utopian: they engage in a critique of the 
status quo by demonstrating its superfluity as well as engaging with the future by positing desirable 
alternatives. 
 
When I considered practices, I found that although various activities could be categorised using 
DeleuzeÕs distinction between active and reactive politics, or the politics of demand in opposition 
to the politics of the act, the actual relation of both entire communities and individual members
112
 
towards these variations was more complex. Often, different members within the community 
undertook the differing tactics simultaneously, or indeed it was fairly typical to observe a solitary 
individual engaging in both the politics of demand (for example voting or lobbying) outside the 
community and in the utopian politics of creative alternatives within the community. Community 
constitutions based on consensual decisions also displayed a willingness to tactically engage with 
the politics of demand (I used the example of Kebele), and some communities provided community 
space and resources for hegemonic politics, such as lobbying, meetings with capitalist or 
government agencies, or hustings for local politicians (in particular, Coventry Peace House, 
Findhorn, Hockerton Housing Project and Springhill). No interviewees expressed the opinion that 
the two methods were fundamentally incompatible and that a comprehensive approach to social 
change should necessarily or always exclude engagement with the state or capital. This indicates a 
complex interplay of forces that requires further theorisation. 
                                            
112
 As always, it is methodologically important to distinguish between the attitudes of individual members and the collective intentions 
of entire communities. Unless otherwise stated, the former are drawn from interviews and personal interactions, whereas the latter are 
drawn from outcomes of consensus, reflected in written constitutions, or where interviewees have explicitly referenced a consensual 
attitude distinct from their own.  
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Despite the fact that the utopian alternatives to a politics of demand posited by Day (2005) and 
Bonanno (1988) are those to which I am more sympathetic, their outright opposition to a politics of 
demand does not reflect the willingness of radical practitioners to engage in considered use of the 
system. Clearly, Ôthe systemÕ has some resources at its disposal that are either impossible or 
strategically inexpediant to refuse. In this context, it is important to consider the relation of state 
politics to capitalism, which is convincingly and appropriately put forward in Deleuze and 
GuattariÕs theory of axiomatics. This is important because it helps to elucidate the relationship 
between rights, the state, and capitalism. This draws the state and capitalism into a comprehensive 
theory of multiple dominations which proceeds through abstraction and alienation that are 
legitimised by the addition of ÔaxiomsÕ (rights). The state is seen to be a territorial entity, insofar as 
it deterritorialises the earth and makes it Ôan object of its higher unityÕ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 
501). Capitalism is not at all territorial, since:  
Its power of deterritorialization consists in taking as its object, not the earth, but Òmaterialized 
labourÓ, the commodity. And private property is no longer ownership of the land or the soil, 
nor even of the means of production as such, but of convertible abstract rights (Ibid: 501). 
 
Deleuze and Guattari show how capitalism always proceeds through the state-form, and it is at this 
level that the regulations required by capitalism are put in place (Ibid: 502). Such regulations or 
ÔaxiomsÕ, often articulated in the language of ÔrightsÕ at state-level, are Ôprimary statements which 
do not derive form or depend on another statementÕ (ibid: 510), and include the social and welfare 
rights, such as those advocated by Marshall and Bottomore (1992 [1949]) after the Second World 
War. They proliferate at times when the domestic market is being organised to meet outside 
demands. Such axioms can often seem advantageous for previously excluded groups; Ôaxioms for 
the young, for the old, for women, etc.Õ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:  510). Whilst appearing to 
provide new freedoms, additional axioms are in fact a way in which new market flows are 
regulated and mastered. The tendency to withdraw or subtract axioms is also a tendency of 
capitalism, and is associated with the totalitarian state at times of appeal to foreign sources of 
capital and an export-based market (Ibid: 510). Due to the relevance of the following passage to the 
practices I have discussed, I will quote it at length: 
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It is sometimes thought that every axiom, in capitalism or in one of its States, constitutes a 
ÒrecuperationÓ. But this disenchanted concept is not a good one. The constant readjustments of 
the capitalist axiomatic, in other words, the additions (the enunciation of new axioms) and the 
withdrawals (the creation of exclusive axioms), are an object of struggles in no way confined 
to the technocracy. Everywhere, the workersÕ struggles overspill the framework of the 
capitalist enterprises, which imply for the most part derivative propositions É There is always 
a fundamental difference between living flows and the axioms that subordinate them to centers 
of control and decision making, that make a given segment correspond to them, which measure 
their quanta. But the pressure of living flows, and the problems they pose and impose, must be 
exerted inside the axiomatic, as much in order to fight the totalitarian reductions as to 
anticipate and precipitate the additions, to orient them and prevent their technocratic perversion 
(Ibid: 512). 
 
Or, in the more polemical language of the Anarchist Federation: 
Obviously we shouldnÕt give up what practical rights the bosses have conceded to us in the 
present. In fact they should get a hearty kicking for even thinking about taking away our rights 
to pensions, striking, free abortion etc. Unfortunately theyÕve already done most of that if we 
ever had it anyway. We need to gain power for ourselves that they canÕt take away (Anarchist 
Federation, 1997). 
 
To the extent that the politics, practice and language of citizenship rights were endemic to many of 
the communities that I visited, a multifaceted theorisation is necessary here. The tactical relation of 
rights to domination in the context of pursuing change both within and outside existing structures is 
well articulated by Robinson and Tormey: 
It is indeed the case that a right is necessarily a recognition of a demand, that it makes sense 
only in relation to an other, and that it usually expresses the way in which a social system 
recognises the limits of its power or claims on others. Hence, an ultimate insurrection against 
the system as such cannot claim rights from it, because it does not recognise the other who 
recognises rights. In a mobile strategic field, however, the winning of rights can serve to 
consolidate or defend autonomy by placing limits on the systemÕs intrusions in a context where 
it continues to exist. The language of rights can also express autonomy and freedom in an 
emancipated or autonomous space, ensuring for instance the construction of a space where 
dialogue is possible, or where one project is not imposed as total; it could thus be enabling of 
difference (Robinson & Tormey, 2009: 167). 
 
Thus, I would argue, contra Day and Bonanno, that despite the fact that rights, and ÔcitizenshipÕ in 
its hegemonic formulation as a status, are indeed expressions and acknowledgements of 
domination, they can form useful and even necessary strategic supplements to critical utopian 
alternatives. 
 
Straddling the bridge between these two identities Ð the hegemonic citizen and the critical utopian 
citizen - or existing as both at once, constitutes a line of flight or active force that is able to 
appropriate strategic forces as they become available. Rather than positing these terms as 
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individuals or identities, they constitute potentials. They have to coexist in order to maintain 
criticality, to resist recuperation into the state, but also retreat to a static utopia. This is what 
Deleuze and Guattari call Ôdouble articulationÕ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 46: 45-82 & passim). 
This is not only a linguistic formation, as traditionally conceived in semiotics (Hjelmslev, 1961), 
but rather applies to all assembleges: Ôthe assemblage is between two layers, between two strata; on 
one side it faces the strata É but on the other side faces something else, the body without organsÕ 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 45).  
 
One aspect of an assemblage may be organised, coded, and exist within a hierarchical system, 
whilst the other side escapes categorisation, or in the case of the conscious agent, resists 
subjectification. ÔAssemblagesÕ here accounts simultaneously for individual community members, 
and entire communities. Double articulation can occur simultaneously within and outwith 
autonomous communities. What is important is not to attempt to avoid or do away with 
hierarchical structures once and for all, or completely, but rather to maintain a state criticality and 
resistance to closure, fixity, or positing a new hegemony: Ôexterior and interior are relative; they 
exist only through their exchanges and therefore only by virtue of the stratum responsible for the 
relation between themÕ (Ibid: 55). It may be that in many situations, and potentially in the future, 
the hegemonic ÔcitizenÕ status becomes irrelevant; in which case criticality becomes a movement 
between different strata. The notion of immanent critique must remain. It is here that theory has 
something to offer the critical utopian citizen in terms of continuing strategies for the avoidance of 
recuperation. 
 
The maintenance of criticality in movements for social change is central to the philosophical 
project of Deleuze and Guattari, as articulated in FoucaultÕs preface to Anti-Oedipus: 
Informed by the seemingly abstract notions of multiplicities, flows, arrangements, and 
connections, the analysis of the relationship of desire to reality and to the capitalist ÒmachinesÓ 
yields answers to concrete questions. Questions are less concerned with why this or that than 
with how to proceed. How does one introduce desire into thought, into discourse, into action? 
(Foucault, 2004 [1984]: xiv).  
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For many, as Foucault hints in the above passage, their intensely philosophical discourse can seem 
ÔabstractÕ or alienating. For others, however, it can be inspiring. It is important to consider that the 
relationship between theory and practice itself is a double articulation, that can be bridged, until 
something escapes it. The process of immanent critique is ongoing. Robinson (2007) provides one 
such bridge or movement between theory and practice in an article published in an activist journal; 
Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed (see Chapter 2 footnote 17). This article speaks to many of 
the concerns of the practitioners in the communities I visited, such as worries about de-
radicalisation in the context of contemporary society; or inversely, worries about retreat into a 
static, isolated utopian identity. The idea of double articulation is re-articulated in terms accessible 
to a different audience: 
From a Stirnerean position, or that of a bricoleur, looking for tools, there is nothing wrong 
with using the system against itself, with using the masterÕs tools so to speak. If something 
serves oneÕs purpose, it is the gesture of Stirnerian egoism to pick it up and use it. A problem 
arises, however, because in using the systemÕs tools, one may be strengthening it in some way 
Ð reinforcing its claim to be the only game in town, giving it the appearance of legitimacy, 
contributing in some way to its apparatuses  (Robinson, 2007: 37) 
 
The article is concerned with ways in which to use the systemÕs tools without contributing to its 
legitimacy. This speaks to some of my intervieweeÕs worries about de-radicalisation. Recuperation, 
a form of de-radicalisation, is defined as:  
The turning-againt-itself of desire, the conversion of an active force, which uses the external 
world as a series of tools or partners in dialogue, with a reactive force, which comes to value 
the fixed forms of the external world as goods in themselves (Ibid: 37) 
 
This article also speaks to my intervieweesÕ worries about ghettoisation, or becoming exclusionary 
due to the stagnation of communal identity (in my examples, this included Ôwhite middle class 
activistÕ and ÔfeministÕ): ÔThe purist drive is itself reactive, expressing subordination to a spook Ð 
the spook of the category of activist or anarchist, constructed in the same way as any other 
identity: a social role based on exclusionÕ (Ibid: 42). Strategies for the maintenance of immanent 
critique are offered in the mode of a personal interrogation: 
Structures and tools have their own personalities which can influence the user. An informed 
tool-user is thus faced with a dilemma over whether, in using this tool at this moment, s/he is 
really serving her or his purpose or the purpose embodied in the tool? (Ibid: 37). 
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An ethics of ontological difference, disruptive subjectivities and alternative relations and 
communities offer alternatives to dominant models of ÔrightsÕ as well as means to institute social 
change. However, ÔrightsÕ can also be an important strategic tool. I would like to suggest that 
critical utopian citizenship occurs at the nexus between these different models. The following 
chapter, which is the concluding chapter, will bring together the different aspects of critical utopian 
citizenship outlined in the preceding chapters on transgressing territory, authority and rights in 
theory and in practice, in the hope of moving towards an answer to the primary research question: 
How else could we live as politically active, participatory people, or, what other kinds of citizen 
could we be? 
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10. Towards a conclusion: new openings 
Does Òone divide into twoÓ or Òtwo fuse into oneÓ É This debate is a struggle between two 
conceptions of the world. One believes in struggle, the other in unity. The two sides have 
drawn a line between them and their arguments are diametrically opposed. Thus, you can see 
why one divides into two (The Red Sunshine Gang 1999, [c. 1970] p. 10)
113
. 
 
Any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1988: 7). 
 
10.1. This is not a conclusion 
The idea of a conclusion is theoretically and methodologically inimical to what I have been trying 
to do in this thesis and in my wider research activities. The critical utopian methodology that I have 
been using resists the closure that is implied by the term ÔconclusionÕ. Critical utopian 
methodology rests on an ethos of epistemological anarchism and attempts to open new avenues for 
thought by disrupting taken-for-granted foundations, transgressing set thought patterns and de-
stabilising routine practice. I cannot, therefore, offer a summary of a single model of citizenship 
that has emerged from this research and a definite path for reaching this: Ôthe book is not an image 
of the world. It forms a rhizome with the worldÕ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 12). Where the first 
three chapters of this thesis drew on pre-existent rhizomes from theory and practice, this chapter 
exposes the trailing ends that emerge from the project, and point to the potential for a politics and a 
praxis that might disrupt taken for granted foundations in new ways that offer multiple further 
possibilities.  
 
10.2. Potential citizenships and potential politics 
The question motivating this research was: 
How else could we live as politically active, participatory people, or, what other types of citizen 
could we be?  
                                            
113
 The authors of Anti-Mass cite the origin of this quote as a Ôdebate in ChinaÕ as a Ôfree translation from the Red Flag Peking 
September 21, 1964Õ which I have been unable to source, but have included it due to its striking articulation of the epistemological 
approach that I have taken in this project. 
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This question was motivated by a political assumption that there is something wrong with the way 
things stand. Citizenship, which once served as a basis for socially progressive politics (for 
example, in Marshall & Bottomore 1992 [1949]) now appears increasingly to be a basis for 
reactionary discourse and policies. States often treat citizenship as a fixed attribute, category or 
ÔdataÕ that can be applied or withheld and whose content can be chosen, modified and defined as an 
exercise in power and control. In the introduction to this thesis, I mentioned how a proposed 
points-system might exclude migrants from citizenship for Ôactive disregard for UK valuesÕ. The 
extent to which this might include even legal forms of dissent, such as anti-war protest, is as yet 
unclear (Ford, The Times, 4 August 2009). 
 
The argument of this thesis has been that citizenship is a constructed practice that is created 
through social processes. It is not something that you are, but something that you become Ð through 
coming together with desiring others and constructing something different. Dominant political 
institutions tend to obscure this utopian element through a programmatic and legislative discourse. 
This resonates with Todd MayÕs project of poststructural anarchism: ÔPractices, both oppressive 
and liberating, are creations, not mere expressions of a human nature or derivations from a 
fundamental or transcendental principle of exploitationÕ (May 1994: 117). This also resonates with 
themes in contemporary citizenship literature. Sassen distinguishes between two different, yet not 
mutually exclusive, potential trajectories for the institution of citizenship, these being 
denationalised and non-national or post-national citizenships (Sassen, 2006: 305). The former of 
these is potentially radical - it represents Ôthe transformation of the national, specifically through 
global and denationalizing dynamics that tend to instantiate inside the nationalÕ (Ibid: 305), and 
provides the Ôstrategic terrainÕ for Ôthe production of ÒpresenceÓ of those without power and a 
politicsÕ (Ibid: 90), thus allowing for Ôa partial reinvention of citizenship as a practice and as 
projectÕ (Ibid: 281). The actors with whom Sassen identifies this new citizenship formation are not 
always formal/legal citizens; indeed Ôcitizenship is partly produced by the practices of the 
Chapter 10: Towards a Conclusion 
 
280 
excludedÕ (Sassen, 2005: 84), and the practices which can be encompassed by such a 
conceptualisation include Ôthe enactment of a large array of particular interests, from protests 
against police brutality and globalization to sexual preference politics and house squatting by 
anarchistsÕ (Sassen, 2006: 281). Such practices are interpreted as rights-claiming activities of 
political actors that although sometimes excluded signify the possibility of new sites for politics 
and emergent formulations of citizenship. Isin (2008) also argues that various contemporary 
processes have combined to produce new subjects, sites and scales of struggle, so that citizenship is 
Ôincreasingly defined as practices of becoming claim-making subjects in and through various sites 
and scalesÕ (Isin, 2008: 16).  
 
This idea of ÔbecomingÕ is important, and I believe signifies an important and under-theorised 
function of citizenship: the articulation of desire for autonomy. This resonates with the work of 
Deleuze. In particular, I would like to draw again on his distinction between active and reactive 
forces, based on NietzscheÕs (1996 [1887]) account of the differential modes of interpretation and 
evaluation characteristic of the master and of the slave. Deleuze aligns the denial of difference with 
reactive forces and the affirmation of difference with active forces: Ôonly active force asserts itself, 
it affirms its difference and makes its difference an object of enjoyment and affirmationÕ (Deleuze, 
2006 [1983]: 52). The affirmation of difference constitutes a becoming, which occurs when an 
entity affirms its difference in relation to its habitus: Ôonly a minority is capable of serving as the 
active medium of becomingÕ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 321). DeleuzeÕs conceptualisations of 
active forces and becoming- are congruent with my conceptualisation of Ôcritical utopianismÕ, since 
they privilege process over closure and opposition to the status quo as a creative and affirmative 
act. In terms of the research question, this presupposes always-already existent other citizenships 
that exist in a tension with state citizenship as a unified and imposed identity. 
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I would therefore like to borrow creatively from DeleuzeÕs active/reactive distinction and from the 
conceptions of citizenship put forward in this thesis in order to formulate my own model of 
potential citizenships, which distinguishes between dominant and critical utopian approaches: 
Figure 10-1:Dominant and critical utopian models of citizenship 
Dominant / reactive Territory, clearly 
bounded political 
entities (nation-states), 
centralisation, clearly 
bounded public/private 
spheres 
Authority, hierarchy, 
subjection, passivity, 
abstracted claim-
making through 
structures of mediation 
Rights, division 
between rights and 
obligations, formal 
status including rights 
that clearly delineate 
public morality and 
private choice and 
private property 
Critical utopian / active Belonging without 
territory, de-
territorialisation, open 
space of opposition 
Participation, 
decision-making and 
claim-making without 
hierarchy and authority 
Ethics of infinite 
responsibility without 
fixed rights, 
relationships without 
abstract mediation, 
subjectivity without 
hegemonic identity 
 
The dominant, reactive formulation of citizenship has been articulated in various terms throughout 
this thesis, and reflects what May (quoted above) calls oppressive practices, the classical and 
evolutionary anarchists would call expressions of the political principle (see sections 2.4.1 & 
2.4.2), and Day (2005) following Gramsci (1971) calls expression of a logic of hegemony. It rests 
on truth-claiming, obscured utopias and is more a form of subjection than citizenship. The latter 
form of citizenship put forward in the table resonates with the critical utopian approach and the 
project of poststructural anarchism (May 1994). In concrete terms, their co-existence leads to a 
paradoxical situation where someone could be a citizen at the level of practice, but not of the state. 
A person might belong to a community, participate in that community, and have ethical values that 
support and are supported by that community yet might be plucked from their social network and 
deported through lack of legal citizenship (see for example Curtis & Lipsett, The Guardian, 31 
May 2008: 6).  
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The aim of this project is not to posit a transcendental or fixed blueprint for a new model of 
citizenship nor a single path by which it might be achieved, and indeed the table above presents 
dangers of oversimplification: 
I do not think it is possible to say that one thing is of the order of ÒliberationÓ and another is of 
the order of ÒoppressionÓ É no matter how terrifying a given system may be, there always 
remain possibilities of resistance, disobedience, and oppositional groupings. On the other hand, 
I do not think that there is anything that is functionally Ð by its very nature Ð absolutely 
liberating. Liberty is a practice. So there may, in fact, always be a certain number of projects 
whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even break them, but none of these 
projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that it will 
be established by the project itself. The liberty of men [sic] is never assured by the institutions 
and laws that are intended to guarantee themÕ (Foucault, 1986: 245). 
 
Poststructural anarchism does however suggest a possible ethical model: that Ôthe project of 
measuring life against external standards constitutes a betrayal rather than an affirmation of lifeÕ 
(May, 1994: 127). The critical utopian method put forward in this project suggests a potential 
politics of experimentation that operates in line with this ethical model Ð one that values 
contingency: 
Experimentation is the activity of trying out something else, something that may get one free of 
the feeling of necessity and ineluctability that attaches to practices one has been brought up on. 
It is crucial to understand, however, that experimentation is distinct from simply transgressing 
the boundaries of practice that are put before one É Experimentation, unlike transgression, 
seeks positive alternatives rather than revolt. Such an activity is more in keeping with a 
perspective that defines power not as a repressive force exercised from above, but as a feature 
of all social relationships. The task of a poststructuralist politics is to attempt to construct 
power relationships that can be lived with, not to overthrow power altogether. As such, 
experimentation is a sober and often tentative activity. One experiments by constructing 
practices that one is prepared to abandon if their effects are intolerable É There is no blueprint 
for practice. The ethical principles that help one to judge practice remain, but one can only 
experiment in their realisationÕ (May, 1994: 114). 
 
Both Foucault and May emphasise the importance of practice. An ethics of poststructural 
anarchism also involves the valorisation of alternative practices as an ethical principle (May, 1994: 
133). Despite this emphasis on alternative practices in critical utopian spaces as a political method 
and form of citizenship, there is still a significant political role for normative theory:  
In essence, our claim is that a guide for action cannot be derived entirely from an ÒisÓ; but 
neither can it be derived from an ÒoughtÓ. It is, in fact, the interaction of the two in ethical 
discourse that provides the grounds for action. We must note that, although in some sense 
ethical claims are distinct from factual ones, in ethical discourse taken as a practice, ethical 
claims and factual ones are both necessary (Ibid: 149). 
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This suggests a dialogue between theory and practice similar to that which I have been attempting 
in this thesis. By bringing practices into dialogue with the academic theory that often ignores them, 
one hope of this project has been to offer Ôa way of grappling with those real, immediate questions 
that emerge from a transformative projectÕ (Graeber, 2004: 9). My hope in this project then, has 
been a mode of social theorising advocated by Graeber that operates somewhat in the fashion of the 
participatory processes that it works with: Ôsuch a project would actually have two aspects, or two 
moments if you like: one ethnographic, one utopian, suspended in a constant dialogueÕ (Ibid: 12). 
Critical utopian citizenship does not hope to posit a vanguardist vision or mode of action, but rather 
some potential strategies for dealing simultaneously with, outside and against hierarchical and 
hegemonic structures: 
One obvious role for a radical intellectual is to É look at those who are creating viable 
alternatives, try to figure out what might be larger implications of what they are (already) 
doing, and then offer those ideas back, not as prescriptions, but as contributions, possibilities Ð 
as gifts (Graeber, 2004: 11-2).  
 
It is with this ethos that I would like to offer a range of suggested imperatives for multiple and 
diverse, overlapping and intersecting bodies of theory and groups of people, in particular: 
citizenship studies, utopian studies, anarchist studies and a wider movement for autonomy, and 
would-be critical utopian citizens within and outwith these groups. Following on from the theme of 
the rhizome, each of these heterogeneous bodies offered me starting points from which I drew my 
disaggregated research questions in section 1.3 of this thesis. Throughout the thesis I have 
developed these questions by intersecting different bodies of thought and practice through dialogue 
with each other in ways that I hope have opened up new possibilities, which in the spirit of 
GraeberÕs words above, I would like to offer back in a spirit of mutual aid and solidarity rather than 
of vanguardist prescription. 
 
10.3. Contributions 
10.3.1. Contribution to citizenship studies 
Citizenship studies inspired the first of my disaggregated research questions: out of what historical 
conditions do dominant models of citizenship arise, what do they have in common, and what are 
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the effects of dominant modes of theorising citizenship. By bringing a critical utopian approach to 
bear upon dominant canonical and contemporary theory I argued throughout the thesis that 
citizenship studies too often remains trapped within a modernist truth-claiming mode of theorising 
that results in a statist, programatic and legislative institution of citizenship at the level of practice. 
This was seen to be partially a result of an historical tendency of focusing on theory at the expense 
of practice. Taking account of my research outcomes, potential directions for citizenship studies 
might include concentrating on revitalising what classical and evolutionary anarchists call the 
Ôsocial principleÕ (see sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2) - that is, forms of unalienated and unmediated 
belonging and face-to-face interaction rather than abstract belonging to state categories. We might 
seek to understand and motivate participation through a conception of human agency based on 
desire, rather than self-deadening transcendental moral principles and to study multiple overlapping 
participatory networks rather than singular belongings. In particular, I would like to emphasise the 
importance of including, or even starting from the voice of the other  - in my case research 
participants - rather than from abstract theoretical goals. 
 
I began the introduction to thesis with a quote from Foucault, who differentiates between the role 
of the intellectual, which is to disrupt fixed modes of thought and institutional practice, and the role 
of the citizen, which is to participate in the development of political transformation. My project 
resonates with but transgresses this distinction. Critical utopian citizenship disrupts the boundary 
between the intellectual and the citizen, and brings voices of those outside academia into a dialogue 
with academic theory in order that they can participate in critique (this however raises some issues 
of representation that will be discussed below). This in itself is a political imperative. The emphasis 
on the importance of critical questioning from multiple perspectives as a form of knowledge raises 
some interesting questions and speaks to important debates in contemporary citizenship theory: 
¥ Can citizenship exist without the state? Is anarchist citizenship possible? (Hoffman, 
2004; Graeber 2004) 
¥ Can dissidence be considered a citizenly practice? (Sparks, 1997) 
¥ What is the relationship between autonomy and sovereignty? (Brace & Hoffman 
(eds), 1997; Agamben, 1998) 
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¥ Can we be citizens of more than one entity at once, at different spatial scales? 
(Heater, 1999; 2004) 
 
Statist approaches associate citizenship with an external or transcendental, territorially sovereign 
power. This makes the idea of autonomy, dissident citizenship, or multiple citizenships 
conceptually difficult Ð sovereignty is jealous, and does not like to share. It is this tension between 
the sovereignty of the autonomous citizen and the sovereignty of the state that lies at the heart of 
many citizenship debates. It is perhaps for this reason that anarchistic approaches tend to reject or 
avoid the term ÔcitizenshipÕ altogether, in favour of terms such as ÔnomadÕ (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1988; Braidotti, 1994). This avoidance is in part necessary and important for constructing the 
estranged viewpoint and reversal of perspective that is so compelling in (what I am terming) 
critical utopian theory. However, practices show that engagement with power dynamics also plays 
an important role in a critically resistant praxis, and can form part of a linguistic, pragmatic and 
substantive intervention (this will be discussed further in section 10.3.3). 
 
10.3.2. Contribution to utopian studies 
Utopian studies inspired my methodology as well as the second of my disaggregated research 
questions: What alternatives to dominant models of citizenship are offered by critical utopian 
theory? The critical utopian approach has been used as a methodology elsewhere: by Moylan it has 
been applied to science fiction, literary and cultural criticism and processes of social and political 
change (Moylan, 1986). By Sargisson, it has been applied to feminist literary utopias (Sargisson, 
1996), and to the concept of the body, brought into dialogue with bodies of thought, bodies of 
people, and the collective bodies of intentional communities (Sargisson, 2000). In this project, I 
broadened the methodology by applying it to the concept of citizenship, which I brought into 
dialogue with various bodies of anarchistic thought and practices in autonomous communities. 
Anarchistic theories and practices were judged to be Ôcritical utopianÕ insofar as they offer 
estranged viewpoints that are oppositional to the status quo, and simulaneously offer creative and 
experimental alternatives. Contemporary anarchistic thought and practice were deemed particularly 
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suitable in the context of a critical utopian approach since they begin from a similar ethos of 
epistemological anarchism, rejection of vanguardism and valorisation of difference and 
experimentation. This conversation between citizenship and anarchism brings the methodology into 
a more self-consciously political arena. The arguments of both Moylan and Sargisson are that the 
utopian method is always-already political, insofar as it articulates non-hegemonic alternatives to 
dominant models of political organisation (Moylan, 1986: 208; Sargisson, 2000: 154). This is also 
my argument. However, considering the critical utopian potential of the concept of citizenship, 
which mainly exists within the dominant register of political thought, has brought a new 
perspective to critical utopianism which considers not only the always-already political nature of 
utopian alternatives, but also the tensions that exist at the nexus between utopian autonomy and 
embedededness within hegemonic structures in a mobile strategic field. This could be taken 
elsewhere and further. For example, in the field of the physical sciences a critical utopian approach 
might begin from the epistemological anarchist position that: Ôscience knows no Òbare factsÓ at all 
but that the ÒfactsÓ that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore, 
essentially ideationalÕ (Feyerabend, 1974: 19). Furthering the possibilities of this theoretical 
position would involve seeking out spaces where estranged ontological positions regarding the 
physical environment were played out in practice, for example ÔprimitiveÕ cultures (Lvi-Strauss 
1966 [1962]) or radical health collectives experimenting with traditional and holistic medicine 
(Gordon & Griffiths 2007), and starting from the voices of the ÔothersÕ within these spaces to 
transgress and open up further possibilities for politics and citizenship in both dominant and 
alternative fields. This is just one example of multiple possibilities for similar methodologies to be 
used elsewhere. 
 
10.3.3. Contribution to anarchist studies and wider movements for autonomy 
Anarchist theory inspired the third of my disaggregated research questions in section 1.3 of this 
thesis: What theoretical and practiced alternatives to dominant models of citizenship do political 
agents in autonomous spaces offer? Anarchist theory throughout history has placed significant 
emphasis on the importance of opening up space for non-hierarchical, non-alienated relationships 
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and practices (see section 2.4), and therefore inspired my urge to study these (see section 3.4). It is 
interesting that despite the ethical emphasis anarchist theory places on everyday life and practice, 
relatively few political works study anarchistic practices directly114. Practices can highlight gaps 
and weaknesses in theory, and thus act as a catalyst for further theorising. 
 
My research and case studies showed that theories of anarchism and alternative practices highlight 
the importance of continuing to desire an outside to state structures, the Ôpolitical principleÕ and 
hegemony, but that the boundaries between the included and excluded, and the social and political 
principles are somewhat more porous than anarchists sometimes allow: that there are certain 
features in common and intersections between state and non-state citizenships, and that movements 
for autonomy would benefit from further theorising along at least two axes of this relationship: 
¥ A more complex theorisation of the ways in which hierarchies continue to 
emerge in intentionally non-hierarchical, autonomous spaces and potential 
strategies for warding off or overcoming emergent hierarchies including 
within communities (see particularly sections 6.3, 7.2 & 7.3 of this thesis) as 
well as the possibility of recuperation in market practices or through 
representation in the spectacle (Žižek, 2004). 
 
¥ A recognition of the ways in which experiments in autonomy can use the 
systemÕs tools, such as citizenship, as a basis for strategic engagement with 
power structures for the achievement of radical goals. Such recognition could 
act as a prompt for theories offering tactical tools for practice, such as the 
avoidance of co-optation, de-radicalisation and recuperation during 
engagements with power (see sections 9.2.5; 9.3.5; Robinson, 2007; Robinson 
& Tormey, 2009).  
 
Robinson and Tormey argue that Ôin a mobile strategic field É the winning of rights can serve to 
consolidate or defend autonomy by placing limits on the systemÕs intrusions where it continues to 
existÕ (Ibid: 167). The authors follow Marcuse
115
 by suggesting that Ôany ethical concept (such as 
freedom, rights, justice, equality) can function in either a utopian or a non-utopian way, depending 
on its degree of distance from the existing systemÕ (Ibid: 167-8). In this project I have partially 
argued for the strategic and utopian potential of citizenship. What I have hoped to offer here is 
                                            
114
 Notable exceptions are Day (2005) and Graeber (2009), although Day relies primarily on secondary sources. 
115
 See particularly Marcuse (1991 [1964]), Ch. 4, ÒThe Closing Universe of DiscourseÓ pp. 85-120 
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neither a blueprint for a perfect society nor an image of the perfect citizen, but rather a strategic 
method for engaging simultaneously with power and with the multiple futures that we desire. This 
must be an ongoing project whereby emergent hierarchies and transcendental theories are 
continually critiqued and transgressed. 
 
10.3.4. Contribution to would-be critical citizens 
The fourth of my disaggregated research questions was: what can a dialogue between theory and 
practices tell us about the conditions for critical utopian citizenship? This question was inspired by 
the idea that in a reversal of much theoretical and popular opinion, not only is the state partially a 
utopian project, but anarchism is also a pragmatic project: 
The moment we stop insisting on viewing all forms of action only by their functions in 
reproducing larger, total, forms of inequality and power, we will also be able to see that 
anarchist social relations and non-alienated forms of action are all around us (Graeber, 2004: 
76). 
 
This project therefore also hopes to have something to offer others, perhaps leading more 
conventional lives, who are not members of autonomous communities, and perhaps do not consider 
themselves anarchists, but who seek to resist certain elements of existing structures or citizenship 
discourse. In this thesis, I have argued for the importance of the practice of creating spaces with 
desiring others in which critical, transgressive and experimental forms of belonging, participation 
and ethics can occur as a method of resistance to dominant, hegemonic forms of citizenship: 
Ôstructural renewal based on the logic of affinity is less Utopian than either reform or revolution in 
its orientation to the realization of desired forms here and now. It is about building spaces, places 
or topias in the most literal sense of the termÕ (Day, 2005: 216). A potential imperative for would-
be critical citizens in everyday life, and also an avenue for further academic study, would be a 
consideration of the ways in which experimental spaces can be opened up in more conventional 
institutional settings, for example the university (Mohanty, 2003) or the mental health service 
(Campling, Davies & Farquharson (Eds.), 2004).  
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10.4. Limitations 
10.4.1. Situatedness 
The main limit of this project is that it has been restricted to a relatively small sample of particular 
communities, all within the United Kingdom. The approach has been exploratory rather than 
confirmatory (see Gerring, 2004: 349-50). I did not wish to ÔproveÕ or even suggest that the 
practices I study might be subsumed under or adequately explained by some abstract category of 
citizenship but rather to disrupt taken-for-granted categories through an exploration of alternative 
practices and to explore what conditions for a critical utopian citizenship might look like, and what 
the strategic, ethical and political value of such a concept might be. In some respects, situatedness 
is a strength, and also an ethical imperative: 
The role of the intellectual consists in a participation in theoretical struggles that are local and 
regional rather than universal. The intellectual offers analyses to those alongside whom he or 
she struggles, rather than sacred truths on tablets passed down to the oppressed (May 1994: 
118). 
 
Situatedness also has drawbacks. Even isolated communities (which my cases are usually not) are 
part of a global web of connected practices and networks, so the limit would be that my 
methodology is focused on the local scale and on one national context, whereas its theoretical 
implications extend to the global, and to a wide range of contexts Ð a fuller understanding of the 
intersection of citizenship, anarchism and utopianism would also have to deal with other contexts, 
both in the sense of studying global connections (citizenship in online communities, diaspora 
networks where the community has two or more ÔplacesÕ and in resistant movements advocating 
solidarity without borders) and in the sense of studying places which are local but are situated 
differently in the world-system (for example, in the global South). 
 
There is also the constraint that my critical utopian approach, by emphasising the ÔbestÕ kind of 
case, leaves open the question of the intersection of emancipatory logics with insidious logics. 
Examples here might include the different issues that would arise in studying certain religious 
intentional communities, criminal networks or American militia groups. In terms of some of the 
categories drawn from poststructural anarchistic theories in this thesis, there is little space in the 
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approaches that I have taken for an analysis of ÔreactiveÕ networks. The methodology does allow 
for a detailed analysis of affinity groups and networks, and the intersection of these with capital, 
the state, and the included, but there may be another set of issues around reactive networks and the 
passages and intersections between non-hierarchical affinity and reactive networks based around, 
for example, human trafficking or illegal arms trade (see Karatzogianni & Robinson, 2010). 
 
What is good about these limits is that they are matters of perspectival multiplicity. It is not 
necessarily a failure of analytic categories or empirical neglect, but rather an ethical commitment to 
focusing on one thing that might otherwise have been neglected, the limit being that this intersects 
with other things, which might be worth focusing on at other times or places, or by someone else. 
This is part, but perhaps only the very beginning, of the development of a critical utopian 
perspective, or a Bakhtinian polyphonic dialogue upon the concept of citizenship. My hope when I 
began the project was that these diverse voices would speak to each other and resonate in some 
ways. I feel that they did, and hope that is apparent. It is also my hope that additional research Ð my 
own and othersÕ - will find resonances and transgressions that multiply perspectives yet further. 
 
10.4.2. Possibility of recuperation 
In Chapter 7, section 7.3.2, I raised the important issue that critical utopian citizenship might be 
recuperated, co-opted or absorbed into individualistic new-right discourses of Ôactive citizenshipÕ, 
or a liberal ideology that posits the necessity of the ÔminimalÕ state to protect minorities and the 
flourishing of difference. I argued that critical utopian citizenship is different, because it does not 
seek the integration of difference into a higher totality. Critical utopian citizenship is also 
distinguished from Ôactive citizenshipÕ as it does not take the norms, limits or goals of the state-
capitalist, or indeed any system as given.  
 
I am also alert to the danger that the method could be recuperated or co-opted into solely the realms 
of academia. In particular, due to constraints of time and the thesis format I am worried that I have 
not offered enough back to the communities that I studied as do some solidarity action research 
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projects that I much admire (for example, Day et. al. (Eds.): 2002; Chatterton, 2007). It is also 
important to note, however, that critical utopian citizenship is something that I hope does also have 
something to offer practices within academia as well as within other spaces. William T. Armaline 
offers some pointers for an Ôanarchist pedagogyÕ (Armaline, 2009: 136) that connects in rhizomatic 
fashion with the critical utopian project: 
(1) a humble, postmodern/poststructural approach to ÔTruth,Ó (2) a central concern with 
creating pedagogical space free from tyranny, coercion and hierarchical domination, such that 
horizontal freely associated democracy might take shape in and outside of the ÒclassroomÓ, and 
(3) an epistemological approach where all people are capable subjects and creators of 
knowledge and history (Ibid, p. 142). 
 
Such an approach resonates with, could be inspired by, but would certainly continue to critique and 
overflow, some of the practices considered in the autonomous communities in this thesis. 
 
10.4.3. Problems of representation 
I am acutely aware that despite my best intentions the project may be somewhat vanguardist, or 
worse, misrepresentative of the voices I am trying to bring into this project. Despite my own ethical 
and political objections to alienation, mediation, and absence, I am re-presenting practitioners by 
bringing their voices into my project, and possibly articulating their views through (and with) 
concepts that they might not have chosen themselves. There is also a worry that interviewees might 
be taken as representatives of their communities or of other radical practitioners. This is, of course, 
a difficulty of all qualitative research, but is more poignant in the context of my own which seeks 
to propagate a non-hegemonic ethos and politics. My hope is that the degree of representation that 
does occur is taken by both contributors and readers in the spirit that it is meant Ð as a non-
hierarchical act of solidarity with resistant others aimed at Ôbreaking the unanimity which is the 
greater part of the symbolic force of the dominant discourseÕ (Bourdieu, 1998: vii-viii). Again, it is 
important to note that the people and places represented in this project overflow and exceed the 
representations given herein. 
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10.5. Tensions and Potentialities 
Through the critical utopian methodology developed in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, I have been 
able to create connections, encounters and interchanges between bodies of theory, concepts, ideas, 
voices and practices that are often kept separate. A multiplicity of perspectives have been brought 
into play from canonical and contemporary political theory, including citizenship studies, utopian 
studies, variations on anarchism, feminism, ecology and post-structuralism as well as from activist 
voices and practices, individual and collective. These perspectives have been brought to bear upon 
a variety of different concepts that simultaneously speak to and are in excess of the concept and 
institution of citizenship. Through the prisms of territory, authority and rights a broad spectrum of 
citizenship formations that speak to, and exceed these concepts has shone forth: themes of 
autonomy, desire, belonging, participation and ethics in particular have branched out in rhizomic 
fashion, highlighting new possibilities for citizenship without, beyond and underneath the 
hegemonic formulations assumed by hierarchical and centralised models.  
 
The process of bringing these different bodies of thought into dialogue with each other, as well as 
particularly tricky task of bringing abstract theory into a conversation with the ideas and practices 
of political agents outside the academy has highlighted tensions between practices and theory  Ð 
such as hierarchies of participation discussed in chapter 7, and emergent individualism and 
complex overlapping models of subjectivity and community, and strategic, doubly-articulated 
orientations towards social change discussed in chapter 9.  The process, however, has hopefully not 
been discordant or jarring. Tensions, contradictions and paradoxes are essential to the ethos of 
perspectival multiplicity and ongoing critique assumed by the critical utopian methodology. This 
offers a logic and practice of citizenship that is at once utopian and autonomous, embedded and 
strategic.  
 
The implications of the (sometimes tense) dialogue between theory and practice are critical, 
utopian, disruptive and open up new possibilities. This open-ended approach creates many avenues 
for studying practices that would not normally be considered in terms of citizenship, and might 
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disrupt and transgress set institutions and conceptions of the political yet further, such as 
relationships and networks that are not so easily identifiable within space; that are more akin to 
Deleuze and GuattariÕs deterritorialised assemblages, or perhaps have less explicitly political 
agendas Ð for example travelling communities, counter-cultural movements and indigenous land-
rights movements. What this research hopefully shows is the need to be less rigid about what 
counts as citizenship practices or desirible political action, and that attempts by the state and by 
dominant discourse to capture and control such practices are not so much about creating citizenship 
as cutting it off. 
Bibliography 
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Appendix 1: Brief descriptions of communities 
Kebele 
Dates of visit: 6
th
-7
th
 of April 2007  
Geographic location: Easton, an inner city area of Bristol. 
History of ownership: Previously squatted, now owned outright after having been bought from the 
previous owners with a mortgage from an ethical bank. 
Number of members: Membership varies from those who enter, use and/or help out in the space 
occasionally, to those who are considered Ôcore membersÕ. Thus it is not possible to precisely 
numerate membership, if membership is taken to mean all those who are involved in Kebele in 
some way or other. At the time of my visit, there were reportedly around ten core members, 
although this number fluctuates, and the group were trying to recruit several more. Core members 
are those who spend four or more hours a week helping out with essential activities. 
Ideological focus: Collective decision-making and organisation, co-operation and mutual aid, 
direct action and taking power back, equality and non-hierarchy, not for profit, openness and 
inclusion, permaculture, resistance and solidarity, vegan, voluntary participation and shared 
responsibility. 
Legal structure and/or intended organisational features: Community co-operative (previously a 
housing co-operative, but in the process of converting due to no longer providing residential 
space). 
Facilities and spaces: Caf and adjoining kitchen, which regularly serves vegan food, a radical 
library, an infoshop (small stall for leaflets), social space with comfortable seating, small back 
yard, which at the time of my visit was used to store parts for the bicycle workshop, but was being 
converted into a permaculture garden. The upstairs space was previously used as bedrooms for 
residents of the housing co-op, although was unused at the time of my visit. 
Important notes: Organised around a series of Ôsub-collectivesÕ, which are responsible for various 
different aspects of what goes on at Kebele. The more established sub-collectives at the time of my 
visit were the caf, infoshop, bike workshop, finance, IT and library sub-collectives. There were 
also sub-collectives that were still in their infancy, but were aiming to become permanent, such as 
the art, maintenance and permaculture collectives.  
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Springhill  
   
Appendix 1 Figure 2: The Common House at Springhill 
Where abbreviated: S.Hill 
Dates of visit: 21
st
 April 2007 
Geographic location: Stroud, Gloucestershire; suburban. 
History of ownership: Land bought in 2000 by David Michael, for £550,000. Ten households who 
joined him during that year each purchased 5000 £1 shares. After this, a system of plot purchase 
was configured and each household paid according to the size of their dwelling. Building was 
completed in 2003. Houses and flats are now owned by individual households on a leasehold basis. 
Number of members: Approximately 80 residents, 50 of whom were adults and the remainder 
children under 18 
Ideological focus: Co-housing, consensus, environmental living. 
Legal structure and/or intended organisational features: Company limited by shares: members 
own their own houses and also a share in the community. Self-describes as an intentional 
community. 
Facilities and spaces: The principles of co-housing attempt to find a balance between individual 
private space and activity and shared community space and activity. Therefore, all members live 
either alone or with their families, partners or housemates in a self-contained flat or house. There is 
also a large amount of shared space in a ÔCommon HouseÕ with cooking, dining and leisure 
facilities. The site is built on a very steep, South-facing slope. It is composed of 34 units, ranging 
from one-bedroom flats, to five bedroom houses 
Hockerton Housing Project  
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Appendix 1 Figure 3: Hockerton eco-houses 
Where abbreviated: HHP 
Dates of visit: 26
th
 April 2007 
Geographic location: Southwell, Nottinghamshire; rural. 
History of ownership: The project was conceived in the early 1990s and took around 4 years to 
complete. Each of the households was responsible for raising the capital for their own home. For 
some, this meant selling their houses and living in caravan on site while construction took place. 
Members own their own homes on leasehold, but with specific conditions, such as restrictions on 
the use of fossil-fuelled cars and an obligation to contribute a minimum number of hours to the co-
operative. 
Number of members: Five households comprising 11 adults and 9 children. 
Ideological focus: Environmentalism, sustainability and self-sufficiency. 
Legal structure and/or intended organisational features: Company limited by guarantee. 
Project members own their own homes and live in them as separate families, but have as a 
condition of their lease to contribute a minimum of 300 hours per year towards communal activities 
such as gardening on the allotment and maintenance.  
Facilities and spaces: Five earth-sheltered homes on a 25-acre site. The houses are built into a hill, 
so that from one side an observer can only see a grass bank, whereas viewing from the other one 
sees modern, stylish eco-houses with glass conservatories reaching out from the front. The land is 
used to generate clean energy through various means, harvest and clarify water through a reed-bed 
sewage system, grow organic vegetables, encourage biodiversity through planting native trees and 
there is a community building used for tours, courses, events and local community activities.  
Important notes: UK's first earth-sheltered, self-sufficient housing development. The group also 
runs a workerÕs co-operative that employs some of the members, called ÔHHP Trading Ltd.Õ, which 
manages all the communityÕs income generating activities, such as education, promotion and 
expertise. 
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Coventry Peace House  
 
Appendix 1 Figure 4: The six adjoined houses of Coventry Peace House 
Where abbreviated: CPH 
Dates of visit: 9
th
-10
th
 May 2007 
Geographic location: Coventry; multi-cultural inner-city area. 
History of ownership: Set up by three founding members between the summers of 1997-8, who 
had been staying at a peace camp outside the Alvis tank factory in Coventry. They set up the 
housing co-op to establish a more permanent community based on non-violence. The houses were 
bought with a mortgage from an ethical bank. The houses have gradually been renovated over 
several years with help from volunteers. 
Number of members: Six out of a maximum potential of eight at the time of my visit. Four were 
full-time members and two long-term guests. Full-time members are required to commit to stay for 
at least two years.  
Ideological focus: Non-violence and simple green lifestyle. 
Legal structure and/or intended organisational features: Fully mutual housing co-operative. 
There is a preference for members to work part-time to earn a living, so that the remainder of their 
time can be dedicated to working for the co-operative.  
Facilities and spaces: Six adjoined terraced houses. Five of the houses have been connected as 
one, and the sixth remains separate. These encompass living space, bedrooms for residents of the 
housing co-operative, a cycle workshop, which is open to the public, and a large community space. 
The large space is used by the co-op and by the local community for meetings and various projects 
in during the day. At night it is used as a shelter for destitute and refused asylum seekers. The 
buildings also house offices and space for an affiliated Ôglobal citizenshipÕ project called 
WorldWise and a vegetarian catering project called Delicious and Nutritious. The once small 
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backyards of the six houses have also been adjoined to create a large communal garden used for 
socialising and growing vegetables in a small patch.  
Findhorn Community 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 5: Cluny Hotel (Findhorn Foundation) 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 6: Whisky-barrel house at The Park (Findhorn Foundation) 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 7: The 'Nature Sanctuary' at The Park (Findhorn Foundation) 
  
Appendix 1 Figure 8: Eco-houses in 'The Field of Dreams' (New Findhorn Association) 
Where abbreviated: Find.n 
Dates of visit: 8
th
 - 20
th
 of June 2007 
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Geographic location: The physical space of Findhorn Community
116
 is situated in West Moray, in 
the Northeast of Scotland, on two locations that are separated by a distance of approximately six 
miles, with regular minibuses transporting staff and guests between the two. The two locations 
have incredibly different atmospheres and serve different purposes. I have included a map in 
appendix 3. 
History of ownership: Peter and Eileen Caddy and Dorothy MacLean began the community in 
1962. They first moved to Scotland in 1957 to manage Cluny Hill Hotel. After their employment 
was terminated, they moved to a caravan park near the bay at the nearby village of Findhorn. Due 
to their spiritual leanings and remarkable success growing vegetables in an unfavourable 
environment, horticultural experts and people with spiritual interests started to move to the caravan 
park to join the group. In 1972 the community was formally registered as a Scottish Charity under 
the name of ÔThe Findhorn FoundationÕ. During the 1970s and 80s the community grew to 
approximately 300 members. In 1975 the Foundation purchased Cluny Hill Hotel, from which the 
three founding members had originally been dismissed as employees. In 1982, the Foundation 
bought its home, the Findhorn Bay Caravan Park. In the 1990s, the number of people attached to 
the community began to outgrow the Foundation, with people buying private homes and businesses 
in the vicinity and associating themselves with the Foundation, which led to the formation of the 
wider community now known as the New Findhorn Association (NFA). 
Number of members: Approximately 150 members of the Foundation, and around 400 members 
of the NFA. 
Ideological focus:  Spiritual. At the outset, the community functioned almost as a theocracy 
through the spiritual guidance of the founding members. Through its history it has developed 
through consensus to a mixture of representative and consensus decision-making structures, and the 
belief system has simultaneously diversified encompassing many aspects of New-Age spirituality. 
All members adhere to the ÔCommon GroundÕ (Appendix 5).  
Legal structure and/or intended organisational features: Registered charity. See also appendix 
4. 
Facilities and spaces: These are described in more detail in section 5.2.1.2 of the thesis. See also 
map in Appendix 3. 
Important notes: It is important to note that there is some complexity regarding the name of 
Findhorn Community. Often, it is simply referred to as ÔFindhornÕ, or ÔFindhorn CommunityÕ and 
this is how it is known worldwide. However, Findhorn is in fact a small fishing village, itself with 
rich history and traditions and a degree of local pride. In the past, residents of this village 
                                            
116
 It is important to note that members often view the community as part of a much wider, spiritual network, and not just a community 
of place. 
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community have been antipathetic towards being confused or conflated with the nearby New Age 
community. For this reason, the New Age community is generally referred to locally as ÔFindhorn 
FoundationÕ, or Ôthe FoundationÕ. However, this can also be somewhat misleading, since the 
Foundation, a legally recognised charitable organisation, only really encompasses those members 
who both live and work in the community, and not members of the NFA. In this thesis, I 
differentiate where appropriate between Ôthe FoundationÕ and Ôthe NFAÕ, but when intending to 
include both I refer to the ÔFindhorn CommunityÕ. When referring to residents of the village, I use 
ÔFindhorn village communityÕ, or Ôthe local communityÕ.  
Mornington Grove Community  
Where abbreviated: MGC 
Dates of visit: 5
th
 - 8
th
 of July 2007 
Geographic location: Bow, East London. 
History of ownership: A Quaker community, who bought several houses on the street, started the 
group in the 1980s. Some of the community left, and in the 1990s there was an amicable divorce 
from the Quaker roots,  
Number of members: 7 during my visit, of an optimum number of 14. 
Ideological focus: No defined ideological focus, but loosely describes as Ôgreenish, leftish and 
feministÕ. Decisions are made by consensus. 
Legal structure and/or intended organisational features: Fully mutual housing co-operative. 
Facilities and spaces: Two large, beautiful, semi-detached houses that are over 150 years old and 
Grade II listed. The two houses are separated inside, each with their own kitchens, bathrooms and 
living rooms, but are joined by a large conservatory at the back. The gardens of the two houses are 
also joined, making one large garden, which is beautifully kept. Although these are both part of the 
same community they also function with a degree of autonomy from one another. Shared 
community matters, which are discussed at community meetings, include business issues (such as 
finance and maintenance) and wider concerns relating to the social and relationship aspects of 
community life. House-specific issues include household issues such as cooking, cleaning and use 
of shared space. One of the households eats together regularly, and the other does not. 
Liverpool Social Centre  
Where abbreviated: LSC 
Dates of visit: 10
th
 July 2007 
Geographic location: Central Liverpool 
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History of ownership: At the time of my visit the centre was still under construction, and had not 
publicly or officially ÔopenedÕ. This was an interesting case study, as it allowed me to observe a 
community in its embryonic stages, and again illustrates that all of my observations during visits 
are only ÔsnapshotsÕ of ongoing processes rather than finalised and complete descriptions of 
communities as static entities. At the time of writing the final draft of this thesis (summer 2009), 
Liverpool Social Centre is a firmly established radical community space and social centre that has 
changed its name to Next to Nowhere
117
. The social centre is situated in ÔThe BasementÕ; a space 
underneath a radical bookshop in Liverpool called News from Nowhere. It rents the space from this 
bookshop, which is run as a workersÕ co-operative. 
Number of members: The Social Centre Collective, who met once a month, was in charge of 
every aspect of running the centre. The collective was formed in January 2006, when an open 
meeting was called to discuss the possibility of opening a social centre. The organisers of the 
meeting expected only a small group of ten to twelve people, who regularly attended a local social 
forum, to turn up, but instead found that over forty enthusiastic people turned up. Since then, 
numbers have dwindled but there is still a stable collective of up to twenty people, with some 
fluidity in membership. 
Ideological focus: At the time of my visit there was no agreed constitutional set of values. 
Members came from a range of backgrounds in community activism, disillusionment with leftist 
politics, the anti-war movement, environmentalism and animal rights amongst others.  
Legal structure and/or intended organisational features: No set legal structure at the time of my 
visit. The Social Centre Collective was run by consensus, and tasks were delegated to sub-groups. 
Facilities and spaces: At the time of my visit, the space was still under construction, but I was 
informed of what various spaces were to become. There was a separating counter that was going to 
become the caf counter, with a kitchen behind. There was an area in front of this, which was to 
become an area for seating for the caf, which could be removed to create floor-space for gigs. 
There was a large area with a raised area in front, which would be used for events, with the raised 
area potentially becoming a stage for bands or speakers, and also housing a projector and screen for 
film nights. There was a cupboard room, which was planned to become an office with a computer. 
There was some talk of removing one of the walls, in order to make the floor space in the event 
area larger. 
Corani Housing and Land Co-operative  
Where abbreviated: Corani 
Dates of visit: Two separate visits on 30
th
 June and 17
th
 July 2007. 
                                            
117
 More information on the current state of the centre can be found on its website at http://www.liverpoolsocialcentre.org, (n.d.) 
Accessed 5 August 2009 
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Geographic location: A multi-cultural area near the centre of Leicester. 
History of ownership: Corani was formed in 1978 and has been owned for many years. The two 
Corani houses used to be on separate streets, but one of the houses was swapped with a house 
belonging to a workersÕ co-op behind one of the Corani houses on a street running parallel, so that 
now the two houses are adjoined through the back yards. 
Number of members: At the time of my visit, Corani had six members. Two of these did not live 
at the housing, and one who was the daughter of one of the founding members was at University so 
only lived in Corani housing during vacation times. There was also one long-term guest, who did 
not want to commit to full-time membership since he did not want to income-share, which is a 
requirement of membership. At the time of my visit there were four people living in the house out 
of an optimum number of eight. 
Ideological focus: Co-operative and sharing.  
Legal structure and/or intended organisational features: Fully mutual housing co-operative. 
Facilities and spaces: Corani housing comprises two houses that are joined at the back. Part of one 
of the houses used to be a workersÕ co-op but is now used as an office for one of the members who 
is self-employed, and also as space for political campaigns. This house has a small kitchen and 
some bedrooms. The other house has a much larger kitchen, which forms the social-hub of the co-
op, and shared meals are eaten at the large table. Other rooms are either living space or bedrooms, 
although a lot of the bedrooms were empty due to the shortage of members. Corani also owns an 
allotment where vegetables were grown elsewhere in Leicester, within walking distance. 
Important notes: Members of the co-op are obliged to income share. This is further discussed in 
Chapter 9 (see also Appendix 9). 
Laurieston Hall  
 
Appendix 1 Figure 9: Laurieston Hall 
Where abbreviated: LH 
Dates of visit: 19
th
 Ð 24
th
 September 2007 
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Geographic location: Dumfries and Galloway, Scotland; rural.  
History of ownership: In 1972, approximately four families sold their houses to pay £25,000 for 
12 acres of land and a 73-roomed mansion. A mortgage was then taken out by remaining members 
to pay these members off. The building is now owned outright, and more of the surrounding land 
has been gradually bought over the years, so that the community also owns 150 acres of land, 
including two lochs. 
Number of members: At the time I visited, there were approximately 22 adults and 8 children. 
Ideological focus: There were no set constitutional values at the time of my visit and diversity of 
values as a key value was often cited during interviews. The aims and purposes of the community 
are co-operation, self-sufficiency and living together harmoniously.  
Legal structure and/or intended organisational features: Fully mutual housing cooperative. 
Decisions are made by consensus. Tasks are delegated to sub-groups, membership of which is 
rotated yearly, including maintenance, finance, gardening and dairy.  
Facilities and spaces: The community owns a 72-roomed mansion, with bedrooms for some 
members, guest rooms for guests on many of the educational courses that the community runs, a 
huge kitchen, a crche, a dining room, a very large living/socialising space with a small side 
kitchen for making tea and coffee. The Hall is heated entirely by wood-burners, some wood is 
taken from the communityÕs own coppice woodland and some form nearby sustainable Forestry 
Commission plantations. Electricity is provided by a hydro-generator. Grassland supports dairy 
cows and male calves used for meat. There are pigs, which are also reared for meat, fed by waste 
scrap-food from the residents and guests. Chickens are reared for both eggs and meat. There is a 
large walled vegetable garden, a sauna built by members of the community and two lochs in which 
members regularly swim. Although some members live in the large Hall, most live in caravans and 
small buildings elsewhere around the site, and the large Hall is mainly reserved for guest 
accommodation.  
Important notes: The main economic income of the community comes from visitors on courses 
arranged by the community, or by others wishing to use the community space. The community has 
an associated workersÕ co-operative, which deals with the business aspects of the community. 
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Appendix 2: Semi-structured interview schedule 
¥ Could you describe your community for me? 
¥ What are the main purposes or aims of this community? 
¥ Are there any shared values in the group? 
-Can you describe them to me? 
¥ How would you describe the relationship between this group and the wider community?  
(e.g. locality, nation, world, environment) 
¥ What makes a ÔgoodÕ member of this group? 
(e.g. Are there certain ways a good member might behave, or certain beliefs they might 
hold?) 
¥ How is the community organised?  
(Is there any sort of hierarchy?) 
¥ How are resources or money shared or allocated? 
¥ How would you describe your relationship with other members of this community? 
¥ How does the group make decisions? 
¥ What happens if somebody disagrees, or refuses to abide by a decision? 
¥ Do you think that this group has a role to play in wider social change? 
(that is, do you see this group as part of a wider transformative process?) 
¥ Is the group inspired by any particular thinkers or examples from the past? 
¥ How did you become a member of this community?  
¥ What beliefs or values are most important to you? 
¥ How do you, personally, participate in this group? (What is your role as an individual?) 
¥ What does the term ÔcitizenshipÕ mean to you? 
¥ What do you think makes a good citizen? 
¥ Do you feel that your membership and participation in this group makes you a good 
citizen? 
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Appendix 3: Map of Findhorn Foundation 
Scanned from a document received during ÒExperience WeekÓ.
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Appendix 4: People, relationships and organisation at Findhorn 
 
Scanned from a document received during ÒExperience WeekÓ.
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Appendix 5: Findhorn common ground 
Findhorn Community. (1996). ÒCommon GroundÓ from Findhorn Foundation: 
http://www.findhorn.org/whatwedo/community/commonground.php Accessed April 24, 2009. 
COMMON GROUND 
Of the Findhorn Foundation and Community 
 
The Common Ground is a statement of the common values of this international and widely diversified 
community. It is a living document, a code of conduct, and something we use as a tool for the transformation 
of ourselves, the way we relate to each other and the environment and, therefore, the world. 
 
(If the word ÒcommitÓ is too strong for you, then you can choose to use the word ÒaspireÓ). 
 
1. Spiritual Practice 
I commit myself to active spiritual practice and to align with spirit to work for the greatest good. 
 
2. Service 
I commit myself to the service of others and to our planet, recognising that I must also serve myself in order 
to practise this effectively. 
 
3. Personal Growth 
I commit myself to the expansion of human consciousness, including my own, and I recognise and change 
any of my personal attitudes or behaviour patterns which do not serve this aim. I take full responsibility for 
the spiritual, environmental and human effects of all my activities. 
 
4. Personal Integrity 
I commit to maintain high standards of personal integrity, embodying congruence of thought, word and 
action. 
 
5. Respecting Others 
I commit wholeheartedly to respect other people (their differences, their views, their origins, backgrounds 
and issues), other peopleÕs and the communityÕs property, and all forms of life, holding these all to be sacred 
and aspects of the divine. 
 
6. Direct Communication 
I commit to using clear and honest communication with open-listening, heart-felt responses, loving 
acceptance and straightforwardness. In public and in private I will not speak in a way that maligns or 
demeans others. I will talk to people rather than about them. I may seek helpful advice, but will not seek to 
collude. 
 
7. Reflection 
I recognise that anything I see outside myselfÑany criticisms, irritations or appreciationsÑmay also be 
reflections of what is inside me. I commit to looking at these within myself before reflecting them to others. 
 
8. Responsibility 
I take responsibility for my actions and for my mistakes. I am willing to listen to constructive criticism and to 
offer constructive feed-back to others in a caring and appropriate fashion, to challenge and support each other 
to grow .  
 
9. Non-violence 
I agree not to inflict my attitudes or desires (including sexual) on others. I agree to step in and stop, or at least 
say that I would like stopped, actions (including manipulation or intimidation) that I feel may be abusive to 
myself or others in the community. 
 
10. Perspective 
I take responsibility to work through and put aside my personal issues for the benefit of the whole 
community. I will resolve all personal and business conflicts as soon as possible. I acknowledge that there 
may be wider perspectives than my own and deeper issues than those that may immediately concern me. 
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11. Co-operation 
I recognise that I live in a spiritual community and that it functions only through my co-operation and my 
good communication. I agree to communicate clearly my decisions. I agree to communicate with others who 
may be affected by my actions and decisions and to consider their views carefully and respectfully. I 
recognise that others may make decisions which affect me and I agree to respect the care, integrity and 
wisdom that they have put into their decision-making process.  
 
12. Resolution 
I commit to make every effort to resolve disputes. At any time in a dispute I may call for an advocate, friend, 
independent observer or mediator to be present. In the event of a dispute continuing unresolved, I will have 
access to a Grievance Procedure. I commit to following this procedure [to be decided by the community]. 
 
13. Agreements 
I commit to keeping agreements I have made and not to break or try to evade any laws, rules, or guidelines; 
to have honest dealings with all bodies and to pay all charges and dues owing.  
 
14. Commitment 
I commit to exercising the spirit of this statement of Common Ground in all my dealings. 
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Appendix 6: Kebele principles 
Kebele Community Cooperative. (n.d.). ÒPrinciplesÓ. from Kebele Community Co-operative website: 
http://www.kebelecoop.org/Principles.html Accessed May 01, 2009  
Introduction 
Kebele is run on a number of core principles, which reflect the sort of world Kebele members want to see, 
and help bring into reality. It is these principles which make Kebele a radical social centre. Instead of waiting 
for that ever far away big moment of revolution, or for leaders and authorities to sort out our problems, we 
recognise that we can make fundamental changes here and now, in the ways we organise, communicate, 
interact and take action. This is the everyday revolution. Kebele aims to be a living example, albeit on a 
small scale, of other possibilities, based on the principles below. 
 
Caveat to Kebele Principles 
Kebele Community Co-op is committed to its principles and actively uses them as guidelines to inform 
ethical decision-making in both policy and practice on all levels. While Kebele strives to uphold its principles 
it recognises that there may be times when it falls short of an ideal.  
There is no hierarchy of principles wherein one principle is considered more important than another. There 
may be situations when two or more of its principles are in conflict with regard to the best course of action. 
Such ethical dilemmas require further discussion and consultation. In that event co-op members, sub-
collective members and volunteers are encouraged to raise the matter with the co-op as a whole for 
discussion at a co-op meeting. 
 
We are conscious that rather than being viewed as problems, such occasions can be opportunities for mutual 
education about the issues involved, raising awareness and information sharing. They also provide useful 
Ôreal lifeÕ practice of problem-solving in a non-hierarchical and consensus-seeking way. 
A compromise between principles may be required. However, reasons for that compromise will be clearly 
articulated and the outcome of the decision reviewed by the co-op members. 
 
 
The Principles (arranged alphabetically) 
 
Collective decision making and organisation 
We try and reach decisions by consensus, where everyone agrees. Sometimes it takes a long time and can be 
frustrating, but direct democracy takes hard work and practice. The process is as important as the results or 
goals. When it works well, working together as a collective is inspiring, and can really get stuff done! 
Co-operation and mutual aid 
In a world dominated by competition and conflict, we believe that working together, sharing knowledge and 
resources, and helping each other out builds strong communities and networks of support and friendship. 
Direct action and taking power back 
Direct action means refusing to be a spectator, or waiting for someone else to do it for us. It is about taking 
power back and realising our potential to bring about change.  
Equality and non-hierarchy  
Kebele sees the importance of organising without leaders or bosses, and everyone having equal say. When 
power is shared equally in a group, it can be more effective and sustainable - as well as empowering - for all 
involved.  
Not for profit 
In a time where everything has a price and the cost of living makes people poor, Kebele has always avoided 
the profit motive, and getting rich! Fixed bikes, food and drinks, free information, books, Internet access and 
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meeting space are available either for free, in return for donations or for next to nothing. We believe in 
making everything genuinely affordable - and accessible - to all. 
Openness and inclusion 
Kebele seeks to be as open and inclusive as possible, providing a space that is equally welcoming to 
everyone (except cops, fascists etc) irrespective of age, race, gender, class, sexuality and (dis)ability & and 
we encourage - and aim to provide equal access to - participation in the collective.  
Permaculture  
Kebele realises that sustainability is at the core of the better world we are aiming to create. By following 
permaculture's fundamental principles (earth care, people care, fair share) we strive to have a positive impact 
on our entire diverse human and ecological environment. 
We aim to chose the most sustainable path in all our activities, providing a clear link between action, 
consequence and solution. 
Resistance and solidarity 
Kebele is anti-authoritarian, opposing both government and capitalism, and supporting people in resistance 
everywhere. Kebele is part of a worldwide movement for revolutionary change. 
Vegan 
Kebele's Cafe and kitchen are vegan. Kebele aims to avoid - as far as is possible and practical - all forms of 
exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose and, by extension, promotes 
the development and use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of humans, animals, and the environment. 
Voluntary participation and shared responsibility 
All that happens at Kebele is made possible by volunteers freely giving their time and sharing the endless 
tasks and hard work of organising a social centre. With no wages or bosses involved, it's a different kind of 
work. People contribute what and when they can. Working for ourselves, for our own goals, on our own 
terms is what we call a proper job! 
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Appendix 7: Hockerton Housing Project constitutional values 
 
This document was scanned from a copy given to me during my visit on 26 April 2007. 
 
Appendix 8: Corani aims and principles 329
Appendix 8: Corani aims and principles 
 
Corani. (n.d.). ÒAims and PrinciplesÓ from Corani Housing Co-Op Website: 
http://www.corani.org/policy.html Accessed June 15, 2009  
 
Our vision is one of human societies based on:  
¥ co-operation and sharing; 
¥ commitment to stewardship of resources; 
¥ an inclusive society. We have established Corani Housing and Land Co-operative to help work towards 
this. Friendship and respect are needed to keep Corani working well. 
 
 
Notes:  
¥ Sharing needs to find expression in as many ways as possible. 
¥ There needs to be no going back on certain aspects that are part of that sharing, i.e. fully mutual, no capital 
requirement, non-equity distributing, income sharing. 
¥ Plans to implement this policy are to be made once a year at a general meeting
AIMS 
[immediate intentions, what we are going to do]  
Practice 
[objectives, measurable, how we are going to do it] 
Taking control of our lives  
Fully mutual housing co-op structure and non-equity sharing. Members decide 
cost share level.  
Democracy 
General meetings involve all members. Consensus decision-making. Working 
groups to work on certain things between general meetings. 
Living down [low consumption of resources, energy] 
Modest, efficient housing. Income sharing. Maximum of three cost shares per 
person. 
Equality Income sharing. No capital requirement. 
Open to new people Joining procedure on separate page. 
Open to different needs 
Variety of housing types. Disabled access. Communal or not. Urban or rural. 
[Subject to resources.] 
Self reliant co-operative 
No dependence on benefit and grants. No claiming housing benefit without the 
agreement of the Co-operative. 
Involvement with land and in food production Manage allotments. 
Involvement in the wider co-operative scene 
Associate Member of Radical Routes Secondary Co-operative. In contact with 
the Confederation of Co-operative Housing and others. 
Maintaining biodiversity 
Sharing provides the most efficient use of existing housing and reduces the 
need to build on greenfield sites. Eat organically grown produce. 
Strengthening the local community Involvement in the local residents association 
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Appendix 9: Snowball income sharing group procedures 
Corani. (n.d.). ÒSnowball Income Sharing GroupÓ from Corani Housing Co-Op Website: 
http://www.corani.org/income.html Accessed June 15, 2009  
We have an open income-sharing pool. You can live anywhere and don't have to be involved with other members outside 
of the income-sharing pool. Personal circumstances are less important than being in the spirit of income sharing [Also see 
Other Points below].  
We meet regularly [usually fortnightly]. We sit round a table for convenience. 
People take on the different tasks of calling, recording, adding up, etc. 
Anyone who cannot attend will have sent their details by phone, letter or fax beforehand. Someone attending the pool 
will stand in for them and present their information at the relevant moment.  
CHECKING THE CASH 
 
The cash [if any] left over from the previous meeting is counted and checked with the figure in the record book. It is then 
placed in the centre of the table. 
Caller 
Information is gathered category by category in the sequence given below. A caller asks each of us in turn to give our 
information for the particular category. The caller records the information on a Caller's Sheet and totals the columns 
when each category is completed. After calling all categories, the totals are used to complete the Balance - see below. 
'Ins' 
We say in turn how much we are putting in. We 'pool' our contributions in the centre of the table. All income goes in: 
wages, dole, child benefit, pension. Interest on capital is optional, see note on capital below. 
'Outs': Basic 
Housing costs [rent + bills]    (amounts vary from person to person) 
Food money              (Household £1 per week to cover consumable items in the home) 
Bicycle 50p per week or £1 for heavy users to cover puncture repair kits, oil, tyres, etc. 
 
'Outs': PERSONAL, SAVINGS AND LOAN REPAYMENTS 
Up to £25 total per week [guideline for younger person, say under 18, is £1 per year old up to and including ten plus £2 
for each year after that] for paying off a loan from the pool [see LOANS below], and/or saving with the pool, and/or 
spending on whatever we like that is not covered by one of the categories. Through use of a saving and loan facility, it is 
expected to cover larger occasional spending such as on gifts [for birthdays, national/religious celebrations, weddings, 
etc.], holidays and special events. Any saving or loan reduction amount is recorded in the Savings and Loans section on 
the member's Record Card - an example of what is printed on card to create the Record Card is given below 
 
'Outs': PRIORITY SPECIALS 
-Medical needs. Some members are in a health care scheme which gives refunds on NHS treatment and some 
'complementary' health services. 
-Travel to work. If you use your bike to get to work, this category covers major repairs. 
-National Insurance if self-employed. 
-Trade Union subs. 
-Childcare expenses. 
Priority Specials are usually agreed without question 
 
'Outs': TRAVEL ALLOWANCE [including Holiday Accommodation Allowance] 
Up to £250 total per year for 'social', non-'political' travel, e.g. visiting relations, friends and going on holiday. This is 
recorded in the Travel Allowance section on the member's Record Card. Also this and other travel spending is recorded 
by type of transport used [bicycle, rail, bus/coach, car/van] on a Transport Analysis form to check how the pool is doing 
in using more sustainable forms of transport. Up to £50 of the £250 may alternatively be used for holiday accommodation 
expenses. This is recorded in the Travel Allowance section on the member's Record Card, but not added to the Travel 
Analysis form. 
'Outs': SUBSCRIPTIONS ALLOWANCE 
Up to £50 total per year. Some subscriptions are paid for by the pool, if all members agree. 
'Outs': END OF MONTH 
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Pre-determined monthly payments, which currently include: 
-Contribution to phone bills for 'political' calls. 
-Corani Housing & Land Co-op member subscriptions. 
-Rusty Car Pool subscription and payment for 'political' mileage. 
-Bank Standing Orders for two charities, an ÔalternativeÕ bookshop, and someoneÕs Trade Union subscription. 
'Outs': LOANS 
The income-sharing pool acts as a savings and loans club. Loans can be taken out for spending we do not feel able to ask 
for as a special, or where the special has not been granted or only partly granted. Any loan is recorded in the Savings and 
Loan section on the member's Record Card. We repay as possible, often a small amount at each meeting. 
BALANCE 
When we have been through each category, we add up all the 'Outs' and check they do not exceed the available money. If 
they do, we may need to cut back or delay some items until next time. When we are happy with this, the record book is 
up-dated. It shows the amount of money put in, the amount taken out, and the amount left as cash, in the bank, or 
invested elsewhere. 
WITHDRAWAL 
We take out of the pool on the table our individual amount and keep it on the table in front of us. Mistakes can be made 
at this stage, so the money has to stay where it can be checked. We may ask the person on our left to count it. Member's 
can use the Record Card to record their individual amounts, which someone may cross-check using the Each Person's 
'Outs' Checklist. 
The remaining amount in the pool is counted to check it agrees with the amount recorded in the record book. When it 
does, it is bagged up. Then we can each 'pocket' our amount 
Gifts 
For example from relatives. Provided these are occasional, cash gifts up to £50.00 may be declared as income and taken 
out again as an ordinary special if finances allow. More than £50.00 may be treated as capital and not put in. 
There is a Children's Fund into which money gifts to our young members are placed. The Children's Fund is used by 
them for special events or requirements, e.g. attending a Woodcraft Folk camp. Details of the Children's Fund and its 
transactions are recorded at the back of the record book. 
Capital 
This is considered 'frozen' while a person is a member of the pool, so it cannot be used to supplement income. It may be 
used for capital transactions but not spent as income. Most of us do not view the interest on capital as income to go in the 
income pool, but choose to accumulate it as new capital. When joining you are asked to allocate your capital in the 
categories - 'personal', 'social', 'housing' and 'trustee' - as applicable: 
- Personal capital is allocated to be spent on oneself in exceptional circumstances, e.g. a 'trip of a lifetime', a visit to a 
relation overseas, paying for a course not related to your work or political/social/charitable/spiritual activism. On these 
occasions you are encouraged to pay into the Capital Fund a similar amount to that being spent on yourself. The Capital 
Fund provides personal capital for special events for those members with no capital or those with little capital needing a 
'top up'. Details of the Capital Fund and its transactions are recorded at the back of the record book. 
- Social capital is reserved for supporting political/social*/charitable/spiritual activity, e.g. large donations/ guarantees/ 
benefactor loans to charities, political and religious organisations and supporting the development of others. It is not 
generally used for your own activist expenses. *Social defined as 'concerned about society and its organisation', not as 
'sociable'. 
- Housing capital is used to provide your home. 
- Trustee capital is held under the legal definition of Trust and, if it can be withdrawn, there are conditional terms for its 
withdrawal, which generally make it very inaccessible. 
Exceptionally, there could be other categories. Two existing members each have an additional category, each particular 
to them. 
To ensure we keep thinking about capital and the effect it has on the pool and our lifestyles, we have a 'Capital' Policy, 
which is given below. 
There is a separate capital-sharing pool. 
Benefits 
A brilliant aspect of an Income Sharing Group is that it can support members without finance from the State. It is the 
policy of this pool to minimise dependence on the State. Any member considering applying for benefits needs to get the 
agreement of the pool first. Decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis. Although a flexible attitude applies, there is 
an expectation that any member receiving benefits [except a pension] will stop doing so as soon as possible. 
Joining and Leaving 
You are welcome to come and watch an Income Sharing meeting. You can come to further meetings if you are still 
interested and you can participate on behalf of a member who is absent [when the money is withdrawn from the pool, it is 
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to be given to a member at the meeting who will check it and pass it on to the absent member]. If you wish to join it is 
important to get to know and be known by members of Snowball. 
When you have decided to join and the Group is still open to that happening, you need to prepare and discuss with the 
Group: 
- a statement forecasting your annual Ins and Outs in as much detail as possible; 
- a statement of any anticipated changes; 
- a statement of anyone else who is or could be dependent on the Outs; 
- a 'Capital' statement [see 'Capital' Policy]. 
These will be discussed with you at a pool meeting, only with existing members present, and treated as confidential. If it 
is agreed that you can join, a date will be agreed with you to be the start for all income received by you to be paid into the 
pool and the date of the first pool meeting when you can start taking out. Although you can then participate fully, your 
involvement will be provisional for the first six months. If this period is successful, you will be invited to become a 
member. 
If anyone decides to leave the pool, it is expected that they will pay off any loan first. 
Other Points 
We try not to make too many hard and fast rules, but rather rely on people's consciences, their consideration of the 
financial situation and the needs of others, and the general principle to live as lightly/modestly as we feel able to. 
As well as giving us an opportunity to handle large amounts of money, attending an income-sharing pool meeting gives 
us time to be together [we usually eat together first] and to share financial and other issues affecting our lives. New ideas 
and changes are always being considered. 
Other groups that income share do it differently to us. 
 
